Andreas Papandreou

Andreas Papandreou
Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου
Papandreou in 1968
Prime Minister of Greece
In office 13 October 1993 – 22 January 1996
President	Konstantinos Karamanlis Kostis Stephanopoulos
Preceded by	Konstantinos Mitsotakis
Succeeded by	Costas Simitis
In office 21 October 1981 – 2 July 1989
President	Konstantinos Karamanlis Christos Sartzetakis
Preceded by	Giorgos Rallis
Succeeded by	Tzannis Tzannetakis
Leader of the Opposition
In office 11 April 1990 – 13 October 1993
Preceded by	National Union government
Succeeded by	Miltiadis Evert
In office 2 July 1989 – 23 November 1989
Preceded by	Konstantinos Mitsotakis
Succeeded by	National Union government
In office 28 November 1977 – 21 October 1981
Preceded by	Giorgos Mavros
Succeeded by	Giorgos Rallis
President of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
In office 3 September 1974 – 23 June 1996
Preceded by	Position established
Succeeded by	Costas Simitis
Member of the Hellenic Parliament
In office 17 November 1974 – 23 June 1996
In office 16 February 1964 – 21 April 1967
Personal details
Born	(1919-02-05)5 February 1919 Chios, Greece
Died	23 June 1996(1996-06-23) (aged 77) Athens, Greece
Political party	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Spouses	Christina Rasia ​ ​ (m. 1941; div. 1951)​ Margaret Chant-Papandreou ​ ​ (m. 1951; div. 1989)​ Dimitra Liani ​ (m. 1989)​
Children	George Sofia Nikos Andrikos Emilia
Parents	Georgios Papandreou (father) Sofia Mineico (mother)
Alma mater	University of Athens Harvard University
Awards	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella the Catholic (1983) Star of People's Friendship (1985)
Signature
Website	Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation
Military service
Branch/service	United States Navy

Andreas Georgiou Papandreou (Greek: Ανδρέας Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου, pronounced [anˈðreas papanˈðreu]; 5 February 1919 – 23 June 1996) was a Greek academic and economist who founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and served three terms as prime minister of Greece.

Papandreou was born in 1919, the son of Georgios Papandreou. In 1938, in his early 20s, Papandreou left Greece for the United States to escape the Metaxas' dictatorship (1936–1941) and became a prominent academic. Papandreou returned to Greece in 1959 after years of resisting his father's entreaties. His father, who was now Prime Minister of Greece, wanted him to return so that he could prepare him as his successor. However, Papandreou's rapid ascension, together with his uncompromising radical rhetoric only amplified Greece's post-civil war political instability, which created the conditions for a group of colonels to stage a coup d'etat and rule Greece for seven years.

Papandreou was exiled during the Greek Junta, with many, even his father, blaming him for the fall of democracy. While in exile, Papandreou developed and spread an anti-American, conspiratorial narrative of past events, in which he was a victim of larger forces. On his return in 1974, Papandreou created PASOK, the first organised Greek socialist party. Papandreou's populist rhetoric resonated with the Greek people who sought a break from the politics of the past, along with the mounting pressure from the 1970s energy crisis. PASOK won the elections in 1981 and Papandreou began to implement a transformative social agenda, expanding access to education and healthcare, reinforcing workers' rights, and passing a new family law that elevated the position of women in society and the economy. He also secured official recognition of the communist resistance groups in the Greek Resistance making it easier for communist refugees from the Greek Civil War to return. His governance, however, was tarnished by numerous corruption scandals, a soft stance on terrorism, damage to democratic institutions, a public divorce and subsequent marriage to an air stewardesses half his age, controversial foreign policy decisions, and a constitutional crisis which he had instigated. Under Papandreou, the Greek economy diverged from the European average as a result of large-scale patronage, misuse of European Union funds, and excessive foreign borrowing, which resulted in Greece earning the reputation of Europe's "black sheep."

Papandreou died in 1996 at the age of 77. He had transformed Greece's post-junta liberal democracy into a "populist democracy" that continues to resonate with many Greeks. His son, George Papandreou became the leader of PASOK in February 2004 and, in part invoking his father's memory, was elected prime minister in 2009.

Personal life and family

Papandreou was born on 5 February 1919 on the Greek island of Chios, the son of Zofia (Sofia) Mineyko (1883–1981) and Greek liberal politician and future prime minister George Papandreou. His maternal grandfather was Polish-Lithuanian-born public figure Zygmunt Mineyko, and his maternal grandmother was Greek. Before university, he attended Athens College, a private school in Greece. He attended the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens from 1937 until 1938 when, during the dictatorship led by Ioannis Metaxas, he was arrested for purported Trotskyism. Following representation in court by his father, Papandreou gained an exit visa through family connections, and once he arrived in New York, he asked for political asylum based on the imprisonment by the Metaxas regime.

Papandreou was married to Christina Rasia from 1941 to 1951. In 1948, he entered into a relationship with Margaret Chant a journalism student at University of Minnesota where he was a professor. After both Chant and Papandreou obtained a divorce from their spouses, they were married in 1951. They had three sons and a daughter. Papandreou also had, with Swedish actress and TV presenter Ragna Nyblom, a daughter out of wedlock, Emilia Nyblom, who was born in 1969 in Sweden. Papandreou divorced his second wife Margaret Chant-Papandreou in 1989, and married Dimitra Liani who was 37 years his junior.

Papandreou died on 23 June 1996. The government declared four days of national mourning, and at his funeral procession produced crowds of "hundreds of thousands." His will shocked the public because he left everything to his 41-year-old third wife and left nothing to his family by the second wife, whom he married for 38 years, and their four children, or the illegitimate Swedish daughter.

Academic career

In 1943, Papandreou received a PhD degree in economics from Harvard University under the thesis advisor William L. Crum. Immediately after earning his doctorate, Papandreou joined America's war effort and volunteered to serve in the US Navy; after his basic training in the Great Lakes Naval Training in Illinois, he spent 15 weeks to qualify as a hospital corpsman at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. Papandreou's skills in maths were recognized by an American admiral who placed him in a statistical control unit planning the Okinawa invasion. He returned to Harvard in 1946 and served as a student advisor until 1947, when he received an assistant professorship at the University of Minnesota. Papandreou became a visiting professor at Northwestern University for 1950–1951, and in 1956, he accepted a tenured teaching position at the University of California, Berkeley (where he became chair of the Department of Economics later on). While in exile, Papandreou worked at Stockholm University for a year and then at York University in Toronto until 1974.

Political career

Pre-Junta era (1959–1967)

Entry into politics

Andreas Papandreou started his career as an academic economist and achieved considerable fame in his field. While he was chair of the department at Berkeley, he was pressured by his father to return to Greece to groom him as his successor. He initially resisted his father's requests. However, he eventually returned to Greece in 1959, where he headed an economic development research program by invitation of Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis. In 1960, he began leading the Athens Economic Research Center, and advising the Bank of Greece.

Initially, Andreas Papandreou developed an ideology shaped by the progressive liberalism from his years in the US, aiming to gain support from the non-communist, left-leaning electorate. He viewed this as the only viable path to help his father ascend to the position of Prime Minister. Central to his vision was a call for social and economic modernization, pursued through the creation of a mass-based political party. At first, American officials hoped that Andreas Papandreou would be a stabilizing force in Greek politics, and he received funding from the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation to promote projects aligned to liberal internationalism. Over time, however, he steadily moved away from progressive liberalism and adopted a fierce populist rhetoric, where the king, the armed forces, and the Americans are described as having "vested interests" not in the best interests of the Greek people.

Center Union rise and conflicts

The 1963 Greek legislative election brought George Papandreou, head of the Center Union, to prime minister. Andreas Papandreou became chief economic advisor, renounced his American citizenship, and was elected to the Greek Parliament in the 1964 Greek legislative election. He immediately became the assistant Prime Minister and leader of the party's left wing. Andreas Papandreou's rapid ascension, orchestrated by his father, created displeasure among members of the Center Union party. In 1965, Constantine Mitsotakis, a Center Union member, raised nepotism concerns in a newspaper interview, "leadership... is neither bestowed nor is it inherited." The discontent of the members of the Center Union increased as Andreas Papandreou's influence grew to the point that his father started to ignore his own Cabinet on critical political decisions.

Both Papandreous advocated for the liberalization of Greek society, which was rapidly urbanizing, resulting in large salary increases for police, judges, and teachers. However, seeds of resentment towards the Papandreous grew among the military as they were excluded from salary increases. Moreover, the Papandreous made a faint attempt to gain military control, which alarmed many officers without weakening them. The latter created friction with the king, who wanted to remain in command of the army and not the elected government. Papandreou's government also released all the political prisoners as a first step towards healing wounds from the civil war.

In foreign policy, Andreas Papandreou criticized the presence of American military and intelligence in Greece by describing Greece as a colony of the United States and publicly taking a neutral stand in Cold War. Andreas Papandreou's rhetoric intensified after his father's visit as Prime Minister to Washington with President Johnson in July 1964 to discuss the Cyprus dispute. This criticism became politically turbulent with his interview on October 4th, resulting in his sudden but temporary resignation.

Disturbing the political balance

Andreas Papandreou's public attacks against the king and the Americans greatly disturbed the political balance. The conservatives feared that Andreas Papandreou was a secret Communist, leading them to another civil war. The US embassy officials, sensitive to these public attacks during the Cold War, and his father repeatedly requested Andreas Papandreou tone down his emotive rhetoric. Despite promises that he would do so, Andreas continued actively campaigning, further deepening divisions and prolonging the political instability in the pre-1967 coup period.

