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Byzantine Navy
LeadersByzantine Emperor (Commander-in-chief)
Megas droungarios,
Megas doux (after 11th century)
Dates of operation330 - 1453 AD
HeadquartersConstantinople
Active regionsMediterranean Sea, Danube, Black Sea
Part ofByzantine Empire
AlliesVenice, Genoa, Pisa, Crusader states, Anatolian Turkish Beyliks
OpponentsVandals, Ostrogoths, the Caliphate and Saracen pirates, Slavs, Rus', Normans, Genoa, Venice, Pisa, Crusader states, Seljuks, Anatolian Turkish Beyliks, Ottomans
Battles and warsthe Justinianic Wars, the Byzantine-Arab Wars, the Rus'-Byzantine Wars, the Crusades and the Byzantine-Ottoman wars

This article discusses the naval forces of the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine navy developed directly from the earlier imperial Roman Navy, but in comparison to its predecessor, which faced no great naval threats, the navy's importance to the defense and survival of the Byzantine state was far greater. With the Muslim conquests from the 7th century onwards, the Mediterranean Sea seized being a "Roman lake" and became a battleground between Byzantines and Arabs. Not only were the Byzantine fleets critical in the defense of the Empire's far-flung possessions around the Mediterranean basin, but they also played a major role in the defense of the imperial capital, Constantinople, from seaborne attacks.

Through the use of "Greek fire", the Byzantine navy's best-known and feared secret weapon, Constantinople was saved from several sieges and numerous naval engagements were won for the Byzantines. Thus, by the early 9th century, the Byzantine navy, a well-organized and maintained force, was again the dominant maritime power in the Mediterranean. The antagonism with the Muslim navies continued until the 11th century, during which the navy, like the Empire itself, began to decline. The Byzantines were forced more and more to rely on the navies of allied Italian city-states like Venice and Genoa, with disastrous effects on their economy and sovereignty.

Several emperors tried to revive the navy, but their efforts had only a temporary effect. By the 14th century, the Byzantine fleet, that once could field thousands of warships, was limited to a few dozen at best.[2] Nevertheless, the diminished Byzantine navy survived and continued to be active, until the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans in 1453.

History

Early period

4th-5th centuries

The Byzantine navy, like the East Roman or Byzantine Empire itself, was a continuation of the Roman Empire and its institutions. Ever since the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, and in the absence of any external threat, the Roman navy in the Mediterranean performed mostly policing and escort duties. The Roman fleets were therefore composed of relatively small vessels, best suited to these tasks. Massive sea battles, as those fought in the Punic Wars, did not occur, with the exception of periods of civil war: in 323 AD, the Emperor Constantine defeated a fleet of 350 triremes of the Eastern Emperor Licinius with a fleet of 200 liburnians.[3] The subsequent transfer of the praetorian fleets from Italy to Constantinople by Constantine I can be regarded as the birth of the Byzantine navy.

During the 5th century, Rome's naval hegemony in the Mediterranean was threatened by the powerful navy of the Vandalic Kingdom of Carthage (428-534). Under the capable king Geiseric, the Vandals carried out devastating raids against the coasts of Italy and Greece, and the eastern emperors were compelled to attend to their fleet. A huge expedition under Basiliscus in 468, reputedly numbering 1,113 ships and 100,000 men, failed disastrously. 600 ships were lost, and the financial cost of 130,000 pounds of gold and 700 pounds of silver nearly bankrupted the Empire.[4] This forced the Empire to come to terms with Geiseric, signing a peace treaty. After Geiseric's death in 477 however, the Vandal threat receded.

6th century

In 513, the magister militum per Thracias, Vitalian, revolted against Emperor Anastasius I. The rebels assembled a fleet of some 200 ships, but after a few successes, they were destroyed by admiral Marinus, who employed an incendiary substance (possibly an early form of Greek fire) to defeat them.[5] In 533, an army of 15,000 under Belisarius was transported to Africa by an invasion fleet of 92 dromons and 500 transports,[6] beginning the Vandalic War (533-534), the first of Justinian's Wars of Reconquest. These were largely made possible by the control of the Mediterranean waterways, and the fleet played a vital role in carrying supplies and reinforcements to the widely dispersed Byzantine expeditionary forces and garrisons. This fact was not lost on the Byzantines' enemies, and the Ostrogoth king Totila created a fleet with which to deny the seas around Italy, then in the throes of the Gothic War (535–554), to the Empire. In 545, General Belisarius personally commanded 200 ships against the Gothic fleet that blockaded the mouths of the Tiber, in order save Rome.[7] In 551, Totila captured Sardinia and Corsica, but his fleet was subsequently destroyed at Sena Gallica.[5] With the final conquest of Italy and southern Spain under Justinian, the Mediterranean became again a Roman lake.[5]

The only major naval action fought for the next 80 years was during the Siege of Constantinople by the Sassanid Persians and Avars/Slavs in 626. The Slavs' fleet of monoxyla was intercepted by the Byzantine fleet and destroyed, denying the Persian army passage across the Bosporus and eventually forcing the Avars to retreat.[8]

