Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598): Difference between revisions
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===Negotiations between China and Japan=== |
===Negotiations between China and Japan=== |
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With pressure from the Chinese and Korean army and supplies cut off by the Korean naval fleet, Konishi was compelled to negotiate for peace. Konishi's forces were reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death. General Li Ju-sung offered a way out for Konishi by giving him a chance to end to the hostilities. In the spring of 1593, China and Korea agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.<ref>pressure from the Chinese army and local guerrillas, with food supplies cut off and his forces now reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death, Konishi was compelled to sue for peace. General Li Ju-sung offered General Konishi a chance to negotiate an end to the hostilities. When negotiations got underway in the spring of 1593, China and Choson agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw from Choson altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.</ref> |
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By [[May 18]], [[1593]], all the Japanese soldiers retreated back to Japan. In the summer of 1593, a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce. |
By [[May 18]], [[1593]], all the Japanese soldiers retreated back to Japan. In the summer of 1593, a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce. |
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Revision as of 00:48, 31 August 2006
Korean Name | |
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Hangul: | 임진왜란 / 정유재란 |
Hanja: | 壬辰倭亂 / 丁酉再亂 |
Revised Romanization: | Imjin waeran / Jeong(-)yu jaeran |
McCune-Reischauer: | Imjin waeran / Chŏngyu chaeran |
Japanese Name | |
Japanese: | [文禄の役 / 慶長の役] Error: {{Lang}}: unrecognized script: japn for code: ja (help) |
Hepburn Romaji: | Bunroku no Eki / Keichō no Eki |
Chinese Name | |
Traditional Chinese: | 壬辰衛國戰爭(萬曆朝鮮之役) |
Simplified Chinese: | 壬辰卫国战争(万历朝鲜之役) |
Hanyu Pinyin: | Rénchén Wèiguó Zhànzhēng (Wànlì Cháoxiǎn Zhīyì) |
Hideyoshi's Invasions | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Joseon Dynasty Korea, Ming Dynasty China | Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Korea: Yi Sun-sin, Gwon Yul, Won Gyun, Kim Myung Won, Yi Il, Sin Lip, Gwak Jae-u, Kim Shi-min China: Li Rusong (pr.), Li Rubai, Ma Gui (pr.), Qian Shi-zhen, Ren Ziqiang, Wang You-quan, Yang Yuan, Zhang Shijue, Zu Cheng-xun, Chen Lin(pr.), Song Yingcheng |
Kato Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, Kuroda Nagamasa, Todo Takatora, Kato Yoshiaki, Mori Terumoto, Ukita Hideie, Kuki Yoshitaka | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Korea: 40,000 Korean Army, (at the beginning) unknown numbers of Korean volunteers and insurgents China: 1st.(1592-1593) 50,000 over or Unknown 2nd.(1597-1598) 100,000 over or Unknown |
1st.(1592-1593) About 160,000 2nd.(1597-1598) About 140,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Korea: Some estimates as high as 1,000,000 when including civilians China: About 30,000 or Unknown | unknown |
Hideyoshi's Invasions of Korea refers to the 1592–1598 Japanese-Korean war masterminded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, which originally had the professed aim of conquering China. It is also known as the Seven-Year War (in reference to its span) or the Imjin War.
During the campaigns, the Japanese army had success on land, occupying parts of the Korean peninsula, while the Korean navy dominated at sea. On land, the Koreans responded with a scorched earth campaign. Unable to support their troops reliably by sea, and facing land rendered useless by the allied forces of Korea and China, Japan withdrew. Korea suffered great loss of life and cultural artifacts, as well as long-lasting damage to its economy.
The first invasion (1592–1593) is called the "Japanese (= 倭 |wae|) War (= 亂 |lan|) of Imjin" (1592 being an imjin [= water—dragon] year in the sexagenary cycle) in Korean and "Bunroku Campaign" in Japanese. The second invasion (1597–1598) is called the "Second War" and "Keichō Campaign", respectively. In Chinese, the wars are referred to as the "Renchen (see Imjin above) War to Defend the Nation" or the "Wanli Korean Campaign", after the reigning Chinese emperor.
Background
Korea
Main article Korea, History of Korea
Prior to the war, the Joseon Dynasty of Korea had presided over 200 years of relative peace since the coup that overthrew its predecessor, the Goryeo Dynasty (918–1392). However, there were occasions of armed conflict during this period; many Jurchen raids had occurred on the northern border of Korea (ended by the extension of the Korean border to the Tumen River), and Japanese Wokou raids on Korea's ports and coastal villages (a particularly severe incident in 1418 resulted in Korea's retaliatory invasion of Tsushima Island, called the Oei Invasion.
Preceding the Japanese invasion, Korea maintained an alliance with the Ming Dynasty of China. Korea and China overall shared a negative relationship due to long wars in the past. However, the Ming Dynasty during the early Joseon period maintained peaceful relations. Sharing Confucian ideals, a common enemy (the Jurchens), and commerce between the two countries helped create a friendly relationship between Korea and China. Korea and Japan traded commercially as well, and Japan traded with China mainly through Korea, but Korea had stronger ties with the Ryukyu Kingdom than with the main Japanese islands.
Yi I (1536–1584), then a scholar and influential philosopher, advised that Korea should train a well equipped army of at least 100,000 soldiers. He strongly believed that Japan would invade Korea and advised to the Korean court to begin reorganizing the army. Unfortunately, the Korean court heeded no attention. Also, a weak Korean performance in 1582 against the Jurchens showed that the Korean army was not trained properly.
Yu Seong-ryong (柳成龍), another scholar, wanted to strengthen the military, fearing an invasion by Japan. He believed that all men, regardless of their social status (including slaves), should be conscripted, and castles and fortresses be repaired. Yu also wanted to reorganize the military for better leadership, develop more advanced arquebuses, and improve armor even in the common foot infantry. He later became Prime Minister of Korea.
