Identity Cards Act 2006

Add links
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 62.30.197.12 (talk) at 17:21, 12 October 2006 (→‎Timescale and implementation progress). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Enabling legislation for the British national identity card was passed under the Identity Cards Act 2006. The scheme is controversial partially because the Act allows the scope to expand far beyond the Government's stated intentions. The Government have explained little about how it will work in practice and the multi-billion pound scheme has yet to enter procurement.

Opponents claim that political opposition could be highlighted through searching the data accumulated, and blackmailed through denial of public services & licences to travel. Supporters claim that the scheme has an important role in identity management, preventing terrorism & fraud and that rights are protected by the Human Rights Act.

The cards have a lesser role than the extensive database they are linked to, which is known as the National Identity Register (NIR). The Act specifies fifty categories of information that the NIR can hold on each citizen [1], including up to 10 fingerprints, digitised facial scan and iris scan, current and past UK and overseas places of residence of all residents of the UK throughout their lives and indexes to other Government databases - which allows them to be connected. The legislation also says that any further information can be added.

The legislation also says that those renewing or applying for passports must be entered on to the NIR. It is expected that this will happen soon after the newly named Identity and Passport Service start interviewing passport applicants.

The NIR database is expected to perform a key role in the delivery of Government services over the Internet in the future [2]. Home Office forecasts also envisage that "265 government departments and as many as 48,000 accredited private sector organisations" will also have access to the database.

Timescale and implementation progress

On October 11 2006, the Government announced a timescale described as "highly ambitious" by computer experts. [3] The Home Office said they will publish an ID management action plan in the months from November 2006, followed by agreements with departments on their uses for the system. There will be a report on potential private sector uses for the scheme before 2007 Budget.

On September 25 2006, Home Office Minister Liam Byrne said that "There are opportunities which give me optimism to think that actually there is a way of exploiting systems already in place in a way which brings down the costs quite substantially" [4]

The different functions split between the NIR and the ID card have yet to be decided. Biometric data (fingerprints, iris scan and facial scan) may be recorded on the NIR itself, eventually making the card irrelevant.

Once the legislation was passed, the Government indicated their desire to get "plenty of ID cards in circulation" before the next election, to prevent it becoming an election issue [5].

This rush seems to be the reason behind an 'early variant' scheme, favoured by Tony Blair, apparently involving storing only ICAO biometrics on a temporary ID database. However emails leaked in June 2006 [6] indicate that the plan is already in difficulty, with the 'early variant' described as "huge risk".

If the Government keeps to its schedule, from 2008 everyone renewing a passport will have their details placed on the associated database - the National Identity Register (NIR). The Identity and Passport Service is already entitled to interview passport applicants and those renewing their passports and to record many of their personal details on a proto-National Identity Register.

In a compromise to get the Bill through the House of Lords, people can choose until 2010 not to be issued a card, though they will still have to pay for one, and will still be placed with their names and details on the database. Identity cards will be compulsory for anyone getting a new or renewed passport after January 1st 2010. The Government is expected to similarly force registration on drivers and anyone working with children via CRB certificates.

The Labour government's plan is that registration will become compulsory for non-passport holders and other nationals resident in the UK by 2013. It is estimated that by this date up to 80% of the working population will already have some kind of biometric identity document.

On August 4, 2006, the Commons' Science and Technology Select Committee also raised concerns about the implementation, saying that costs, acceptable technology performance levels, plans for the information technology system, the scope of the scheme, and what personal data will be revealed in use are all unclear [7].

Development

Reasons for introduction

Initial attempts to introduce an identity card were made under the Conservative administration of John Major, under Home Secretary Michael Howard. At the Labour party conference in 1995, Tony Blair demanded that ‘instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID cards as the Tory Right demand, let that money provide thousands more police officers on the beat in our local communities.’[8] This proposal was halted once the Conservatives lost the 1997 election.

A proposal for ID cards was initially revived by the Home Secretary at the time David Blunkett following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the New York World Trade Center, but was reportedly opposed by Cabinet colleagues.

However, rising concerns about identity theft and the misuse of public services led to a proposal in February 2002 to introduce an "entitlement card", to be used to obtain social security services. A public consultation process followed, which resulted in a majority of submission by organisations being in favour of a scheme to verify a person's identity accurately. However, it was clear that the ability to properly identify a person to their true identity was central to the proposal's operation, with wider implications for operations against crime and terrorism.

In 2003, Blunkett announced that the government intend to introduce a 'British national identity card' linked to a national identity database, the National Identity Register. The proposals were included in the November 2003 Queen's Speech, despite doubts over the ability of the scheme to prevent terrorism (Government polling indicated that the term 'entitlement card' was superficially softer and warmer, but less familiar and ‘weasely’, and consequently the euphemism was dropped in favour of identity cards).

During a private seminar for the Fabian Society in August 2005, Tony McNulty, the minister in charge of the scheme, stated 'perhaps in the past the government, in its enthusiasm, oversold the advantages of identity cards,' and that they 'did suggest, or at least implied, that they might well be a panacea for identity fraud, for benefit fraud, terrorism, entitlement and access to public services'. He suggested that they should be seen as 'a gold standard in proving your identity' [9]. Documentation released by the Home Office demonstrated analysis conducted with the private and public sector showed the benefits of the proposed identity card scheme could be quantified at £650m to £1.1bn a year, with a number of other, less quantifiable, strategic benefits - such as disrupting the activities of organised crime and terrorist groups. [10]

Legislative progress

The Identity Cards Bill was included in the Queen's Speech on November 23, 2004, and introduced to the House of Commons on November 29.

