Attack on Mers-el-Kébir

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Attack on Mers-el-Kébir
Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean during the Second World War
Croiseur de bataille Strasbourg 03-07-1940.jpg
The battleship Strasbourg under fire
Date3 July 1940
Location35°43′10″N 0°41′20″W / 35.71944°N 0.68889°W / 35.71944; -0.68889
Result British victory
 United Kingdom  France
Commanders and leaders
James Somerville
Dudley Pound
Marcel-Bruno Gensoul
François Darlan
1 aircraft carrier
2 battleships
1 battlecruiser
2 light cruisers
11 destroyers
At least 23 aircraft[1]
4 battleships
6 destroyers
1 gunboat
1 seaplane tender
42 aircraft[2]
Casualties and losses
2 aircrew killed
2 sailors wounded
3 Swordfish
2 Skuas[3]
1,297 killed
350 wounded
1 battleship sunk
2 battleships damaged
2 destroyers damaged
1 seaplane tender damaged
1 destroyer grounded
1 tugboat destroyed[4]
3 aircraft damaged[1]

The attack on Mers-el-Kébir (Battle of Mers-el-Kébir) on 3 July 1940, during the Second World War, was a British naval attack on French Navy ships at the naval base at Mers El Kébir, near Oran, on the coast of French Algeria. The attack was the main part of Operation Catapult, a British plan to neutralise or destroy French ships to prevent them from falling into German hands after the Allied defeat in the Battle of France. The British bombardment of the base killed 1,297 French servicemen, sank a battleship and damaged five other ships, for a British loss of five aircraft shot down and two crewmen killed.[3]

The attack by air and sea was conducted by the Royal Navy, after France had signed armistices with Germany and Italy, coming into effect on 25 June. Of particular significance to the British were the five battleships of the Bretagne and Richelieu classes and the two fast battleships of the Dunkerque class, the second largest force of capital ships in Europe after the Royal Navy. The British War Cabinet feared that the ships would fall into Axis hands. Admiral François Darlan, commander of the French Navy, assured the British, even after the French armistices with Germany and Italy, that the fleet would remain under French control, but Winston Churchill and the War Cabinet judged that the risk was too great. Darlan repeatedly refused British requests to place the fleet in British custody or move it to the French West Indies, out of German reach.

The British attack was condemned in France as an attack on an allied nation and resentment festered for years over what was considered betrayal by a former ally.[5] The French thought that their assurances were honourable and should have been sufficient. Marshal Philippe Pétain, who was appointed the Prime Minister of France on 16 June, severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 8 July.

French aircraft retaliated by bombing Gibraltar and French ships exchanged fire several times with British ships, before a tacit truce was observed in the western Mediterranean. On 27 November 1942, after the beginning of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, the French Navy foiled Case Anton, a German and Italian operation to capture its ships at Toulon, by scuttling them. In 1997, Martin Thomas wrote that the British attack at Mers-el Kébir remains controversial but that other historians have written that it demonstrated to the world that Britain would fight on.[6]


French–German armistice[edit]

After the Fall of France in 1940 and the armistice between France and Nazi Germany, the British War Cabinet was apprehensive about control over the French navy. The French and German navies combined could alter the balance of power at sea, threatening British imports over the Atlantic and communications with the rest of the British Empire. In Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Armistice terms, the German government "solemnly and firmly declared that it had no intention of making demands regarding the French fleet during the peace negotiations" and there were similar terms in the armistice with Italy but they were considered by the British to be no guarantee of the neutralisation of the French fleet. On 24 June, Darlan assured Winston Churchill against such a possibility.[7] Churchill ordered that a demand be made that the French Navy (Marine nationale) should either join with the Royal Navy or be neutralised in a manner guaranteed to prevent the ships falling into Axis hands.[8]

French ships based in Africa, June 1940

At Italian suggestion, the armistice terms were amended to permit the French fleet temporarily to stay in North African ports, where they might be seized by Italian troops from Libya. The British made a contingency plan, Operation Catapult, to eliminate the French fleet in mid-June, when it was clear that Philippe Pétain was forming a government with a view to ending the war and it seemed likely that the French fleet might be seized by the Germans.[9] In a speech to Parliament, Churchill repeated that the Armistice of 22 June 1940 was a betrayal of the Allied agreement not to make a separate peace. Churchill said, "What is the value of that? Ask half a dozen countries; what is the value of such a solemn assurance? ... Finally, the armistice could be voided at any time on any pretext of non-observance...".[10]

