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Blackwater Fire of 1937

Coordinates: 44°24′43″N 109°44′30″W / 44.41194°N 109.74167°W / 44.41194; -109.74167
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Blackwater fire of 1937
Blackwater fire at approximately 3:45 pm on August 21, 1937[1]
Date(s)August 21, 1937
LocationShoshone National Forest, Park County, Wyoming, U.S.
Coordinates44°24′43″N 109°44′30″W / 44.41194°N 109.74167°W / 44.41194; -109.74167
Statistics
Burned area1,700 acres (690 ha)
Land useForest
Impacts
Deaths15
Non-fatal injuries38

On August 18, 1937, a lightning strike started the Blackwater fire in Shoshone National Forest, approximately 35 miles (56 km) west of Cody, Wyoming. Fifteen firefighters were killed by the forest fire when a dry weather front caused the winds to suddenly increase and change directions. The fire quickly spread into dense forest, causing spot fires which trapped some of the firefighters in a firestorm. Nine firefighters died during the fire and six more died shortly thereafter due to severe burns and respiratory complications, while another 38 firefighters were injured. The Blackwater fire killed the most wildland firefighters since the Great Fire of 1910 and was not surpassed until 2013 when 19 firefighters died during the Yarnell Hill fire.

The Blackwater fire consumed 1,700 acres (690 ha) of old growth forest dominated by Douglas fir trees on the west slopes of Clayton Mountain. At the time the firestorm occurred, the temperatures were about 90 °F (32 °C) and the relative humidity was only 6 percent. Though most of the firefighters consisted of Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) employees, they were led by more experienced United States Forest Service (USFS) fire managers. Firefighters in the first half of the 20th century used mostly hand tools to suppress wildfires and all gear was either carried by the firefighters themselves or by pack animals. Weather forecasting and radio communication was generally poor or nonexistent.

Investigations and analysis of the event led the USFS to develop a better way to provide a more immediate response to combat fires when they are first detected, and the smokejumper program was initiated in 1939.[2] Additionally, the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders, a standardized set of wildland firefighting principles, were developed twenty years later for firefighters to use when combatting fires. A year after the tragedy, survivors and their fellow employees constructed several memorials at the scene of the incident.

Geography

Blackwater Creek originates on the north slope of Sheep Mesa at an altitude of 11,400 feet (3,500 m) in Shoshone National Forest and flows north through Blackwater Canyon. The creek is 12 mi (19 km) long and descends a steep gradient before it empties into the North Fork Shoshone River, across from U.S. Routes 14/16/20 immediately west of Mummy Cave and 15 mi (24 km) east of the border of Yellowstone National Park.[3] The firestorm deaths were on the west slopes of Clayton Mountain, approximately 6 mi (9.7 km) south into the canyon.[4] The canyon consists of numerous gullies and small ridges which form a washboard landscape shaped by extensive erosion of the volcanic igneous rocks which comprise the Absaroka Range.[5] The canyon has moderate to steep slopes with a gradient of 20 to 60 percent.[6] The region has an upper montane mixed-conifer forest dominated by Douglas fir trees.[6][7] When the fire swept the area the forest was dense and mature with heavy fuel loads from dead trees, which also had dead limbs which extended to the ground providing a fuel ladder for it to easily spread into the tree tops.[6]

Early 20th-century firefighting

In 1937, firefighters did not have portable radios for rapid on-scene communication or helicopters available which could bring supplies and provide water drops. Firefighters had some access to portable water pumps but most used backpack-style pumps which were manually operated and held limited water. Firelines were dug by handcrews using shovels, axes and pulaskis; a tool that could be used as either an axe or a hoe.[8] The average firefighter wore cotton and wool clothing that provided poor protection from flames.[8] Additionally, they did not have fire shelters, which were not available until 40 years later. Later researchers believe the use of shelters might have saved some lives depending on where the firefighters were when the firestorm occurred.[8][9] The steepness and ruggedness of the terrain in Blackwater Canyon meant they had to access the fire on foot carrying all their supplies with them. Many of the firefighters were employed by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and had limited training in wildfire suppression and behavior, as the CCC was mainly engaged in construction projects. After a series of severe and deadly forest fire events in the early 20th century, officials established the 10 am rule in 1935, which recommended aggressive attack on all fires and to have them extinguished by 10 am, the day after they are first detected.[10][11] This was to try and prevent fires from remaining active late into the day when the rising temperatures generally cause fires to get bigger. A standardization of wildfire suppression training was not developed until 1951 as a response to the fatalities that occurred during the Mann Gulch fire.[8]