It was first voted on by Members of Parliament following the second reading of the bill on December 20, 2004, where it passed by 385 votes to 93. The bill was opposed by 19 Labour MPs, 10 Conservative MPs, and the Liberal Democrats, while a number of Labour and Conservative members abstained, in defiance of party policies. A separate vote on a proposal to reject the Bill was defeated by 306 votes to 93. Charles Clarke, the new Home Secretary, had earlier rejected calls to postpone the reading of the Bill following his recent appointment.

The third reading of the bill in the Commons was approved on February 11, 2005 by 224 votes to 64; a majority of 160. Although being in favour in principle, the Conservatives officially abstained, but 11 of their MPs joined 19 labour MPs in voting against the Government. The Bill then passed to the House of Lords, however there was insufficient time to debate the matter, and were unable to do a deal with the Conservatives in the short time available in the days before Parliament was dissolved on April 11, following the announcement of the next General Election on May 5, 2005 [11].

Labour's manifesto for the 2005 election stated that, if returned to power, they would introduce ID cards, including biometric data like fingerprints, backed up by a national register and rolling out initially on a voluntary basis as people renew their passports. In public speeches and on the campaign trail, Labour made clear that they would bring the same Bill back to Parliament. In contrast, the Liberal Democrat manifesto opposed the idea because ID cards don’t work, while the Conservatives made no mention of the issue.

After the 2005 election

Following their 2005 election victory, the Labour Government introduced a new Identity Cards Bill, substantially the same as the previous Bill, into the Commons on May 25. The Conservatives have now joined the Liberal Democrats in opposing the Bill, saying that it does not pass their 'five tests'. These tests include confidence that the scheme can be made to work, and its impact on civil liberties. In December 2005 the Conservatives elected a new leader, David Cameron, who opposes ID cards in principle.

The second reading of the Bill on Tuesday June 28 was passed, 314 votes to 283, a majority of 31.

At its third reading in the Commons on October 18, the majority in favour fell to 25, with 309 votes in favour to 284 against [12]. In the Report stage between the readings, the Bill was amended to prevent the National Identity Register database being linked to the Police National Computer.

In early 2006, the Bill was passed through the House of Lords committee stage, where 279 amendments were considered. One outcome of this was a vote demanding that the Government instruct the National Audit Office to provide a full costing of the scheme over its first ten years, and another demanding that a 'secure and reliable method' of recording and storing the data should be found. A third defeat limited the potential for ID cards to be required before people can access public services [13]. On the 23rd of January the House of Lords defeated the government by backing a fully voluntary scheme [14].

The committee stage ended on January 30, and the third reading of the Bill took place on February 6, after which it returned to the Commons. There, on February 18, the legislation was carried by a majority of 25, with 25 Labour MPs joining those opposing it. Following the defeats in the Lords, the government changed the Bill in order to require separate legislation to make the cards compulsory, however an amendment to make it possible to apply for a biometric passport without having to register on the National Identity Register database was defeated, overturning the Lords' changes to make the Bill fully voluntary. The Lords' amendment requiring a National Audit Office report was rejected.

The Bill returned to the Lords on March 6, where the Commons amendments were reversed by a majority of 61 [15]. The defeat came despite ministers warning that the Lords should follow the Salisbury Convention by refraining from blocking a manifesto commitment. Both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats stated generally in 2005 that they no longer feel bound to abide by the convention, while in this specific case several Lords have stated that it would not apply as the manifesto commitment was for implementation on a "voluntary basis" as passports are renewed, rather than being compulsory as passports are renewed.

Subsequent votes:

  • March 13: House of Commons - majority of 33 for Government (310 to 277) [16]
  • March 15: House of Lords - majority of 35 against Government (218 to 183) [17]
  • March 16: House of Commons - majority of 51 for Government (292 to 241) [18]
  • March 20: House of Lords - majority of 36 against Government (211 to 175) [19]
  • March 21: House of Commons - majority of 43 for Government (284 to 241) [20]

But on March 29, the House of Lords voted in favour of a new plan with a majority of 227 (287 to 60) [21]. Under this scheme, everyone renewing a passport from 2008 will be issued an ID card and have their details placed on the national ID card database. The Government has said that until 2010, people can choose not to be issued a card, though they will still have to pay for one, and still be placed on the database.

The Bill received Royal Assent and entered the statute book on 30 March 2006 as the Identity Cards Act 2006.

Historical and international comparisons

ID cards during the World Wars

Compulsory identity cards were first issued in the United Kingdom during World War I, and abandoned in 1919. Cards were re-introduced during World War II under the National Registration Act 1939, but were abandoned seven years after the end of that war in 1952, amid widespread public resentment. Opposition reached its peak with the 1951 court case of Willcock v Muckle, after Clarence Henry Willcock refused to produce his identity card. The judge in the case said that the cards were an "annoyance" and "tended to turn law-abiding subjects into law breakers".

Wartime cards were a temporary measure to combat a wartime threat and did not record information on people through a central database. The cards were of the uncontroversial form. However, being paper based and with no way to verify if the card was, in fact, real, they would be an ineffective solution today, but they were necessarily constrained by the technology available at the time.

