Battle of Mantinea (362 BC)

For other uses, see Battle of Mantinea.

The (second) Battle of Mantinea or Mantineia was fought on 4 July 362 B.C. between the Thebans, led by Epaminondas and supported by the Arcadians and the Boeotian league against the Spartans, led by King Agesilaus II and supported by the Eleans, Athenians, and Mantineans. The battle was to determine which of the two alliances would dominate Greece. However, the death of Epaminondas and his intended successors would cost Thebes the military leadership and initiative to maintain Theban supremacy in the region. Similarly, the Spartans were weakened by yet another defeat and loss of troops. Epaminondas' death coupled with the impact on the Spartans of yet another defeat weakened both alliances, and paved the way for Macedonian conquest led by Philip II of Macedon.

Battle of Mantinea
Part of the Theban–Spartan War
Date 4 July 362 BC Location Near Mantineia, Arcadia 37.6°N 22.4°E / 37.6; 22.4 Result Theban victory
Belligerents
Boeotian League Thebes Arcadia Argos	Sparta Athens Elis Mantineia
Commanders and leaders
Epaminondas † Daiphantus † Iolaidas †
Strength
25,000–30,000 men	20,000 hoplites 2,000 cavalry
class=notpageimage| Location of the battle near Mantinea

Image of Battle of Leuctra Troop formation of Spartan and Theban camps.

Background

During the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), Thebes allied with the Spartans against Athens. After Sparta's victory against Athens, the Thebans were told that their forts were to be garrisoned by Spartan troops. This decision changed the relationship between Thebes and Sparta from one of allyship to one of occupation by the Spartans. Greek General and Statesman Epaminondas (in some sources spelt Epameinondas) headed a revolt against the garrison of Spartan troops in Boeotian territory in 378 B.C. A final blow to Spartan hegemony occurred during the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. This was because Epaminondas stacked his left flank 50 men deep with elite Theban Soldiers of the Sacred Band led by General Pelopidas in anticipation that the Spartans' strongest soldiers would traditionally be stacked on the right flank. This strategy proved fruitful for Thebes as the war cost the lives of many Spartans, including King Cleombrotus. The battle of Leuctra "led, undeniably, to a wholly different world, in which the Spartans were badly weakened and Thebans wildly emboldened."

After the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. had shattered the foundations of Spartan hegemony, Thebes' chief politician and general Epaminondas attempted to build a new hegemony centered on his city. General Epaminondas had served both as a statesman and a Theban general from 420 B.C. to his death during battle in 362 B.C. Epaminondas had been highly regarded for his military prowess and his tendency to promote virtues such as simplicity and perseverance. The historian Diodorus Siculus made claim that after the Battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas "became the foremost man, not only of Thebes, but of all who lived in his time". Due to the high regard from his subjects and recent military victory, Epaminondas sought to continue to expand and establish Theban supremacy. Consequently, the Thebans had marched south into the area traditionally dominated by the Spartans and set up the Arcadian League, a federation of city-states of the central Peloponnesian plateau to contain Spartan influence in the Peloponnese and thereby maintain overall Theban control. In years prior to the Battle of Mantinea, the Spartans had joined with the Eleans (a minor Peloponnesian people with a territorial grudge against the Arcadians) in an effort to undermine the League. When the Arcadians miscalculated and seized the Pan-Hellenic sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia in Elis, one of the Arcadian city-states, Mantinea detached itself from the League. The Spartans and Eleans joined the Mantineans in a military attack on the Arcadian League. Athens decided to support the Spartans, as they resented the growing Theban power. The Athenians also recalled that at the end of Peloponnesian War, the Thebans had demanded that Athens be destroyed and its inhabitants enslaved; the Spartans had resisted these demands. An Athenian army was sent by sea to join the Spartan-led forces, in order to avoid being intercepted on land by Theban forces. Epaminondas then led a Theban army into the Peloponnese to restore order and re-establish Theban/Arcadian hegemony there.