Firefighter deployment

Firefighters use backpack water pumps and hand tools on the Blackwater fire

The Blackwater fire was started by lightning on August 18, 1937 but remained undetected until early on August 20 at which time, it was estimated to be about 2 acres (0.81 ha) in size.[9] By the evening of August 20, it had expanded to 200 acres (81 ha) and 65 firefighters from the USFS, CCC workers from the National Park Service, Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) and members of the CCC Company 1852 from the Wapiti Ranger District of Shoshone National Forest were constructing firelines along two different flanks of the fire.[2][12] Fire officials believed they needed more manpower so CCC crews from Bighorn National Forest, 165 mi (266 km) to the east, and other districts of Shoshone National Forest and Yellowstone National Park started responding by the morning of August 21.[9][13] By early afternoon on August 21, more than 200 firefighters were on duty but the fire was then over 500 acres (200 ha). It started crowning into the treetops, and wind driven embers caused the fire to spread more rapidly. Along at least one of the small creeks which flowed into Blackwater Creek, such as the later named Clayton Creek, efforts were made to build small dams to pocket water supplies for use in backpack water pumps.[14] Due to a long overnight journey over rough roads, the Tensleep CCC members from Bighorn National Forest did not commence response to the fire until almost noon on August 20, arriving at the fireline with limited sleep.[15] Once the Tensleep CCC unit got there, they relieved the Wapiti CCC unit which had been fighting the fire since the previous evening. More than 50 firefighters commenced construction of a new fireline along Clayton Creek and Clayton Gulch, a ravine which extended east from Blackwater Creek. The construction was led by USFS Rangers Alfred Clayton and Urban Post, and their crews consisted mainly of the Tensleep CCC camp and some from other entities.[6][15]

Firefighters trapped by shift in firelines

Blackwater fire at approximately 4 pm on August 21, 1937[1]

Radio transmissions from Idaho to the base camp at the Wapiti Ranger Station in Shoshone National Forest indicated a dry weather front had pushed through and was heading east with moderate to strong westerly winds. Aerial spotting of the fire behavior was radioed to Wapiti and at 12:40 pm on August 21, several spot fires were reported near the firelines.[15] At 1 pm, the weather at Wapiti was 90 °F (32 °C) with an extremely low relative humidity of 6 percent.[6] Winds were generally from the southwest during the morning of August 21, but increased as the dry front approached at 3:30 pm with winds to 30 miles per hour (48 km/h). At 3:45 pm the wind shifted abruptly from southwest to northeast which caused increased crowning and spot fires over the firelines.[6] The wind shifted once again to the northwest and the fire front started up the drainage heading east.

Urban Post was leading the Tensleep CCC crews in and passed Alfred Clayton who had only one other firefighter with him. Post left six firefighters to assist Clayton and the other firefighter attend to some small fires that were spotting over the firelines.[6] Post then led his crews east up a ridge but looked back and saw more spot fires below where Clayton and his small crew were. Clayton also saw the spot fires and moved to suppress them. At 4 pm the spot fires started to crown and Clayton sent a hand written note to Post requesting additional manpower.[14] By the time the note reached Post, the firestorm commenced, racing east up the ravines and gullies, trapping Clayton and his crew near the dam they had built to obtain water. There, Clayton and six others died.[13] The eighth firefighter in his crew was rescued but later died at the hospital.

Post led 40 firefighters consisting of USFS, CCC and BPR employees up the ridge seeking an opening in the forest to take refuge.[16] Spot fires blew ahead of Post and his crew preventing them from advancing further up the ridgeline but they found a rocky outcropping and got prone on the ground as the fire engulfed them.[17] Crammed together on the outcropping, Post's men moved around to avoid the flames and USFS employee Paul Tyrrell (who later died) used his own body to keep several CCC firefighters from panicking and to shield them from the fire. The flames and heat nevertheless drove five CCC firefighters to try and make a run for it and they charged the flames seeking better conditions on the other side of the firefront. Of the five that ran off the rocky outcropping, only one survived.[17] A total of nine firefighters were killed on the firelines, six more later died from their injuries, while another 38 suffered various burns and other complications. The Blackwater fire is tied for fourth involving the greatest loss of life by firefighters on a wildfire in U.S. history.[18] The Blackwater fire killed more wildland firefighters than any other in the 103 years between the Great Fire of 1910 and the Yarnell Hill Fire in 2013.

Recovery

Clayton Gulch after the fire

The news of the deaths and injuries started reaching the fire camps by 6 pm on August 21, by which time the fire had calmed down as the dry front had passed and the wind had decreased. Post led his party down through the burned area and calls went out to Yellowstone National Park for medical assistance.[17] By that night another 150 firefighters and rescue personnel had reached the fire. Rescue efforts commenced as soon as reports arrived and by the time the fire was fully suppressed on August 24, more than 500 firefighters and rescue workers were on scene.[13] The fire ultimately consumed a relatively modest 1,700 acres (690 ha) but the difficult terrain and concerns about new flareups kept a limited number of firefighters at the fire until August 31.[13] By 7 pm on August 21, the first fatalities were discovered by a team led by Paul Krueger of the USFS.[13] They came upon a member of Clayton's crew, finding him badly burned and wearing only his shoes. The survivor later died but was able to direct rescuers to where Clayton and the other crew members were last seen. Shortly thereafter, Urban Post encountered the rescue team and reported that two of his party would have to be carried out and his men were too weary to do so; these two later died at the hospital. The following morning, two members of Post's crew that had tried to run through the flames were found. All those that died were recovered by the morning of August 22.[13] The rugged terrain made it necessary for the deceased to be carried out on either stretchers or slung over pack horses. The fire was still very active as the procession of pack horses carrying the recovered bodies passed through the fire camps where other firefighters were preparing to go combat the fire. After witnessing the bodies passing through their lines, many firefighters and their crew leaders were reluctant to aggressively attack the fire.[13]