International comparisons & developments

If introduced, Britain would become the fifth (mostly) common law country in the world to accept ID cards in peacetime, along with Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.

Whilst 21 of 24 other countries in the EU have some form of ID card, these are not necessarily compulsory, biometric, or linked to a national database. In addition these schemes may have a far lower cost than that proposed for the British ID card, and in some cases may be funded entirely through taxation rather than an individual fee.

Elsewhere, there has been a move to introduce biometrics into identity and travel documents and use them to improve the security and reliability of identity checks. The ICAO has recommended all countries to adopt biometric passports, and the United States has made it a future requirement for entering the US. Most countries have begun schemes in order to adopt biometric passports. Indeed, the EU countries are moving to upgrade identity cards across the Union with the agreement of common minimum standards for identity cards. Biometric border control systems have been established in the United States and the United Arab Emirates whilst biometric identity schemes operate in over 40 countries at present. Denmark and Switzerland are introducing biometric passports along with others. However, the Greek Government was prevented from introducing biometric border checks by their Data Protection Authority.

While most of these schemes hold limited personal information about the individual centrally in passport databases or in compulsory national population registers, there is a differing policy on whether biometrics should be held on central databases. Central databases facilitate "one-to-many" biometric checks so a person's biometric records can be checked against previous enrollees to ensure that they have not enrolled before and are not trying to create another identity.

Many other EU states have not yet stated if they plan to follow this route as they seek to improve their existing identity cards schemes, many of which are simple paper based systems. The US-VISIT and UAE border control systems hold biometric records centrally. The Filipino, Thai and British identity card schemes plan to follow this strategy while it is also an element of the controversial proposals for a new French national identity card.

A number of countries have decided not to hold biometric records centrally citing civil liberties concerns - Australia, New Zealand and Canada have rejected the idea. However, this move also raises concerns about the true reliability of such documents during the issuing process.

It has been reported in the Republic of Ireland that the introduction of the card in the United Kingdom may lead to a similar Irish scheme. The details were announced after the London bombings. The Irish Government confirmed that discussions with British counterparts have been ongoing for some time. The main motivation of this is the Common Travel Area and proximity of Northern Ireland.

In July 2005 the UK indicated that it would use its European Union Presidency (July-December 2005) to develop moves towards a Europe-wide biometric ID scheme.[22]

The system

Legal requirements

Under the law, British residents will have the following legal requirements placed upon them:

  • To an appointment to be photographed, have fingerprints taken and iris scanned, on penalty of a fine of up to £2500. Additional fines of up to £2500 may be levied for each failure to comply until the subject submits to these procedures.
  • To promptly inform the police or Home Office if a card is lost or damaged, on penalty of a fine of up to £1000, or imprisonment for up to 51 weeks. If someone found another person's card and did not immediately hand it in, they would have committed a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or a fine, or both.
  • To promptly inform the National Identity Register of any change of address, on penalty of a fine of up to £1000.
  • To promptly inform the National Identity Register of significant changes to one's personal life or any errors they have made, on penalty of a fine of up to £1000. It may also be required to submit to being re-interviewed, re-photographed, re-fingerprinted and re-scanned, or face a fine.

National Identity Register

Key to the ID Card scheme will be a centralised computer database, the National Identity Register (NIR). To identify someone it will always not be necessary to check their card, since identity could be determined by a taking a biometric scan and matching it against a database entry. Indeed, if the biometric scanners necessary to do this become widespread enough, the ID cards themselves will become rather superfluous. However, official documentation demonstrates that this is not intended and while biometric checks will be made, other card related checks will be made - for example, using a Personal Identification Number (PIN) for checking the card's validity electronically against source records.

According to the published legislation, the database will record the following information for each UK resident:

  • Personal information:
    • full name;
    • other names by which he is or has been known;
    • date of birth;
    • place of birth;
    • gender;
    • principal UK place of residence;
    • every other UK place of residence;
    • past places of UK and overseas residence during a prescribed period.
  • Identifying information:
    • head and shoulder photograph;
    • signature;
    • fingerprints;
    • other biometric information.
  • Residential status:
    • nationality;
    • entitlement to remain in the United Kingdom;
    • the terms and conditions of leave to enter or remain in the UK, if applicable.
  • Personal reference numbers etc:
    • National Identity Registration Number;
    • the number of any ID card issued;
    • any national insurance number;
    • the number of any immigration document;
    • the number of any United Kingdom passport;
    • the number of any non-UK passport;
    • the number of any document that can be used instead of a passport;
    • the number of any overseas identity card;
    • any reference number in connection with an application to enter or to remain in the UK;
    • the number of any work permit;
    • any driving licence number;
    • the number of any other designated document;
    • the date of expiry or period of validity of a document listed above.
  • Record history:
    • previous records of the above information;
    • changes affecting the above information and changes made to the Register entry;
    • date of death.
  • Registration and ID card history:
    • the date of every application for registration;
    • the date of every application for a modification of the registry entry;
    • the date of every application confirming the contents of the registry entry;
    • the reason for any omission from the information recorded;
    • particulars (in addition to its number) of every ID card issued;
    • whether each such card is in force and, if not, why not;
    • particulars of every person who has countersigned an application;
    • particulars of every notification given by him (lost, stolen and damaged cards, etc);
    • particulars of every requirement to surrender an ID card.
  • Validation information:
    • the information provided in connection with every application or modification;
    • the information provided in connection with every registry entry confirmation;
    • the steps taken to identify the applicant or verify the information provided;
    • any other steps or information used to ensure a complete, up-to-date, accurate entry;
    • particulars of every notification given by that individual.
  • Security information:
    • a PIN used in connection with applications or information provision;
    • a password used for the above purpose;
    • questions and answers to be used for security when applying or modifying information.
  • Records of provision of information:
    • particulars of every occasion on which the registry entry has been accessed;
    • particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided;
    • other particulars associated with the registry access.