Weeks before the coup, his father apologized to the US ambassador Phillips Talbot for his son's behavior, explaining that his son "would like nothing better than to be arrested" as he would "relish the role of martyr", adding that if he were not his son, then he would have been expelled from Center Union. Andreas Papandreou increasingly became the target of ultra-rightists who feared that, following any new elections, which the nearly 80-year-old Georgios Papandreou would likely win, his son would be the actual focus of power in the party.

Iouliana

In 1965, Andreas Papandreou was accused in the Aspida scandal within the Hellenic Army. In response, his father decided to remove the defense minister and assume the post himself to protect his son from investigations. The King, Constantine II of Greece, refused to endorse this move since this would create a conflict of interest, which forced George Papandreou's resignation; the events following this became known as the Iouliana in 1965. For the next twenty-two months, there was no elected government, and hundreds of demonstrations took place, with many being injured and killed in clashes with the police. The King tried to lure members of the Center Union party to his side and form a government. He temporarily succeeded in bringing 45 members to his side including Mitsotakis, who later were called 'apostates' by the side supporting Papandreous. To end the political deadlock, his father attempted a more moderate approach with the King, but Andreas Papandreou publicly rejected his father's effort and attacked the whole establishment. This attracted the support of 41 members of the Center Union in an effort designed to gain the party's leadership and prevent any compromise. As the politicians were unable to sort out their differences, rumors of a military coup intensified and before the next election took place, anti-Communist Colonels led the Greek military junta of 1967–1974.

Junta and exile (1967–1974)

Further information: Greek junta and Turkish invasion of Cyprus

Andreas Papandreou in 1968.

When the Regime of the Colonels led by Georgios Papadopoulos seized power in April 1967, Andreas Papandreou was captured and charged with treason. His political colleagues, including his father, blamed him as the person primarily responsible for the fall of Greek democracy. Gust Avrakotos, a Greek-American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer assigned to Athens, told the Colonels that the U.S. Government wished for Andreas Papandreou to be allowed to leave the country with his family. Unofficially, however, Avrakotos warned them that he'll be back if you don't execute him. Under heavy pressure from American officials and academics, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, a friend of Andreas Papandreou since their Harvard days, the military regime released Andreas Papandreou on Christmas Day 1967 on condition that he leave the country. He then moved to Sweden with his wife, four children, and mother, where he accepted a post for one year at Stockholm University. Afterward, he moved to University of Toronto, where he stayed until 1974.

Andreas Papandreou in an anti-dictatorial rally, Netherlands, 1968

In exile, Andreas Papandreou was a political pariah and was excluded from the political forces seeking to restore democracy in Greece. In the beginning, he actively campaigned, relying on his American network for a US intervention to bring down the junta, but then changed his mind and favored military resistance. Papandreou publicly accused the CIA of being responsible for the 1967 coup and became increasingly critical of the US administration, often stating that Greece was a US "colony" and a Cold War "garrison state."

In 1968, Andreas Papandreou formed an anti-dictatorship organization, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), which sought to 'violently overthrow' the military regime. Reacting to the creation of PAK, his father added: "Political leaders do not head up conspiratorial organizations" and urged his son to work within the Central Union party. George Papandreou, who was under house arrest since the coup and already at an advanced age, died in 1968; Andreas Papandreou was not allowed by the junta regime to attend his father's funeral.

In the early 1970s, during the latter phase of the dictatorship in Greece, Andreas Papandreou opposed the process of political normalization attempted by Georgios Papadopoulos and his appointed Prime Minister, Spyros Markezinis. Overall, Papandreou's rhetoric found little response in Greece and whose activities contributed little to the downfall of the junta, which in effect collapsed because of the poor handling of the events leading to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974.

Return to Greece, Restoration of democracy (1974–1981)

Further information: Metapolitefsi, PASOK, and European Union

We are announcing today the inauguration of a new political movement, a movement which we believe represents the desires of and needs of the average Greek: the farmer, the worker, the craftsman, the salaried worker, and our courageous and enlightened youth. The movement belongs to them, and we will call on every exploited Greek to strengthen our ranks, to form cadres and participate in the molding of the movement in order to promote our national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation, and democracy in all phases of public life.

—Papandreou announcing the creation of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement on 3 September 1974.

The logo of PASOK in the elections of 1981.

Establishing PASOK

Papandreou returned to Greece after the fall of the junta in 1974, during metapolitefsi. The dominant and leading political figure in Greece was Karamanlis with his new political party New Democracy, while Papandreou continued to have the stigma of past events. On 6 August 1974, Papandreou dissolved PAK in Winterthur, Switzerland, without announcing it publicly. He was offered the leadership of his father's old party, which had evolved into Centre Union – New Forces. However, he turned it down by rejecting his father's ideological heritage as a Venizelist liberal, declaring himself a democratic socialist. Instead, he formed a new 'radical' party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) on 3 September 1974. Most of his former PAK companions, as well as members of other leftist groups such as the Democratic Defense joined the new party. The founding charter of PASOK advocated social liberation, a radical re-orientation of the country's foreign policy, Greek withdrawal from NATO, the closure of the US military bases, and rejection of the option of membership of the EEC, which was dismissed as a capitalist club. In 1974 elections, PASOK received 13.5% of the vote.

Opposition to the Constitution

A new Constitution, adopted by Parliament and promulgated on 11 June 1975, established a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state. In the new constitution, the majority of powers resided upon the prime minister, with the president having sufficient powers to guard the constitution. Papandreou boycotted the promulgation of the constitution and publicly described it as "totalitarian", advocating instead for a "socialist" constitution without explaining what he meant. Papandreou's attacks sharpened upon the initiation of talks for the entry of Greece into the EEC, accusing the politicians and the democratic institutions of Greece of "national betrayal."

Rise in popularity

Papandreou was able to salvage his political career by doubling down on his polarizing pre-junta-developed ideology by combining it with nationalist elements, which was assisted by three major events. First, the US interactions with the junta after the coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus reinforced in the imagination of the Greek populace the conspiratorial involvement of the US in the Colonels' junta, and thus, Papandreou depicted himself and his father as victims of larger forces. Second, the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 deeply affected the Greek economy, and the inability of Karamanlis' governments after the democratic restoration to address the rising economic problems further increased the frustration of the Greek population. Third, Karamanlis, the dominant political figure in bringing democracy back to Greece, became President of Greece in 1980, leaving a power vacuum in the upcoming elections of 1981. Papandreou promised a wide range (some unrealistic) changes, encapsulated in the PASOK's slogan "Change" (Greek: Αλλαγή), which resonated with the Greek people who sought a break from the politics of the past. In 1977 elections, PASOK received 25.3% of the vote, doubling in size from 1974, and Papandreou became the leader of the opposition.

Greece's entry in EEC

The radical and uncompromising positions (mostly anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-EEC) of Papandreou, along with his rising popularity, renewed fears of another military coup in the Right and Greece's allies. After the 1977 elections, Karamanlis toured the European capitals, urging for Greece's quicker entry into EEC as this may reduce the temptation for military intervention if Papandreou implements his promises once in power. Foreign leaders agreed with Karamanlis on a plan for Greece's entry to EEC. Papandreou started to soften his tone without abandoning his initial positions. Specifically, he called for a referendum regarding the entry to EEC after 1977 as he was trying to win over the crucial share of the vote from the centrist Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK) after its disintegration from its performance in the elections of 1977, and the entry to EEC was becoming positively popular among the Greeks. Papandreou frequently stated in his campaigns prior 1981 elections regarding the entry to EEC:

PASOK believes that the crucial matter of our accession to the EEC cannot be decided without a referendum.

However, placing the entry to EEC in a referendum was impossible since only the President can do this according to the Greek constitution of 1975 and Karamanlis, as President, would not have permitted this. Legislation to ratify the entry to EEC was passed in the Greek Parliament on 28 June 1979, with PASOK and the Communist Party leaving the chamber. Greece entered the EEC as its tenth member in January 1981, and in the eyes of allies, Karamanlis, as President, would act as a restraining factor on radical departures in foreign and domestic affairs. In the elections of October 1981, Papandreou won by a landslide with 48.1% of the vote.

Leading the "Change" (1981–1985)

Our basic target is a self-sufficient economic and social development, using all the productive forces in combination with a fairer distribution of the national income and wealth... We seek the gradual reform of the structures of the economy so that the basic economic choices are made by the society as a whole. The strategic sectors of the economy must come under substantial social control without overlooking the positive role of private initiative. The crisis in the capitalist system on a world scale, with ever-increasing unemployment and inflation, intensified international competition, the increase in the degree of concentration and the monopolistic structure of many branches, have made the traditional means of economic policy ineffective.

—Papandreou, in his first appearance in the Greek Parliament as the prime minister on 22 November 1981.

PASOK's 1981 landslide victory over the conservative New Democracy party made Papandreou Greece's first socialist prime minister. It marked a milestone as PASOK was the first non-communist party with a mass-based organization, ushering in new political and social participation. Supporters celebrated the victory, while conservatives feared the impact of Papandreou's radical positions. However, by the end of his first term, Papandreou moderated his approach by making considerable U-turns, either by choice or due to dysfunction of his governments (see Government style). His administration passed important social legislation, updating laws from the pre-junta era to align with Greece's more liberal society. However, his social policies further enhanced the country's economic problems, compounded by the 1970s oil crisis and Greece's integration into the EEC.

EEC

Andreas Papandreou in Athens European Council – 1983. (1st row L-R) Bettino Craxi, Wilfried Martens, Gaston Thorn, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, Andreas Papandreou, and Helmut Kohl.

Papandreou abandoned his campaign promise of placing Greece's entry to the EEC in a referendum and instead submitted a memorandum to the EEC with a list of demands in March 1982. The memorandum effectively pleaded for special treatment and financial support based on Greece's "peculiarities." EEC delayed its response until after the date at which Greece could opt out of her entry into the EEC and then rejected the Greek memorandum in March 1983. However, the EEC promised support via the newly created "Integrated Mediterranean Programs", and Papandreou declared victory. Greece started to become more dependent on the EEC funding, and by 1989, the EEC's support had reached 4.5% of Greece's GDP. In March 1985, Papandreou stated that Greece would remain in EEC for the foreseeable future because "the cost of leaving would be much higher than the cost of staying"; there was little reaction from PASOK members.

Economy in the early 80's

Upon taking office, Papandreou’s government introduced extensive wealth redistribution policies, expanding aid for the unemployed and low-wage earners. Public pension spending nearly doubled from 1980 to 1985, while manufacturing wages rose by 10% and the minimum wage jumped 32% in 1982. Social welfare, healthcare, and insurance spending increased, credit became more accessible, and labor laws were strengthened. A national unemployment support system was established, and public consumption and investment grew by 7% and 10%, respectively, between 1982 and 1985.

Greek debt over GDP (%) in 1974–2000 period. The colored regions approximately highlight the prime minister's reigns; for 1989–1990, there was no stable government due to Papandreou's change in electoral law. In 1981, Papandreou changed the course of the economy by making it more dependent on foreign borrowing. The dataset is from the International Monetary Fund website [1].

Papandreou's pro-worker policies, combined with anti-capital rhetoric hindering foreign investment and failure to address structural economic issues like limited growth and high inflation, burdened companies in Greece. Companies in Greece already had competitiveness issues and diminished profits due to the oil crisis in the 70s, and they were now exposed to European competition. Several multi-national companies left Greece, such as Esso, Ethyl, Pirelli, and Goodyear. Shipyards and associated industries employing thousands of workers shuttered. Companies not already bankrupted encouraged early retirement, further burdening the Greek state, which had to assist the insurance funds. In 1983, PASOK nationalized numerous industries by establishing a restructuring business agency, "Industrial Reconstruction Organisation." However, these companies continued to operate at a loss without increasing productivity, effectively turning nationalization of the economy into patronage. Agriculture also struggled, as Greece shifted from a trade surplus in agricultural products to a deficit by 1986, partly due to artificially high wages that led to labor shortages. By the end of his first term, Papandreou recognized the lack of productivity and increased trade deficits, admitting that "we consume more than we produce."

Nationalization added to Greece's debt, with the Bank of Greece on the brink of collapse. Recovery started once EEC support arrived in Greece. However, growth remained sluggish mainly due to corruption and clientelism (see more on Papandreou's populism and patronage). Unemployment had risen sharply from 2.8% in 1980 to approximately 8% by the end of his first term. Papandreou did not introduce progressive tax reform to increase the state's revenues to address the increasing budget deficits due to his policies, and instead, he used foreign loans. As the foreign debt increased, so did the external debt interest payments from 2.5% of GDP in 1980 to 5.4% of GDP in 1986, more than defense and education combined in his second administration.

Foreign policy, NATO, Turkey

Further information: NATO

After swearing-in as prime minister, Papandreou took the Ministry of Defense as well (a typical move in times of war; however, Greece was not at war) because there were fears of another coup as it happened in 1967. This move also made various leaders in the NATO alliance, particularly Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, uncomfortable in dealing with Papandreou. In December 1981, at the NATO Defence Planning Committee, Papandreou demanded, in an acrimonious discussion, NATO guarantees against Turkey, a NATO ally, stating that the true threat for Greece is from the east instead from the north. The NATO meeting concluded without publishing a press release for the first time. While this displeased Greece's allies, Papandreou reinforced his image as a patriot in the eyes of concerned Greek voters and the Greek military wary about their neighbor. Despite efforts to appease the military, Papandreou struggled with discipline, as two so-called "readiness exercises" in 1982 and 1983, both followed by forced resignations, were likely failed coup attempts.

Papandreou maintained the military spending at high levels, at 6.7% of GDP in 1982, pleasing the Greek military at the expense of the economy. In 1985, he bought 40 American F-16 and 40 French Mirage 2000 aircraft at the cost of US$2 billion, committing Greece's defense to long-term dependence on French and American technology. The purchase size was unusual given the status of the Greek economy, and it was described in the press as the "purchase of the century" (Greek: η αγορά του αιώνα).

Despite Papandreou's campaign promise to immediately remove U.S. troops and military bases from Greece once in power, the country remained firmly within NATO. This reversal required careful navigation between domestic expectations—shaped by over a decade of anti-American rhetoric—and geopolitical realities, as removing the bases would have elevated Turkey's strategic value within the NATO alliance. In the 1983 agreement, all four U.S. bases established since 1952 remained in Greece for another five years, with some added military aid—but no guarantees against Turkish aggression. Papandreou claimed the deal included a provision for base removal after 1988, granted Greece greater control over foreign bases, and secured U.S. military aid under the 7/10 ratio with Turkey. All these statements were inaccurate, but the treaty agreement documents were kept away from the public for nearly two months to sideline the opposition. Afterward, it was revealed that the agreement was nearly identical to his predecessor beyond minor symbolic concessions.

Education

Further information: Education in Greece

After the fall of the junta, Greece undertook major educational reforms. In 1976, Education Minister Georgios Rallis reinstated Georgios Papandreou’s 1964 reforms, extending compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, replacing katharevousa with demotic Greek in schools, separating junior (Gymnasium) and senior high schools (Lyceum), and introducing vocational education. Papandreou continued these educational reforms followed in 1981, aiming to broaden access. The Greek language adopted the simplified monotoniko system, entrance exams for senior high school were abolished, and Ancient Greek literature was taught in modern translation. Classical language requirements for university were dropped, school uniforms were eliminated, and civic education was expanded through student committees and new curricula. Vocational training also improved.

University access doubled between 1981 and 1986, though funding increases were limited. Administration became more democratic, involving staff and student representatives. However, education quality declined due to underfunded libraries, poor research infrastructure, and a lack of qualified staff. Moreover, PASOK's reforms of 1982 gave students a sense of entitlement to a degree by fighting to gain their demands with mass protests and occupations at the expense of critical thinking. Papandreou also abolished school inspectors, forcing them to retire, and weakened the authority of headmasters, giving more power to teacher committees. Promotions became automatic, based on seniority rather than merit. Political patronage influenced staffing, a trend continued by later governments. Public schools fell behind private ones in performance, and families turned to private tutoring and foreign universities. By 1999, Greek families were spending more on education than almost any other Europeans—despite constitutional guarantees of free education.

Social reconciliation

After the restoration of democracy in 1974, healing the wounds caused by the civil war was pressing since the junta had only exacerbated them. Towards this direction, Karamanlis legitimized the Communist Party and opened the borders to exiled Greeks who had fled the junta and civil war to return home, including Melina Merkouri, Mikis Theodorakis, and Cornelius Castoriadis. Approximately 25,000 returned after passing security screening from 1974 to 1981. However, Karamanlis' governments maintained the post-civil war state's anticommunist stance, i.e., it was challenging to get a civil service job as a communist. Minister of Interior Konstantinos Stefanopoulos explained the conservative viewpoint as "Greeks would never forgive those who had taken up arms against the Nation."

Papandreou made progress in this direction, but unlike Karamanlis, he was pressured to do more since he relied on left-leaning voting blocks (see details in Papandreou's populism). In December 1982, Papandreou dropped the security screening requirement, allowing the return of another potential 22,000 returnees; the most notable was Markos Vafiadis at age 77, but excluded any Slav-Macedonian war veterans (comprising half the group) that participated in the resistance.

Papandreou introduced a law in 1985 for civil servants dismissed for political reasons to restore their pension. All formal Civil War commemorations were abolished, including ceremonies commemorating Dekemvriana. The first law recognizing the Greek Resistance was passed in 1949, which excluded left-leaning partisan groups that fought against the Greek State in the Greek Civil War. On 20 September 1982, Papandreou's government passed a law that abolished this exception, allowing EAM/ELAS members the war veteran status and pension rights. Papandreou touted this as "the gravestone of the spirit of national division," however, New Democracy deputies, who many of their senior members were participants in the civil war, denounced it as a "shameless attempt to whitewash the communist crimes during and after the war."

Healthcare reforms

Further information: Healthcare in Greece

From 1974 to 1981, Greece's healthcare was somewhere between advanced northern Europe and the developing southern regions. Both PASOK and New Democracy recognized issues like a shortage of doctors in rural areas and sought healthcare reform, focusing on universal access and prevention. New Democracy, influenced by Dr. Spyros Doxiadis, proposed decentralized rural health centers but faced political and professional opposition, preventing these plans from moving forward.

When Papandreou came to power, he turned to Paraskevas Avgerinos to create a national healthcare system (ESY), modeled on the Britain's National Health Service (NHS). The law was passed in September 1983 and was hailed as a landmark legislation, for it was the first time that an organized healthcare system was formally articulated within the framework of Greek Law. Between 1982 and 1987, healthcare spending increased, resulting in the building of new hospitals, expanding coverage and access, especially in rural areas. However, Papandreou's reforms were not compressive due to budgetary constraints and shortage of specialized doctors, as well as obstruction from professional unions, who refused to give up their private health insurance plans. The medical profession strongly opposed the reforms requiring doctors to relinquish private practice and work under state control. University and military doctors were temporarily exempt, pending a presidential decree that was never issued. Following prolonged protests and strikes, Health Minister Avgerinos resigned in January 1984.

Papandreou then appointed Georgios Gennimatas, who took a more pragmatic approach, partially implementing the reforms. However, the inclusion of doctors, irrespective of ideology, under a single organization with limited governmental supervision resulted in doctors having considerable political leverage. Soon, it was revealed that doctors were breaking the 1983 healthcare law with impunity by continuing to receive informal payments (fakelaki) from patients, undertaking private practice, and being able to choose their working hours. Gennimatas resigned in 1987, under pressure from the medical profession.

Ultimately, Papandreou's vision of a socialist healthcare system was never fully realized because doctors convinced the public of their essential role and stopped the implementation of the reforms. The partial implementation of the reforms created new problems and made it more challenging for future governments to reform Greek healthcare. Wealthy Greeks, including Papandreou himself in 1988, continued to seek treatment abroad.

Elevation of women and their inclusion in the economy

Further information: Feminism in Greece

The 1975 Greek Constitution guaranteed equality under the law for men and women (Article 4) and equal pay (Article 22), but many pre-junta laws were outdated. Greek law was also expected to align with European standards under the Treaty of Rome. In 1974, women's advocacy groups emerged, with Margaret Chant, the wife of Prime Minister Papandreou, playing a key role.

In 1981, Papandreou's "Social Contract" introduced liberal reforms that redefined gender roles, emphasizing individuals over the family and reducing Church and state control over private life. These reforms legalized civil marriage, abolished dowries, decriminalized adultery, and allowed divorce by mutual consent. Women's participation in education and the workforce increased, and in 1986, abortion was decriminalized. Further reforms in the 1980s improved women's work-life balance, including 14 weeks of maternity leave, paid at 66% of salary, and the establishment of parental leave, childcare centers, and incentives for women in agricultural cooperatives. Additionally, women with unmarried children under 21 gained the right to retire at 55. However, women remained underrepresented in politics, with fewer than 5% of deputies being women.

Papandreou's reforms also led to a steep decline in the total fertility rate from 2.2 in 1980, which was just above the 2.1 threshold for stabilizing the size of the population, to 1.4 by 1989, which would lead to shrinking the Greek population. The demographics of Greece has not recovered from this sharp decline in the fertility rate, placing pressure on the Greek society and economy due to population decline. In 1988, deaths exceeded births, though immigration offset the effect on the population until 2010; between 2008 and 2018, Greece lost 385,000, or 3.5% of its population. A 2016 demographics analysis estimates that Greece might lose up to a quarter of its population by 2050.

Constitutional crisis of 1985 and elections

Presidents of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis (left) and Christos Sartzetakis (right).

Further information: 1985 Greek constitutional crisis

On March 6, 1985, Greece underwent a major political shift when Papandreou unexpectedly nominated Christos Sartzetakis, a Supreme Court judge favored by the left, for president—despite earlier signaling support for incumbent Konstantinos Karamanlis. This surprise move by Papandreou caught off guard many including in his own party and it triggered a series of events that led to a constitutional crisis. Simultaneously, Papandreou proposed constitutional reforms to reduce presidential powers, arguing against Karamanlis overseeing reforms to a constitution he helped craft. Critics warned this would dangerously centralize power in the prime minister.

Karamanlis resigned two weeks before the termination of his term, and acting president Ioannis Alevras of PASOK took over. Sartzetakis faced tense parliamentary votes, with opposition leader Konstantinos Mitsotakis accusing Papandreou of violating constitutional protocols. Mitsotakis and Papandreou ended up having an oral confrontation, with Mitsotakis showing how Papandreou had no respect for the parliament, and Papandreou firing back that Mitsotakis was the last person to speak about respect, invoking memories from Iouliana. Sartzetakis was elected in the third round with Alevras casting the decisive vote. This deepened Greece's constitutional crisis. Mitsotakis declared the vote illegitimate, while Karamanlis warned of national "confusion and uncertainty." However, state media controlled by the governing party suppressed Karamanlis' comments.

The polarized confrontation continued into the election campaign. Despite the turmoil, Papandreou won the June 1985 elections, benefiting from increased support on the far left. Mitsotakis later accepted Sartzetakis as president. Papandreou's constitutional changes were enacted in 1986, consolidating power in the office of the prime minister.

Stabilization effort and disillusionment (1985–1989)

Papandreou began his second administration with a comfortable majority in the parliament and increased powers based on the 1986 Greek Constitution. However, his premiership was soon surrounded by numerous financial and corruption scandals while the Greek economy rapidly deteriorated. Moreover, choices made in the early 1980s on anti-terrorism legislation and controversial foreign policy decisions led to a significant rise in terrorist incidents in Greece. Papandreou's extramarital affair and eventual divorce from his wife became a frequent topic of yellow newspapers and tabloids. The retired Karamanlis publicly described the situation at the end of Papandreou's second administration as: "A boundless lunatic asylum", while others refer to the events surrounding 1989 as "dirty 89."

Failed stabilization of the economy

Further information: Euro convergence criteria

Greek inflation (%) in 1974–2000 period. The colored regions approximately highlight the prime minister's reigns; for 1989–1990, there was no stable government due to Papandreou's change in electoral law. In 1987, Papandreou abandoned the austerity measures (the dotted line estimates inflation if he had not) and delayed the convergence of the Greek economy with EEC criteria by more than four years. The 1980–2000 dataset is from the International Monetary Fund website [2], the 1974–1979 dataset is from AMECO Database [3].

In 1985, Papandreou's government applied to the EEC for a $1.75 billion loan to address Greece's widening foreign trade deficit (8.7% of GDP). However, the EEC required a package of economic stabilization measures as a condition for the loan. These measures were implemented by Finance Minister Costas Simitis and included a 15% devaluation of the drachma, limits on government borrowing, stricter monetary policy, wage controls, and the elimination of some tax exemptions, which effectively reduced incomes to pre-1980 levels. As a result, public consumption fell by 2.2% on average, and public investment decreased by 18.2% in 1986 and 1987.

Papandreou presented the loan as essential for Greece, arguing that without it, the International Monetary Fund would impose even harsher austerity measures. Additionally, Greece signed the Single European Act in February 1986, which aimed to create a single EEC market by 1992 through deregulation and reduced state intervention. Simitis' policies had the intended outcome, with inflation dropping from 23% in 1986 to 13.5% in 1988, and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement falling from 18% of GDP in 1985 to 13% in 1987. However, Papandreou was shaken by a widespread backlash, with long-running strikes and demonstrations by farmers and major unions in early 1987. With the elections approaching, Papandreou forced Simitis to resign from his ministerial position in November 1987, and the austerity measures were abandoned, violating the loan agreement. As a consequence, Greece started to fall behind in terms of economic convergence with EEC goals, competitiveness, and growth.

Stance on terrorism

Further information: Terrorism in Greece, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, TWA Flight 847, EgyptAir Flight 648, and City of Poros ship attack

After democracy was restored in 1974, Greece faced growing terrorist activity, fueled by economic struggles and radical left-wing sympathies, especially among youth inspired by the Athens Polytechnic uprising. In response, Prime Minister Karamanlis passed a strict anti-terror law (774/1978) in 1978, which was based on the recently enacted Italian and German anti-terrorist bills. Opposition leader Papandreou criticized the law as unconstitutional and abolished it in 1983 without offering an alternative, arguing it targeted civil liberties more than actual terrorists.

The pilot with one of the hijackers holding a gun, who took TWA Flight 847 passenger plane from the unguarded Athens airport in June 1985.

Papandreou's stance, combined with closer ties to radical Arab regimes (see details in foreign policy), allowed terrorists to operate freely in Greece during the 1980s. This led to strained US-Greece relations, especially after major incidents like the TWA Flight 847 hijacking (1985), which prompted a U.S. travel advisory and a significant tourism decline. Terrorist acts, including bombings and murders linked to Arab and Palestinian factions, continued. PASOK often dismissed incidents as American conspiracies, even releasing known suspects like Ozama Al Zomar to Libya instead of extraditing him to Italy, where he was suspected by Italian police of the Great Synagogue of Rome attack.

The symbol of November 17 terrorist organization, which operated largely undisturbed under Papandreou's reign.

The main domestic terrorist group, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, operated from 1975 to 2002, targeting Western diplomats with military or intelligence roles and prominent businessmen. Soon after taking power, Papandreou closed down the police unit investigating the organization, and his anti-West rhetoric likely aligned with their goals, delaying attacks during the first two years coming to power. However, once he allowed US bases to remain, the group turned against him. In 1985, in an attack responding to the death of a 15-year-old boy by police, the organization claimed that Papandreou's PASOK is "now working for the Right, which explains why it has yet to be overthrown." The 17 November also assassinated prominent industrialists (Dimitrios Angelopoulos and Alexandros Athanassiadis) and eventually a member of parliament during the Koskotas scandal.

Throughout the 1980s, Greek police were underfunded and weakened by Papandreou's anti-authoritarian stance, resulting in few convictions. He also used state surveillance to monitor political rivals rather than terrorists. A policy shift came under Mitsotakis in the 1990s, who reinstated anti-terror laws (1916/1990) and expelled PLO members. PASOK repealed these again in 1993. Eventually, Simitis passed new anti-terror legislation (2928/01) in 2001, leading to the dismantling of 17 November ahead of the 2004 Olympic Games.

Reapprochment with Turkey

Further information: 1987 Aegean crisis

Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 1988 – Handshake between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal.

Greece and Turkey nearly entered into war over a series of miscommunications in late March 1987; Turkey learned that Greece was about to initiate exploration for the drilling oil in the Aegean Sea near Thasos, a Greek island on the north Aegean. In response, the Turkish survey ship Piri Reis (and later the RV MTA Sismik 1) was sent to the area with an escort of Turkish warships. Papandreou threatened to sink any Turkish ship found in Greek waters. Turkey's reaction was exaggerated by hard-liners since Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal was undergoing open heart surgery in Houston, Texas. As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and NATO intervened to defuse the crisis. Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for the Turkish aggressiveness. He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri, and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria, for consultations with President Zhivkov. The crisis ended with Greece not pursuing oil drills in the north Aegean Sea and Turkey withdrawing its naval vessels.

In January 1988, Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, Turgut Özal, met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations" and "a breakthrough" by Özal. Part of the meeting was a 'no war agreement' and establishing a 'hotline' between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations. Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace, while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.

A week after the Davos meeting, Mitsotakis criticised Papandreou that he focused on bilateral disputes in Davos and effectively "shelved" the Cyprus dispute. Papandreou was forced to denounce the Davos process and famously apologized in Latin ("mea culpa") from the podium of the Greek parliament. Despite some progress achieved on culture exchange and accident prevention over international waters, however, by the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights, vanishing the 'spirit of Davos'.

Heart Surgery, Liani, and crowd size

In August 1988, Papandreou (at age 70) underwent major heart surgery in London, but he refused to yield the reins of power. The operation and recovery lasted three months, leaving the Greek state and party without a leader. The opposition described the situation as "government by fax."

However, in London, it was revealed that next to him was not his wife but Dimitra Liani, an Olympic Airways steward aged 33, who had met in 1986, and she was a constant companion in the last months before the surgery. Soon after the revelation, Papandreou divorced his wife Margaret Chant one month before the elections of June 1989 and married Liani soon after. Liani became an influential 'gatekeeper' for Papandreou's favor and was involved in appointments in the Prime Minister's Office. The sudden elevation of Liani in the Prime Minister's Office had negative effects on the operation of the government and caused discontent among members of PASOK; his sons had key positions in the party.

The return from London after the heart surgery (22 October) sparked another series of controversies. No family member was there to greet Papandreou, including his eldest son (George Papandreou), who was the Minister of Education and a key member of PASOK. Three days later, there was a sudden strike from the Greek Radio and Television Corporation (ERT) employees, alleging that PASOK gave prepared texts to ERT's employees to read as live reports at the scene of Papandreou's arrival. Moreover, the government spokesman publicly stated that the strike was illegal and accused the ERT's union of not describing Papandreou's arrival (crowd size and enthusiasm) in the same way as Karamanlis's return after the junta's fall.

Koskotas scandal

Further information: Koskotas scandal

During Andreas Papandreou's second term as Greek Prime Minister, widespread corruption scandals involving PASOK (e.g., Yugoslav corn scandal), came to light—most notably the Bank of Crete scandal involving George Koskotas, a banker who embezzled large sums to build a media empire that supported PASOK. Koskotas fled Greece in November 1988 but was later arrested in the U.S. on 24 November 1988. Investigations revealed serious misconduct, including blocked audits, profiteering from illegal arms sales, and inflated military purchases with unofficial commissions to PASOK officials.

In 1989, Time magazine published claims by Koskotas alleging that Papandreou directed over $200 million in state funds to Koskotas' bank and personally received $600,000 in a Pampers box. Papandreou denied the allegations, blamed U.S. interference, and sued the magazine. Six ministers resigned, and Papandreou barely survived two no-confidence votes. At the same time, he passed a controversial emergency legislation to shield himself from prosecution. Tensions escalated when Pavlos Bakoyannis, a key figure in efforts to indict Papandreou, was assassinated by the terrorist group 17 November, just before a parliamentary vote on indictments. In the ensuing chaos, Papandreou publicly denounced his accusers.

Koskotas was extradited to Greece in 1991 for the trial, and Papandreou's trial began in Athens on 11 March 1991. However, as a former prime minister, he exercised his constitutional right not to attend the trial and proclaimed that the trial was a witch-hunt. In January 1992, the Parliament-appointed tribunal of 13 judges of Supreme Special Court acquitted Papandreou of the charge of instigating the loss of funds of state companies with a 7–6 vote and a bribery charge of receiving the proceeds of a crime with a vote 10–3. During the trial, the deputy of the Prime Minister, Agamemnon Koutsogeorgas, who was also accused and a close friend of Papandreou, had a stroke on witness stand, on live television, and died a few days afterward. Dimitris Tsovolas, former Minister of Finance, was sentenced to two-and-a-half jail years. Koskotas was tried and sentenced to a 25-year prison term. The trial was characterized as the "trial of trials" and the most critical judicial decision in modern Greek history since the Trial of the Six in 1922.

Junta's surveillance state under Papandreou

In 1989, it was revealed that the National Information Service (EYR), through the state telecommunications organization OTE, had been bugging over 46,000 phones of allies and enemies in politics, press, business, and law and Papandreou used the information obtained for PASOK's purposes. While the wiretapping infrastructure was established in previous decades and used by the junta and lesser degree conservative governments to track suspects that may pose a threat at national level on anti-communist grounds, Papandreou utilized these tools and expanded the potential targets by changing the definition of "national security threat" to be any Greek citizen raising criticism against him. A former head of EYR appointed by PASOK claimed that none of these activities would have been possible without the approval of the prime minister, involving Papandreou in another scandal.

Junta's extensive anti-communist filing on private citizens, promised by Papandreou to destroy in the pre-1981 campaigns, was revealed in 1989 during the Catharsis era that Papandreou not only did not destroy the files as proclaimed in 1985 but also extended and updated on anyone perceived by Papandreou as a potential enemy. This list included political opponents inside and outside PASOK and many prominent conservatives and communists. Leaks to pro-PASOK yellow newspapers against Papandreou's opponents originated from these files. Moreover, many on the left were uncomfortable by Papandreou's threat of using the files to entice their vote by invoking the danger of these files falling into the hands of conservatives. The majority of these files were destroyed in 1989 by the collaborative government of conservatives and communists to prevent future governments from exploiting the files for political gains, as Papandreou did.

Abuse of power

Four Greek politicians (L-R: Leonidas Kyrkos, Charilaos Florakis, Mitsotakis, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos) discuss a time after the Papandreou indictment for the Koskotas scandal. Papandreou called them as the "gang of four."

Beyond the financial scandals, the public was getting worried about the government's assertions of arbitrary power. Papandreou used the national broadcasting organization as a public relations agency. The newspapers that were unfriendly to PASOK were openly threatened by his ministers. Six months before the 1989 elections, public appointments were bestowed on about 90,000 people to gain additional votes.

The abuse of power continued when Papandreou changed the electoral law shortly before the June 1989 general elections to prevent the absolute majority of a rival political party. Papandreou's actions deepened the instability, because there was no stable government to address the growing economic issues for nearly a year. He also ordered his ministers to withhold cooperation during the transition of power, resulted in official documents and state treaties went missing.

Catharsis (1989–1990)

Charilaos Florakis took the decisive step to collaborate with conservatives, closing the chapter of the Greek Civil War, to indict Andreas Papandreou for the PASOK scandals.

In the June 1989 elections, PASOK's support dropped to 38%, largely due to the Koskotas scandal. Although Mitsotakis' New Democracy secured 43%, it was insufficient to form a government. A last-minute change to the electoral law by Papandreou had raised the threshold for a majority to 50%. Papandreou's last-minute change of the electoral vote law required a party to win 50% of the vote to govern alone. Papandreou hoped that while PASOK might come second in electoral votes, it could form a government with the support of the other leftist parties, but he was rejected. Instead, New Democracy formed an unexpected coalition with the radical-left Synaspismos, led by Charilaos Florakis. Despite their opposing ideologies and as rivals in the Greek Civil War both parties sought political "catharsis" through a thorough investigation of PASOK's corruption. This transitional government was first led by Tzannis Tzannetakis (2 July– 12 October), then by Ioannis Grivas (12 October–23 November).

Synaspismos' participation in the government marked a turning point, signaling the end of military interference in politics. The decision carried additional responsibility because if charges weren't filed against Papandreou during this term, future prosecutions would be impossible. The collaboration was soon dissolved after the indictment of Papandreou for the Koskotas scandal (29 September 1989).

In the November 1989 elections, New Democracy rose to 46% but still could form a government. A National unity government was then formed by New Democracy, PASOK, and Synaspismos under 85-year-old former banker Xenophon Zolotas to break the deadlock and restore public trust. Zolotas resigned in April 1990, unable to reverse the economic decline attributed to Papandreou's earlier policies. In the April 1990 elections, Mitsotakis secured enough support to form a government, with Papandreou becoming opposition leader.

Papandreou in opposition (1990–1993)

Recovering from the Koskotas scandals and electoral defeat, Papandreou had a relatively quiet opposition strategy (departing from the radical rhetoric in the 1970s and early 1980s). Mitsotakis had implement difficult, unpopular economic and foreign policy choices, which Papandreou criticized.

Mitsotakis' government, after taking office, introduced a series of austerity measures (following the footsteps of Simitis in 1985-7), including freezing public-sector salaries and pensions, cutting government spending, and raising taxes on various goods, including fuel oil. It also repealed the wage price index, which kept people's incomes high while fuelling inflation, and it was PASOK's popular law among wage earners since 1982 when it was first introduced. This repeal caused wages and salaries to fall by 13% from 1990 to 1993, resulting in continuous strikes by the affected workers. Certain areas, such as banking, were deregulated to attract capital. Mitsotakis' government sold or liquidated 44 companies controlled by the "Industrial Reconstruction Organisation," which was created by PASOK and was designed to assist failed firms in recovery. The Greek economy started to recover due to Mitsotakis' economic policies toward meeting the Euro convergence criteria, but this was not enough to balance the rising frustration of the Greek voters with the impact of austerity on their lives.

Mitsotakis initiated efforts designed to improve relations with the US, which Papandreou's anti-American rhetoric had damaged. In July 1990, a defense cooperation agreement was signed regarding the operation of American bases in Greece for the next eight years. Greece's airspace and naval support during the Gulf War further improved the relations between Greece and US. Mitsotakis also visited Washington, making him the first Greek prime minister to do so since 1964 by Papandreou's father. The fall of Mitsotakis's government followed after Antonis Samaras left the New Democracy party (June 1993) in protest for Mitsotakis removing Samaras from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (April 1992) for his handling of the Macedonia naming dispute with the neighboring country; Mitsotakis had one seat above the threshold according to Papandreou's electoral law.

Papandreou campaigned to bring back the euphoria of the early 1980s. Moreover, PASOK's campaign program had dropped the past socialist ideals and instead presented itself as a "responsible" political party. The Greek people voted in October 1993 the return of Papandreou to power. Following the electoral results, Mitsotakis resigned from the leadership of New Democracy and was replaced by Miltiadis Evert.

Return to power (1993–1996)

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou on official visit with United States President William J. Clinton, Washington, April 1994. Dimitra Liani is in the background on the right.

Health, Liani, and contesters

Papandreou's return to power was less vigorous, as he could work a few hours a day due to his fragile health, and for much of 1995, he remained bedridden. Lianni, now officially part of the government as Chief of Staff, was the person, along with her staff, that Papandreou depended upon, alienating many of his senior ministers.

At the same time, two factions were emerging: the "reformers" faction with a pro-Europe vision led by Costas Simitis, Vasso Papandreou (no relation) and Theodoros Pangalos, and the "loyalists" faction advocating a populist path led by Akis Tsochatzopoulos, Kostas Laliotis, and Gerasimos Arsenis. They were long-time members of PASOK. However, Papandreou was said to favor one of the loyalists without specifying which, but rank and file tended to favor the pro-Europe reformers, reflecting Papandreou's losing grip on his party.

Towards Euro

Like Mitsotakis, Papandreou had to bring the Greek economy to converge to Euro convergence criteria, but little time remained to achieve them. He abandoned his campaign promises and continued the austerity policies of Mitsotakis with minor alterations, expanding the deregulation and liberalization of the economy. There was less public reaction to these policies because Papandreou found a compromising position between capital and unions, and the pace of deregulation was slower than his predecessor.

North Macedonia, territorial waters, and Cyprus

Papandreou followed a hawkish strategy. In February 1994, Papandreou ordered an economic embargo on landlocked North Macedonia due to the ongoing naming dispute regarding the name of the then Republic of Macedonia. In April 1994, Papandreou visited the United States to meet with President Clinton, who had recently recognized the new republic, but failed to make any progress. Papandreou hoped the embargo would have been a bargaining chip, but it backfired because North Macedonia gained considerable sympathy worldwide at the expense of Greece's reputation. In September 1995, an interim accord was signed between the two countries to temporarily address the name issue and ending the 18 months embargo.

In October 1993, Papandreou announced the "Common Defence Dogma" with the Republic of Cyprus and the intention of expanding the territorial waters to 12 miles (November 1994), which further disturbed Turkey. These actions increased the chances for another crisis, as it happened at Imia in January 1996, right after the transition of power from Papandreou to Simitis.

Resignation and death

On 21 November 1995, Papandreou was hospitalized with advanced heart disease and renal failure at Onassio Cardiac Surgery Centre and refused to retire from office. Papandreou's refusal to resign paralyzed the government; Costas Simitis resigned in protest, and Papandreou's eldest son joined the call for his father to resign "for the good of the country." Eventually, Papandreou resigned on 16 January 1996, and Costas Simitis was chosen as the new party leader on 18 January. Papandreou died on 23 June 1996.

Legacy and assessments

Papandreou's grave in the First Cemetery of Athens. On his grave is written "Greece belongs to the Greeks."

Papandreou shifted political power in domestic issues from the conservatives, who dominated Greek politics for decades, to a more populist and centre-left locus. His inclusionist policies, expanding access to healthcare, education and strengthening women's rights, ended the sociopolitical and economic exclusion of social classes. This shift in the Greek political landscape helped Greek society to become more pluralistic and converge to the Western European countries' social norms.

His early achievements, however, were tarnished by controversial decisions leading to a Constitutional crisis and many corruption scandals. Moreover, the revelation that Papandreou did not hesitate to redirect the junta's surveillance infrastructure against any Greek citizen who opposed him, his soft stance on terrorism, damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and his public family drama dominated public discourse. Papandreou's populism under the guise of inclusionist social policies became part of PASOK's patronage, greatly expanded by misuse of EEC funds and an unprecedented rate of foreign borrowing that brought the Greek economy twice (1985 and 1989) to the verge of bankruptcy. His mishandling of the Greek economy's reconstruction became a central problem for future governments. Overall, Papandreou had little impact on improving the Greek state and its institutions, and his governance became a negative reference point.

Economic policies

Further information: Greek economy, § Economy in the early 80's, § Failed stabilization of the economy, and § Elevation of women and their inclusion in the economy

Once in power, Papandreou did not oppose the integration of Greece into the European Union despite his fierce rhetoric against it in the 1970s. Papandreou began to implement a political agenda to restructure the Greek economy and improve living standards by increasing access of lower-income and rural populations to state services such as education and healthcare. Many infrastructure projects were completed in rural areas at the expense of large urban centers. He pursued expansionary fiscal policies, characterized by increases in public spending, and total public expenditure rose from 44.2% to 51.3% of GDP between 1984 and 1988. These increases were carried out to boost social welfare, healthcare, education, and pensions. Workers' rights were reinforced. Women with new rights and protections were integrated into the economy, particularly in the emerging tourism industry. At the same time, he started to nationalize a wide range of companies in key sectors such as banking, industry, and transport, believing this would stabilize the economy and protect national interests.

Papandreou pursued a mix of protectionist policies and state-backed lending, but many of his measures worsened Greece's existing structural economic problems—stemming from the 1970s oil crisis, rising European competition, and the global recession of the early 1980s. His approach reduced business competitiveness, with many companies left or minimized investments to survive. Meanwhile, nationalizations, widespread clientelism, corruption, and expansive social spending rapidly expanded the public sector and created large fiscal deficits. Papandreou did not implement a progressive taxation and kept military spending high (over 5.5% of GDP), relying instead on foreign loans that significantly increased national debt and became a burden for future governments. By the end of his first term, the trade deficit widened as European imports grew to a point that Greece was nearing bankruptcy as foreign exchange reserves were at a historic low. In 1985, to avoid economic collapse, Papandreou accepted an EEC loan and imposed austerity. Though the economy began to recover after two years, he abandoned the reforms once PASOK's popularity declined, wasting any progress toward meeting the Euro convergence criteria.

Greek National Income per decade for 1900–2000. Under Papandreou's 1981–1989 tenure, the national income increased approximately at the same rate as in the turbulent decade of 1941–1950. Source: The Bank of Greece and National Statistical Service, various open source bulletins and reports.

After eight years of Papandreou's rule, the Greek economy was in dire condition, with a reputation nationally and in European circles as that of a 'black sheep.' Specifically, the economy was burdened by debt that had nearly tripled in size (from 26.7% of GDP in 1981 to 73.3% of GDP in 1990), high inflation rates (ranging between 13% and 23% from 1981 to 1989), rising unemployment (2.7% in 1980 and reached 8% in 1988), chronic primary budget deficits, and large government expenditures some intended to keep failed companies afloat. The gross national income increased in the decade 1981–1990 at approximately the same rate as the decade 1941–1950, where foreign occupation and a civil war took place. The poor economic performance of Greece and the misuse of EEC funds was the subject of a report produced by the EEC Monetary Committee in March 1992. While political opponents criticized Papandreou's economic policies early on, in the end, criticism came from his allies as well. Theodore Stathis, who worked in the governments of Andreas Papandreou and his father, commented on Papandreou's economic policy outcome,

He [Andreas Papandreou] wanted to build a state with better salaries and services. But in the end, the money just went into the bureaucracy and not to the people. In fact, we built up such a large state that we had to keep borrowing just to pay its expenses. This was a terrible mistake.

The austerity measures needed in the Greek economy were implemented in the early 1990s by Mitsotakis, which Papandreou continued with minor variations after his return in 1993. After Papandreou's death, Simitis put the economy in order, and by 2001, Greece joined the Euro.

Foreign policy

Further information: Foreign relations of Greece and § Reapprochment with Turkey

Papandreou conducted, as PASOK affiliates touted, an "independent" and "multidimensional" foreign policy; however, even his more vigorous supporters admitted later that these characterizations meant "everything or nothing" due to the frequent inconsistencies and U-turns.

Papandreou's foreign policy had two facets: international relations and domestic consumption. On the latter, he often utilized foreign policy by exaggerating the (real or not) national dangers to distract the Greeks from a domestic crisis. Moreover, his rhetoric was that of a Third World populism infused with nationalism aimed against the imperialist forces represented by the United States and the European Union. His statement best represents his nationalism: "Greece belongs to the Greeks." According to historian John Iatrides, Papandreou's nationalistic and confrontational diplomacy had a "therapeutic effect upon the national psyche, as the general [Greek] public came to believe that [Greece's] sovereignty had been restored" since the Greeks largely perceived that their country is pushed around by European Great Powers and now the Americans. On the former, foreign politicians recognized his 'pragmatic' approach despite the frustration rising from his radical rhetoric and confrontational tactics. On the most consequential aspects, Papandreou's actions, often contrary to his rhetoric, followed Karamanlis' policy of "Greece belongs to the West" by keeping Greece firmly committed to the NATO alliance and EEC. The balance between these two facets has made Greece's foreign policy appear "schizophrenic" to an outsider observer.

Papandreou's frequent statements antagonizing the Western allies made foreign leaders question his intentions and made Greece more isolated and vulnerable, and they were not helping solve the Cyprus question. A notable example was in September 1983, when Papandreou vetoed a formal European Community statement condemning the Soviet government for shooting down the Korean airliner KAL Flight 007, asserting that it was a plane spying for the benefit of the United States, and he added that "if such a plane came into Greece, we would have downed it." Papandreou's siding with the Soviet position effectively eliminated any possibility of visiting the White House under at the time the Reagan administration to advance Greek national interests in the foreseeable future.

Papandreou continued Karamanlis's opening to Arab countries as part of diversifying diplomatic partners to secure trade deals and investments from petro-dollars countries. He improved relations with 'radical' Arab nations, such as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, Hafez al-Assad's Syria, and letting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members stay in Greece, antagonizing the United States. Moreover, Papandreou supported the causes of various national liberation movements worldwide and agreed for Greece to host representative offices of many such organizations. He also supported the Palestinian liberation cause and advocated the two-state solution while at the same time condemned Israeli policies in the occupied territories. However, inviting 'radical' Arab groups in Greece further fueled the rising terrorism incidents in Greece. Morevoer, his frequent radical and combative rhetoric frustrated existing allies and did not bring new allies (Arab states or countries from the eastern bloc), leaving Greece more diplomatically isolated and unable to advance a solution on the Cyprus problem.

Regarding Turkey, Papandreou often emphasized the threat to Greece is coming from the east instead of from the north and tried to remind other European members frequently of Turkey's violations of international law and human rights. Moreover, he repeatedly blocked EEC credits for Turkey and its candidacy application for EEC membership in 1987. At the same time, Papandreou made an effort to improve relations with Turkey in Davos.

He was co-creator in 1982 of, and subsequently an active participant in, a movement promoted by the Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Initiative of the Six, which included, besides the Greek PM, Mexico's president Miguel de la Madrid, Argentina's president Raúl Alfonsín, Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme, Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere and India's prime minister Indira Gandhi. The movement's stated objective was the "promotion of peace and progress for all mankind." Papandreou pledged that Greece would be a nuclear-free country by removing the existing nuclear weapons and initiating diplomatic efforts to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone, but then proceeded to modernize nuclear storage sites in Greece. After various initiatives, mostly directed at pressuring the United States and the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing and reduce the level of nuclear arms, it eventually disbanded after the US-Soviet rapprochement that was taking place independently of international activities.

Approach to governance

Papandreou had lifelong experience in political campaigning, which few could match in the metapolitefsi era (1974–1990), and had commanding leadership in setting the narrative of Greece in the greater context. However, he had little ministerial experience, and spent little time preparing on how to govern before the 1981 election victory. The lack of experience was exacerbated by two more choices. First, Papandreou chose ministers with no previous ministerial experience but who were also ideologically similar, thus eliminating differences of opinion out of fear of leading to intra-party factionalism, as happened in Iouliana. Second, PASOK passed Law 1232/82 in 1982, which purged senior civil servants from all ministries (eliminating institutional memory) based on the allegation that they were hostile to the new regime, and they were replaced by party loyalists who had little knowledge of how the government worked. Lack of experience in Papandreou's governments led to early failures with costly economic and social consequences.

Papandreou had unchallenged authority in PASOK to the point of being "authoritarian." He acted as the 'final arbiter,' and he was "ruthless" if he felt threatened. He did not hesitate to silence his intra-party critics with expulsion from PASOK, followed by a character assassination from the pro-PASOK press and even state media. His grip on the government and his party started to weaken after the Koskotas scandal.

Papandreou experimented with various government structures (both in size and form) and restarted the government frequently as he holds the record for the most ministerial reshuffles (13 times in 1981–1989, with over 100 people changing various ministerial positions). Papandreou found the day-to-day government management less interesting (especially after 1983) and instead focused on the grant narratives of Greece's democratization process. Limited access to Papandreou (especially in later years), lack of guidance, and fluid organizational structure left his ministers spending valuable time decoding what their 'Leader' wanted. Ministers who have worked with Papandreou have recorded their frustration at Ministerial Councils where Papandreou would not disagree with anyone. These choices reflected his aversion to institutional development, and he instead opted for personality (reactive) politics to be the cohesive force that kept PASOK together. The result was that Papandreou's governments were dysfunctional and lacked coordination, with ministers having little or no time until the next reshuffle to implement campaign promises. The fluid government style of Papandreou, both in structure and in personnel, also made his governments vulnerable to corruption, as the Koskotas scandal proved.

Populism and patronage

Further information: § Social reconciliation

Both major parties in the Metapolitefsi era, New Democracy and PASOK, promoted an inclusive society, but PASOK held an advantage due to Papandreou’s populist rhetoric. He framed Greek history through stark binaries, Left vs. Right, privileged vs. underprivileged, intentionally deepening political polarization. Papandreou and his inner circle often invoked the trauma of the Civil War, appealing to the "revenge of the losers [of the Civil War]" (Greek: "η ρεβάνς των ηττημένων") narrative to reassure left-leaning supporters that PASOK remained true to its roots. He claimed to empower the 'underprivileged' through his leadership, even at the expense of democratic institutions, once declaring: "There are no institutions – only the people rule this country." His populism included vilifying opponents, e.g., calling Mitsotakis a "traitor" and a "nightmare," and blaming conservatives for the Civil War and the junta: "Greek people never forget what the Right has done." With little policy difference between the two parties, Mitsotakis eventually adopted similar populist tactics, further intensifying polarization. By 1985, The Economist described Greece as a "country divided," tearing open wounds of civil war. Papandreou's populism also extended into his foreign policy rhetoric (see foreign policy).

The class struggle that Papandreou campaigned on had little basis in reality, it was instead part of old-fashioned patronage politics. Papandreou transformed the localized voter-patron relation, where the patrons were local aristocratic families, into a centralized national machine where the state controlled by PASOK became the source of patronage. He rewarded its loyal supporters with civil service jobs to an unprecedented degree. Papandreou's generosity depended on PASOK's performance in the polls. One day before the 1989 elections and as the scandals were closing in, Papandreou's populism reached new heights when, on a balcony, surrounded by a crowd that gathered to watch him, he gave a public command to the Minister of Finance Dimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (Greek: Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα) and "Tsovolas, empty the coffers [of the state]," and the crowd chanted these back. Later on, Papandreou claimed that he was merely joking, but this event became an infamous moment of the era.

The mass-scale patronage from PASOK was made feasible by abolishing early on the merit-based evaluations in selecting civil servants in the public domain, such as utility companies and the National Bank of Greece (see also education). After a decade without merit-based evaluations and intensified PASOK's clientelism, these organizations were near paralysis or collapse. In 1994, merit-based evaluations were re-introduced by PASOK, known as Supreme Council for Personnel Selection (ASEP). Despite initial criticism of this behavior, Mitsotakis' and future governments adopted Papandreou's newly established voter-patron relation.

Papandreou's populism remained popular in a significant fraction (approximately 40%) of Greek society, despite the deterioration of the economy and the various corruption scandals. Papandreou's son, George Papandreou, capitalized on his father reputation and was elected leader of PASOK in February 2004 and prime minister during the October 2009 parliamentary elections.

Cultural and political image

Papandreou was highly charismatic, an excellent orator, and adept at shaping perceptions to achieve his political goals. Despite his aristocratic and academic background, Papandreou could converse with Greeks of any social status. At the same time, it was also challenging to interpret his intentions. He used a form of doublespeak, absent in the Greek political language at the time, where the meanings of terms could change depending on the situation.

Both supporters and critics referred to him simply as "Andreas," a break from tradition in Greek politics that allowed him to distance himself from his family name, which had been linked to the political turbulence leading to the 1967 dictatorship and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

In the 1970s, Papandreou made headlines by pairing business suits with turtleneck sweaters instead of the usual shirt and tie. His first appearance in Parliament in a black turtleneck caused an uproar among conservatives, who saw it as disrespectful. However, the controversy only boosted his popularity, symbolizing his image as a "rebel" against the conservative establishment. However, once in power, he adopted a more conventional style by wearing a suit with a shirt and tie.

Bibliography

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• Papandreou, Andreas (1943). The Location and Scope of the Entrepreneurial Function. Boston: Harvard University.
• ———————; Wheeler, John T. (1954). Competition and its regulation. Summit St. Kent: Prentice-Hall.
• ———————; Sauerlender, Owen H. (1957). A test of a stochastic theory of choice. University of California publications in economics. Oakland: University of California Press.
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• ——————— (1966). Δημοκρατία και εθνική αναγέννηση [Democracy and National Rebirth] (in Greek). Athens: Fexis.
• ——————— (1970). Man's freedom. New York: Columbia University Press.
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• ——————— (1972). Paternalistic Capitalism. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
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• ———————; Zohar, Uri (1974). Project Selection for National Plans. New York: Praeger Publishers.
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• Papandreou, Andreas (1950). "Economics and the social sciences". The Economic Journal. 60 (240): 715–723. doi:10.2307/2226710. JSTOR 2226710.
• ——————— (1953). "An experimental test of an axiom in the theory of choice". Econometrica. 21 (3): 477.

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Constitutions of Greece

• "Greek Constitution of 1952". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 1/1952 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
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• ——————, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781349230563.
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• ——————; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198825104.
• Gallant, Thomas W. (2016). Modern Greece: From the war of independence to the present. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781350014510.
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• Heraclides, Alexis (2010). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780230283398.
• Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis [in Greek] (2006). Greece and the Cold War Front Line State, 1952-1967. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781134154883.
• Jones, Michael J., ed. (2011). Creative Accounting, Fraud and International Accounting Scandals. West Sussex: Wiley. ISBN 9781119978626.
• Jouganatos, George A. (1992). The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991, An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis. Westport & London: Greenwood Press. ISBN 9780313283444.
• Kaplan, Robert D. (1994). Balkan Ghosts, A Journey Through History. London: Vintage Books. ISBN 0679749810.
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• Katsoulas, Spyros (2021). The United States and Greek-Turkish Relations, The Guardian's Dilemma. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000514339.
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• —————— (1985). "The 1985 Constitutional Crisis in Greece". The Journal of Modern Hellenism. 2 (1): 103–112.
• —————— (1996). "Andreas Papandreou – A political profile". Mediterranean Politics. 1 (3): 382–387. doi:10.1080/13629399608414596.
• Danopoulos, Constantine (1985). "From balconies to tanks: post-junta civil-military relations in Greece". Journal of Political & Military Sociology. 13 (1): 83–98. JSTOR 45371219.
• Dimitras, Panayote E. (1985). "Greece: A New Danger". Foreign Policy. 58 (58): 134–150. doi:10.2307/1148656. JSTOR 1148656.
• Dobratz, Betty A.; Whitfield, Stefanie (1992). "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era". European Sociological Review. 8 (2): 167–180. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036630. JSTOR 522295.
• Draenos, Stan (2014). "Andreas Papandreou's Exile Politics: The First Phase (1968-1970)". The Historical Review/La Revue Historique. 11: 35–66. doi:10.12681/hr.332.
• Featherstone, Kevin (March 2005). "Introduction: 'Modernisation' and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics". West European Politics. 28 (2): 223–241. doi:10.1080/01402380500058753.
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• Tsarouhas, Dimitris (2005). "Explaining an activist military: Greece until 1975" (PDF). Southeast European Politics. 6 (1): 1–13.
• Van Steen, Gonda (2003). "Margarita Papandreou: Bearing Gifts to the Greeks?". Journal of Modern Greek Studies. 21 (2): 245–282. doi:10.1353/mgs.2003.0021.
• Vlachadis, Nikolaos; Siorti, Maria; Petrakos, Georgios; et al. (2023). "Tracing Time Trends of Births in Greece". Cureus. 15 (1): e34040. doi:10.7759/cureus.34040. PMC 9940775. PMID 36814739.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: article number as page number (link)

Newspapers and magazines

• Steven V. Roberts (24 January 1977). "Greece Is Facing an Uphill Fight For Admission to Common Market". The New York Times.
• Loren Jenkins (21 October 1981). "Papandreou takes over, warns the military". Washington Post.
• Marvine Howe (22 October 1981). "Papandreou at swearing-in calls for change". The New York Times.
• "Greece grants diplomatic status to P.L.O. Office". The New York Times. 17 December 1981. p. 6.
• "Greece obstructs NATO communique". The New York Times. 10 December 1981.
• "Greece seeks weapons and an arms industry". The New York Times. 3 March 1982.
• Gage, Nicholas (21 March 1982). "The paradoxical Papandreou". The New York Times Magazine.
• "Θεαματική εξαγγελία της αγορά του αιώνα" (in Greek). Kathimerini. 6 March 1985.
• "New issues raised for US on Greece". The New York Times. 11 March 1985.
• Jonathan C. Randal (13 March 1985). "Greek Opposition Leader Gladdened by Papandreou's Shift". Washington Post.
• "Greek banker arrested at Boston airport". Washington Post. 24 November 1988.
• Doyle McManus (16 April 1989). "Koskotas Implicates Premier in Payoffs, Bribery: Ex-Banker's Tale May Be Greek Tragedy". Los Angeles Times.
• "Papandreou Marries 34-Year-Old Mistress". Los Angeles Times. 13 July 1989.
• "Papandreou Survives No-Confidence Motion". The New York Times. 14 March 1989.
• Robert Ajemian (13 March 1989). "Scandals The Looting of Greece". TIME magazine.
• "Grave Scandal for Greece". The New York Times. 18 June 1989.
• Marlise Simons (27 September 1989). "Greek lawmaker is slain in Athens". The New York Times.
• "Papandreou Trial a Modern Drama". Chicago Tribune. 5 October 1989.
• Marlise Simons (17 January 1992). "Greek ex-premier not guilty in bank scandal". The New York Times.
• Steve Vogel (25 May 1994). "Greek blockade, U.N. embargo threaten Macedonia's future". Washington Post.
• "Papandreou's Wills: A Modern Greek Drama". The Washington Post. 22 September 1996.
• Clogg, Richard (24 June 1996). "Papandreou Obituary". The Independent. Archived from the original on 7 May 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2014.
• "Greece gives a last sad farewell to Papandreou". The New York Times. 27 June 1996.
• Bohlen, Celestine (16 January 1996). "Ailing Papandreou Resigns, Asking Quick Election of Successor". The New York Times. p. 5.
• Dimitris Kapranos (4 March 2003). "Greece's tradition of spectacular trials". Kathimerini.
• Μαυρής, Γιάννης (30 December 2007). "Τομή στη Μεταπολίτευση το 1981". Kathimerini (in Greek).
• "Μεγάλες αλλαγές αλλά και μεγαλύτερες κοινωνικές ανισότητες". Kathimerini (in Greek). 30 December 2007.
• Νίκος Νικολάου (24 November 2008). "Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου" (in Greek). Το Βήμα.
• Landon Thomas Jr. (12 July 2011). "Family Differences, Global Issues". The New York Times.
• Emmanouela Seiradaki (24 August 2011). "Colonel Gadhafi Greek bonds". Greek Reporter.
• Yiannis Elafros (16 October 2016). "Greece in 2050 a country for old men". Kathimerini.
• Nikoleta Kalmouki (23 June 2014). "Remembering Andreas Papandreou 18 years later". Greek Reporter Times.
• Simos, Adriana (3 September 2020). "On This Day in 1974: PASOK was established". The Greek Herald.
• "Σαν σήμερα: Ακούγεται στο Περιστέρι το σύνθημα του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου "Τσοβόλα δώσ' τα όλα"" (in Greek). Ethnos. 19 April 2021.
• "Τριήμερο εθνικό πένθος: Τι είναι και τι προβλέπει – Πότε κηρύσσεται". Ethnos (in Greek). 14 June 2023.
• Νίκος Μποζιονέλος (31 January 2024). "Η "αγορά του αιώνα": Κατασκοπία και σκάνδαλα για F-16 και Mirage επί εποχής Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου" (in Greek). Gov News.
• "Σαν σήμερα πριν 35 χρόνια ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου αναφωνεί το "Τσοβόλα δώσ' τα όλα"" (in Greek). New Money. 20 April 2024.

Web and other sources

• "Εθνικό Οπτικοακουστικό Αρχείο, Επίσημη επίσκεψη του Προέδρου του Κρατικού Συμβουλίου της Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της Γερμανίας Έριχ Χόνεκερ στην Ελλάδα" [National Video-audio Archive, Official visit of General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party Erich Honecker in Greece] (in Greek).
• "Breaking Ranks: Andreas Papandreou, American Liberalism, and Neo-Conservatism". Wilson Center. 14 March 2006.
• "Greece's GDP over the years". World Bank.
• "Greece's debt over GDP (%)". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 5 February 2023.
• "Greece's unemployment (%)". International Monetary Fund.
• "Greece's inflation rate (%)". International Monetary Fund.
• "Greek political scene on eve of parliamentary session" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
• Prepared by American Embassy Athens (1990). "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, Greece". U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce.
• "Ο Ανδρέας για το "Τσοβώλα δώστα όλα"" (in Greek).
• "Real Decreto 2129/1983, BOE-A-1983-21630" (PDF). Boletín Oficial del Estado. 9 August 1983.

Additional reading

• Boggs, Carl (1995). The socialist tradition: from crisis to decline. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415906708.
• Jacobs, Francis (1989). Western European political parties: a comprehensive guide. London: Addison-Wesley Longman Limited. ISBN 978-0582001138.
• Kassimeris, George (2019). "Greek Everyman: Andreas Papandreou at 100". The Political Quarterly. 90 (2): 304–309. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12685. hdl:2436/622589.
• Kutlay, Mustafa (2018). The Political Economies of Turkey and Greece: Crisis and Change. London: Springer International Publishing. ISBN 978-3319927886.
• Pantazopoulos, Andreas (2001). For the people and the nation - the moment of Andreas Papandreou [Για το λαό και για το έθνος - η στιγμή του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου 1965–1989] (in Greek). Athens: Ekdoseis Polis. ISBN 978-9608132320.
• Veremis, Thanos (2017). Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου: Μεγάλες Προσδοκίες [Andreas Papandreou: Great expectations]. Athens: Pataki. ISBN 9789601672069.
• Williams, Allan M.; Gallagher, Tom, eds. (1989). Southern European Socialism Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719025006.

External links

• "Collection of articles about Andreas Papandreou from Kathimerini" (in Greek).
• "ERT archives; Andreas Papandreou' interview after the 1977 elections" (in Greek).
• T. Pappas (August 2020). "The rise of modern populism". TED.
• "Videos of Andreas Papandreou". British Pathé.