However, these proposals were opposed by most advisors of the court, who believed Japan was not in a position to attack Korea. Also, they rejected the proposals to repair castles because of the money and labor that went into it. Yu was dismissed by King Seonjo.
Japan
Main article Japan, History of Japan
Toyotomi Hideyoshi established his hegemony over the warring states in Japan in the latter part of the 16th century. Hideyoshi united all the states and brought Japan to a brief period of peace. Motivated in part by a need to satisfy the perpetual hunger for territory by his vassals and find employment for restive samurai, he began to plan for the conquest of Ming Dynasty China. He revealed his plan first to Mori Terumoto in 1586, and pursued the plan after he defeated the clans of Shimazu and Hojo. Thousands of troops were mobilized and trained; weapons, and supplies were gathered; and hundreds of arquebuses were imported from Portugal. Hideyoshi failed to hire two Portuguese galleons to join the invasion; [citation needed] therefore, hundreds of ships were built to carry the entire Japanese army across the sea.
Hideyoshi sent ambassadors to request the Joseon court to allow his troops to move through the Korean peninsula to China. His first request was ignored, and the second request was snubbed after King Seonjo sent envoys to Hideyoshi's government and determined from their observations that Hideyoshi posed no threat. After the denial of his second request, Hideyoshi launched his armies against Korea in 1592. There were those who opposed Hideyoshi's plan, such as Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Konishi Yukinaga and So Yoshitoshi were among those who tried to arbitrate between Hideyoshi and the Joseon court.
Weapons and Equipment
Muskets (Arquebuses) and Bows
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bd/Tempo-p1000697.jpg/300px-Tempo-p1000697.jpg)
One reason the Japanese so dominated the early stages of the war was their development and implementation of advanced muskets, first introduced 50 years earlier by Portuguese traders in 1543, in Tanegashima, a small island south of Kyushu.[1] The acquisition of the weapons, lightweight versions of matchlock muskets, was the first occasion of an opening of the Japanese market to the West's science and technology. The local lord, Tokiaki, impressed by the demonstration, purchased two of these firearms, of which he soon began to manufacture copies. About twenty years later, the arquebuses were standardized and improved from the Portuguese originals, and mass-produced throughout Japan at the rate of at least several thousand per year.[2]
Korea disassociated from Western weapons, and while sporadic usage of short-barrelled personal Chinese-style firearms ("sungja"), was seen, the main emphasis was on archery and fire arrows. When the first arquebus was introduced to Joseon/Korean in 1590, during a visit of an Embassy sent by King Sonjo to Hideyoshi, the weapon was given cursory examination and promptly archived in the royal arsenal. The Korean minister Yu Song-nyong, author of the Chingbirok (Record of Reprimands and Admonition), advocated the use of the new acquisition and its mass production as part of the strengthening of the national defenses, but his recommendations in favor of the creation of arquebus squads were dismissed as "something laughable"[3], and Korean bows continued to be the standard long-range arms. The maximum range of the Korean bow was 460 meters, in contrast to its Japanese counterpart, a heavy composite bow whose range was 380 meters [4] which sacrified raw distance for improved accuracy. In battle, Korean archers would find themselves outranged against Japanese musketeers, who had a range of about 500 meters. Still, the bow had significant utility with a short reload time (six arrows could be shot while an arquebus/musket was being loaded and fired) and was a strong asset. However, training men to become skilled archers was an arduous and repetitive task, which could take several years. The arquebus' lack of accuracy was compensated by effective technique; heavy volley fire and striking firepower that could easily pierce iron armor at closer distances. The overall efficiency of the weapon had been proven at the Battle of Nagashino, before being used in Korean territory.
Armor
Korean soldiers had a notable lack of armor. Although Korean troops were equipped with iron and lamellar armor during the Goryeo Dynasty, its usage declined by the mid-16th century. Commanders saw no need for armor because of their confidence in their projectile weapons, which they believed made face-to-face combat less likely. Although the government mandated wearing armor for all ranks, generally only officers complied. Most soldiers hesitated to wear armor due to its bulky nature.
A common Korean soldier wore a heavy black leather jacket over their normal white clothes. A hard conical hat gave some protection as well. This uniform allowed easy movement and speed but no protection against bullets, arrows, or swords. Korean soldiers often used a long trident with blades on all prongs as their main weapon.
Japanese foot soldiers wore steel or leather plate and/or chainmail over their chest, arms, and legs. Shin guards added protection to the lower legs and feet. A round cone hat was worn by the Japanese, usually painted with an insignia of a samurai's crest. This armor did not prevent arrows or bullets from passing through but protected the soldier from sword or spear slashes.
Naval Forces
The Korean navy was mainly made up of standard Panokseons, toughed from dealing with pirates, along with a few turtle ships. Each Panokseon had 32 large cannons and multiple Hwachas, often preferring to fight at a distance, utilizing their firepower and range (for example, see Battle of Noryang Point). Japanese commanders preferred to engage in close combat, as the Japanese fleet excelled in boarding and the ensuing mêlée combat. The difference in philosophy is reflected in the contrast of the slower, high powered Korean vessels with the agile, lightweight Japanese ships.
In contrast to their lack of firearms, Korean soldiers had a wide selection of cannons, grenades, and mortars at their disposal. Korean versions of cannons were first developed in the 1400s under King Sejong (1418–1450) for use mainly on battleships and castles due to their lack of mobility.
First Invasion
Initial Landing
Main articles Siege of Busan, Battle of Tadaejin
The invasion began when Japanese forces of the First and Second Divisions, under Kato Kiyomasa and Konishi Yukinaga landed at Busan and Dadaejin (다대진) respectively on May 23, 1592 with a combined 150,000 soldiers.[5] The Siege of Busan was won after the Korean troops' morale crumbled when their general, Jeong Pal, died of a gunshot wound. Tadaejin fell in a matter of hours. The cities were fortified to allow safe passage for reinforcements, supplies, and ships.