A number of people argue that the NIR is more of a threat to privacy and civil liberties than the ID Cards themselves, not necessarily because of the information held in the database, but because of the potential for a wide range of bodies to cross-reference information on other databases. Others point out that the existence of the National Insurance Number as a unique identifier at present has not led to such developments and discussions in parliament have pointed to the protections in the Data Protection Act that provide safeguards with relation to the use of information and personal identifiers.

Currently, opponents claim that the closest parallel to the National Identity Register is the requirement for convicted offenders to register on the Violent and Sex Offender Register. However, the UK National DNA Database, with around 3 million profiles, is a larger database, and expected to grow at a much faster rate. All suspects arrested for an arrestable offence must give DNA samples that are permanently stored, and under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, all offences (including, eg speeding) are arrestable.

As of September 2006 it is unclear when the when the national identity register will be in place - see timescale for introduction.

Identity Registration Number

One entry on the NIR is the Identity Registration Number. The Home Office have recognised that a unique identifier is needed to connect databases together. Any data linked to your IRN is automatically linked to you. Some fear that this enables the creation of a database of unlimited detail on your private life as well as automatic scanning for suspicious kinds of behaviour.

The 1998 version of the Data Protection Act specifically excludes the Home Secretary from any of its protections against holding too much data on innocent citizens.

The Home Office Benefits Overview document [23] clearly describes how the IRN enables data sharing amongst police databases (including the Police DNA database), legal databases, and even corporate databases (including bank and travel operators). The relevant bits are quoted in a No2ID summary [24].

However supporters claim this is not actually what the text says and the legislation makes clear that information from the identity card system can only be provided with the consent of the individual, except in limited cases for the police or security services.

Penalties

Failure to inform the Government of a change of address or other personal details will result in a fine of £1,000. Fines for refusing to register have been removed until a later Bill - instead you may be denied a passport and/or other designated documents (eg driving licence). Failure to inform the Government if the card is tampered with, damaged, lost or stolen may result in a prison sentence of up to 51 weeks [25].

The Government has decided that civil rather than criminal penalties will apply. This could allow those rich enough to do so - including those supported by criminal organisations - to avoid registration and pay the fines imposed.

Voluntary vs compulsory

The current proposals are for a two-stage scheme. ID cards will be introduced on a voluntary basis, coming to be compulsory at a later date. However, from 2008 applications for new passports will require the collection of biometric data and the issue of an ID card, effectively making the cards compulsory for anyone wishing to travel outside of the UK. Recent amendments to the legislation mean that a fully compulsion stage will require a further Act of Parliament. The linking of any document to the issue of an identity card will also require a vote in each House of Parliament before being permitted in the voluntary phase.

However a number of bodies have pointed out that many people will not have this option to avoid getting an identity card in the voluntary phase. While agreeing that the scheme could make a significant contribution to achieving the aims set out for it by the Government [26], among their criticisms the Select Committee on Home Affairs pointed out that anyone needing a new passport or driving licence would be automatically added to the National Identity Register, and therefore to describe the first phase of the Government's proposals as 'voluntary' stretches the English language to breaking point [27].

There has also been speculation that motorists could be required to register for an identity card under Section 28 of the Road Safety Bill, which makes it a criminal offence to refuse to hand in a driving licence and buy a new one specified by the Secretary of State [28].

Discussions are also taking place which might lead to compulsory registration for those applying for a Criminal Records Bureau check [29].

Biometric technology

The accuracy and effectiveness of biometric technology has been dragged into the political debate around the Scheme. Many opponents of the Scheme, including a report drafted by privacy campaigners at the London School of Economics, claimed that biometric technology is ineffective. Some biometric experts have questioned whether separate biometric readings can be combined together effectively [30].

However, other experts have countered these claims, claiming that the evidence provided by the London School of Economics report was highly flawed. They and the Government point to research conducted by biometric labs in the US, UK and Germany which have demonstrated the reliability of biometric technology on a large scale. They also point to existing biometric systems - such as the US Visit system. [31] [32]

In January 2004, a six-month trial of the people's reaction to the recording process began, organised by the United Kingdom Passport Service. 10,000 people were involved in the trials

Problems with the technology forced the Passport Service to cut the trial down to three months. Opponents to the government's plans criticised this cut as reducing the efficacy of the trial and were critical that it was not a full technology trial. The Government argued that technology testing was planned later and existing research was sufficient at that time.

The trials indicate the majority of participants were comfortable with the recording process and found it better than expected. Although it was not a test of technology, 99% of the participants were able to record biometrics on the technology used but there were concerns that the technology in the trial was not as effective for some ethnic groups. link title

Universal children's database

Under the provisions of the Children Act 2004, the Government plan to create a Universal Child Database of all children living in the UK. While the aim is to help the authorities to identify and protect children at risk from abuse or neglect, some critics have claimed that it is a proto-national identity database.

