Abkhazia conflict

War in Abkhazia
File:Sukhumiciviliance.jpg Armed Georgian residents of Sukhumi fight in the city, 1993.
Date 1992–present Location Abkhazia, Westerm Georgia Result Military victory by Separatist forces Territorial changes Abkhazia becomes an unrecognized de facto republic, but internationally recognized as part of Georgia.
Belligerents
Abkhaz separatists Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus Russian Cossacks Russian Forces1	Georgian Interior and Defense Ministry forces Paramilitary groups and volunteer batallions
Commanders and leaders
Iysuph Soslanbekov, Musa Shanibov, Shamil Basaev, Beslan Barghandjia, Anri Djergenia	Geno Adamia, Guram Gubelashvili, Gia Kharkharashvili, Davit Tevzadze, Soso Akhalaia
Casualties and losses
~2,500-4,000 dead, unknown wounded	~10,000-30,000 dead, unknown wounded
1Involvement Disputed

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict refers to the ethnic conflict between Georgians and Abkhaz (allegedly supported by Russia) in Georgia’s Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (Аҧснытәи Автономтәи Республика in Abkaz, აფხაზეთის ავტონომიური რესპუბლიკა in Georgian) peaked in 1992–1993.

It involved a 13-month long Abkhazian war between Georgian government forces and Abkhaz separatists reinforced by the North Caucasian, Cossack militants and unofficially supported by Russian forces stationed.

Handling of this conflict was aggravated by the civil war with "Zviadists" (supporters of the former president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia) waged about at the same time period in Western Georgian region of Samegrelo and Abkhazia and the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, see Georgian Civil War for the overview.

As a result, between 20,000 to 30,000 ethnic Georgians were killed and more than 250,000 Georgian refugees were displaced. Numerous war crimes were committed by both sides during the conflict, including the Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia. Between 2,500 and 4,000 Abkhaz were killed and another 20,000 became refugees. Post-Soviet Georgia was heavily affected by the war and suffered considerable financial, human and psychological damage. Abkhazia has been devastated by the war and subsequent continued sporadic conflict. The region, de facto independent from Georgia, suffers huge economic and social problems and is entirely dependent on Russia.

History

The situation in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia has been tense since the end of 1980s when Georgian anti-Soviet opposition started demanding the separation from the USSR. In March 1989, Abkhaz nationalists demanded, in the Lykhny Declaration, the status of separate Soviet Socialist Republic (allegedly basing on the precedent of the existence of the separate Abkhazian SSR during 1925-1931, which was allegedly associated with the Georgian SSR by the "Union Treaty"). The Declaration was signed by the rector of the Sukhumi University. Ethnic Georgian students of the university announced a demonstration of protest, but it was forbidden by Georgian government. Nevertheless the students rallied and were attacked by some Abkhazians. Georgian anti-Soviet movement was outraged by the event and included the student's clause against Abkhazian secession into the list of slogans of the demonstrations of several thousands of Georgians in Tbilisi, which concluded with a bloody crackdown by the Soviet troops on April 9 1989.

In the aftermath, the first armed clashes between the representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian populations took place on July 16–July 17, 1989 in Sukhumi. The conflict was sparkled by alleged violations during the entrance exams to the Sukhumi University. The resulting civil unrest quickly turned into militarized clashes resulting in 16 deaths and about 140 wounded, mostly Georgians. To quench the unrest, the Army was invoked.

The government of the Soviet Union did nothing to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts, itself being on the verge of collapse.

The tensions in the autonomy approached the dangerous edge in June 1992, when Abkhaz militants attacked the government buildings in Sukhumi. On July 23, 1992, the Abkhazian government declared independence of the region, though this was not internationally recognized. On August 14, 1992, Georgian police and National Guards units were dispatched to protect railways and restore an order in Abkhazia. The fights broke out the same day. On August 18, 1992, the separatist government left Sukhumi. Georgian government forces managed to take control of most of Abkhazia. On August 26 armed Chechens captured an ethnic Abkhaz Valery Maliuk from Eshera, just because he expressed his sympathy to Georgians. On the same day they raped Georgian teenagers and along with the Abkhaz militants committed atrocities in the village of Orjonikidze. Significant ethnic cleansing accompanied by atrocities occurred on both sides , with Abkhazians displaced from Georgian-held territory and vice-versa; some 3,000 people were reported to have been killed in this first phase of the war, see Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia.