Battle of Sangju
Main article: Battle of Sangju
After securing the ports, the First Division (under Konishi Yukinaga) with 25,000 men marched quickly north to Sangju. Sangju was defended by Yi Il, an older general who fought Jurchens in northern Korea. With a small garrison and a weak castle, Yi Il's men fell again to the powerful arquebuses.
Konishi then crossed Choryang Pass, which was a major strategic point that the Koreans failed to guard when Sin Lip made a bad decision to pull his cavalry back the Chungju. The failure to defend Choryang Pass would lead to the capture of Hanyang (present-day Seoul).
History of Korea |
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Timeline |
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Battle of Chungju
Main article: Battle of Chungju
Konishi soon reached Chungju defended by a cavalry division under the command of Sin Lip. The newly recruited cavalry division of 8,000, having been outnumbered and limited to melee weapons, was overwhelmed by 19,000 Japanese soldiers equipped with arquebuses. The Battle of Chungju marked the last defense line to Hanyang, and the Japanese forces journeyed north without much complication.
Upon hearing of General Sin Lip's defeat, the Yi court took flight toward Pyongyang. In Kaesong, the Korean commoners mourned bitterly because they believed that their king was abandoning them. The Yi court would eventually travel as far as the very northern states of Korea, and the prince would be sent with other ambassadors to ask the Ming Emperor for military aid.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of 23,000 men under Kato Kiyomasa captured Gyeongju, the former capital of Korea during the Silla Dynasty, and massive looting and burning took place. A series of minor battles between the Koreans and Japanese led Kato to Chuksan, and eventually Seoul in a month.
Capture of Hanseong
Chungju was the last line of defense for the Koreans and the road to Hanseong (present-day Seoul) was open to the Japanese. Both Generals Kato and Konishi vied to earn the honor of reaching Hanseong first, and the Third Division under Kuroda Nagasama was not far behind. In the end, Konishi managed to arrive near Hanseong first, and planned to attack the East Gate.
To their surprise, the city was left undefended and was found burned and destroyed. Konishi and his men simply walked through the massive gates. King Seonjo had already fled to Pyongyang the day before. There were no soldiers either. Korean looters helpfully destroyed the food warehouses and armories and the Japanese failed to collect any treasures or supplies.
Siege of Jinju
Main article Siege of Jinju (1592)
Jinju (진주) was a large castle that defended Jeolla Province. The Japanese commanders knew that control of Jinju would mean the fall of Jeolla. Therefore, a large army under Hosokawa Tadaoki gleefully approached Jinju. Jinju was defended by Kim Si-min (김시민), one of the better generals in Korea, commanded a Korean garrison of 3,000 men. Kim had recently acquired about 200 new arquebuses that were equal in strength to the Japanese guns. With the help of arquebuses, cannon, and mortars, Kim and the Koreans were able to drive back the Japanese from Jeolla Province. Hosokawa lost over 30,000 men. The battle at Jinju is considered one of the greatest victories of Korea because it prevented the Japanese from entering Jeolla.
In 1593, Jinju would fall to the Japanese.
Japanese Northern Campaign
(See also Kato Kiyomasa's campaign in the North-Eastern part of Korea)
Japanese troops ravaged and looted many key towns in the southern part of Korea, took Pyongyang and advanced as far north as the Yalu and Tumen rivers. By 1593, Konishi was already planning to invade China.
Of the Second Division, Kato Kiyomasa was still unhappy because of Konishi's glory from the capture of Seoul. Kato planned to invade Hamgyong province in northern Korea and begin his China campaign. With an army of 20,000 men, Kato advanced north, capturing every single castle he arrived at. This included all the castles along Korea's eastern border.
Kato's first real resistance was at Haejungchang. Kato met Northern Korean Contingents, who were renowned as elites among the Korean army. Korean cavalry charged the field and smashed Kato's army as a whole. Surprised, Kato fell back to Haejungchang, a rice storage, built cover from rice pouches and waited for the attack to stop. Feeling confident about the first victory, the Korean commander ordered the cavalry to charge and harass the enemy under cover. Kato replied by heavy arquebus fire behind a 'rice wall' and forced the Koreans back to a nearby hill. After nightfall, Kato silently led his troops to the foot of the hill. He then ordered an attack from three sides and destroyed the Korean army as a whole.
This would be the last Korean resistance to his advance into northeastern China.
Kato then marched toward northeastern China, leaving the coast, and after the Battle of Songjin, captured two Korean princes who were sent down south with an escort of 1,000 Japanese soldiers as a negotiation condition. After crossing the Tumen River, Kato arrived in northeastern China, where Chinese authority did not reach and Jurchens ruled. Here Kato attacked a Jurchen fortress and took it by heavy arquebus fire. The next day Jurchens retaliated against the Japanese with 10,000 strong troops. The Japanese were practically surrounded by the Jurchen cavalry and while managing to pull out of Jurchen attacks, Kato quickly retreated back across the Tumen River. This would be the first and last time Kato and the Japanese ever stepped outside Korea during the war. It is interesting to note that Japan never reached China - their political goal - after this.
Naval battles of Yi Sun-shin
Battles are listed at the end of the article
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/be/Panokseon.jpg/350px-Panokseon.jpg)
While the Koreans were struggling on land, their admiral Yi Sun-sin, who kept a war diary, was preparing for battle against the Japanese ships docked in Busan.
While the Japanese army were greatly successful on land, in June, 1592, a small Korean fleet commanded by Yi destroyed several Japanese flotillas and wrought havoc on Japanese logistics in the Battle of Okpo, Dangpo Battle, and Battle of Sacheon (1592). During the Battle of Sacheon, the Korean iron-roofed Geobukseon, or turtle ships, were introduced. After another Korean victory at the Battle of Tanghangpo, Japanese generals at Busan began to panic, fearing that their supply lines would be destroyed, so therefore the Japanese naval generals decided to kill Yi before his threat to Japanese supply ships escalated and sent Wakizaka Yasuharu to destroy him.