Reaction

Public reaction

2003

The announcement of the scheme followed a public consultation, particularly among 'stakeholder groups' pdf. At March 2003 the government stated that the overall results were:

in favour: 2606 responses (61%)
against: 1587 responses (38%)
neutral: 48 responses (1%)

However the government has been criticised for ignoring the overwhelming majority of those replying who stated that they did not want national identity cards. The government claimed that over five thousand negative online responses through a single portal site, organised by stand, represented one lobby group so treated them as one reply, thus reversing what would otherwise have been recognised as an overwhelming vote against national identity cards. However, the Government claimed that many supportive organisations did not number their entire membership numbers in their submissions and thus, it would not be a true representation to include each individual submission by this campaign.

2004

Some polls have indicated that public opinion on the issue varies across the UK. The 2004 State of the Nation poll [33] by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust showed that opinion in Scotland was far less supportive than that in the rest of the UK. Although that trend is reversed in other polls. [citation needed]

In a poll for Detica conducted by MORI in March 2004 [34] showed that 80% of those polled were in favour of a national identity card (11% opposed), although 67% of them have little or no knowledge about the Government's proposed national ID card scheme. Furthermore, only 54% were prepared to pay for a card, with 80% unwilling to pay more that £25. 83% were in favour of carrying the card at all times, though only 44% were in favour of the police being given powers to see it on demand. 58% doubted that the Government could bring in such a scheme smoothly.

In May 2004 a YouGov poll for Privacy International [35] indicated that 61% of the population supported compulsory identity cards. However in respect of the database maintenance elements, 47% opposed the legal requirement to notify a change of address (compared to 41% in favour), while 45% were against the legal requirement to report lost, stolen or damaged cards (44% in favour). 27% of those polled were 'strongly opposed' to fines. In the under 30 age group, 61% were opposed to fines. Of those opposing the scheme (percentage unstated), 28% would take part in demonstrations, 16% would take part in civil disobedience, and 6% would prefer prison to registering.

2005

National opinion polls suggest that the expected cost of the cards affects levels of support. An estimate from the Home Office placed the cost of a 10-year passport and ID card package at £85, while after the 2005 General Election in May 2005 they issued a revised figure of over £93, which a subsequent announcement that a "standalone" ID card would cost £30. Two polls conducted by TNS at the end of 2005 amongst British Citizens and Foreign Residents demonstrated over 65% support for identity cards backed by a central database with a cost of an identity card at £30 and a passport/identity card package at approximately £100 [citation needed]. However, the research conducted by MORI in 2004 showed that only 20% were willing to pay more than £25.

A 2005 poll on the BBC web site indicated that of the nearly 9,000 voting, 17% were in favour, 83% against [36]. However, internet polls cannot be considered as being very reliable - indeed, the wording under the poll result states that results of such polls cannot be taken as indicative of public opinion.

Before the July 2005 London bombings, a Telegraph/YouGov poll [37] showed that 66% of people were opposed to the scheme if it cost £6bn and 81% opposed if it cost £10-19bn. However, the questions in such polls have often failed to reflect that the costs issued by the Government already included the running costs of the existing Passport Service [citation needed].

The NO2ID opposition group announced in September 2005 that 11,369 people have pledged to refuse to register for an ID card and will donate £10 to a legal defence fund if the Bill becomes law. In Australia, concerted opposition by organisations and individuals refusing to cooperate with their identity scheme led to it being abandoned in 1987 [38], however, more recently the idea of a national identity card has again been raised in Australia [39].

2006

In February 2006, a YouGov/Daily Telegraph poll [40] indicated that public support for the scheme had fallen to 52% (with 37% opposed), despite 60% of those polled stating that those with nothing to hide should have no objection to the scheme. It revealed that the following percentages of people thought that the scheme would:

  • 64% - cut benefit fraud
  • 62% - cut health tourism
  • 55% - cut bogus asylum-seekers
  • 43% - help catch criminals
  • 42% - will make life simpler and more convenient
  • 21% - cut chances of terrorist atrocities

At the same time, it showed that the following percentages thought:

  • 80% - determined criminals and terrorists will forge the cards
  • 74% - the scheme will be enormously expensive
  • 71% - information will be hacked or leaked
  • 61% - information will be improperly passed to foreign governments
  • 60% - will be time consuming and inconvenient
  • 55% - will contain incorrect information
  • 51% - card readers will often malfunction or read inaccurately

In July 2006, an ICM poll[41] indicated that public support had fallen further to 46%, with opposition growing to 51%:

Q1. The government has proposed the introduction of identity cards that in combination with your passport, will cost around £93. From what you have seen or heard do you think the proposal is...?

  • Very good idea 12%
  • Good idea 34%
  • Bad idea 29%
  • Very bad idea 22%

Q2. As part of the National Identity Scheme the government has also proposed that everyone is required to attend an interview to give personal details about themselves for use by the police, tax authorities and all other government departments. From what you have seen or heard do you think that this is a..?

  • Very good idea 10%
  • Good idea 31%
  • Bad idea 33%
  • Very bad idea 23%

Union reaction

On Friday June 24, UNISON, the public sector trade union whose members would be involved in implementing the cards and database, voted at their conference to oppose the Government's proposals. They plan to ask the 62 Labour Members of Parliament affiliated to the union to vote against it and claim that the scheme is an intrusion on civil liberties and not a way of stopping terrorism.

On May 25, 2005 the Transport and General Workers Union called the scheme 'an enormous, costly and unnecessary diversion'.