Theban Hegemony, Battle of Mantineia

Battle

The two armies met near Mantinea in 362 B.C. The Spartans, Athenians, Eleans and Mantineans were led by the Spartan king, Agesilaus II, who was assisted by Podares of Mantinea and Cephisodorus of Marathon, the commander of the Athenian cavalry. The Theban army also included contingents from city-states of the pro-Theban Boeotian League. Epaminondas' Thebans were assisted by the Arcadians loyal to the League, principally those from the city-states of Megalopolis (founded by the Thebans when they were last in the Peloponnese, as the Arcadian federal capital) and Tegea (the traditional leading city-state of the Arcadians). Though both generals were highly competent, Epaminondas prevailed at Mantinea. Using a modified version of the tactics he had successfully pioneered at Leuctra, he organised the Boeotian troops on the left wing of his army into an unusually deep column of hoplites. This formation of troops, in conjunction with the echelon, sought to establish local superiority of numbers while delaying the battle on the weaker center and right side. This tactic allowed the large, dense section of the line to force its way through the thinner classical phalanx. Epaminondas personally led this column from the front line. Xenophon (Hellenika 7.5.23) described the left wing of that Theban army as "like a trireme, with the spur of the prow out in front."

The Theban cavalry and light infantry drove off the enemy cavalry. The Theban hoplites marched in a column across the face of the enemy line, then performed a smart wheel and crashed into the enemy right, where the Mantineans were positioned. The Mantinean leader Podares offered heroic resistance, but when he was killed, the Mantinean hoplites fled the field. However, in the thick of the fighting, Epaminondas was mortally wounded when facing the Spartan phalanx by a man variously identified as Anticrates, Machaerion, or Gryllus, son of Xenophon. The Theban leaders Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him, were also killed.

The death of Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea

According to Polyaenus, after the battle, the Mantineians wanted to send heralds to the Thebans in order to make an agreement about carrying off the dead, but Cineas persuaded them against such an action.

Aftermath

Depiction of Epameinondas

Thebes was struck a heavy blow to their supremacy despite the victory on the battlefield because Epaminondas had been slain. On his deathbed, Epaminondas, upon hearing of the deaths of his fellow leaders, instructed the Thebans to make peace, despite having won the battle. Without his leadership and military capabilities, Theban hopes for hegemony faded. The Spartans, however, having again been defeated in battle, were unable to replace their losses. Since many elite Spartan warriors were slain during the battle, Sparta's military strength was greatly weakened by the conflict. This was because it would take years of training, experience, and resources to produce the seasoned veterans lost in the battle, thus the remnants of the military were left in the hands of the less experienced. The ultimate result of the battle was to pave the way for the Macedonian rise as the leading force who subjugated the rest of Greece by exploiting the weakness of both the Thebans and the Spartans. This was because from 368–365 B.C. Phillip II of Macedon was held captive in Thebes, in which he became mentored by Epaminondas. Under Epaminondas' wing, Phillip was able to earn a military education in Epaminondas' successful unconventional (at the time) styles of warfare. In 364 B.C., Phillip returned to Macedon. Thereafter he would utilize his military skills to dominate Greece.

References

• Anderson, J.K. (1970). Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 221–224. doi:10.7591/9781501734915. ISBN 0-520-01564-9.
• Buckler, John (1980). The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 206–219. ISBN 0-674-87645-8.
• G. S. Shrimpton (1971). "The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature". Phoenix. Classical Association of Canada. 25 (4): 310–318. doi:10.2307/1088061. JSTOR 1088061.
• Isocrates. "Isocrates, To Philip George Norlin, Ed." Translated by George Norlin, 346AD. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech&highlight=epaminondas.
• Mackil, Emily Maureen. Creating a common polity: Religion, economy, and politics in the making of the Greek Koinon. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2023.
• Siculus, Diodorus. "Diodorus Siculus, Library." http://www.perseus.tufts.edu, 6n.d.. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084%3Abook&highlight=epaminondas.
• Xenophon. "Xenophon, Hellenica Carleton L. Brownson, Ed." Xenophon, Hellenica, 35n.d.. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0206%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D5%3Asection%3D26.

External links

• Hellenika 7.5.23 on Perseus Xenophon