Wakizaka Yasuharu was reported seen with a very large Japanese fleet sailing down the Straits of Kyonnaeryang by local fishermen and scouts. Yi was reluctant to attack the Japanese in the narrow strait, for fear of his Panokseons performing badly in a tight quarters. He also did not want the Japanese to escape onto land, where they could commence operations. Instead, he lured the Japanese out of the strait into the Bay of Hansando with a few ships. When the bulk of the Japanese forces pursued into open water, the Battle of Hansando commenced, with Yi using a crane-wing formation and continuous firing of cannons to achieve a victory.
In September 1592, Yi attacked the Japanese naval headquarters at Busan. Yi managed to leave with all of his ships intact, while inflicting damage on several hundred enemy ships still in their docks. With applications of sweeping naval campaigns, in 1592 a single battle near Hansan Island would leave the Japanese cut off from sea lanes in southwestern Korea and abruptly end all prospects of any future advance of the Japanese army.[6]
The Japanese lost control of the Korea Strait after such naval defeats, and their activities were largely limited around Busan until the Battle of Chilchonryang in 1597. Without the continuous supplies coming from Busan, the Japanese army lost their initial advantage and could not proceed any further from Pyongyang.
Much credit of the war's eventual outcome has been attributed to Admiral Yi's efforts.
Korean Irregular Army
Throughout Hideyoshi's Invasions, irregular Korean forces were active and operated against the Japanese forces. Both Korean civilians and Buddhist monks gathered to form irregular armies. The irregulars' main jobs were to harass Japanese communication lines, ambush armies, kill Japanese commanders, and provide reinforcements.
Insurgency resistance was especially strong in the southern provinces of Chungcheong, Jeolla and Gyeongsang. Gwak Jae-u, Jo Heon (조헌), Kim Cheon-il (김전일), Go Kyung-myung (고경명), and Jeong In-hong (정인홍) were among the notable insurgency leaders.
Gwak Jae-u is one of the most celebrated heroes of the Seven Year War. He was originally a landowner in Gyeongsang province, but the urgency of the war caused him to begin gathering volunteers to fight the Japanese. In popular depiction, Gwak Jae-u is wearing an all-red tunic, claiming that the tunic was stained with the blood of Korean innocents slaughtered by the Japanese. Today, Gwak is remembered by Koreans as a mysterious patriotic hero.
Gwak Jae-u's first attack was on Japanese supply boats that transported supplies up and down on the Nam River. Gwak positioned his men in tall reeds in the water and preyed on Japanese river boats that ferried supplies. One of Gwak's most important achievemets were to destroy Japanese communication systems in Korea.
In the north, insurgency leader Jeong Mun-bu (정문부) fought against Kato Kiyomasa, and defeated the Japanese at the northernmost point in Korea. One of his most decisive victories was the Battle of Gilju, which forced Kato's army into retreat. Jeong's victories helped force the Japanese to retreat permanently from northern Korea. The whole of his campaign was carved into a stone memorial after the war.
While the official army was being easily overrun by the Japanese army, the hit-and-run tactics of the irregular army was actually the biggest threat for the invaders.
Buddhist Volunteers
As mentioned above, Buddhist monks formed a large part of the Korean irregular forces. An interesting thing to note is the participation of Buddhist monks who were only seen in mountains since the overthrow of the Goryeo dynasty. Buddhist monks proved to be great leaders and excelled at fighting the Japanese.
Buddhist monks recruited to the Korean irregular forces, with the inspiration of patriotism and to raise the status of Buddhism, since Joseon was a highly Confucianistic society. A certain monk named Hyujong, called on all monk volunteers to destroy the Japanese samurai, described as "poisonous devils". By the fall of 1593, a total of about 8,000 monk warriors gathered over the next couple months.
Battle of Haengju
Main article Battle of Haengju
The Japanese invasion into Jeolla province was broken down and pushed back by Gwon Yul, a respected general at the hills of Ichiryeong, where outnumbered Koreans fought overwhelming Japanese troops and gained victory. Gwon Yul quickly advanced northwards, re-taking Suwon and then swung south toward Heangju where he would wait for the Chinese reinforcements. After he got the message that the Koreans were destroyed at Pyokje, Gwon Yul decided to fortify Haengju.
Bolstered by the victory at Pyokje, Kato and his army of 30,000 men advanced to the south of Hanseong to attack Haengju Fortress, an impressive mountain fortress that overlooked the surrounding area. An army of 3,800 led by Gwon Yul was garrisoned at the fortress waiting for the Japanese. Kato believed his overwhelming army would destroy the Koreans and therefore ordered the Japanese soldiers to advance upon the steep slopes of Haengju with little apparent plan. Gwon Yul answered the Japanese with fierce fire from the fortification using Hwachas, rocks, handguns, bows, and even quicklimes were thrown at the Japanese. But Kato stubbornly ordered his men up. The Japanese eventually forced the Koreans to the second line of defense, but they pushed no further. After nine massive assaults and 10,000 casualties, Kato burned his dead and finally pulled his troops back.
The Battle of Haengju was an important victory for the Koreans, and celebrated as one of the three most decisive Korean victories; Battle of Haengju, Siege of Jinju (1592), and Battle of Hansando.
Today, the site of Haengju fortress has a memorial built to honor Gwon Yul.
Intervention of Ming China
China sent land and naval forces to Korea in both the first and second invasions to assist in defeating the Japanese. Chinese credit goes largely to assisting Korean reorganization of the military after the war.
After the fall of Pyongyang, King Seonjo retreated to Uiji, a small city near the border of China. With the First and Second Divisions rapidly approaching, King Seonjo made another shameful retreat into China. At the Chinese court, King Seonjo informed of the Japanese invasion.
In July, the Ming Dynasty Emperor Wanli and his advisers took the threat of the Japanese lightly and responded to King Seonjo's request for aid by sending a relatively small force of 5,000 soldiers.[7]
Hideyoshi, having suffering numerous setbacks, including logistical problems caused by Korean saboteurs and major naval defeats at the hands of the Korean navy, proposed to China the division of Korea: the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south to remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was promptly rejected. This negotiation was, of course, done out of sight of the Korean Royal Court. Both sides resumed hostilities.