The French fleet had seen little fighting during the Battle of France and was mostly intact. By tonnage, about 40 per cent was in Toulon, near Marseilles, 40 per cent in French North Africa and 20 per cent in Britain, Alexandria and the French West Indies. Although Churchill feared the fleet would be used by the Axis, the need to man, maintain and arm the French ships with items that were incompatible with German and Italian equipments made this unlikely.[11] The Kriegsmarine and Benito Mussolini made overtures but Adolf Hitler feared that an attempted take-over would provoke the French fleet into defecting to the British. Churchill and Hitler viewed the fleet as a potential threat; the French leaders used the fleet (and the possibility of its rejoining the Allies) as a bargaining counter against the Germans to keep them out of unoccupied France (the zone libre) and French North Africa. The armistice was contingent on the French right to man their vessels and the French Navy Minister, Admiral François Darlan, had ordered the Atlantic fleet to Toulon and to demobilise, with orders to scuttle the ships if the Germans tried to take them.[11]

British–French negotiations[edit]

The British tried to persuade the French authorities in North Africa to continue the war or to hand over the fleet to British control. A British admiral visited Oran on 24 June, and Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, visited Casablanca on 27 June.[12] The French Atlantic ports were in German hands and the British needed to keep the German surface fleet out of the Mediterranean, confine the Italian fleet to the Mediterranean and to blockade ports still under French control. The Admiralty was against an attack on the French fleet in case the ships were not sufficiently damaged, France declared war and the French colonies would be less likely to defect. The Royal Navy lacked the ships to permanently blockade the French naval bases in North Africa and keep the Atlantic approaches open, which made the risk of the Germans or the Italians seizing the French capital ships too great. Because the fleet in Toulon was well guarded by shore artillery, the Royal Navy decided to attack the base in North Africa.[13]


Modern view of the harbour at Mers-el-Kébir

The most powerful group of French warships was at Mers-el-Kébir in French Algeria, comprising the old battleships Provence and Bretagne, the newer Force de Raid battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, the seaplane tender Commandant Teste, six destroyers and a gunboat Rigault de Genouilly, under the command of Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul. Admiral James Somerville, commander of Force H, based in Gibraltar, was ordered to deliver an ultimatum to the French, the terms of which were contrary to the German–French armistice.[12][a] Somerville passed the duty of presenting the ultimatum to a French speaker, Captain Cedric Holland, commander of the carrier HMS Ark Royal. Gensoul was affronted that negotiations were being conducted by a less-senior officer and sent his lieutenant, Bernard Dufay, which led to much delay and confusion.[15] As the negotiations continued, it became clear that agreement was unlikely. The French made preparations for action and 42 aircraft were armed and made ready for take-off.[2] Darlan was at home on 3 July and could not be contacted; Gensoul told the French government that the alternatives were internment or battle but omitted the option of sailing to the French West Indies.[12] Removing the fleet to U. S. waters had formed part of the orders given by Darlan to Gensoul in the event that a foreign power should attempt to seize his ships.[16]

Operation Catapult[edit]

Plymouth and Alexandria[edit]

Blackburn Skuas of No 800 Squadron Fleet Air Arm prepare to take off from HMS Ark Royal

Along with French vessels in metropolitan ports, some had sailed to ports in Britain or to Alexandria in Egypt. Operation Catapult was an attempt to take these ships under British control or destroy them. The French ships berthed in Plymouth and Portsmouth were boarded without warning on the night of 3 July.[17][18] The submarine Surcouf, the largest in the world, had been at Plymouth for the last month.[19] The crew resisted a boarding party and three Royal Navy personnel, including two officers, were killed, along with a French sailor. Other ships captured included the old battleships Paris and Courbet, the destroyers Le Triomphant and Léopard, eight torpedo boats, five submarines and a number of lesser ships. The French squadron in Alexandria (Admiral René-Émile Godfroy) including the battleship Lorraine, the heavy cruiser Suffren and three modern light cruisers, was neutralised by local agreement.[20]

Attack on Mers-el-Kébir[edit]

Diagram of the British attack on Mers-el-Kébir

The British force comprised the battlecruiser Hood, the battleships Valiant and Resolution, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and an escort of cruisers and destroyers. The British had the advantage of being able to manoeuvre, while the French fleet was anchored in a narrow harbour and its crews did not expect an attack. The main armament of Dunkerque and Strasbourg was forward of the superstructure and could not immediately be brought to bear. The British capital ships had 15 in (381 mm) guns and fired a heavier broadside than the French battleships. On 3 July, before negotiations were formally terminated, six British Fairey Swordfish planes escorted by three Blackburn Skuas from Ark Royal dropped five magnetic mines in the harbour exit. The force was intercepted by five French Curtiss H-75 fighters which shot down a Skua into the sea with the loss of its two crew, the only British fatalities in the action.[21][22]