Map of Abkhazia

Fall of Gagra

On September 3, 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated in Moscow. According to the agreement, Georgian forces were obliged to withdraw from Gagra district. The Georgian side carried out the implementation of the agreement and they left the positions. As the result local population remained defenceless. The ceasefire was soon violated by Abkhaz. Thousands of volunteer paramilitaries, mainly Chechens and Cossacks from the militarized Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) joined the Abkhaz separatists to fight the Georgian government. Abkhaz and CMPC forces attacked the town of Gagra on October 2. Abkhaz, Russian and CMPC joint troops attacked Gagra by overwhelming numbers of tanks and aviation. Russian navy started to block the seawater area near Gagra. The military vessels: SKP "Bezukoriznenniy", "KIL-25", "BTH-38", "BM-66", "Golovin", Landing 345, aviation 529 (SU-25, SU-27), MI- and anti-aircraft 643 regiments commanded by the first deputy Minister of Defense of Russian Federation G. Kolesnikov took part in the occupation of Gagra. Russian tanker "Don" delivered 420 tons of fuel to Separatist-held Gudauta.

With the fall of the town, the majority of the Georgian population was expelled, with many executed. The rebels largely supported by Russian military presence in the region established their control over Gagra, Gudauta (the town where a former Soviet/Russian military base remains), Tkvarcheli and approached Sukhumi.

Abkhaz offensive on Eshera, Shroma and Gulripshi

On September 5 Abkhaz formations occupied the new positions near Eshera. Georgian residents of Kvemo Eshera were rounded up and executed. On October 3 Abkhaz and CMPC attacked the positions of Dvurechia on the Gumista River to the direction of the villages Kamani and Shroma. Georgian forces managed to repell the attack. The Third Brigade of Georgian National Guard destroyed the heavy artillery and overwhelmed the CMPC. On October 18 The President of Caucasus Peoples' Confederation, Musa Shanibov arrived in Gudauta and established Strategic Headquarter of the Confederation.

Bombing and siege of Sukhumi

File:Gulripshi.jpg

Georgian fighters defending the bridge near Gulripshi, 1992

In December 1992, rebels began shelling of Georgian-held Sukhumi. On March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the State Council of Georgia, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city. The Minister of Economy, Beslan Kobakhia, arrived in Sukhumi during the negotiations with Goga Khaindrava. Kobakhia declared that separatist leader Ardzinba would resign if Shevardnadze would do the same. He did not approve the facts of vandalism in Gagra and noted that Abkhazia officially never declared the aim to secede from Georgia. Now as Commander–in chief of Georgian Military Forces Eduard Shevardnadze issued an order "Measures on defense of Sukhumi and Ochamchire Regions" that states: "Military formations of different countries are concentrating in Gudauta and Gumista area. We have an information that those forces have serious aim to seize Sukhumi and bring the chaos and turmoil in entire Georgia." On February 10 Shevardnadze appointed Guram Gabiskiria as Mayor of Sukhumi. Meanwhile, Georgian Parliament made an official declaration blaming Russia in aggression against Georgia and demanded withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Abkhazia. Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Sukhumi on March 4 and led Sukhumi defense operations.

On March 14, 1993, At 6 and 9 o'clock in the morning Abkhaz and the Confederation forces launched a full-scale attack on Sukhumi resulting in large destruction and casualties among the civilians. At 2 o'clock in the morning Abkhaz side started artillery bombardments of Georgian positions at the Gumista River and Sukhumi. Later in the day several Russian SU-25 had been shelling Sukhumi till the morning of the next day. Russian special detachment led the operation followed by Abkhaz fighters and CMPC mercenaries. They crossed the river Gumista and took part of Achadara. However, the government forces repelled the attack.

File:Capturesukhumi.jpg

Georgians captured by Abkhaz militants and later executed, fall of Sukhumi, September 1993

On May 14, a short-lived ceasefire was signed. On July 2, a strong force of Abkhaz and North Caucasian mercenaries landed again with the strong support of Russian navy near the village Tamishi. The battle was one of the bloodiest in the war. Several hundreds were killed and wounded from all sides, but Georgian forces succeeded to regain the positions. In July Russian detachments, Abkhaz separatists and CMPC mercenaries captured the villages of Akhalsheni, Guma and Shroma of Sukhumi region. The fiercest struggle near the village Kamani took away the life of many Georgians, both military and civilian. Separatists occupied almost every strategic heights and practically besieged Sukhumi. However, Sukhumi was virtually besieged by the end of July. Soon after the Chairman of the Council of Defense of Abkhazia Tamaz Nadareishvili has resigned due to ill-health and the Member of Georgian Parliament Zhiuli Shartava took that post. Separatists brought down airplane after airplane (which were used to evacuate civilians from Sukhumi airport) with only civilians on the board.