The Ming Emperor sent a large force in January 1593 under the two famous Generals Song Yingchang and Li Rusong. The salvage army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, made up of 42,000 from five northern military districts and a contingent of 3,000 soldiers proficient in the use of firearms from South China. The Ming army was also well armed with artillery pieces.
In February 1593 a large combined force of Chinese and Korean soldiers attacked Pyongyang and drove the Japanese into eastward retreat. Li Rusong personally led a pursuit with over 20,000 strong troops, along with a small force of Koreans, but was halted near Pyokje by the sally of a large Japanese formation.
In late February, Li ordered a raid into the Japanese rear and burned several hundred thousand koku of military rice supply, forcing the Japanese invading army to retreat from Seoul due to the prospect of food shortage.
These engagements ended the first phase of the war, and peace negotiations followed. The Japanese evacuated Hanseong in May and retreated to fortifications around Busan. Some Japanese soldiers left the army and settled down in Korea, even marrying Korean women. An uneasy truce was to last for close to four years.
Negotiations between China and Japan
With pressure from the Chinese and Korean army and supplies cut off by the Korean naval fleet, Konishi was compelled to negotiate for peace. Konishi's forces were reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death. General Li Ju-sung offered a way out for Konishi by giving him a chance to end to the hostilities. In the spring of 1593, China and Korea agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.[8]
By May 18, 1593, all the Japanese soldiers retreated back to Japan. In the summer of 1593, a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce.
An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by autumn 1596; a small garrison was nevertheless left in Busan. Satisfied with the Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to allow retired Regent (Taikō (太閤)) Hideyoshi to have the title of "King of Japan" on condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea.
The Ming ambassador met Hideyoshi in October 1596 but there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the context of the meeting. Hideyoshi was enraged to learn that China insulted the Emperor of Japan by presuming to cancel the Emperor's divine right to the throne, offering to recognize Hideyoshi instead. To insult the Chinese, he demanded among other things, a royal marriage with the Wanli Emperor's daughter, the delivery of a Korean prince as hostage, and four of Korea's southern provinces.
Peace negotiations soon broke down and the war entered its second phase when Hideyoshi sent another invasion force. Early in 1597, both sides resumed hostilities.
Korean Military Reorganization
Proposal for Military Reforms
During the period between the First and Second invasion, the Korean government had a chance to examine the reasons on why they had been destroyed by the Japanese. Yu Seong-ryong, the Prime Minister, spoke out about the Korean disadvantage.
Yu pointed out about the Korean castle defences (which he had vigorously advocated before the war) that were extremely weak. He noted how Korean castles had incomplete fortifications and walls too easy to scale. He also wanted cannons set up in the walls. Yu proposed to have strong towers with gun turrets for cannons. Besides castles, Yu wanted to form a line of defences in Korea. He proposed to create a series of walls and forts, all enveloping Seoul as the center.
Yu also pointed out how efficient the Japanese army was (considering their speed of taking only 1 month to Seoul) and how well trained they were. The superior military units the Japanese generals deployed was a large part of the Japanese. Yu noted how the Japanese moved their units in complex movements, often weakening the enemy with arquebuses, then attacking with melee weapons. Korean armies often moved forward in one body, without any organization.
China helped Korea reorganize the military largely. Yu was recommended to train Korean soldiers with the "three arts", which included the skills of swordsmanship, archery, and arquebuses. Chinese generals suggested that Koreans should be trained in all three skills, clearly being able to effectively repel any kind of attack, be they melee, arrows, or bullets.
Military Training Agency
King Seonjo and the Korean court finally began to reform the military. In September 1593, the Military Training Agency was established. The agency carefully divided up the army into units and companies. Also, within the companies were squads of archers, arquebusers, and edged weapons. The agency set up divisional units in each region of Korea and battalions were garrisoned at castles. The number of the members of the agency soon grew to about 10,000, originally less than 80 members.
One of the most important changes were the eligible people to be conscripted. Now, both high, upper class citizens and slaves were subject to drafts and all males had to enter military service to be trained and famimliarized with weapons.
Unfortunately, the creation of the Military Training Agency was halfhearted and under developed. Also, nearly all the reforms Yu called for were ignored again. The lack of manpower and a devastated economy put Korea in nearly the same position as in the first invasion. Although the second invasion was quickly repelled with the help of China, Korea ultimately failed to reform the military again; with another cost when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910.
Second Invasion
Hideyoshi was unsatisfied with the first campaign, and decided to push his luck with another attack on Korea.
One of the main differences of the First and Second invasions, was that China was a long lost achievement for the Japanese. Failing to gain a foothold during Kato Kiyomasa's Chinese campaign and the full retreat of the Japanese during the first invasion affected the Japanese morale. Hideyoshi and his generals planned to conquer Korea.
Soon after the Chinese ambassadors returned safely to China, in 1597, Hideyoshi sent 200 ships with approximately 141,100 men[9] under the overall command of Kobayakawa Hideaki. [10] Upon hearing this news, the imperial court in Beijing appointed Yan Hao (楊鎬) as the supreme commander of an initial mobilization of 55,000 troops[9] from various (and sometimes remote) provinces across China, such as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong[11]. A naval force of 21,000 was included in the effort.[12]. Rei Huang, a Chinese historian, estimated that the combined strength of the Chinese army and navy at the height of the second campaign was around 75,000[13]. Korean forces totaled 30,000 with General Gwon Yul's army in Gong Mountain (공산; 公山) in Daegu, General Gwon Eung's (권응) troops in Gyeongju, General Gwak Jae-u's soldiers in Changnyeong (창녕), Yi Bok-nam’s (이복남) army in Naju, and Yi Si-yun's troops in Chungpungnyeong.[9]
Initial Offensive
The Japanese planned to attack Jeolla Province in the southwestern part of the peninsula, and eventually occupy Jeonju, the provincial capital. Korean success in the Siege of Jinju in 1592 had saved this area from further devastation during the first invasion. But this time, Japanese commanders wanted to capture this area. Two Japanese armies, under Mori Hidemoto and Ukita Hideie, began the assault in Busan and marched towards Jeonju, taking Sacheon and Changpyong along the way.