The struggle against the Arabs

The emergence of the Arab naval threat

During the 640s, the Muslim conquest of Syria and Egypt created a new threat, as the Arabs not only conquered significant recruiting and revenue-producing areas, but, after the utility of a strong navy was demonstrated by the short-lived Byzantine recapture of Alexandria in 644, they took to creating a navy of their own. In this effort, the Arabs used the manpower of the conquered Levant, which until a few years ago had provided ships and crews for the Byzantines.[9] As a result, and because of a shared Mediterranean maritime tradition and mutual interactions in the subsequent centuries, the Arab ships were very similar to their Byzantine counterparts.[10] This similarity also extended to tactics and general fleet organization, with translations of Byzantine military manuals being available to the Arab admirals.[11]

In the Battle of the Masts of 655, the young Arab navy decisively defeated the Byzantines, destroying 500 Byzantine ships, and began a centuries-long series of naval conflicts over the control of the Mediterranean waterways. During this period, the Byzantine fleet proved instrumental to the survival of the Empire: through the use of its feared secret weapon, the "Greek fire", the first Arab Siege of Constantinople ended in failure when the Byzantines defeated the Arab navy in the Battle of Syllaeum, saving the Empire and halting the Muslim advance. In the 680s, under Justinian II, great care was shown to the navy, which was strengthened by the resettlement of over 18,500 Mardaites in the Empire, where they were employed as marines and rowers.[12]

Nevertheless, the Arab naval threat intensified as they gradually took control of North Africa. The last Byzantine stronghold, Carthage, fell in 698, despite the dispatch of a fleet to defend it, and Byzantine control of the western Mediterranean was challenged by a new Arab fleet operating from Tunisia.[13]

The Byzantine counter-offensive

In 718, and second and last siege of Constantinople by the Arabs failed, saving the Empire. In its aftermath, the retreating Arab fleet was decimated in a storm, and Byzantine forces launched a counteroffensive.[14] For the next half-century, naval warfare featured constant raids from both sides. A revolt of the thematic fleets in 727 was put down by the imperial fleet through use of Greek fire.[15] Despite the losses this entailed, in 747, aided for the first time by ships from the Italian city-states, the Byzantines decisively defeated the combined Syrian and Alexandrian fleets, breaking the naval power of the Umayyad Caliphate.[9] Together with the collapse of the Ummayyad state shortly after, this victory ushered the second period of complete Byzantine naval superiority in the Mediterranean. This enabled Emperor Constantine V to use the fleet in his campaigns against the Bulgars in the 760s. In 763, he sailed with 800 ships carrying 9,600 cavalry and some infantry to Anchialus, where he scored a significant victory. In 766 however, a second fleet of 2,600 ships sunk en route to Anchialus.

Renewed Muslim ascendancy

The Byzantine naval dominance of the Mediterranean was to last until the 820s, when a succession of disasters spelled its end. The first disaster was the revolt of Thomas the Slav in 821, which carried along a large part of the Byzantine armed forces, and which severely weakened the Empire. Crete fell in 824 and became a base for Muslim piratical activity in the Aegean, while under the new Abbassid Caliphate, Arab naval power was revived, and a series of reverses were inflicted on the Empire in the West.[16] There, in 827, the Aghlabid dynasty began the slow conquest of Sicily, which was critically aided by the defection of the Byzantine commander, Euphemius, together with the island's thematic fleet.[16] By the 840s, Arabs were raiding Italy and the Adriatic. Two Byzantine attempts at reconquest of Sicily were heavily defeated in 840 and 859, and the Muslim fleets, together with large numbers of independent raiders, emerged as the major power of the Mediterranean, putting the Byzantines on the defensive.[16] In 867 for instance, a Byzantine fleet of 45 ships (some sources state 139 ships) was forced to engage the Arabs off Sicily in order to halt their attacks on Dalmatia.[17] In 878, Syracuse, the main Byzantine stronghold in Sicily, was lost, largely because the Imperial Fleet was occupied with transporting marble for the construction of the Nea Ekklesia, the new church of Emperor Basil I.[18] While a short-lived Byzantine counter-offensive in the 880s managed to regain Bari and a foothold in Apulia, which would later evolve into the Catepanate of Italy, a renewed defeat off Sicily in 888 signaled the virtual disappearance of significant Byzantine naval activity from Italy for the next century.[16]