Fall of Sukhumi

Russian-mediated ceasefire was again agreed in Sochi on July 27, and lasted until September 16, when separatist forces launched a large-scale offensive against Sukhumi, which fell after a fierce fighting on September 27. Shevardnadze appealed to Sukhumi population and by radio:

"Dear friends, Citizens of Sukhumi and Georgia! Georgia is facing the most difficult days, especially Sukhumi. Separatists and foreign invaders entered into city. I am proud of your courage… Separatists and adventurers will be judged by history... They do not want Georgians to live in this Georgian City. Many of them dreams to repeat the Gagra tragedy here... I know that you understand the challenge we are facing. I know how difficult the situation is. Many people left the city but you stay here for Sukhumi and for Georgia… I call you, citizens of Sukhumi, fighters, officers and generals: I understand the difficulties of standing on the positions now, but we have no right to step back, we all have to keep our places. We have to fortify the city and save Sukhumi. I would like to tell you that all of us – Government of Abkhazia, Cabinet of Ministers, Mr. Zhiuli Shartava, his colleagues, city and regional government of Sukhumi are prepared for action. The enemy witnesses our readiness, that's why he is fighting in the most brutal way and destructs our beloved Sukhumi. I call you to keep peace, tenacity and self-control. We have to meet the enemy in our streets as they deserve."

File:TL023037.jpg

Dying Georgian man in Sukhumi Hospital, September 1993

After the capture of the city one of the most horrific massacres of this war have been committed against the remaining and trapped Georgian civilians in the city. Almost all members of the Abkhaz government including Zhiuli Shartava, Guram Gabiskiria and Raul Eshba (those who refused to leave the city) were brutally massacred. Eduard Shevardnadze left the city narrowly escaping death. Soon Abkhaz forces and the Confederates overran the whole territory of Abkhazia, except small region of the Kodori Gorge (which more or less remains under the control of the Tbilisi government). The total defeat of government forces was followed by ethnic cleansing of Georgian population with all horrors of humanitarian catastrophe. More than 250.000 refugees (mainly Georgians, also Greeks and others) were forced out from Abkhazia. In September 1994, several reports indicated ethnic clashes between Abkhaz and Armenians, significant part of which supported the former during the war. Chechen militants of CMPC soon left Abkhazia to take part in the “Chechen Resistance War” against Russia.

Russian role in the conflict

During the conflict, Moscow officially maintained neutrality; the Russian government condemned human rights violations and established sanctions against both sides. However, Russian forces situated in the conflict zone from the beginning provided unofficial support for the Abkhaz formations. Numerous eyewitness accounts testify to the bombardment of Georgian forces by Russian aircraft and the use of the Russian navy to transport Abkhaz fighters. Official statements by the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces were only acting in self-defence and were only returning fire when attacked.

The alleged aim of Russia was strengthening it's military control on Black Sea shore, depriving Georgia it's north-western territory with the help of Moscow supported separatist forces (which were striving not to independence, but to maintaining Russian control on this strategically important region of Georgia).

File:Map abkhasia.jpg

Situation in Abkhasia as of autumn and winter 1992-1993. Pink-marked areas were then still held by Georgian troops. Main battlefields - one NW of Sukhumi and the other NW of Otchamtchira - are marked red. Note the "Abkhasian" bridgehead in the alter area, established after a full amphibious attack: how should this have been undertaken without Russian support - as claimed by Abkhasians and Russians - remains unclear. It was, however, this event that broke the back of Georgian troops in Abkhasia, then it cut off the main supply route between Georgia and Sukhumi.)

Parliament of Georgia sent the appeal to the United Nations, European Parliament and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. Declaration defined Russia's decisive role in the assault of March 14 1993. Parliament demanded withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Abkhazia. Georgian government clearly stated that Russia was conducting “an undeclared war” against Georgia. The statement was strengthened by capturing of several Russian officers by Georgian forces. On March 19, Georgian forces shot down a Russian aircraft SU-27 and capturing the dead body of the Russian pilot.