French warships were ordered from Algiers and Toulon as reinforcements but did not reach Mers-El-Kebir in time.[12] The French put their submarines at Oran, Ariane, Danaé, Diane and Eurydice, on alert and they anchored in the outer harbour at 3:30 p.m.[23][24][25][26] At 5:54 p.m., the four submarines received orders to put to sea.[23][24][25][26] Churchill ordered the British ships to open fire at the same time and the British commenced at 5:57 p.m. from 17,500 yd (9.9 mi; 16.0 km).[27] The third British salvo scored hits and a magazine aboard Bretagne exploded, the ship sinking with 977 of her crew at 6:09 p.m. After thirty salvoes, the French ships stopped firing; the British force altered course to avoid return fire from the French coastal forts but Provence, Dunkerque, the destroyer Mogador and two other destroyers were damaged; their crews ran them aground to prevent them from sinking. Four French Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters arrived, outnumbering the British Skuas. Another nine French fighters were then spotted at 7:10 p.m. and a dogfight ensued in which a Curtiss H-75 and an M.S.406 were damaged. Three more Curtiss fighters appeared and there was another engagement.[28] The four French submarines were unable to close with the British warships.[23][24][25][26]

Bretagne on fire, still under bombardment

Strasbourg, three destroyers and one gunboat managed to avoid the mines and escape to the open sea, under attack from a flight of bomb-armed Swordfish from Ark Royal. The French ships responded with anti-aircraft fire and shot down two Swordfish, the crews being rescued by the destroyer Wrestler; a French flying boat also bombed a British destroyer.[29] As the British bombing had little effect, at 6:43 p.m. Somerville ordered his ships to pursue. The French aviso (gunboat) Rigault de Genouilly, en route to Oran, met Force H at 7:33 p.m. and steamed towards Hood, only to come under fire by the light cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise at 12,000 and 18,000 yd (5.9 and 8.9 nmi; 6.8 and 10.2 mi; 11 and 16 km) respectively. Hood also fired several 15 in shells at Rigault de Genouilly, and the French ship fired nineteen 14 cm (5.5 in) shells in response before being hit by Enterprise and withdrawing.[30] Meanwhile, a British aircraft sighted Danaé and Eurydice shortly before 8:00 p.m. and dropped illuminated floats to guide a British destroyer to them.[24][26] The destroyer depth-charged the two submarines but they escaped without damage.[24][26]

At 8:20 p.m. Somerville called off the pursuit, feeling that his ships were ill-deployed for a night engagement. After another ineffective Swordfish attack at 8:55 p.m., Strasbourg reached Toulon on 4 July.[31] Slower than Hood, Valiant and Resolution fell behind. Somerville had received information that the French naval force from Algiers — four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and a number of destroyers — was steering to rendezvous with Strasbourg. With Valiant and Resolution having fallen off the pace, he concluded that by the time his ships came within gunnery range of Strasbourg shortly after 9:00 p.m., he would be outnumbered by the combined French force and ill-deployed for a night engagement, silhouetted against the evening twilight and giving an advantage to the French gunners. As a result, at 8:20 p.m., when Hood had closed to 25 nautical miles (46 km; 29 mi) from Strasbourg, Somerville called off the pursuit. After another ineffective Swordfish attack at 8:55 p.m., Strasbourg reached Toulon on 4 July.[31][22][32] The French cruiser force from Algiers missed its rendezvous with Strasbourg but arrived at Toulon separately on 4 July.[32]

During the night of 3/4 July 1940, Ariane, Danaé, Diane and Eurydice patrolled on the surface off Oran in a north–south patrol line and they remained on patrol off Oran until 8:00 p.m. on 4 July before returning to Oran.[23][24][25][26] On 4 July, the British submarine Pandora encountered Rigault de Genouilly off the Algerian coast, mistook her for a cruiser and sank her.[30] After receiving orders on 3 July to form a north–south patrol line in the Mediterranean Sea for a distance of 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) east of Alboran Island and south of Cape Palos during the night of 6/7 July 1940 to protect Oran and attack British ships, the French submarines Archimède, Le Conquérant and L'Espoir got underway from Toulon at 2:45 a.m. on 4 July 1940 bound for their patrol area at 15 kn (28 km/h; 17 mph) but they were recalled to Toulon on 5 July 1940.[33][34][35] The French Air Force (Armée de l'Air) made reprisal raids on Gibraltar, including a small night attack on 5 July, when many bombs landed in the sea.[36][37]