In the East, despite some successes, such as the razing of Damietta by a Byzantine fleet of 85 ships in 853, the Byzantines were engaged in many operations around the Aegean and off the Syrian coast with at least three more fleets, numbering 300 ships in total.[19] A victory over the Cretan pirates in 879 stabilized the situation somewhat, even allowing the temporary recapture of Cyprus.[16] During the first two decades of the 10th century, the Byzantines faced the renegade Leo of Tripoli, whose raids devastated the Aegean coasts, even sacking the Empire's second city, Salonica.[16] The most distinguished Byzantine admiral of the time was Himerios, the Logothete of the Dromos, who led a successful attack on Laodicea in 910. The city was sacked and its hinterland plundered and ravaged without the loss any ships.[20] A year later however, a huge expedition under Himerios against the Emirate of Crete, comprising a fleet of 112 dromons and 75 pamphyloi with 43,000 men, failed,[21] followed by another defeat at the hands of Leo of Tripoli in 912. The year 920 witnessed for the first time the ascension of an admiral, Romanus Lecapenus, to the imperial throne, and in 924, the decisive defeat of Leo of Tripoli off Lemnos marked the beginning of the Byzantine resurgence.[22] In 941, a hastily assembled fleet of 15 old ships equipped with Greek fire managed to defeat the Rus fleet threatening Constantinople.

The "Byzantine Reconquest" of the 10th century

During the course of the 10th century, as Arab power weakened, the Byzantines launched a series of successful campaigns against the weakened Caliphate and its successor states. This "Byzantine Reconquest" was overseen by the able sovereigns of the Macedonian dynasty (867-1056), and marked the high water-mark of the Byzantine state. An expedition of about 100 Byzantine ships (20 dromons, 64 chelandia, and 10 galeai) against the Emirate of Crete in 949 failed,[23] but in 960, Nicephorus Phocas set out with a fleet of 1,000 dromons, 2,000 chelandia, and 308 transports carrying 50,000 men to subdue the island.[24] The conquest of Crete removed the direct threat to the Aegean, Byzantium's naval heartland, while the conquest of Cilicia, Cyprus (in 968),[25] and the northern Syrian coast (under John I Tzimiskes) removed the threat of the once-mighty Muslim Syrian fleets and effectively re-established Byzantine dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.[22]

In the West however, a heavy Byzantine defeat by the Fatimids in 965 resulted in the absence of significant naval activity until after 1025, when Byzantium again actively intervened in southern Italy and Sicily. Nevertheless, during the 11th century, both the Byzantine and Muslim navies gradually declined, a phenomenon parallel to the rise of the naval power of the Italian city-states.[22]

Komnenian period

Further information: Byzantium under the Komnenoi
"Strive at all time to have the fleet in top condition and to have it not want for anything. For the fleet is the glory of Romania. [...] The droungarios and prōtonotarios of the fleet should [...] investigate with rigor the slightest thing which is done to the fleet. For when the fleet is reduced to nothingness, you shall be overthrown and fall."
Admonitions to the Emperor
Strategikon of Kekaumenos, Ch. 87

By the end of the 11th century the Byzantine navy was a shadow of its former self, having declined through neglect, the incompetence of its officers, and lack of funds.[26] Kekaumenos, writing in ca. 1078, laments that the Byzantine ships "on the pretext of reasonable patrols, they are doing nothing else but ferrying wheat, barley, pulse, cheese, wine, meat, olive oil, a great deal of money, and anything else" from the islands and coasts of the Aegean, while they "flee [the enemy] before they have even caught sight of them, and thus become an embarrassment to the Romans."[27] By that time, the Muslim naval threat had vanished, but a new and powerful adversary had risen: the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, which had designs on the Byzantine Adriatic coasts and beyond. At the beginning of his reign, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) was therefore forced to rely on the help of the Venetian fleet against the Normans, and in a treaty in 1082, he granted the Venetians major trading concessions. Nevertheless, Alexios realized the importance of having his own fleet, and took steps to re-establish the navy. His efforts bore some success, and in 1104, a Byzantine fleet of 10 ships captured Laodicea and other coastal towns as far as Tripoli.[28] By 1118 he was able to pass on a modest but well-organized navy to his successor, John II Komnenos (1118-1143).

John II concentrated on the army and regular land-based campaigns, and although he did not employ the navy much, he took care to maintain its strength.[29] This did not avert an embarrassment when John refused to renew the trading privileges that Alexios had granted to the Venetians; after they had plundered several Byzantine islands in retaliation, John was forced to renew the treaty. Evidently the Byzantine navy at this point was not sufficiently powerful for John to successfully confront Venice, especially as there were other pressing demands on the Empire's resources.

The navy experienced a major revival after 1143 under the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180), who was determined that Byzantine naval power should be re-established. The Byzantine navy under Manuel quickly became formidable and was used by this ambitious emperor as a powerful tool of foreign policy in the relations with the Latin and Muslim states of the the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1148, Manuel sent a fleet of 500 galleys and 1,000 transports along with an army of 20-30,000 men that succeeded in recapturing Corfu and the Ionian Islands from the Norman Kingdom of Sicily,[30] and in 1155, a Byzantine fleet of 10 ships in support of Norman rebel Robert III of Loritello landed at Ancona, launching the last Byzantine bid to regain Southern Italy. Despite initial successes, the expedition was ultimately defeated in 1156, 4 Byzantine ships were captured.[31] In 1169, a large fleet of about 200 ships (12 large warships, 150 galleys, and 60 transports) under megas doux Andronikos Kontostephanos was sent to invade Egypt in cooperation with the ruler of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.[2] Historian William of Tyre was impressed by the spectacle it provided, noting the swift dromons and the large horse transports used by the navy to transport the Byzantine cavalry. The invasion failed and the Byzantines lost half (about 100 ships) in a storm on the way back.[32] In 1171, Kontostephanos with 150 ships chased off a Venetian fleet off Chios,[33] and in 1177, another fleet of 150 ships under Kontostephanos, destined for Egypt, returned home after appearing off Acre due to the refusal of Count Philip of Flanders and many important nobles of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to help.[32]