On April 27, Georgian Parliament adopted another resolution which openly blamed Russia in political facilitation of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Georgians. Relevant appeal had been sent to United Nations and other international organizations that defined Russia's behaviour as aggression against Georgia and a violation of its independence and territorial integrity: "Encouraged by Russian military forces, the separatists took control over the part of Georgian territory – Abkhazia, conducting ethnic cleansing that takes a character of genocide of Georgians and other nationalities in the territory". Meanwhile Russian military helicopters delivered "surface to surface" missiles and submachine guns to Tkvarcheli where separatists were intrenched.

The Georgians had therefore to conclude that they had effectivelly lost not only the best part of their army during the fighting in 1993, but also control over Abkhazia: while this is not recognized internationally as an independent country, it is meanwhile de-facto established as an independent territory – to a large degree due to deployment of Russian Army “peacekeepers”, who ever since control the administrative border between Georgia and Abkhazia. To make matters worse, in the late 1990s the Russians improved their relations to Abkhazia, and Moscow meanwhile brought several new laws, enabling "other countries" to become members of the Russian Federation. This move was obviously undertaken as an offer to Abkhazia, and should was considered as quite sarcastic by many in the West, given that simultaneously the Russians are undertaken whatever they can in order bring down Chechen separatism.

Russia's leaders, dismayed at Russia's loss of status as a superpower, seek to have Russia be at least a regional power. They have never given up their claim of authority over former U.S.S.R. territory and want to restore their authority in these areas. They want to maintain their power and military bases in the territory of the former U.S.S.R.

Oxford Professor S.N. MacFarlane, notes on the issue of Russian mediation in Abkhazia:

Notably, it is clear that Russian policy makers are uncomfortable with the idea of a prominent role being granted to external actors in dealing with conflict in the former Soviet space. More recently, this has been extended specifically to he activities of international organisations in the management of conflict. As one group of influential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put it in May 1996, 'it is definitely not in Russia’ s interest to see outside mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union'. (511)

[...] Russia has clear hegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet space. Although a wide array of opinions is expressed on Russian policy in the newly independent states in the media and in parliament, a dominant consensus appears to have emerged among foreign policy influentials on the need for active presence and influence in the area. Such views have been widely expressed in official statements, influential statements by independent policy groups, and by advisers to the president, influential political figures, and the president himself. The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ` near abroad’ is evident in its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the former Soviet Union, to reassume control over the Soviet air defence network, to obtain agreements on basing Russian forces in the non-Russian republics, and by its obvious sensitivity to external military presences (including multilateral ones) on the soil of the former Soviet Union. To judge from Russian policy on Caspian Sea and Central Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/security realm and into the economic one. Its sources are diverse, and include the Russian imperial hangover, but more practically the fate of the Russian diaspora, the lack of developed defences along the borders of the Russian Federation proper, concern over Islam, and discomfort with the spill-over effects of instability in the other republics. (521)

One of the main targets of Russia's claims was Georgia. The Russians allegedly provoked the South Ossetians into fighting for separatism from Georgia. Russia also helped to defeat Georgian forces in Abkhazia; with Georgia weakened, Russia was able to restore much of its influence in Georgia.

The civil war in Georgia was inspired, plotted, and provoked by forces from outside Georgia, particularly in Russia. Russian civilian and military intelligence organizations perpetuated the civil war. The Russians denied involvement and spoke of an Abkhazian navy and army, but how could 70,000 people acquire tanks and bombers. Russian Defense Minister Grachev went so far as to claim that Georgians had painted aircraft to look Russian and then bombed the port city of Sukhumi themselves. Professor Gachechiladze indicated that he thought that former Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia did not commit suicide, as was announced, but was killed.

Leonid Radzikhovsky is a political analyst and independent journalist:

The tangled and antagonizing history of relations between Georgia and Russia from 1991 through to 2004 awaits scrupulous analysis. Attempting any guess as to who is to blame is useless at the moment. It may have been Zviad Gamsakhurdia with his affected anti-Russian hysteria; Russian generals who helped the Abkhazians to fight with the Georgians; Shamil Basayev’s Abkhazian battalion engaged in the massacre of the Georgians, who believed that it was directed by Moscow; the U.S., convinced that a pro-American Georgia must preferably be anti- Russian; or the warlord Ruslan Gelayev and his gang that took hiding in the Pankisi Gorge. No one can draw a commonly shared opinion on all of these factors today. Moreover, it is unwise to build relations that are based on the balance sheet of past reciprocal offenses.