Aftermath

Dedication ceremony of the Blackwater fire roadside memorial along U.S. Routes 14/16/20

The USFS investigation of the Blackwater fire incident was led by David Godwin, Assistant Chief of Fire Control for the USFS.[19] His conclusions were that the firefighters were in good physical condition and most had experience working on forest fires. Additionally, the management at the fire were all very experienced with forest fires.[19] He indicated that due to the distances involved in getting enough manpower to combat the fire while it was still relatively small, the fire wasn't contained enough to prevent the rapid spread that occurred when the weather front approached.[19] Godwin's findings indicated to most that, in conjunction with the 10 am rule of getting the fire out early in the day, rapid deployment of firefighters was critical to successful fire suppression. These findings were reinforced by A. A. Brown, head of the Division of Fire Control in the Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain Region, who studied the fire behavior and the responses to the Blackwater fire.[19]

In an era when all fire was considered detrimental and with limited studies which documented the important ecological role of fire, immediate suppression using aggressive attack was still considered the best way to protect the forests. Godwin believed that parachuting firefighters from airplanes as soon as fires were detected and as near to the fire as possible would provide the fastest way to get firefighters in place before a fire raged out of control. Consequently by 1939, the first stages of the parachuting smokejumper program were initiated at Winthrop, Washington and at two locations in Montana.[19] A later review of 16 fatal fires, from the Blackwater fire in 1937 through 1956, led managers of the USFS to implement the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders in 1957, which were later changed to FIREORDERS in 1987 with each letter designating one of the ten orders.[20]

In 1938, several monuments were erected by members of the CCC to honor those killed and injured during the Blackwater fire. The largest and most accessible is along Highway 14/16/20.[12] Another memorial was erected the same year where Alfred Clayton and his crew perished.[14] A third memorial was placed where Urban Post and his crews waited out the firestorm on the rocky ledge that was later named Post Point.[16] Clayton also had several geographic locations named in his honor, including Clayton Mountain.[21]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Kauffman, Erle (November 1937). "Death in Blackwater Canyon" (pdf). American Forests. Retrieved July 1, 2013.
  2. ^ a b "Staff Ride to the Blackwater Fire". Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Retrieved June 29, 2013.
  3. ^ "Blackwater Creek". Geographic Names Information System. United States Geological Survey, United States Department of the Interior. Retrieved June 29, 2013.
  4. ^ Clayton Mountain, WY (Map). Topoquest (USGS Quads). Retrieved June 29, 2013.
  5. ^ "Absaroka Range". Wyoming State Geological Survey. 2013. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g Brown, A.A. (2003). "The Factors and Circumstances That Led to the Blackwater Fire Tragedy" (pdf). Fire Management Today. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  7. ^ Baker, William L. (September 26, 2012). Fire Ecology in Rocky Mountain Landscapes. Island Press. p. 196. ISBN 9781610911917.
  8. ^ a b c d Brauneis, Karl (April 26–28, 2005). A Blackwater Comparison (pdf). Missoula, MT.: Eighth International Wildland Fire Safety Summit. Retrieved June 30, 2013.{{cite conference}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
  9. ^ a b c Kidston, Martin (May 18, 2012). "Deadly fire: Blackwater blaze in Wyoming remembered 75 years later". Wyoming Star Tribune. The Billings Gazette. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  10. ^ "Evolution of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy" (pdf). Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy January 2001. National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service. 2001. Retrieved June 30, 2013. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  11. ^ Omi, Phillip N. (May 23, 2005). "Institutionalization of Fire Exclusion". Forest Fires: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. p. 67. ISBN 978-1851094387.
  12. ^ a b "Stand 1 - Highway Memorial". Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g Fifield, Charles. "Memorial Number Blackwater Fire" (pdf). Rocky Mountain Region Bulletin. U.S. Forest Service. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  14. ^ a b c "Stand 3 - Clayton Gulch". Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  15. ^ a b c "Stand 2 - Trail Ridge". Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  16. ^ a b "Stand 4 - Post Point". Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  17. ^ a b c "Statement by Ranger Urban J. Post" (pdf). Blackwater Fire on the Shoshone. U.S. Forest Service. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  18. ^ "Deadliest Incidents Resulting in the Deaths of 8 or More Firefighters". National Fire Protection Association. February 2012. Retrieved June 30, 2013.
  19. ^ a b c d e Brauneis, Karl (2002). "1937 Blackwater Fire Investigation: Boost For Smokejumpers?" (pdf). Fire Management Today. 62 (2). U.S. Forest Service: 24–26. Retrieved July 1, 2013.
  20. ^ Brauneis, Karl (2002). "Fire Orders: Do You Know Their Original Intent?" (pdf). Fire Management Today. 62 (2). U.S. Forest Service: 27–29. Retrieved July 1, 2013.
  21. ^ "Decisions of the United States Geographic Board". United States Geographic Board. Retrieved July 9, 2013.
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