With the Normans invading the Balkans in 1185, Emperor Andronikos I prepared 100 ships in the Sea of Marmara to prevent the Norman fleet from reaching Constantinople.[34] With his brother Alexios III being held captive in Acre, Emperor Isaac II Angelus sent 80 galleys to liberate him, but the fleet was destroyed by the Norman pirate Margaritus of Brindisi. Later, another Byzantine fleet of 70 ships was sent by Isaac II Angelos to recapture Cyprus from Isaac Komnenos, but was also defeated by Margaritus.[35] In an attempt to regain some lost territories in the Holy Land, the Byzantine Emperor agreed to send 100 galleys to aid Saladin in capturing Antioch.[36]

Decline

Byzantine culture
Further information: Byzantium under the Palaiologoi

After the demise of the Komnenian dynasty in 1185 however, the navy deteriorated hopelessly. While in the 1180s, expeditions of 70-100 ships are still recorded in contemporary sources,[37] by 1196 there were only about 30 galleys left.[2] The emperors were driven to rely on the help of the Venetians, and later the Genoese: in 1187, an agreement was made by Isaac II Angelos with Venice, in which the Republic would provide 40-100 galleys at six months' notice in exchange for favorable trading concessions. Thus, when the Fourth Crusade arrived at Constantinople in 1203, there were only 20 ships, so decayed that during the siege, 17 of those ships were used as fireships in a failed attempt against the Venetian fleet.[2]

After the Fourth Crusade, there was a temporary naval revival under the Nicaean Emperors: in 1225, the Nicaean fleet was able to occupy the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Icaria. Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos laid special emphasis on the fleet. In the 1260s, the Byzantine navy was still weak, as can be seen by how a combined Byzantine-Genoese fleet of 48 ships was defeated by a much smaller Venetian fleet in 1263.[38] By 1270 however, Michael could count on a strong navy of 80 ships, with several Latin privateers sailing under imperial colours. In the 1270s, the reorganized Byzantine navy succeeded in recapturing many islands in the Aegean, including Euboea and successfully harassed the Latin states in Greece.[39]

This revival did not last long; Andronikos II Palaiologos, who succeeded Michael in 1282, wrongly assumed that by relying on the naval strength of their Genoese allies he could completely do without the maintenance of a fleet, with its particularly heavy expenditure. He therefore disbanded the navy and hired 50-60 Genoese galleys in 1291. In ca. 1320, he tried to rebuild the navy by constructing 20 ships, but this effort came to naught.[2] His grandson and heir Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328-1341) was the last emperor to actively try and rebuild the navy's strength, personally leading it to expeditions against Latin holdings in the Aegean, but his policies failed to stem the overall decline. After his reign, the highest number of warships ever mentioned to be in the Byzantine navy rarely exceeded 10 warships, but with impressment of merchant vessels, the Byzantine navy could occasionally increase to about 100-200 ships.[2] In 1349 for instance, the Emperor sent a newly-built fleet of 9 fair-sized ships and about 100 smaller ships against the Genoese, but it was captured in its entirety.[40] In 1351, Emperor John VI sent 12 ships to help Venice and Aragon against Genoa.[41] 40 years later, Manuel II was able to gather only 5 galleys and 4 smaller vessels to rescue his father John V from captivity,[42] and in 1396, Manuel armed 10 ships to assist the Crusade of Nicopolis. Later he personally commanded 4 galleys and 2 other vessels carrying some infantry and cavalry, and saved the island of Thasos from an invasion.[43] The last appearance of the Byzantine fleet was in 1453, when a fleet of 10 Byzantine and 16 foreign ships defended Constantinople against the Ottoman fleet.[44] During the siege, 3 Genoese galleys and 1 Byzantine transport fought their way into Constantinople.[45]

Organization

Early period (4th-7th centuries)

The organization of the Roman fleets in the 4th and 5th centuries is unclear. The large, permanent fleets of the early Empire had been progressively broken up in smaller squadrons, and fleets appear to have been assembled on an ad hoc basis for individual operations and then disbanded. The first permanent Byzantine fleet can be traced to the revolt of Vitalian in 513-515, when Anastasius I created a fleet to counter the rebels' own.[5] This fleet was retained, and under Justinian I and his successors it developed again into a professional and well-maintained force.[9] Due to the absence of any naval threat however, the fleet of the late 6th century was relatively small, with several small flotillas in the Danube and two main fleets maintained at Ravenna and Constantinople.[46]

Middle period (8th-11th centuries)

The naval themes

The Byzantine Empire in 717. The scattered and isolated imperial possessions around the Mediterranean were defended and reinforced by the Byzantine fleets.