It seems to me that gaining new territories is precisely the thing that Russia does not need these days. Moreover, if it does need new territories, it is worthwhile seeking them in any other place, even on the North Pole, but not in the Caucasus. I dare say that Chechnya is quite enough for us now. To support foreign separatism means to throw stones at your neighbors while living in a glass house. Should we really do it even if we love our neighbors so dearly? Supporting the separatists may have played into our hands – we have something to bargain over. If our goal is to wipe out the terrorists in their backyards, then Russia must offer Georgia a compromise. The Georgians have an interest in restoring their territorial integrity. The Russians have an interest in building an alliance with Georgia to fight against terrorists.

Conflict mediation

File:JW001358.jpg

A House of the Government of Abkhazia in downtown Sukhumi, destroyed in the separatist offensive on September 27 1993. Many members (Z.Shartava, R.Eshba, G.Gabiskiria, etc) of this government were executed near the building.

During the war the peace mediation was done first by the Russian Federation and second by the UN. From 1993 onwards, the pressure for a peace settlement mounted from UN, Russia and the then Group of Friends of Georgia (Russia, U.S., France, Germany and UK). In December 1993, an official ceasefire was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz leaders under the aegis of the UN and with Russia as intermediary.The venues shifted from Geneva to New York and finally to Moscow. On April 4, 1994, the "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict" was signed in Moscow. Instead of the deployment of a traditional UN peacekeeping force, the deployment of a CIS, mainly Russian peacekeeping force was agreed in Moscow on May 1994. In June 1994, CIS peacekeeping forces comprising only the Russian soldiers were deployed along the administrative border between Abkhazia and the remaining Georgia. The UN mission (UNOMIG) also arrived. However, these could not prevent further atrocities against the Georgians in the following years (around 1.500 deaths have been reported by the Georgian government in the post-war period). On September 14, 1994, Abkhaz leaders appeared on local TV to demand that all ethnic Georgians depart from the region by September 27 (the anniversary of the capture of Sokhumi). On November 30, 1994, Abkhazia promulgated a new constitution declaring independence of the breakaway region. However, none of the foreign governments recognized this. On December 15, 1994, the US State Department condemned Abkhazia’s declaration of independence. On March 21, 1995, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accused Abkhaz militias of torturing and murdering dozens of returning ethnic Georgian refugees in the Gali District. Despite an official economic blockade imposed on Abkhazia by Russia and CIS in 1995 (virtually ended by the Russian government in 1997), the breakaway region has been enjoying both military and economic support by the Russian Federation.

UN implication

The UN sent non-military observers (UNOMIG) to monitor the ceasefire and Russia deployed peacekeeping forces. The Organization for Security in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations are also involved in monitoring developments. Negotiations toward a permanent peace settlement have made little progress, but the Georgian and Abkhazi governments have agreed to limit the size of their military forces and extend the authorization for UNOMIG. Meanwhile, Georgian refugees maintain a government in exile.

Resumption of hostilities

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Georgian refugees fleeing Abkhazia.

In April–May, 1998, the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District when several hundreds of Abkhaz forces entered the villages still populated by Georgians support the separatist-held parliamentary elections. Despite the criticism from opposition, Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, refused to deploy troops against Abkhazia. A ceasefire was negotiated on May 20. The hostilities resulted in hundreds of casualties form both sides and additional 20.000 Georgian refugees.

In October 2001, around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerillas appeared in the Kodori Valley in extremely controversial conditions. The Chechen-Georgian paramilitaries advanced as far as Sokhumi, but finally were repelled by Abkhaz and Gudauta based Russian "peacekeeper" units. There have been some concerns (in both Tbilisi and Sokhumi) that Chechen attacks in the Kodori Gorge were a military escapade organized by certain Georgian authorities.

Current status

File:Abkhazia UNOMIG map.JPG

A UN mission in Georgia map of the conflict zone.