Actions of 8 July[edit]

The British believed that the damage inflicted on Dunkerque and Provence was not serious and on the morning of 8 July raided Mers-el-Kébir again in Operation Lever, with Swordfish aircraft from Ark Royal. A torpedo hit the patrol boat Terre-Neuve, moored alongside Dunkerque, full of depth charges. Terre-Neuve quickly sank and the depth charges went off, causing serious damage to the battleship.[38] Another attack took place on 8 July, when aircraft from the carrier Hermes attacked the Richelieu at Dakar, seriously damaging it.[36][37] When word of the events at Dakar reached Oran, the French submarines Ariane, Diane, and Eurydice got back underway on 8 July to form a patrol line off Cape Falcon, Algeria,[23][25][26] in case of another British attack on Oran, but the submarines encountered no British forces.



Mogador running aground, after having been hit by a 15-inch shell

Churchill wrote, "This was the most hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned".[39] Relations between Britain and France were severely strained for some time and the Germans enjoyed a propaganda coup. Somerville said that it was "the biggest political blunder of modern times and will rouse the whole world against us ... we all feel thoroughly ashamed...".[40] The attack revived Anglophobia in France, demonstrated British resolve to continue the war and rallied the British Conservative Party around Churchill (Neville Chamberlain, Churchill's predecessor as prime minister, was still party leader). The British action showed the world that defeat in France had not reduced the determination of the government to fight on and ambassadors in Mediterranean countries reported favourable reactions.[36]

The French ships in Alexandria under the command of Admiral René-Emile Godfroy, including the old battleship Lorraine and four cruisers, were blockaded by the British on 3 July and offered the same terms as at Mers-el-Kébir. After delicate negotiations, conducted on the part of the British by Admiral Andrew Cunningham, Godfroy agreed on 7 July to disarm his fleet and stay in port until the end of the war.[41] Some sailors joined the Free French while others were repatriated to France; the ships at Alexandria went on to be used by the Free French after May 1943. The British attacks on French vessels in port increased tension between Churchill and Charles de Gaulle, who was recognised by the British as the leader of the Free French Forces on 28 June 1940.[42][43]

According to his principal private secretary, Eric Seal, "[Churchill] was convinced that the Americans were impressed by ruthlessness in dealing with a ruthless foe; and in his mind the American reaction to our attack on the French fleet in Oran was of the first importance". On 4 July, Roosevelt told the French ambassador that he would have done the same.[44] Jean Lacouture, in a biography of De Gaulle, blamed the tragedy mainly on miscommunication; if Darlan had been in contact on the day or if Somerville had possessed a more diplomatic character, a deal might have been done. Lacouture accepted that there was a danger that the French ships might have been captured by German or more likely Italian troops, which was proven by the ease with which the British seized French ships in British ports or the Germans seized French ships in Bizerte in Tunisia in November 1942.[45][46]

In 2004, David Brown wrote that foreign opinion was generally favourable to Operation Catapult and that the demonstration of British determination had succeeded.[47] In 2010, Colin Smith wrote that the attack was the first big triumph of Churchill's premiership and that they had been received favourably by the governments of the US, Turkey, Greece and Brazil, with condemnation from Spain and Switzerland. Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, made a diary entry that the RN retained the "ruthlessness of the captains and pirates of the C16th".[48]

In 2015, George E. Melton took a far more negative view, writing that much of the historiography of the attack represented a "Churchillian perspective" that ignored how the British attack on Mers el-Kébir had been a "tactical failure" that did not achieve any of its goals.[49] Melton wrote that the attack was unnecessary in the first place, because the French Navy had both pledged and planned to scuttle its ships as a matter of honor rather than see them fall into German or Italian hands.[50] In Melton's view, the results of the attack were the opposite of what the British intended because it had sunk or put out of action very little of the French fleet rather than ensure that the fleet as a whole was neutralized;[51] prompted French ships that had been dispersed to remote bases in French North Africa, where they were beyond the reach of the Axis, to concentrate at Toulon, where they formed a powerful striking force and were in far greater danger of seizure by Axis forces;[32] and united the French Navy and French people in hostility to the British, resulting in a loss of British access to the French Empire and French leaders other than Charles de Gaulle and beginning an undeclared Anglo-French conflict over the next few months that created an even more threatening strategic situation for British forces than before.[52] He also discounted as a "myth" the idea that the attack had demonstrated British resolve to the United States, something British decision-makers did not discuss prior to the attack and which he wrote could have been more convincingly achieved through a major attack on the Italian fleet or large bombing raid against Germany.[53] Melton suggested that Churchill's anger at France for its capitulation to the Axis and his "obsession" with seizing or sinking the four modern French battleships (Jean Bart, Richelieu, Dunkerque, and Strasbourg) was largely responsible for the attack.[54]