In response to the Arab conquests during the 7th century, the whole administrative and military system of the Empire was reformed, and the thematic system established. According to this, the Empire was divided into several themata, which were regional civil and military administrations. Under the command of a stratēgos, each thema maintained its own, locally levied forces, while on campaign they would supplement the central imperial army stationed at Constantinople. The fleet was established along similar lines, with a central Imperial Fleet (βασιλικόν πλώιμον) at Constantinople and separate provincial or thematic squadrons provided by the maritime themes, each commanded by a droungarios (the most important were later raised to the rank of stratēgos).[22] Unlike the earlier Roman navy, where the provincial fleets were decidedly inferior in numbers and included only lighter vessels than the central fleets, the Byzantine thematic fleets were formidable fleets in their own right. The only major difference appears to have been the exclusive use of Greek fire by the Imperial Fleet.[47]

During the course of the middle Byzantine period, the large original themes were subdivided into smaller ones, and new ones were created by conquest in the 9th and 10th centuries. Although most themes that had a shoreline maintained some ships, the naval themes (θέματα ναυτικᾶ) proper in the 8th-10th centuries were three:

  • the Theme of the Carabisiani (θέμα τῶν Καραβησιάνων, "Theme of the Ships' Men", from the word κάραβις, meaning "ship"), which was the first and initially only naval theme to be established. It was created by Constantine V in the 680s, possibly from the remainders of the old quaestura exercitus[48] or the Army of the Illyricum.[49] It was headed by a stratēgos, and included the southern coast of Asia Minor from Miletus to Seleucia in Cilicia, the Aegean islands and the imperial holdings in southern Greece. Its capital was initially at Samos, with a subordinate command under a drungarios at Cibyrra in Pamphylia. After the separation of the Theme of Hellas, and a failed revolt in 727, the seat was moved to Cibyrra (and later Attaleia), being renamed into the Theme of the Cibyrrhaeots (θέμα Κιβυρραιωτῶν), under a droungarios.[50] As it faced the Arab fleets of Egypt and Syria, it was the most important and powerful of the naval themes.[22]
  • the Theme of the Aegean (θέμα Αἰγαίου), separated from the Cibyrrhaeots in 843, included the Aegean islands except for the Dodecanese.[51]
  • the Theme of Samos (θέμα Σάμου), separated from the Theme of the Aegean Sea ca. 882.[51] It included the Ionian coast, with capital at Smyrna.

Other themata with a significant naval force were:

  • the Theme of Hellas (θέμα Ἑλλάδος), founded in ca. 686-689 by Justinian II, encompassing the imperial possessions of southern Greece with capital at Corinth. Justinian settled 6,500 Mardaites there, who provided oarsmen and garrisons.[52] While not exclusively a naval theme, it maintained its own fleet. It was split in 809 into the Theme of the Peloponnese and the new Theme of Hellas, covering Central Greece and Thessaly.[53]
  • the Theme of Sicily (θέμα Σικελίας), responsible for Sicily and the imperial possessions in southwestern Italy (Calabria). Once the bastion of Byzantine naval strength in the West, by the late 9th century it had greatly diminished in strength, and disappeared after the final loss of Taormina in 902.[22]
  • the Theme of Ravenna, in essence the Exarchate of Ravenna, until its fall in 751.
  • the Theme of Cephallonia (θέμα Κεφαλληνίας), controlling the Ionian Islands, promoted from an archontate in 809.[53] The new imperial possessions in Apulia were added to it in the 870s, before they were made into a separate thema (that of Langobardia) in about 910.[54]

The manpower of the Byzantine navy in 899 during the reign of Leo VI the Wise reached 34,200 oarsmen and perhaps as many as 8,000 marines.[1] The central Imperial Fleet totaled some 19,600 oarsmen and 4,000 marines under the command of the droungarios of the basilikon plōïmon (δρουγγάριος τοῦ βασιλικοῦ πλωίμου). These four thousand marines were professional soldiers, recruited by Basil I in the 870s, and greatly strengthened the Imperial Fleet. Whereas previously the fleet had depended on thematic and tagmatic soldiers for its marines, the new force provided a more reliable, better trained and immediately available force at the Emperor's disposal.[55] The Aegean Themal Fleet numbered 2,610 oarsmen and 400 marines, the Cibyrrhaeotic Fleet stood at 5,710 oarsmen and 1,000 marines, the Samian Fleet at 3,980 oarsmen and 600 marines, and finally, the Theme of Hellas furnished 2,300 oarsmen with a portion of its 2,000 thematic soldiers doubling as marines.[1]

In 950, the Imperial Fleet stationed at Constantinople consisted of 100-150 ships, or even, according to some estimates, up to 250 ships.[56]

Rank structure

Naval themes were organized much the same way as their land bound counterparts: the droungarios stood at the head, assisted by a deputy called topotērētēs and the prōtonotarios, who headed the civilian administration of the theme. Further staff officers were the chartoularios in charge of the fleet administration, the prōtomandatōr ("head messenger"), who acted as chief of staff, and a number of staff komētes ("counts"). Squadrons of ships were commanded by a komēs or droungarokomēs, and each ship's captain was called kentarchos ("centurion"), nauarchos, or, more archaically, triērarchos or kybernētēs.[57] The marine infantry ranks followed those of the army.