Siege of Namwon
Main article Siege of Namwon
Namwon was located 30 miles southeast from Chonju. It was the largest fortress[citation needed] in Jeolla Province, and a coalition force of 6,000 soldiers (including 3,000 Chinese)[14] and civilian volunteers were readied to fight the approaching Japanese forces. The Japanese laid siege to the walls of the fortress with ladders and siege towers[15]. The two sides exchanged volleys of arquebuses and bows. Eventually the Japanese forces scaled the walls and sacked the fotress. According to Japanese commander Okochi Hidemoto, author of the Chosen Ki, the Siege of Namwon resulted in 3,726 casualties (number of noses collected) on the Korean and Chinese forces' side[16]. The entire Jeolla Province fell under Japanese control.
Battle of Hwangsoksan
Main article Battle of Hwangsoksan
Hwangsoksan Fortress consisted of extensive walls that circumscribed the Hwangsok mountain, and garrisoned thousands of soldiers led by the guerilla leader Gwak Jae-u. When Kato Kiyomasa laid siege on the mountain with a colossal army, the Koreans lost morale and retreated with 350 casualties.
Korean naval operations
The Korean navy played a crucial part in the second invasion, as well as the first. The Japanese advances were halted due to the lack of reinforcements and supplies[citation needed], as the frequent naval victories of the allied forces prevented the Japanese from accessing the tributaries on the western side of the Korean peninsula.[17] Also, China sent a large number of Chinese fleets to aid the Koreans. This made the Korean navy an even bigger threat to the Japanese, since they had to fight a larger enemy fleet.
The war at sea took off on a bad start when Won Gyun took Admiral Yi's place as commander.
Because Admiral Yi, the commander of the Korean navy, was so able in naval warfare, the Japanese plotted to demote him by making use of the laws that governed the Korean military. A Japanese double agent working for the Koreans falsely reported that Japanese General Kato Kiyomasa would be coming on a certain date with great Japanese fleet on another attack on Korean shores, and insisted that Admiral Yi be sent to lay an ambush.[18]
Knowing that the area had sunken rocks detrimental for the ships, Admiral Yi refused, and for refusing instruction from higher command he was demoted and jailed by King Seonjo. Added to that, Admiral Won Gyun accused Admiral Yi of drinking and idling. Won Gyun was quickly put in Admiral Yi's place. Won Gyun's place of Admiral Yi would soon bring the destruction of the Korean navy at Chilchonryang.
Battle of Chilchonryang
Main article Battle of Chilchonryang
On August 28, 1597, a Japanese fleet engaged the entire Korean navy at Chilchonryang strait, and the battle resulted in 157 sunken Korean ships and 20,000 casualties[citation needed] when Won Gyun failed to effectively use his cannons. Won Gyun and his remaining army were killed after he struggled ashore to a Japanese fort. Only 12 Korean warships survived the battle and retreated to Yosu. With the destruction of the Korean navy, the area around the Korea Strait was finally under Japanese control and supply ships could reach Busan without being attacked. This battle was Japan's only naval victory of both campaigns.
Battle of Myeongnyang
Main article Battle of Myeongnyang
After the debacle in Chilchonryang, King Seonjo immediately reinstated Admiral Yi. Admiral Yi quickly returned to Yosu only to find his entire navy destroyed. However, Yi re-organized the navy now reduced to 12 ships and 200 men[19], saved from the previous battle, which would be the grand total of the Korean navy for next several months. Nonetheless, Admiral Yi's strategies did not waver, and on September 16, 1597, he led the Korean fleet against a Japanese fleet of 133 war vessels[20] in the Myeongnyang Strait. The naval Battle of Myeongnyang resulted in Korean victory with at least 123 Japanese vessels sunk, and the Japanese were forced to return to Busan[21], under the orders of Mori Hidemoto. Admiral Yi won back the control of the Korean shores.
Siege of Ulsan
Main article: Siege of Ulsan
By late 1597, Japanese forces were very near Hanseong, and behind them was a trail of devastation. They defeated the Korean forces at Chiksan and Sangju, and laid siege on Kyeongju. After the news of the loss at Myeongnyang, Kato Kiyomasa decided to destroy Kyeongju, the former capital of the Silla kingdom. Already sacked and looted in the first invasion during two battles, the city was this time burnt down by the Japanese soldiers in a vengeful raid. The Pulguksa temple, one of the prominent place of Korean buddhism, was entirely detroyed in the process (it has since been restored). The Japanese proceeded to retreat south to Ulsan[22], a harbor that had been an important Japanese trading post a century before, and that Kato chose as a strategic stronghold.
Yet Admiral Yi's control of the areas over the Korea Strait permitted no supply ships to reach the western side of the Korean peninsula, into which many extensive tributaries merge. Without provisions and reinforcements, the Japanese forces had to remain in the coastal fortresses known as wajo that they still controlled. To gain advantage of the situation, the Chinese and Korean coalition forces attacked Ulsan, a major Japanese stronghold. This siege was the first major offensive from the Chinese and Korean forces in the second phase of the war.
The effort of the Japanese garrison (about 7,000 men) of Ulsan was largely dedicated to its fortification, in preparation for the expected attack. Kato Kiyomasa assigned the direction and defense of the base to Kato Yasumasa, Kuk Hirotaka, Asano Nagayoshi, and others before proceeding to Sosaengpo.[23] The Chinese Ming troops' first assault on January 29, 1598, caught the Japanese army unawares and still encamped, for a large part, outside Ulsan's unfinished walls. [24] A total of around 36,000 with the help of singijeons and hwachas nearly succeeded in sacking the fortress, but reinforcements under the overall command of Mori Hidemoto came across the river to aid the besieged fortress[25] and prolonged the hostilities. Later, Japanese were running out of food and the victory was imminent for the allied forces, but another Japanese reinforcement arrived from the rear of the Chinese and Korean troops and forced them to retreat.