On 27 June, USDAW, the shopworkers' trade union, voted for ID cards. [42]

Terrorism and crime

Eliza Manningham-Buller, the current head of the Security Services is on record in her support of the introduction of identity cards, as is Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and his predecessor, Sir John (now Lord) Stevens. The Association of Chief Police Officers are also supportive.

However, in November 2005 Dame Stella Rimington, former Director General of Britain's counter-intelligence and security agency MI5, questioned the usefulness of the proposed scheme. Addressing the Association of Colleges annual conference, she stated[43]:

My angle on ID cards is that they may be of some use but only if they can be made unforgeable - and all our other documentation is quite easy to forge.
ID cards may be helpful in all kinds of things but I don't think they are necessarily going to make us any safer.
ID cards have possibly some purpose. But I don't think that anybody in the Intelligence Services, particularly in my former service, would be pressing for ID cards

Her intervention caused a good deal of controversy amongst supporters and opponents of the scheme, especially as Manningham-Buller stated that ID cards would in fact disrupt the activities of terrorists, noting that significant numbers of terrorists take advantage of the weaknesses of current identification methods to assist their activities.

ID cards will not help fight crime or terrorism. Generally, the police’s problem is not identifying those arrested but catching criminals in the first place. The terrorists responsible for 9/11 and the Madrid bombings all carried valid identity documents. Knowing someone’s identity is different from knowing how they will behave. No one can seriously tell that ID cards would have prevented the London bombings. The fight against crime and terrorism needs more police and better police work, not ID cards.Cite error: The <ref> tag name cannot be a simple integer (see the help page).

Lord Carlile and Lord Stevens

Lord Carlile was appointed on 11 September 2001 to independently review the working of British Terrorism Act and subsequent anti-terrorist laws [44]. Talking on GMTV on January 29th, 2006, he expressed his views on the proposed legislation, saying[45]:

ID cards could be of some value in the fight against terrorism but they are probably of quite limited value.
They would be an advantage but that advantage has to be judged against the disadvantages which Parliament may see in ID cards.
There may be a gain from the security viewpoint in the curtailment of civil liberties, but Parliament has to be the judge about whether the proportion is right.

However, speaking on the same programme, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, former Met Police Commissioner, argued in favour for the need for identity cards, saying they had benefits in tackling serious crimes, such as money laundering and identity theft.

Concerns

Privacy concerns

Some people are concerned about how much information the government has about its citizens. These concerns fall into two categories, generally: a person's biometric features and a history of citizen's lives.

Currently, the only way the government can legally obtain fingerprints of a citizen is if the individual is arrested. Eye scans are generally not done now. It has yet to be seen what will happen if an individual refuses to give up this information. For example, access to government services lost? Could people be arrested, as in previous cases of persons who had not broken the law, but who were not carrying identification with them?

There is also a concern about a creeping loss of privacy. Once the government has finger prints and eye scan, what will be the next thing the government asks for? Could the government ask for your DNA, or dental records? (This is banned under the current planned legislation because it requires an external biometric, whereas DNA is an internal biometric).

Benevolence of the government

One reason for these concerns centres around arguments about the benevolence of government.

Governments of a number of countries have oppressed and even exterminated sections of their population for reasons including race, religion, or political views. Within living memory such events have taken place in countries normally regarded as civilised, including the USA (racial segregation and McCarthyism), Germany (during The Holocaust), Italy (against Socialists, catholics and Jews under Mussolini), and France (against Jews under the Vichy regime). While the British mainland may have been relatively stable throughout these periods, there is no guarantee that this will continue indefinitely. Providing government with a database of information on all those in the country would make it easier, for the government as a whole, and for its civil servants to oppress citizens to lesser or greater extent. The machinery of government switches from being a servant of the people to being their master.

A second argument relates to the individuals that make up the government. Some would argue that the individuals with control are the rich and powerful. They argue that turning over this information is the equivalent of giving the information to these people. There is a fear that these people would use the information for their own purposes.

Database access, usage and function creep

Privacy campaigners have raised concerns over the uses to which the national database might be put. Intended uses so far discussed by ministers have included countering illegal immigration (for which ethnic minorites will need to be frequently asked to produce their ID) and health tourism where the government hopes to save £50 million a year.

The unique National Identity Numbers would potentially make possible the creation of a massive virtual database including the Police UK National DNA Database, GCHQ electronic surveillance database and phone and internet surfing records. Civil servants and foreign secret services would be able to access and search through comprehensive files on every person resident in the UK, including current and previous jobs and addresses, tax and finances, family relationships, health, and religious or political affiliations. With the additional integration of information from mobile phone location services, people could potentially even be tracked in real-time.

Such development may be incompatible with Article 8 of the Human Rights Act - see the the Human Rights section below.

There is also concern over who will have access to the data. Home Office consider forecasts envisage that "265 government departments and as many as 48,000 accredited private sector organisations" would have access to the database, and that 163 million identity verifications or more may take place each year [46].

Information Commissioner's concerns

One notable voice raising serious concerns over the Government's plans has been the Government's own Information Commissioner.