Each ship's crew, depending on its size, was composed of one to three ousiai (ούσίαι, sing. ούσία) of ca. 110 men each. The rowers of the upper level were also expected to fight in a boarding action, and were therefore specially picked and equipped with light armor.[57] Under the captain, there was the bandophoros, who acted as executive officer, two helmsmen called prōtokaraboi ("heads of the ship") and a bow officer, the prōreus.[57] There were also a number of specialists on board, such as the two bow oarsmen and the the siphonatores, who worked the siphons used for discharging the Greek fire.[57]

Late period (11th century - 1453)

The reforms of the Komnenoi

After the decline of the navy in the 11th century, Alexios I rebuilt it on different lines. The thematic fleets vanished, and their remnants were amalgamated into a unified imperial fleet, under the new office of the megas doux.[29] The megas droungarios of the fleet, once the overall naval commander, was subordinated to him, acting now as his principal aide.[58] The megas doux was also appointed as governor of southern Greece (the old themata of Hellas and the Peloponnese), which was divided into districts (oria) that supplied the fleet.[59] Later, in the 13th century, another high rank, that of amiralios (ἀμιράλιος or ἀμιράλης) was introduced, being third in the hierarchy after the megas doux and the megas domestikos.[60]

Under John II, along with Greece, the Aegean islands became responsible for the maintenance, crewing and provision of warships, and contemporary sources took pride in the fact that the great fleets of Manuel's time were crewed by "native Romans", although use was made of mercenaries and allied squadrons.[29]

The navy of Michael VIII Palaiologos

With the decline of the Byzantine fleet after 1185, the Empire increasingly relied on the fleets of Venice and Genoa. Alongside the mistrusted Italian city-states, with whom alliances shifted regularly, mercenaries were increasingly employed in the last centuries of the Empire. Under Michael VIII, for the first time a foreigner, the Italian privateer Licario, became megas doux; another, the Genoese Giovanni de lo Cavo, was employed as an admiral and given Rhodes as a quasi-fief.[61]

After regaining Constantinople in 1261, Michael VIII initiated a great effort to rebuild a "national" navy, forming a number of new corps to this purpose: the Gasmouloi (Γασμοῦλοι), who were men of mixed Greek-Latin descent living around the capital; and colonists from Laconia, called Lakōnes (Λάκωνες, "Laconians") or Tzakōnes (Τζάκωνες), were used as marines, and formed the bulk of Byzantine naval manpower in the 1260s and 1270s.[62] Michael also set the rowers, called Prosalentai or Prosēlontes, apart as a separate category.[63] All these groups received small grants of land to cultivate in exchange for their service, and were settled together in small colonies.[64] The Prosalentai were settled near the sea throughout the northern Aegean,[65] while the Gasmouloi and Tzakōnes were settled mostly around Constantinople and in Thrace. These corps remained extant, albeit in a diminished form, throughout the 14th century (the last mention of the Gasmouloi is in 1422, and the Prosalentai in 1361).[2]

Ships

Further information: Dromon
A light Byzantine galley (galea) of the 10th century.

The main warship of the Byzantine navy was the dromon (δρόμων). A derivation of the light liburnian galleys of the imperial Roman fleets, the term first appeared in the 6th century, during the wars of Justinian, to describe fast ships with a single row of oars. During the next few centuries, as the naval struggle with the Arabs intensified, heavier versions with two or even three banks of oars evolved.[66] Eventually, the term was used as a general reference for "warship", and in a specific sense as an alternative name for the heaviest class of warships, the chelandion.[67]

By the 10th century, there were three main classes of two-banked ("bireme") warships: the ousiakos, so named because it was manned by an ousia of 108 men, the pamphylos, which was crewed with up to 120-160 men, and the chelandion, with a crew of up to three ousiai.[68] The largest known crew comprised 230 rowers and 70 marines.[69] A smaller, single-bank ship (the monērēs or galea, from which the term "galley" derives), with ca. 60 men as crew, was used for scouting missions.[70] Three-banked ("trireme") dromons are described in a 9th century work dedicated to the parakoimōmenos Basil Lekapenos, however this treatise, which survives only in fragments, draws heavily upon references on the appearance and construction of a Classical trireme, and must therefore be used with care when trying to apply it to the warships of the middle Byzantine period.[66] Nevertheless, it is likely that three-tiered versions of the bireme dromons existed.

