1994 Gambian coup d'état

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1994 Gambian coup d'état
Gambia, The-CIA WFB Map (2004).png
Map of The Gambia.
Date22 July 1994
LocationThe Gambia
Result

Coup attempt succeeds.

Belligerents
Flag of The Gambia.svg Government of the Gambia Military faction
Commanders and leaders
Dawda Jawara Yahya Jammeh

In the 1994 Gambian coup d'état, a group of soldiers led by then 29-year-old Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh seized power in a bloodless coup d'état on 22 July, ousting Dawda Jawara who had been President of the Gambia since 1970.[1]

Coup[edit]

On 21 July 1994, the USS La Moure County docked in Banjul for an international courtesy call. However, Gambian radio had previously reported that Gambian troops would be conducting a joint training exercise with the American warship. This factor is what ultimately led to the success of the coup - with the lack of a military presence and unrestricted access to military vehicles and the armory, the coup went off without a seam[2]

Taking advantage of that, the coup was set in motion the next day at 7:30 am at Yundum Barracks, a military installation 25 kilometers (15 mi) away from the capital. The protest-turned-coup was initially staged by discontented lieutenants and junior officers of the Gambian National Army including Sabally, Singhatet, Basiru Barrow, Alhaji Kanteh, and Alpha Kinteh[3]. However, Kanteg and Kinteh withdrew from the plans on the basis of their belief that the timing wasn't right for the protest [3]. Following their withdrawal, Hydara and Jammeh, who went on to rule Gambia following the coup, were brought into the plans[3]. The Gambian National Army, under the command of these Junior Officers, seized the airport, a radio station, and a power station ostensibly in a mutiny over lack of pay. Hours later, Dawda Jawara and his family fled to the La Moure County for safety. The ship left Banjul that afternoon and docked in Dakar where Jawara disembarked under the protection of American warships[4]. This mutiny, with Jawara having fled the country, left a vacuum of power in which the Coup Organizers filled with the creation of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), which went on to serve as the ruling government of Gambia until 1996, when a citizen-ruled party replaced it [5]

Discontent in the Gambia[edit]

The Coup of 1994 was rather spontaneous in nature - in fact, it was not even a planned 'coup' per say, rather it was a mutiny that eventually turned into a coup[6]. Even then, the mutiny had only been planned the night before its execution leaving much up to chance [6]. Despite the spontaneity of the actual act, the sentiments behind the coup had been developing since the attempted coup of 1981[6]. The primary complaints of supporters of the coup included the delegitimization of the government, the lack of accountability present, its overall ineffectiveness, and the corruption that riddled the government [7].

Declining legitimacy[edit]

In the 1992 election, the People's Progressive Party maintained a comfortable 58.2% of the vote, however there was a sharp decline in government legitimacy almost immediately after[3][8]. The citizens of Gambia felt that the government was no longer accountable and therefore did not represent the preferences of the votes - a result of its comfortable hold on power over the 29 years since Gambia's Independence from Great Britain [3]. This movement was spearheaded by the youth in Gambia, who felt particularly underrepresented by Jawara Regime[3]. Similarly, with the uncovering of multiple scandals involving high-ranking government official, the corruption that "riddled" the Gambian government became more and more apparent[3]. A well-known, but by no means the only, example of this involves 3 high-ranking officials who were accused of embezzling millions of dollars from Union Funds in late 1933[3]. The Jawara regime's reluctance to investigate and take action against these men, aside from seizing and auctioning their houses, made many skeptical of their complacency with the blatant corruption[3]. Domestic pressures led to the establishment of a commission to investigate the scandal in June 1994 - however, President Jawara's attempts to recover the trust of the people came too late and the results weren't released until after the Coup later that year[3]. This instance was not the only, despite Jawara's claims that "the extent of corruption under the PPP was nothing like as great as claimed by the AFRPC"[3]. An investigation in November 1994 uncovered considerable corruption and mismanagement of the government under Jawara, including accusations of tax noncompliance, the distribution of favorable lands in Banjul to the administration, overpayment of travel expenses, theft of state resources and the nonpayment of government loans[3].