The conflict, one of the bloodiest in the post-Soviet area, remains unresolved. The Georgian government offered a large autonomy to Abkhazia several times. However, both Abkhaz government and opposition refuse any forms of union with Georgia. Abkhaz consider their independence as a result of liberation war against Georgian aggression, while Georgians believe the conflict to be a patriotic war to retain sovereignty and integrity of Georgia. Many accuse Eduard Shevardnadze’s government in initiation of a senseless hostilities, and then in ineffective conduction of the war and post-war diplomacy.

The new Georgian government of President Mikhail Saakashvili promises not to use force and to resolve the problem only by diplomacy and political talks.

While at a summit of CIS it was decided to exclude any contacts with separatists, the trans-border economical cooperation an transport between Abkhazia and Russia grows in scale, with Russia claiming that all this is a matter of private business, rather than state. Georgia also decries the unlimited issuing of Russian passports in Abkhazia with subsequent payment of retirement pensions and other monetary benefits by Russia, which Georgia considers to be economical suport of separatists by Russian government.

In May 2006 the Coordinating Council of Georgia’s Government and Abkhaz separatists was convened for the first time since 2001. In late July the 2006 Kodori crisis erupted resulting in establishment of de jure Government of Abkhazia in Kodori. For the first time after the war, this government is located in Abkhazia and headed by Malkhaz Akishbaia, Temur Mzhavia and Ada Marshania.

Timeline

• 1989, Interethnic tension
• July 15–July 17, 1989 first armed clashes between the representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian
• December 1991 – January 1992, ethnic violence in former South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast and military confrontation after coup d’etat in Tbilisi
• June 1992, Abkhaz separatists attacked the government buildings in Sukhumi
• July 23, 1992, separatist members of the Abkhazian government declared independence of the region, no international recognition followed. Anti-governmental diversions made by several so-called “Zviadist” armed groups in Abkhazia.
• August 14, 1992, Georgian police and National Guards units dispatched to protect railways and restore an order in Abkhazia. The fights broke out.
• August 18, 1992, a secessionist government left Sukhumi. Georgian government forces managed to take control of most of Abkhazia.
• September 3, 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated in Moscow
• October 2 Abkhaz and CMPC forces attacked the town of Gagra. With the fell of the town, the majority of the Georgian population was either executed, or expelled.
• December 1992, rebels began shelling of Georgian-held Sukhumi.
• March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city.
• March 14, 1993, Abkhaz and the Confederation forces launched a full-scale attack on Sukhumi resulting in large destruction and casualties among the civilians.
• March 19, 1993, Georgian forces shot down a Russian aircraft SU-27.
• May 14, 1993, ceasefire was signed, shortlived
• July 2, one of the bloodiest in the war fought near the village Tamishi.
• July 27, 1993 Russian-mediated ceasefire was again agreed in Sochi
• September 16, ceasefire violated when separatist forces launched a large-scale offensive against Sokhumi,
• September 27, fall of Sukhumi after fierce fighting

See also

• Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia
• Sukhumi Massacre

Bibliography

• Chervonnaia, Svetlana Mikhailovna. Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow. Gothic Image Publications, 1994.
• Andersen, Andrew. "Russia Versus Georgia: One Undeclared War in the Caucasus." Published October 2001.
• Lynch, Dov. The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian 'Peacekeeping' Policy. Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 1998.
• MacFarlane, S., N. , “On the front lines in the near abroad: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’ s civil wars”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 509- 525, 1997.
• Marshania L. Tragedy of Abkhazia Moscow, 1996
• White Book of Abkhazia. 1992-1993 Documents, Materials, Evidences. Moscow, 1993.
• Heathe Blair. Ethnic Conflict as a Tool of Outside Influence: An Examination of Abkhazia and Kosovo. Yett Publishing, 2001
• Amy McCallion, Abkhazian Separatism, New York, 1999

External links

• Documented accounts of ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia Template:Ru icon
• Documented accounts of ethnic cleansing of Abkhazians by Georgians Template:Ru icon
• Video file, capture of Zhuili Shartava, Guram Gabiskiria, Raul Eshba, etc and their execution
• "Abkhazia: An Open Wound in Georgia" by Dr. Andrew Andersen
• Government of Abkhazia (-in-exile)
• Exile Images - Thomas Morley: The forgotten refugees of Abkhazia
• http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_282.shtml#top
• http://www.geocities.com/tato_nikoladze/separatism.html
• http://www.abkhazia-georgia.parliament.ge
• http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data/gabkhazchro.htm
• Exile Images - Thomas Morley: The forgotten refugees of Abkhazia