Memorial on the coast path at Toulon to the 1,297 French seamen killed at Mers El Kebir
Numbers killed at Mers-el-Kébir[55]
Officers Petty
Bretagne 36 151 825 1012
Dunkerque 9 32 169 210
Provence 1 2 3
Strasbourg 2 3 5
Mogador 3 35 38
Rigault de Genouilly 3 9 12
Terre Neuve 1 1 6 8
Armen 3 3 6
Esterel 1 5 6
Total 48 202 1,050 1,300
Fleet Air Arm[21] 2

Subsequent events[edit]

British–Vichy hostilities[edit]

Following the 3 July operation, Darlan ordered the French fleet to attack Royal Navy ships wherever possible; Pétain and his foreign minister Paul Baudouin over-ruled the order the next day. Military retaliation was conducted by ineffective air raids on Gibraltar but Baudouin noted that "the attack on our fleet is one thing, war is another". As sceptics had warned, there were also complications with the French empire; when French colonial forces defeated de Gaulle's Free French Forces at the Battle of Dakar in September 1940, Germany responded by permitting Vichy France to maintain its remaining ships armed, rather than demobilised.[56][57] On 24 September Gibraltar was bombed by sixty Vichy French aircraft which dropped 45 long tons (50 short tons; 46 t) of bombs and that night, 81 bombers dropped 60 long tons (67 short tons; 61 t) of bombs. The French 2nd Destroyer Division comprising Fougueux, Frondeur, Épée and Fleuret had sailed from Casablanca on 24 September and in the early hours of 25 September encountered the destroyer Hotspur patrolling off Gibraltar. Épée opened fire but its 13 cm (5.1 in) guns broke down after firing fourteen shells, Fleuret did not open fire because it could not get on target and the other French destroyers fired six shots between them. Hotspur returned fire but this was not reported by the French ships.[58]

On 27 September Force H stayed at sea after receiving "a charming message [that] the whole of the Toulon fleet was coming out to have a scrap with us" but the two navies adhered to a tacit understanding that the British did not attack more powerful French forces at sea or ships in port but intercepted other French ships:

Though British commanders had precise instructions regarding the interception of French shipping, discretion might prove the better part of valour if Vichy escorts were liable to inflict serious loss.[58]

In the autumn, the French sent a convoy through the Strait of Gibraltar untroubled, a state of affairs that rarely changed during the Mediterranean Campaign.[58]

Gibraltarian civilians[edit]

In early June 1940, about 13,500 civilians had been evacuated from Gibraltar to Casablanca in French Morocco. Following the capitulation of the French to the Germans and the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, the Vichy government found their presence an embarrassment. Later in June, 15 British cargo vessels arrived in Casablanca under Commodore Crichton, repatriating 15,000 French servicemen who had been rescued from Dunkirk. Once the French troops had disembarked, the ships were interned until the Commodore agreed to take away the evacuees, who, reflecting tensions generated after the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, were escorted to the ships at bayonet point, minus many of their possessions.[59]

Case Anton[edit]

On 19 November 1942, the Germans tried to capture the French fleet based at Toulon, against the armistice terms, as part of Case Anton, the military occupation of Vichy France by Germany. All ships of any military value were scuttled by the French before the arrival of German troops, notably Dunkerque, Strasbourg and seven (four heavy and three light) modern cruisers. For many in the French Navy this was a final proof that there had never been a question of their ships ending up in German hands and that the British action at Mers-el-Kébir had been unnecessary.[21] Darlan was true to his promise in 1940, that French ships would not be allowed to fall into German hands. Godfroy, still in command of the French ships neutralised at Alexandria, remained aloof for a while longer but on 17 May 1943 joined the Allies.[60]

Orders of battle[edit]

Royal Navy

French Navy (Marine Nationale)

See also[edit]


  1. ^

    It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;

    (a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.

    (b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.

    If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.

    (c) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans lest they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West IndiesMartinique for instance—where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.