Battle of Sacheon
Main article Battle of Sacheon (1598)
During the winter of 1597, the Chinese and Korean allies repelled the Japanese forces from reaching Hanseong (present-day Seoul). Now there was no hope for the Japanese to conquer the Korean peninsula; therefore, Japanese forces began to prepare to retreat. From the beginning of spring in 1598, the Korean forces and 100,000 Chinese soldiers prepared to retake castles on the coastal areas. The Wanli Emperor of China sent a fleet under the artillery expert Chen Lin in May 1598; this naval force saw action in joint exercises with the Koreans against the Japanese navy. And in June 1598, under Commander Konishi Yukinage's warning of the dire situations in the campaign, withdrew 70,000 troops and left 60,000 -mostly Satsuma warriors under the Shimazu clan commanders, Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son Tadatsune[26]. The remaining Japanese forces fought desperately, turning back Chinese attacks on Suncheon and Sacheon as the Ming army amassed more troops to prepare for a final assault.
The Chinese believed that Sacheon was crucial in their program to retake the lost castles. Although the Chinese were ascendant initially, the tide of the battle turned when Japanese reinforcements attacked the rear of the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers inside the fortress counter-attacked through the gates[27]. The Chinese Ming forces retreated with 30,000 losses[28]
Death of Hideyoshi
On 18 September 1598, Hideyoshi died, his last order from his deathbed to withdraw the forces in Korea. The Council of Five Regents upheld his order, made a secret of Hideyoshi's death to preserve morale, and sent a decree in late October to the Japanese commanders to withdraw.
Battle of Noryang Point
Main article Battle of Noryang Point
Noryang Point was the final naval battle in the war. The Korean navy under Admiral Yi had recovered from its losses and was aided by the Chinese navy under Chen Lin. Intelligence revealed that 500[29] Japanese ships were anchored in the narrow straits of Noryang in order to withdraw the remaining Japanese troops. Noting the narrow geography of the area, Admiral Yi and the Chen Lin led a surprise attack against the Japanese fleet at dawn on December 16, 1598.
The allied fleet fired volleys of cannons and fire arrows against the resting Japanese fleet. The Japanese fleet hurriedly prepared and sailed toward the allied fleet through the strait. It suffered much devastation from the bombardments as the ships became concentrated into bundles, due to narrowness of the strait. As mentioned above, Japanese cannon technology was far more inferior to that of the Korean and Chinese; therefore, they could not return any fire.
As the Japanese ships became nearer, Chen Lin ordered the Chinese fleet to engage in melee combat. Fierce battle ensued and the Japanese began to suffer when Admiral Yi's fleet began to send mortars into their ships. When General Chen Lin's flagship was threatened, Admiral Yi came to aid with his ship. By dawn, nearly half of Japanese battle ships were destroyed; as the Japanese began to retreat, Admiral Yi ordered the final charge to destroy the remaining few. Admiral Yi's flagship sped forward. It was then when Admiral Yi was shot. Only 3 nearby captains, including his cousin, saw his death. Admiral Yi told his captains to keep his death secret and to continue the battle so that the morale of the soldiers would not drop.
The battle ended as an allied victory with a Japanese loss of nearly 450 battleships out of the original 500. Only after the battle did the soldiers learn of Admiral Yi's death, and it is said that Chen Lin lamented that Admiral Yi died in his stead[30].
Aftermath
Hideyoshi's Invasions left deep scars in Korea. Farmlands were devastated, irrigation dikes were destroyed, villages and towns were burned down, the population was first plundered and then dispersed, and many skilled workers (celadonware makers, craftsmen, artisans, etc) were kidnapped and brought to Japan to help develop and expand Japan's crafts during and after the war. Japanese craftsmanship increased dramatically after the war.
One of the worst consequences Korea suffered were the hundreds of Korean artifacts stolen by the Japanese generals. Even today, many Korean artifacts are displayed in Japan. For several years Korea has been demanding the return of these artifacts, but Japan does not comply.
In 1598 alone, the Japanese took some 38,000 ears as gruesome trophies. A survey conducted in 1601 revealed that the productive capacity of farmlands had been reduced from 1.5–1.7 million gyeol[31], assessed in 1592, to 30,000 gyeol.[32]
Many captured Korean citizens were eventually sold as slaves to Portuguese traders, and sold to various European colonies over the world.[33][34] With the death of Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu eventually gained control of Japan and established 300 years of political stability.
Most of Seoul had been torched. The royal palace was heavily damaged and markets of Seoul were destroyed.
Ming Dynasty China had invested enormous human and material resources in Korea, which helped empty the state treasury and weakened its northeastern border against the emerging power of the Manchu.
Following the war, political and economic relations between Korea and Japan were suspended. Negotiations between the Korean court and the Tokugawa Shogunate were carried out via the Japanese daimyo of Tsushima Island, So Yoshitomo, who had avoided intervening in the invasion. The So clan desired to restore commercial relations with Korea, Japan at the time relying on Chinese silk for kimonos. Tokugawa Ieyasu favored peaceful relations abroad. In the spring of 1604, Tokugawa Ieyasu released 3,000 captives.[35] In 1608, an Embassy of three officials and 270 men was sent to Edo, and received by Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada, Ieyasu's son. As a result of the visit, thousands of prisoners were returned to Korea, and Japanese captives were repatriated. [36] Accompanying this action, limited trade relations were restored.
References
- ^ Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch/UC Berkeley Press, 2005, pp. 3–7, ISBN 89-954424-2-5/
- ^ Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch/UC Berkeley Press, 2005, p. 6.
- ^ Palais, J.B., Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty, University of Washington Press, 1996, p. 520.