In a press release on July 30, 2004 (.doc file), Richard Thomas stated that:

I want to make it very clear to the public that this draft Bill is not just about an ID card, but an extensive National Identity Register (NIR) and the creation of a National Identity Registration Number (NIRN). Each of these raise substantial data protection and personal privacy concerns in their own right.
Further clarification is also needed [for] the reasons why such a large amount of information needs to be recorded as part of establishing an individual's identity.
I also have concerns in relation to the wide range of bodies who can view the record of what services individuals have used. This will enable the Government and others to build up a comprehensive picture of how we live our lives. However, individuals will not know which bodies have been accessing their personal information.

The Commissioner has also pointed out that those who renew or apply for a driving licence or passport will be automatically added to the National Identity Register, so losing the option of not registering.

In a subsequent interview in The Times newspaper of August 16, 2004 [47], the Commissioner also mentioned concerns over the children's database, the Office for National Statistics' Citizen Information Project, and the NHS National Programme for IT project, and stated that My anxiety is that we don't sleepwalk into a surveillance society, and drew a parallel to the way that governments in Eastern Europe and Spain gained too much power and information in the 20th century.

As long ago as February 2003, on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, he warned that ID cards could become a target for organised crime to steal identities and access their confidential details, adding that We are dealing with matters touching on the very nature of the society in which we live.

Human rights

On February 2, 2005, Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned the compatibility of the Bill with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private life) and Article 14 (the right to non-discrimination) [48], both of which are encapsulated with the UK's own Human Rights Act.

Ethnic minorities

The Government's Race Equality Impact Assessment pdf indicates that there is significant concern among some ethnic groups over how the Police would use their powers under an Identity Cards Act, with 64% of black and 53% of Indian respondents expressing concern, particularly about the potential for abuse and discrimination. In their January 2005 report doc on the Bill, the Commission for Racial Equality state that the fear of discrimination is neither misconceived nor exaggerated, and note that this is also an ongoing issue in Germany, the Netherlands and France.

The CRE are also concerned that disproportionate requirement by employers and the authorities for ethnic minorities to identify themselves may create a two tiered structure amongst racial groups, with foreign nationals and British ethnic minorities feeling compelled to register while British white persons do not. They also comment that the impact on those who have been living and working illegally in the UK for many years would entrench an underclass, undermining community cohesion.

According to the CRE, certain groups who move location frequently and who tend to live on low incomes (such as gypsies, travellers, asylum-seekers and refugees) risk being criminalised under the legislation through failing to update their registration each time they move due to lack of funds to pay the fee that may be charged.

ID cards will also lead to discrimination and harassment. As the Government encourage the police to detect illegal immigrants and terrorist suspects, black and Asian people will inevitably be targeted. The damage to community relations will compound an already tinderbox climate post 7 July 2005 London bombings.Cite error: The <ref> tag name cannot be a simple integer (see the help page).

Vulnerable individuals

The CRE have also recommended that more work is required to protect the interests of vulnerable individuals. For example, women escaping a violent partner or a forced marriage may be at risk if their previous names or addresses are disclosed.

Identity theft

Tony Blair said "ID cards are needed to stop the soaring costs of identity theft" in May 2005 [49]. However, security experts have claimed that placing trust in a single document may make identity theft easier, since only this document needs to be targeted [50].

Falsely obtaining such a 'secure' identity becomes very valuable because people are less likely to question its validity. This has happened in Australia, where identity theft has risen above British levels since the introduction of a widely used Tax File Number. Identity theft surrounding the Social Security Number is also a major problem in the USA. However, it can be argued that part of the problem in these countries arises from the lack of a national ID card as no positive identification exists which links one to one's unique ID number such as the Social Security Number. It is the lack of such means of identification, not necessarily the existence of the unique number itself, which promotes ID theft since there are no easily available means to verify one's SSN (such as a card with a person's SSN and photograph).

However, others claim that such comparisons cannot be directly compared with the introduction of identity cards and point out that such critiques usually offer not any alternative solutions to identity theft as it continues to grow.

Opponents to the scheme state that in order to apply for the new identity cards, existing documents such as passports will be used to prove identity; however, such identification is proficiently forged, allowing identity thieves posing as someone else to apply for cards. While new applications could be made using false documentation, existing cards and database entries would also be targets. Supporters note that such claims ignore that actual process, which allows for electronic checks of applications rather than a solely paper based system.

The NIR database would make an attractive target for computer hackers. Opponents also claim that any system involving human operators is liable to social engineering attacks, infiltration or bribery or blackmail of staff. Supporters claim that there are potential ways of organising working processes to stop such attacks.

Due to the supposed security of the British system, proving that your identity has been stolen could prove problematic. If a person's biometric information is discovered and exploited by an identity thief the subject has little recourse, since such information by definition cannot be changed or reissued.

Card tampering and forging

In addition to problems affecting the database, there may be the tampering or superficial forging of the actual biometric identity cards. In a recent case in Germany, criminals forged an ID card that included biometric data.Cite error: The <ref> tag name cannot be a simple integer (see the help page).

A number of academics also point to problems of removing human interaction from security systems. Such problems can be seen with Chip and PIN credit card systems [51]. While not a criticism of the technology itself, the work notes that operators cannot simply leave the security up to the technology and must remain vigilant in preventing suspicious behaviour.

Technology

Elsewhere, doubts remain concerning the practicability of the scheme, relying on unproven technologies such as iris scanning, and even the very best system will be liable to a small error rate. In some cases this error rate can disproportionately affect certain ethnic minorities (eg Afro-Caribbeans, for iris scanning). Existing government systems are not appropriate for the issuing to UK citizens from 2009.[52]

Costs

By the start of 2005 the expected cost of the scheme had doubled to £5.5 billion in six months [53]. Estimated running costs were revised upward by the Home Office to £584 million per year after the 2005 General Election. However, they refused to give a cost for setting up the scheme as the information was deemed commercially sensitive.