    If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.

    Finally, failing the above, I have orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.

    — Somerville[14]


  1. ^ a b Sutherland & Canwell 2011, pp. 21–22.
  2. ^ a b Sutherland & Canwell 2011, p. 20.
  3. ^ a b Marder 2015, p. 256.
  4. ^ Playfair 1959, p. 137.
  5. ^ Chin 2022, p. 103.
  6. ^ Thomas 1997, pp. 643–670.
  7. ^ Butler 1971, p. 218.
  8. ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 57.
  9. ^ Lacouture 1991, pp. 246–247.
  10. ^ Hansard, War Situation, 25 June 1940, 304–05
  11. ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 56.
  12. ^ a b c d Lacouture 1991, p. 247.
  13. ^ Bell 1997, pp. 19–20.
  14. ^ Butler 1971, pp. 223–224.
  15. ^ Jameson 2004, pp. 160–161.
  16. ^ Butler 1971, pp. 224–225.
  17. ^ Butler 1971, p. 222.
  18. ^ Roskill 1957, pp. 240, 242.
  19. ^ Smith 2010, p. 48.
  20. ^ Smith 2010, pp. 47–56, 93.
  21. ^ a b c Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 61.
  22. ^ a b Melton 2015, p. 190.
  23. ^ a b c d e ARIANE (in French) Accessed 15 October 2022
  24. ^ a b c d e f DANAÉ (in French) Accessed 15 October 2022
  25. ^ a b c d e Sous-Marins Français Disparus & Accidents: Sous-Marin Diane II (in French) Accessed 16 October 2022
  26. ^ a b c d e f g EURYDICE (in French) Accessed 15 October 2022
  27. ^ Brown 2004, p. 198.
  28. ^ Sutherland & Canwell2011, p. 21.
  29. ^ Sutherland & Canwell2011, p. 22.
  30. ^ a b O'Hara 2009, p. 24.
  31. ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 59–60.
  32. ^ a b c Melton 2015, p. 195.
  33. ^ ARCHIMEDE II (in French) Accessed 8 August 2022
  34. ^ Sous-Marins Français Disparus & Accidents: Sous-Marin Le Conquérant (in French) Accessed 10 August 2022
  35. ^ Sous-Marins Français Disparus & Accidents: Sous-Marin L'Espoir (in French) Accessed 5 August 2022
  36. ^ a b c Playfair 1959, p. 142.
  37. ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 94–95.
  38. ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 60–61.
  39. ^ Lacouture 1991, p. 246.
  40. ^ Smith 2010, pp. 86, 88.
  41. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 140–141.
  42. ^ Auphan & Mordal 1976, pp. 124–126.
  43. ^ Butler 1971, p. 230.
  44. ^ Smith 2010, p. 92.
  45. ^ Lacouture 1991, p. 249.
  46. ^ Smith 2010, p. 404.
  47. ^ Brown 2004, pp. 204–205.
  48. ^ Smith 2010, pp. 94, 93.
  49. ^ Melton 2015, p. 197.
  50. ^ Melton 2015, pp. 170–171, 174, 177.
  51. ^ Melton 2015, p. 200.
  52. ^ Melton 2015, pp. 202–206.
  53. ^ Melton 2015, pp. 200–202.
  54. ^ Melton 2015, pp. 202–203.
  55. ^ O'Hara 2009, p. 19.
  56. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 142–143.
  57. ^ Smith 2010, p. 99.
  58. ^ a b c O'Hara 2009, p. 56.
  59. ^ Bond 2003, p. 98.
  60. ^ Roskill 1962, pp. 338, 444.



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  • Lacouture, Jean (1991) [1984]. De Gaulle: The Rebel 1890–1944 (Eng trans. ed.). London: W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-02699-3 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Marder, A. (2015) [1974]. From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915–1940 (repr. Seaforth Publishing (Pen & Sword Books) Barnsley ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-84832-252-3. LCCN 2015938192.
  • Melton, George E. (2015). From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir: The Promise of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation 1919–1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-61251-879-4.
  • O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
  • Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; et al. (1959) [1954]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I (3rd impr. ed.). HMSO. OCLC 494123451. Retrieved 24 November 2017.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1957) [1954]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The War at Sea 1939–1945: The Defensive. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I (4th impr. ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 881709135.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956]. The Period of Balance. History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. II (3rd impression ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 174453986.
  • Smith, C. (2010) [2009]. England's Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940–1942 (Phoenix ed.). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-7538-2705-5.
  • Sutherland, Jon; