Born in Moosomin, Saskatchewan (at the time in the Northwest Territories), on 25 February 1887, McNaughton was a student at Bishop's College School in Lennoxville, Quebec. He earned a B.A. from McGill University in Montreal in 1910, where he was a member of The Kappa Alpha Society, and an MSc in 1912.
First World War
McNaughton joined the Canadian militia in 1909. He took the 4th Battery of the Canadian Expeditionary Force overseas with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and arrived in France in February 1915.
While there he helped make advances in the science of artillery, and was wounded twice. The need to accurately pinpoint artillery targets, both stationary and moving, led to his invention of a target detection technique using an oscilloscope which was the forerunner of radar. He sold the rights to that invention to the Government of Canada for only $10.
In March 1916 he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and returned to England to take command of the newly arrived 11 (Howitzer) Brigade RCA, taking it to France in July. In early 1917 he was appointed the Counter Battery Staff Officer of the Canadian Corps. On the day before the armistice he was promoted to Brigadier-General and appointed General Officer Commanding Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery.
Chief of the General staff
In 1920 McNaughton joined the regular army and in 1922 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the General Staff in 1929. During that time he worked at mechanising the army and modernising the militia. In 1919, it became necessary to integrate the numbered battalions of the returning Canadian Expeditionary Force with the old militia regiments, the Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden created the Otter committee headed by General Sir William Otter. In general, the Otter committee tended to create as many regiments as possible across the country, but McNaughton, who served on the Otter committee, ensured the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which had been privately raised in 1914, was taken on by the "permanent force militia" as a regiment for western Canada. Likewise, McNaughton ensured that the 22nd Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was not disbanded, arguing that the 22nd Battalion which came from Quebec and won more battle honours than any other of the Canadian battalions should be kept on to show the army appreciated the sacrifices of French-Canadians in the war. The 22nd Battalion was assigned to the "permanent force militia" as the 22nd Regiment, becoming the Royal 22nd Regiment in 1922, and went on to become the most famous French-Canadian regiment in the Canadian Army.
McNaughton was described as "a forceful dynamic thruster with a tornado-like intellect", whom the historian James Eayers wrote "dominated his colleagues in the military establishment as a great oak dominates a scrub forest". At the same time, McNaughton was referred to as "a master military bureaucratic politician" who fought hard for more funding for defence and as a general who was so interested in scientific problems who had "attacks of the gadgets" during staff meetings as he always fascinated by science and technology. McNaughton remained active as a scientist throughout his military career, being regularly published in various scientific journals. To secure more military funding from hostile politicians, McNaughton, whom many viewed as the most powerful civil servant in Ottawa during the interwar period, pushed for strongly for northern development. As part of his plans to develop the far north of Canada, McNaughton pressed for the aerial mapping and survey of the north (much of which was still unmapped as late as the 1930s), which increased the budget for the Royal Canadian Air Force and for the building of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System, which increased the budget for the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. In 1929-30, McNaughton came into major conflict with the Defence Minister, Colonel James Ralston, a highly decorated veteran who considered himself just as much an expert on defence matters as McNaughton, something that caused considerable vexation between the chief of staff and the minister of national defence. Ralston vetoed McNaughton's plans to upgrade the equipment of the permanent force militia and to build more arsenals, saying that the Liberals would not be "Merchants of Death". Had the Liberals won the 1930 election, McNaughton was planning to resign as he did not want to serve any longer under Ralston.
McNaughton was a friend of the Conservative leader Richard Bennett and in the 1930 election, secretly reviewed drafts of his campaign speeches and in 1935 when Bennett swung to the left with his "New Deal", McNaughton likewise secretly suggested improvements to his speeches. It was during the years 1930-35 when Bennett was Prime Minister that McNaughton was at the height of his influence in Ottawa. During the interwar period, McNaughton was widely credited with inventing the cathode ray tube, which enhanced his reputation as a brilliant scientist-general, making him the best known Canadian soldier and scientist around the world. In 1933, when the Bennett government brought in the "Big Cut" to defence spending, ordering the defence department to cut $3.6 million at once, McNaughton tried very hard to abolish the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), arguing that Canada did not need a navy and without a navy, the defence department would save $2 million/per year. In a lengthy bureaucratic battle, Commodore Walter Hose of the Royal Canadian Navy argued to the Bennett government that McNaughton was wrong to dismiss sea power as he did, and with Japan showing expansionist tendencies as proven by the seizing the Manchuria region of China in 1931, that Canada did need a navy. The RCN was almost abolished in 1933, but Hose was able to save the navy; however, McNaughton's attempt to abolish the navy left a lasting bitterness between the two services that went for decades afterwards.
The Canadian historian Colonel John English wrote on the whole that McNaughton for his intelligence and drive had a deleterious effect on the Canadian military, describing him as a general who was so caught up in his scientific studies that he neglected military issues. McNaughton shared the long-standing hostility felt by most Canadians to a professional army and believed that a well-trained militia was all that was needed. In 1931, McNaughton forcefully stated his belief that "a Citizen Militia...is the proper type of Land Defence Force for Canada" with the "permanent force militia" as the professional army was euphemistically described was to serve as the "instructional corps" for the militia. McNaughton did not see the importance of training officers for the operational level of war, writing that the "foundations of military efficiency" were the education of Canadian men and the "creation of a national spirit" suitable for war, writing that "technical efficiency in the various arms and services...would readily follow" as that was required to prepare for war was "merely a matter of drill and training combined with careful selection of suitable material". Reflecting his strongly scientific bent, McNaughton wrote what was needed were officers well trained in science like himself and that for "a highly scientific army requiring highly trained personnel...[could] be best obtained quite outside the army itself". One consequence of this way of viewing war was that McNaughton cut the funding for the training of infantry and cavalry officers while ensuring the majority of the officer training went to those in artillery, engineer and signals branches. As a result, the majority of officers holding senior positions in the Canadian Army in World War II were artillerymen, engineers and signals men. As early as 1933 there were complaints from infantry officers that "the gunners" as artillerymen were known were monopolizing the senior positions as McNaughton himself was a "gunner". In 1932, Brigadier James Sutherland Brown wrote about McNaughton: "the C.G.S is a super-engineer and college professor by profession. He is a gunner in the Canadian Militia and, technically, he is a good one. He is cold, calculating, touchy, and determined to pursue his own schemes, inclined to do everything himself and will not take advice". McNaughton insisted that officers seeking high command attend courses at the Imperial Defence College which provided much training for questions of grand strategy. English described McNaughton as neglected the study for war on the operational level, which did interest him in the same way that grand strategy and science did.
Formation of relief camps
By the summer of 1932, due to the massive unemployment caused by the Great Depression, Canada had become poverty-stricken with much of the populace left destitute. While on a tour of the nation's military establishments General McNaughton was shocked by the spectacle of homeless men living in shacks, begging on the streets of Western cities and swarming aboard freight trains to move on to the next town or city in search of a job. McNaughton recognised that here was a situation where the possibility of revolution didn't seem unreal. In October he presented a proposal eagerly grasped by Prime Minister R. B. Bennett, that had two aims. It would get the men off the streets, out of the cities and out of sight, and, at the same time improve their bodies and provide useful work in a group of camps, run by the military. In the so-called "relief camps" men would be fed, clothed and housed, and would work on projects of national importance—building airfields, highways and other public works. As an "alternative to bloodshed on the streets," this stop-gap solution for unemployment was to establish military-run and -styled relief camps in remote areas throughout the country, where single unemployed men toiled for twenty cents a day.
Unfortunately, what appeared to be a humanitarian effort to aid the unemployed and indigent and prevent the propagation of revolution soon turned into a hotbed of dissent due to the draconian disciplinary measures adopted. Portions of a letter smuggled out read to the House of Commons by J. S. Woodsworth, MP for Winnipeg North Centre described the conditions.
"Picture to yourself a tarpaper shack 79 feet x 24 with no windows, along each side there is a row of double decker bunks, these are spaced off with 8 × 1 board so that there is room for two men in each bunk. The bunks are filled with straw and you crawl into them from the foot end. Along the front of the lower bunk a narrow board is placed upon which the men may sit. The place is very meagerly lighted and ventilation by three skylights.... So narrow is the passageway between the bunks that when the men are sitting on the bench there is scarcely room to pass between them. This shack houses 88 men.... At times the place reeks of the foul smell and at night the air is simply fetid. The floor is dirty and the end of the shack where the men wash ... is caked with black mud. The toilet is thoroughly filthy, unsanitary, and far too small."
The irony was that McNaughton's scheme for staving off revolution had the seeds of revolution inherent in it. Within two years the camps that had been greeted with such applause would be known throughout the country as slave camps. The "volunteer inmates" were not allowed newspapers, magazines or radios. Any man who left a camp, even for a visit to his family, was subsequently refused re-entry and the "dole" was denied to him.
National Research Council of Canada
He returned for a few years to civilian life and from 1935 to 1939 was head of the National Research Council of Canada. National Research Council Building M50 on the Ottawa Campus was named the McNaughton Building, in his honour. IEEE honours McNaughton in the naming of the McNaughton Medal, presented annually for excellence in engineering.
Second World War
As the best known Canadian soldier, McNaughton was the natural choice to lead the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Europe; the fact that McNaughton was vocally opposed to conscription, insisting that an all-volunteer force was all that was needed to win the war endeared him to the Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, who had promised in September 1939 that there would be no overseas conscription. In September 1939, the Union Nationale Premier of Quebec, Maurice Duplessis, had called a snap election with the aim of seeking a mandate to oppose the war, and to defeat Duplessis, Mackenzie King had promised the people of Quebec there would no overseas conscription. Having McNaughton as a professional soldier endorse Mackenzie King's no overseas conscription views as militarily sound and correct gave the prime minister a potent political shield to wield against those in English-Canada who called for overseas conscription. Furthermore, McNaughton's views that the correct way to defeat Germany was through a series of methodical, "scientific" operations in which artillery was to play the dominant role promised to minimize casualties, which was the all-important consideration for Mackenzie King who wanted to avoid battles with heavy casualties as that would force him to make a difficult decision about conscription. Mackenzie King had remembered how the heavy losses taken by the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the battles from 1915 to 1917 had led to the Conscription crisis of 1917 as by 1917 the government of Sir Robert Borden had the choice of either pulling the Canadian Corps out of action or bring in conscription, and he very much wanted to avoid a repeat.
McNaughton commanded the 1st Canadian Infantry Division during the early part of the Second World War, and led the division overseas, first to the United Kingdom in December 1939 and later to France in June 1940, only to be withdrawn back to England in the final stages of the Battle of France. McNaughton, who was known for his care for his men, ensuring that the Canadian soldiers sent to Britain had the best possible accommodations, was always very popular with the rank and file of the Canadian Army. As the best known Canadian general in the world, McNaughton attracted much media attention in both Canada, the United Kingdom and even the neutral United States as the great "soldier-scientist", making the cover of Life magazine on 18 December 1939, which predicated that McNaughton was the Allied general most likely to take Berlin. In June 1940, McNaughton's old nemesis, Colonel Ralston, was brought back by Mackenzie King as Defence Minister after Norman Rogers, the previous defence minister was killed in an airplane clash. Relations between Ralston and McNaughton remained unfriendly as they had been in 1929-30. In a reversal of the expected roles, General McNaughton insisted as a professional soldier that overseas conscription was unsound while Ralston, the civilian minister of defence, was more open to the idea of overseas conscription.
He commanded VII Corps from July to December 1940 when it was renamed the Canadian Corps. Then under his leadership the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, reinforced with the II Canadian Corps, and the Canadian Corps being redesignated as the I Canadian Corps, was organised into the Canadian First Army in April 1942. McNaughton's contribution to the development of new techniques was outstanding, especially in the field of detection and weaponry, including the discarding sabot projectile.
Mackenzie King preferred to keep the First Canadian Army in Britain to guard against a possible German invasion, which had the convenient effect of keeping the Canadians out of action and ensured no casualties, meaning no decision was necessary about overseas conscription. McNaughton very much wanted to keep all 5 divisions of the First Canadian Army together, insisting he would not allow a division or two to be detached from his command to go to North Africa as he wanted all of the Canadian units to fight together. As a result, the Canadian units languished in Britain, guarding against a possible invasion of Britain that no one felt was very likely after Operation Barbarossa was launched in June 1941, while British, Australian, New Zealand, South African and Indian divisions fought the North African campaign. While the other Commonwealth units were fighting the North African campaign, many of the Canadian officers and enlisted men in Britain were jealous of the way of the other Commonwealth units were winning glory in North Africa while they had to sit on the sidelines of the war. In the spring of 1942, when McNaughton was approached by Admiral Louis Mountbatten with a request that the 2nd Canadian Division take part in a raid on the French city of Dieppe, McNaughton jumped at the chance to finally get one of his divisions into action.
McNaughton was unduly blamed for the disastrous Dieppe Raid in August 1942, which saw the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division sustain heavy casualties, blame better deserved by the British who failed to provide needed, requested, and promised support. General Sir Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), his opponent since the First World War, frequently criticised him. Brooke had been the Staff Officer Royal Artillery in the Canadian Corps during the First World War and organised the "creeping barrages" in support of the assaults at the Battle of Vimy Ridge.
McNaughton's reputation was badly damaged by Operation Spartan war games held on 4–12 March 1943, which he described as "a dress rehearsal for the full-scale invasion of the Continent". McNaughton commanding the First Canadian Army had the task of breaking out over the river Thames to "take" Huntingdon, which was the "capital" of the fictional country of "Eastland", which was defended by 8th and 11th Corps of the British Army. Much criticism of McNaughton's leadership ensured over his decision on the night of 7 March 1943 to leave his command post to personally supervise the building of a bridge over the Thames instead of sending an engineer officer to build the bridge, which showed that McNaughton was unable to delegate authority properly as he insisted on doing everything himself, leading to command paralysis. McNaughton did not understand war on the operational level, and Colonel English wrote: "That McNaughton had no idea that a corps required a minimum of 24 hour warning in order to execute a major task is borne out by the following timings: at 2335 hours on 6 March, he directed 2 Corps to advance east across the Thames through 1 Corps; at 1615 hours, the next day he gave counter orders to effect the western envelopment that night; at 2130 hours on 10 March he issued orders for operations the following day; and at 2259 hours 11 March, he gave orders for operations on 12 March". Sir James Grigg, the British War Secretary, who attended the Spartan war game wrote he was "appalled at McNaughton's indecision" as "he stood in front of his situation map hesitating as to what to do and what orders to issue". General Alan Brooke, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, who also attended the Spartan war game wrote in his diary that the Spartan war game had done much to "proving my worse fear that...McNaughton is quite incompetent to command an army!". The man who was to replace McNaughton as commander of First Canadian Army, General Harry Crerar later wrote that during the Spartan war game "that it became patently obvious to all" that McNaughton "was totally unsuitable for high operational command". Spartan ended in the "defeat" of the Canadians as McNaughton was unable to break out over the Thames to "take" Huntingdon".
A favourite of Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister; though in October 1943 he came back from a weekend at Chequers looking limp and told Brooke that he had had a ghastly weekend .... kept up all hours of the morning. Brooke had warned him that Churchill might want him to agree to an operation against Norway (which had twice been turned down as impractical). While he had eventually agreed to examine the Trondheim operation, to Brooke's relief he had since sent a telegram to Mackenzie King that he was on no account to agree to the employment of the Canadian forces in any operations in Norway.
In the spring of 1943, Mackenzie King, who until then had tried to keep the Canadians out of action as much as possible in order to avoid casualties that might lead to a difficult decision on conscription, became obsessed with the fear that the war might end with the Canadians winning no victories on land. As Churchill had described Italy as the "soft underbelly" of the Axis, King believed the up-coming Italian campaign would provide an opportunity for easy victories that would not cause too many casualties, and insisted to the British that a Canadian division had to take part in Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, saying the Canadian people would be unhappy with him if the war ended with only battles for Canada being Hong Kong and Dieppe. Despite King's crass political motives for wanting the Canadians to take part in Husky, the British agreed to accommodate him. McNaughton was opposed at first to losing a division, saying he was opposed to sending the 1st Division to Sicily "merely to satisfy a desire for activity". In June 1943, McNaughton very reluctantly approved of the decision to detach the 1st Canadian Division from the First Canadian Army, which was to take part in Operation Husky as part of the British 8th Army commanded by General Bernard Montgomery. McNaughton was concerned about losing a division, but was promised that 1st Division would return to Britain to rejoin First Canadian Army when Husky was completed, and the possibility of finally getting the 1st Division into action, which had been assigned to Britain in late 1939, was too much to resist. Operation Husky began on 9 July 1943, and McNaughton complained much when the initial press releases announcing the invasion did not mention the Canadians were taking part. When McNaughton tried to visit Sicily to observe the 1st Division in action, Montgomery refused, saying the 1st Canadian Division was operating as part of his 8th British Army and he not want McNaughton interfering with his operations. General Guy Simonds commanding the 1st Division supported Montgomery as he felt McNaughton would do more than "observe" his operations and it would be impossible for him to serve two commanders at once. McNaughton complained furiously about his exclusion from Sicily, saying that as the senior Canadian general in Europe that he had the right to visit Canadian troops whatever they were in Europe. The British found the Canadian nationalist McNaughton a "prickly" man to deal with, as McNaughton saw Canada as an equal power, and not as some subordinate power.
In September 1943, McNaughton clashed with Mackenzie King, when the Prime Minister decided that the 1st Canadian Division would stay with the British 8th Army as it crossed over to the Italian mainland, and that he would send the 5th Canadian Armored Division and 1st Canadian Armored Brigade and the headquarters for I Canadian Corps to Italy as well. In a memo to Defence Minister James Ralston, McNaughton wrote: "The important thing for Canada at the end of the war is to have her army together under the control of a Canadian". However, the prospect of the Canadians fighting in the "soft underbelly" of Italy, which King mistakenly believed would not involve too many losses and allowed the Canadians to win battlefield glory, was too attractive to King. McNaughton for his part, believed that all of the Canadian units in Europe should operate together as part of the First Canadian Army was incensed about losing an entire corps to the 8th Army, and did little to disguise his fury that the Canadians would operate in both Italy and in north-west Europe when Operation Overlord was launched. McNaughton wrote the "dispersion of the Army" by taking away 1st Corps from his command would be bad for morale, and in a memo to Ralston suggested "it would be wise to put someone in control who believed in it [dispersion]". A further strain in relations with Ralston occurred when the Defence Minister passed along Brooke's opinion that McNaughton was unfit for field command, a judgement that deeply wounded McNaughton's ego. McNaughton believed that Ralston was responsible for Brooke's views, leading to the exchange of increasingly acrimonious telegrams between the Ralston and McNaughton with the latter accusing the former of seeking to undermine his command.
He was sent as envoy for a conference with Stalin. McNaughton, then a Major-General, was cover celebrity for Life magazine in December 1939 when Canada had entered the war, but the USA had not. His support for voluntary enlistment rather than conscription led to conflict with James Ralston, the then Minister of National Defence. McNaughton had taken the loss of I Canadian Corps to the Eighth Army very badly, leading to stained relations with Ralston while the British and Montgomery in particular made it clear that they did not want the First Canadian Army going into Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, under McNaugton's command. In December 1943, McNaughton was removed as commander of the First Canadian Army and the historian Desmond Morton wrote: "By the end of December, a fit and lively looking McNaughton returned to Canada, recalled on "on grounds of health". His successor, after a brief interlude, commanding the Canadian Corps in Italy, was Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar".
Because of his support for a volunteer army, McNaughton remained friendly with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, who wanted to make him the first Canadian-born Governor General of Canada. Instead, McNaughton became Minister of National Defence when Ralston was forced to resign after the Conscription Crisis of 1944, as King did all he could to avoid introducing conscription. McNaughton was soon pressured into calling for conscription despite King's wishes, a popular move for some Canadians but an equally unpopular one for many others. After losing both a February by-election in the Ontario riding Grey North to W. Garfield Case and, a few months later, the riding of Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan which he contested in the 1945 federal election McNaughton resigned as Defence minister in August 1945. King had made him take blame for conscription, to which both men had been opposed, and now had to replace him as Governor-General designate. King recommended to King George IV that the British Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander be appointed Governor-General, setting back the first appointment of a Canadian to that role by seven more years.
After the war
|By-election on 5 February 1945|
|Progressive Conservative||Case, Wilfrid Garfield||7,333|
|Liberal||McNaughton, Hon. Andrew George L.||6,097|
|Co-operative Commonwealth||Godfrey, Albert Earl||3,118|
After the war McNaughton chaired the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 to 1948; served as Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations from 1948 to 1949; and chaired the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission from 1950 to 1962.
His promotions were:
- Lieutenant (9 May 1910)
- Captain (16 May 1911)
- Major (28 May 1913)
- Brevet Brigadier-General (10 November 1918)
- Lieutenant-Colonel (1 January 1920)
- Colonel (1 January 1923)
- Major-General (1 January 1929)
- Lieutenant-General (1940)
- General (1944)
- "Juno Beach Centre – General Andrew McNaughton". Digital Wizards Ontario Inc. Archived from the original on 4 December 2008. Retrieved 13 November 2008.
- "Andrew G.L. McNaughton". IEEE Global History Network. IEEE. Retrieved 14 July 2011.
- Canada Science & Technology Museum
- Morton 1999, p. 168.
- English 1991, p. 43.
- Morton 1999, p. 174.
- English 1991, p. 43-44.
- English 1991, p. 44.
- English 1991, p. 46.
- English 1991, p. 47.
- English 1991, p. 46-47.
- English 1991, p. 46-47 & 96-97.
- Berton, Pierre, The Great Depression, McClelland and Stewart, 1990
- Cook 2012, p. 237-238.
- English 1991, p. 79.
- English 1991, p. 79 & 87.
- Morton 1999, p. 182.
- Morton 1999, p. 187.
- Army Commands Archived 5 July 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- Morton 1999, p. 202-203.
- Morton 1999, p. 202.
- Morton 1999, p. 203.
- Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment edited by Geoff Hayes p97-99
- English 1991, p. 144.
- English 1991, p. 145-146.
- English 1991, p. 145.
- English 1991, p. 146.
- Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Lord (2001). War Diaries 1939–1945. Phoenix Press. p. 191. ISBN 1-84212-526-5.
- Morton 1999, p. 209.
- Morton 1999, p. 209-210.
- Creighton 1976, p. 85.
- Morton 1999, p. 210.
- Morton 1999, p. 210-211.
- Creighton 1976, p. 86.
- Creighton 1976, p. 86-87.
- "Commander of the Canadians", Life, pp. cover, 18 December 1939, retrieved 24 October 2013
- Morton 1999, p. 211.
- Morton 1999, p. 212.
- "McNaughton Avenue". National Inventory of Military Memorials. National Defence Canada. 16 April 2008. Archived from the original on 21 May 2014.
- "Canadian army chief grilled at war crimes tribunal". CBC. 24 April 2008. Retrieved 14 November 2008.[dead link]
- Unit Histories
- Cook, Tim (2012). Warlords: Borden Mackenzie King And Canada's World Wars. AllanLane. ISBN 0670065218.
- English, John (2000). Failure in High Command The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign. Golden Dog Press. ISBN 0-919614-60-4.
- Morton, Desmond (1999). A Military History of Canada. McClelland & Stewart. ISBN 0-7710-6514-0.
- Swettenham, John (1968). McNaughton. 3 volumes. Ryerson Press. ISBN 978-0-7700-0238-1.
- McNaughton Archives at McGill
- Newspaper clippings about Andrew McNaughton in the 20th Century Press Archives of the German National Library of Economics (ZBW)
| Chief of the General Staff
| GOC 1st Canadian Infantry Division
| GOC VII Corps
July 1940 – December 1940
Corps renamed Canadian Corps
Corps renamed from VII Corps
| GOC Canadian Corps
| GOC First Canadian Army
| Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations
January 1948 – December 1949
John W. Holmes