Setting out a detailed case against the ID cards in a report by Peter Lilley MP, the centre-right think tank the Bow Group suggested that the costs could easily double pdf. In May 2005 a leaked draft report by the London School of Economics [54] suggested that costs in the range £12 billion - £18 billion (double to triple the government's estimates), which for the top estimate works out at £300 per registration. Among other factors for the higher estimate was the LSE's conclusion that people may need to be re-scanned every 5 years (rather than every 10 as had previously been expected), as biometric measurements change with age.

However, supporters claim that the reliabilty of such reports has come into question, arguing that a number of important failings in the research behind the LSE costings have been revealed. In the course of Parliamentary debate, the Government has pointed out basic errors in the report. It is claimed that research demonstrated that the claim that biometrics would have to be re-recorded every 5 years does not match reputable research and was not supported by any research in the London School of Economics report, and that biometric experts quoted in the LSE reports have sought to distance themselves from its findings.

The Government has also claimed that the authors of these estimates are established opponents to the scheme and cannot be considered unbiased academic sources.

However, a number of other major government IT projects have been expensive failures yet none are as complex as the ID card scheme.

Tony McNulty, Home Office minister responsible for the scheme, has responded to this criticism by saying a "ceiling" on costs would be announced in October 2005 (BBC). There are now indications that the Government is looking at ways of subsidising the scheme by charging other Government Departments, with the implication that this would result in increased charges for other Government services to individuals or businesses [55].

As of October 10, 2005, over £20m had been spent on preliminary work [56].

In October 2006, the Government declared it would cost £5.4bn to run the ID cards scheme for the next 10 years.[57] The overall price tag will be put before Parliament in the week of October 11 2006. Most of the cost will be for the biometric passport scheme that will act as a first step to ID cards. 70 per cent of the cost will be incurred just to keep British passports up to international standards. Only about 15 per cent is to be spent on technology. Until it is clear what the government is procuring, it is difficult to define the cost. It was reported on October 12 2006 that, concerning the technology for the national biometric identity card scheme, the government expects to spend about £800m.[58]

Poor use of funds

Irrespective of the exact costs of the scheme, critics have suggested that it would be better to use any available cash to increase funding to bodies tasked with tackling the various issues involved, for example to enhance immigration controls at all ports of entry [59], or to increase the budget of MI5.

As an example of the funds involved, the disputed government 2005 estimate for the annual cost of the ID card scheme is greater than the 2006-07 funding for the new Serious Organised Crime Agency, believed to be £400m [60].

Effectiveness

The Bow Group are also of the opinion that ID cards offer a "largely illusory solution"; police have problems proving people guilty, not identifying suspects; terrorists normally conceal their intentions rather than their identities; benefit fraudsters usually misrepresent their circumstances, not who they are; and all illegal immigrants can, and most do, claim asylum whereupon they are already required to have an identity card containing their finger prints and photo.

There is also sceptiicism among opponents over the ability of the cards to help identify illegal workers. Employers are already required to check identities but in 2003 there were only two prosecutions for employing an illegal worker[verification needed]. ID cards will not thwart unscrupulous employers or suddenly turn a beleaguered Home Office into a well-oiled machine. Neither will ID cards shore up our porous borders. Countries that have ID cards still have benefit fraud.Cite error: The <ref> tag name cannot be a simple integer (see the help page).

David Blunkett himself stated that "ID Cards won't stop terrorism". His successor, Charles Clarke, said the same in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings [61], but claimed that they might help identify the perpetrators. ID card opponents have cited the failure of Spanish ID cards to prevent the Madrid train bombings as an example of the ineffectiveness of ID cards as an anti-terrorism measure.

Totalitarian drift

A further concern among some is that the identity cards scheme is just one part of an unwitting drift towards totalitarianism, a reverse in the relationship between citizen and state, and a diminution of the individual liberty for which the nation was famous. In this view, the Identity Cards Bill is only one element, others being:

Supporters of these changes claim that they are necessary due to the international terrorist threat, that any reduction in individual liberty is justified by the greater common good, and that accusations of totalitarianism are alarmist. Opponents claim that they damage the values of freedom for which the country has long stood and which citizens gave their lives to protect during World War II.

Opposition campaigns

In May 2006, NO2ID launched the "Renew for Freedom" campaign [65], urging passport holders to renew their passports in the summer of 2006 to delay being entered on the National Identity Register. This followed the comment made by Charles Clarke in the House of Commons that anyone who feels strongly enough about the linkage [between passports and the ID scheme] not to want to be issued with an ID card in the initial phase will be free to surrender their existing passport and apply for a new passport before the designation order takes effect [66].

In response, the Home Office said that it was hard to see what would be achieved, other than incurring unnecessary expense by renewing passports early [67]. However, it should be remembered that the cost of a passport is set to rise in October 2006 and nearly double once identity cards are introduced.

The Pet Shop Boys on their lastest CD, Fundamental has a protest song called Integral, referring to the state of living becoming information governed by the goverment.

See also



References

External links

News stories

Guides

Opposition groups

Alternative solutions

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Identity_Cards_Act_2006&oldid=81042938"