- ^ Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch/UC Berkeley Press, 2005, p. 8.
- ^ The University Record, February 22, 1999. Imjin War diaries are memorial of invasions for Koreans
- ^ http://koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C12/E1203.htm
- ^ http://koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C12/E1204.htm
- ^ pressure from the Chinese army and local guerrillas, with food supplies cut off and his forces now reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death, Konishi was compelled to sue for peace. General Li Ju-sung offered General Konishi a chance to negotiate an end to the hostilities. When negotiations got underway in the spring of 1593, China and Choson agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw from Choson altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.
- ^ a b c 브리태니커백과사전. 정유재란 (丁酉再亂)
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 187, ISBN 0-304-35948-3.
- ^ Hawley, The Imjin War, op. cit, p. 450.
- ^ Huang, Ray, "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620." in The Cambridge History of Chani. Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I, edited by Denis Twitchett and John Farbank. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 572.
- ^ Huang, Ray, "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620." in The Cambridge History of Chani. Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I, edited by Denis Twitchett and John Farbank. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 572.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592–98. London: Cassell & Co, 2002, p. 191.
- ^ 脇坂紀, 太田 藤四郎 and 塙 保己一, editors, 続群書類従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju Series], 1933, p. 448.
- ^ Hidemoto, Okochi, 脇坂紀 [Chosen Ki}, 太田 藤四郎 and 塙 保己一, editors, 続群書類従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju Series], 1933
- ^ Lee, Ki-Baik, A New History of Korea, Translated by Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz, Ilchorak/Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 214, ISBN 0-674-61575-1.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, pp. 182–183.
- ^ 桑田忠親 [Kuwata, Tadachika], ed., 旧参謀本部編纂, [Kyu Sanbo Honbu], 朝鮮の役 [Chousen no Eki] (日本の戦史 [Nihon no Senshi] Vol. 5), 1965, p. 192.
- ^ Nanjung Ilgi. War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Translated by Ha Tae Hung, edited by Sohn Pow-key. Yonsei University Press, Seoul, Korea, 1977, p. 312, ISBN 89-7141-018-3.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 202, ISBN 0-304-35948-3
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 203.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, pp. 204–205.
- ^ 文禄・慶長役における被虜人の研究, 東京大学出版, 1976, p. 128, ASIN 4130260235.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 215.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 219.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 220–221.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 222.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 227.
- ^ pg. 111 Woongjinweewinjungi #14 Yi Sun-shin by Baek Sukgi. (C) Woongjin Publishing Co., Ltd.
- ^ Palais, Confucian Statecraft, op. cit., pp. 105–106. "In the mid-fifteenth century households held parcels of land measured in gyeol, not really a measure of land area but a constant measure of crop yield produced by an area that varied from 2.25 to 9.0 acres, depending on the fertility of the land".
- ^ Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, op. cit., p. 564.
- ^ Hur, Nam-Lin, "The Korean Diaspora in the Imjin War, 1592–1598", Centre for Korean Research, University of British Columbia, Centre for Korean Research, Seminars 2003
- ^ Neves, Jaime Ramalhete. "The Portuguese in the Im-Jim War?" Review of Culture 18 (1994), pp. 20–24.
- ^ Yamagata I., "Japanese-Korean Relations after the Japanese Invasion of Korean in the XVIth Century", Transactions of the Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1913, p. 5.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, Cassel, 2002, p. 236.
Bibliography
- Eikenberry, Karl W. "The Imjin War." Military Review 68:2 (February 1988), pp. 74–82.
- Ha, Tae-hung, tr., and Sohn Pow-key, ed. Nanjung Ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1977, ISBN 89-7141-018-3.
- Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch/UC Berkeley Press, 2005, ISBN 89-954424-2-5.
- Kim, Kichung. "Resistance, Abduction, and Survival: The Documentary Literature of the Imjin War (1592–8)." Korean Culture 20:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 20–29.
- 桑田忠親 [Kuwata, Tadachika], ed., 旧参謀本部編纂, [Kyu Sanbo Honbu], 朝鮮の役 [Chousen no Eki] (日本の戦史 [Nihon no Senshi] Vol. 5), 1965.
- 이민웅 [Lee, Min-Woong], 임진왜란 해전사 [Imjin Wae-ran Haejeonsa: The Naval Battles of the Imjin War], 청어람미디어 [Chongoram Media], 2004, ISBN 89-89722-49-7.
- Neves, Jaime Ramalhete. "The Portuguese in the Im-Jim War?" Review of Culture 18 (1994), pp. 20–24.
- Niderost, Eric. “Turtleboat Destiny: The Imjin War and Yi Sun Shin.” Military Heritage 2:6 (June 2001), pp. 50–59, 89.
- Niderost, Eric. "The Miracle at Myongnyang, 1597." Osprey Military Journal 4:1 (January 2002), pp. 44–50.
- Park, Yune-hee. Admiral Yi Sun-shin and His Turtleboat Armada: A Comprehensive Account of the Resistance of Korea to the 16th Century Japanese Invasion. Seoul: Shinsaeng Press, 1973.
- Sadler, A.L. "The Naval Campaign in the Korean War of Hideyoshi (1592-1598)." Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan Second Series, 14 (June 1937), pp. 179–208.
- Stramigioli, Giuliana. "Hideyoshi's Expansionist Policy on the Asiatic Mainland." Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan Third Series, 3 (December 1954), pp. 74–116.
- Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592–98. London: Cassell & Co, 2002, ISBN 0-304-35948-3.
See also
- Timeline of the Imjin War – incomplete
- List of Imjin War battles
- Military history of Korea
- Military history of Japan
- Li Rusong
- List of wars
- Bukgwan Victory Monument
- Immortal Yi Soon-shin (TV series)
- History of Korea
- List of Korea-related topics
External links
- Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Korean Invasions: the Bunroku Campaign (1592–93)
- 임진왜란 (very visual website)
- The Battles of Imjin Waeran (in Korean)
- The Imjin Waeran (in Korean)