The ineffectiveness of the ruling government also became apparent in the months leading up to the mutiny-turned-coup in July. Specifically with regards to the Assets Management and Recovery Commission (AMRC), which was tasked with recovering debts from Gambian citizens and government officials, where ineffectiveness was transparent and information was available to the public [3]. Citizens claimed that the government had hindered the AMRC's efforts to increase effectivity in recovering unpaid loans - a claim that was not completely unfounded[3]. Many political elites resisted these efforts, undoubtedly a result of their unwillingness to pay back their own debts[3].

Effects of the coup[edit]

Immediate effects[edit]

The coup itself came with very little public or military resistance - a stark contrast from the much more violent and bloody attempted coup of 1981[9]. Jammeh also made an announcement that he would be dedicated to improving the transparency, integrity and accountability of the Gambian government - some of the chief complaints of those participating in the coup [10]. These acts during and immediately following the coup were instrumental in Jammeh's goal to legitimize the newly instituted government and the ruling PPP (People's Progressive Party (The Gambia)) once again[11]. Further, the AFPRC also implemented starker restrictions on the press, which had considerable liberties under the Jawara regime, in order to control the news sources that might ignite opposition sentiments[12]. These restrictions led to the eventual imprisonment and exile of multiple Gambian journalists[12].

The Paradox to the Third Wave of Democratization[edit]

The Gambia Coup of 1994 came at the height of the Third Wave of Democratization in Africa - a time lasting from 1974 and into the 1990's in which many countries had began to make the transition from autocratic regimes to democratic regimes led by the people[13]. The Coup marked the end of the longest lasting democracy, and consequently the rule of the longest serving head of state, in the entire continent of Africa[14]. Despite the Gambia being the Paradox to the Third Wave of Democratization, the Jammeh regime has taken considerable steps to liberalize Gambia and "[transform it] from the backwards State it was under Sir Jawara to the rapidly developing state it is today" [15].

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ In Gambia, New Coup Follows Old Pattern
  2. ^ Loum, Momodou (April 2000). "An Analysis of the Gambia Coup of 1994" (PDF): 49.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Hughes, Arnold; Perfect, David (2006). A Political History of the Gambia 1816-1994. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. pp. 280–295. ISBN 1-58046-230-8.
  4. ^ Mwakikagile, Godfrey (2001). Military Coups in West Africa Since the Sixties. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers. pp. 25–37. ISBN 1-56072-945-7.
  5. ^ "World Atlas - About Gambia". www.traveldocs.com. Retrieved 2018-10-12.
  6. ^ a b c Saine, Abdoulaye (2009). The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994-2008. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. pp. 23–36. ISBN 978-0-7391-2921-0.
  7. ^ Hughes, Arnold; Perfect, David (2006). A Political History of the Gambia 1816-1994. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. pp. 280–295. ISBN 1-58046-230-8.
  8. ^ Dieter, Nohlen; Krennerich, Michael; Thibaut, Bernhard (1999). Elections in Africa: A data handbook. p. 420. ISBN 0-19-829645-2.
  9. ^ Wiseman, John A. (1996). "Military Rule in the Gambia: An Interim Assessment". Third World Quarterly. 17 (5): 917–940.
  10. ^ "Gambia, The". freedomhouse.org. Retrieved 2018-10-05.
  11. ^ Ihonvbere, Julius Omozuanvbo; Mbaku, John Mukum (2003). Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275975067.
  12. ^ a b Saine, Abdoulaye (Fall 2002). "Military and Human Rights in the Gambia: 1994-1999". Journal of Third World Studies.
  13. ^ Wiseman, John A.; Vidler, Elizabeth (January 1995). "The July 1994 coup D'Etat in the Gambia: The end of an era?". The Round Table. 84 (333): 53–65. doi:10.1080/00358539508454237. ISSN 0035-8533.
  14. ^ Ihonvbere, Julius Omozuanvbo; Mbaku, John Mukum (2003). Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275975067.
  15. ^ "http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook?sid=550165ad-49f0-42c2-96ab-9bb63b3f1b91@sdc-v-sessmgr01&vid=0&format=EB". web.a.ebscohost.com. Retrieved 2018-10-05. External link in |title= (help)

Further reading[edit]