Dromons were generally fully decked ships, had one to two masts (histos or katartion), and used lateen sails. Each oar bank generally had about 25 oars, which extended directly from the hull (unlike ancient Greek and Hellenistic vessels, which used an outrigger), in addition to the two large steering oars in the stern. Overall length must have been between 35 and 40 m.[71] The larger ones had elevated wooden castles (xylokastra) between the masts, and carried one to three siphons, located on the bow or amidships, for the discharge of Greek fire.[72]

For cargo transport, the Byzantines commandeered ordinary merchantmen and cargo ships, but there existed also a number of specialized vessels such as horse-transports (confusingly also called "chelandion" in some sources).[66]

Tactics and weapons

As with the land army, the Byzantines took care to codify, preserve and pass on the past lessons of warfare through the use of military manuals. The main surviving texts are the chapters on sea combat (peri naumachias) in the Tactica of Leo the Wise and Nikephoros Ouranos, and relevant passages in the De administrando imperio of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.[11]

The manuals emphasized training of the crews, the acquisition of accurate intelligence, and the maintenance of a disciplined and well-ordered formation. Advice is provided on drawing up a battle plan, but they also emphasized the need for initiative and improvisation on the part of the admiral during the actual battle.[11] On open seas, a crescent formation seems to have been the norm, with heavier ships, including the admiral's vessel, in the center and the lighter and faster ones at the horns of the formation, while a range of other tactics and counter-tactics was available.[11]

Weapons

Unlike the earlier warships, Byzantine and Arab ships did not feature rams, and the primary means of ship-to-ship combat were boarding actions and missile fire, as well as the use of inflammable materials such as Greek fire.[47] Byzantine ships were equipped with small catapults and ballistae (toxoballistrai) that launched stones, arrows, pots of Greek fire or other incendiary liquids, or even caltrops and containers of scorpions and snakes, according to some sources.[47] Marines were also armed with bows and crossbows, alongside close-combat arms such as lances and swords. Cannons were rarely used by the Byzantines, who only had a few pieces for the defense of the land walls of Constantinople. Unlike the Venetians and Genoese, there is no indication that any were ever mounted on ships.[73]

Greek fire

Further information: Greek fire
Depiction of the use of Greek fire in the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript
Depiction of the use of Greek fire in the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript

"The emperor knew that the Pisans were skilled in warfare at sea and was afraid to clash with them. Thus he ordered the construction on all the ships of bronze and iron heads of lions and other wild animals of all types, with open mouths and covered in gold leaf, so that their appearance alone was enough to spread fear. The liquid fire that was to attack the enemy would pass through the mouths of these heads, so that it would appear verily that they were vomiting forth flames..."
From the Alexiad of Anna Comnena

The term "Greek fire" was attributed to the concoction by the Latins (Westeners), as they viewed the Byzantines simply as Greeks. The native Greek name was "liquid fire" (ὑγρόν πῦρ). Although the use of incendiary chemicals by the Byzantines has been attested since the early 6th century, the actual substance known as Greek fire is believed to have been created in the seventh century (673 AD) and attributed to an engineer from Syria, named Kallinikos. The weapon was first used by the Byzantines, and the most common method of deployment was to emit the formula through a large bronze tube (siphōn) onto enemy ships.[47] Usually the mixture would be stored in heated, pressurized barrels and projected through the tube by some sort of pump while the operators were sheltered behind large iron shields. Alternatively, it could be launched by catapults. A portable version (cheirosiphōn) also existed, reputedly invented by Leo VI, making it the direct analogue to a modern flamethrower.[70]

The means of its production in the harbour of Galata was kept a state secret, and its components are only roughly guessed or described through secondary sources like Anna Comnena, so that its exact composition remains unknown to this day. In its effect, the Greek fire must have been rather similar to napalm.[47] Burning fiercely, it could stay ablaze even underwater for a short period. Despite its great destructive ability and psychological impact, Greek fire was never used on land, except during the last siege of Constantinople in 1453. The Arabs eventually also fielded "liquid fire" after 835, but it is unknown whether they used the Byzantine formula, possibly obtained through espionage or through the defection of stratēgos Euphemios in 827, or whether they independently created a version of their own.[47]

Citations

  1. ^ a b c Treadgold (1995), p. 67
  2. ^ a b c d e f g I. Heath (1995), p. 17 Cite error: The named reference "Heath17" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  3. ^ J. Norwich (1990), pp. 48-49
  4. ^ J. Norwich (1990), p. 166
  5. ^ a b c d Age of the Galley, p. 90
  6. ^ J. Norwich (1990), p. 207
  7. ^ J. Norwich (1990), p. 77
  8. ^ J. Norwich (1990), pp. 259-297
  9. ^ a b c Age of the Galley, p.91
  10. ^ Age of the Galley, pp.94-95
  11. ^ a b c d Age of the Galley, p.98
  12. ^ Treadgold (1995), p. 72
  13. ^ J. Norwich (1990), p. 334
  14. ^ J. Norwich (1990), pp. 352-353
  15. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 352
  16. ^ a b c d e f Age of the Galley, p.92
  17. ^ M. MacCormick (2002), p. 413
  18. ^ Treadgold (1995), p. 33
  19. ^ J. Norwich (1999), p. 57
  20. ^ J. Norwich (1999), p. 120
  21. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 470
  22. ^ a b c d e f Age of the Galley, p. 93
  23. ^ M. MacCormick (2002), p. 414
  24. ^ J. Norwich (1999), pp. 175-178
  25. ^ J. Norwich (1999), p. 195
  26. ^ Haldon (1999), p. 91
  27. ^ Kekaumenos, Strategikon, Ch. 87
  28. ^ D. Nicolle (2005), p. 69
  29. ^ a b c Haldon (1999), p. 96
  30. ^ J. Norwich (1996), p. 98
  31. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 643
  32. ^ a b J. Harris (2006), p. 109
  33. ^ I. Heath (1995), p. 4
  34. ^ J. Norwich (1995), p. 151
  35. ^ J. Harris (2006), p. 128
  36. ^ J. Harris (2006), p. 130
  37. ^ J. Harris (2006), pp. 128-130
  38. ^ J. Norwich (1995), p. 220
  39. ^ J. Norwich (1996), p. 238
  40. ^ J. Norwich (1995), p. 312
  41. ^ J. Norwich (1996), pp. 316-317
  42. ^ J. Norwich (1996), p. 346
  43. ^ J. Norwich (1996), pp. 376-377
  44. ^ D. Nicolle (2005), p. 45
  45. ^ D. Nicolle (2005), pp. 53-56
  46. ^ Haldon (1999), p. 68
  47. ^ a b c d e f Age of the Galley, p. 99
  48. ^ Haldon (1999), p. 74
  49. ^ Treadgold (1995), p. 73
  50. ^ Treadgold (1995), p. 27
  51. ^ a b Treadgold (1995), p. 67
  52. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 383
  53. ^ a b Treadgold (1997), p. 427
  54. ^ Treadgold (1995), pp. 33-34
  55. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 457
  56. ^ M. MacCormick (2002), p. 414
  57. ^ a b c d Age of the Galley, p. 97
  58. ^ Plakogiannakis (2001), p. 244
  59. ^ Haldon (1999), p. 144
  60. ^ Plakogiannakis (2001), pp. 245-246
  61. ^ Bartusis (1997), p. 60
  62. ^ Bartusis (1997), pp. 44-45
  63. ^ Bartusis (1997), p. 46
  64. ^ Bartusis (1997), p. 158
  65. ^ Bartusis (1997), pp. 46-47
  66. ^ a b c Age of the Galley, p. 102
  67. ^ Age of the Galley, p. 94
  68. ^ Age of the Galley, pp. 94-95
  69. ^ Age of the Galley, p. 106
  70. ^ a b Age of the Galley, p. 105
  71. ^ Age of the Galley, p. 95
  72. ^ Haldon (1999), p. 189
  73. ^ I. Heath (1995), pp. 19-21

References

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Navy of the Byzantine Empire.
  • Template:Fr icon Ahrweiler, Hélène (1966). Byzance et la mer. La Marine de Guerre, la politique et les institutiones maritimes de Byzance. aux VIIe–XVe siècles. Paris.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • Bartusis, Mark C. (1997). The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society 1204-1453. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 0812216202.
  • Gardiner, Robert (Ed.) (2004). AGE OF THE GALLEY: Mediterranean Oared Vessels since pre-Classical Times. Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 978-0851779553.
  • Haldon, John F. (1999). Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine world, 565-1204. Routledge. ISBN 1857284941.
  • Harris, Jonathan (2006). Byzantium and The Crusades. Hambledon & London. ISBN 978-1852855017.
  • Heath, Ian (1995). Byzantine Armies: AD 1118-1461. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1855323476. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • MacCormick, Michael (2002). Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce, A.D. 300-900. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521661027.
  • Nicolle, David (2005). Constantinople 1453: The End of Byzantium. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0275988562.
  • Norwich, John Julius (1990). Byzantium: The Early Centuries. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0140114478.
  • Norwich, John Julius (1999). Byzantium: The Apogee. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0140114485.
  • Norwich, John Julius (1996). Byzantium: The Decline and Fall. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0140114492.
  • Ostrogorsky, Georgije (1986). History of the Byzantine State. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-0813511986.
  • Template:Gr icon Plakogiannakis, Kimon Emmanouil (2001). Timītikoi Titloi kai Energa Axiōmata sto Vyzantio ("Honorary titles and active offices in Byzantium"). IANOS. ISBN 960-7771-57-5.
  • Pryor, John H. (2006). The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ: The Byzantine Navy ca. 500-1204. Brill Academic Publishers. ISBN 978-9004151970. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Treadgold, Warren T. (1995). Byzantium and Its Army, 284-1081. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804731632.
  • Treadgold, Warren T. (1997). A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804726302.
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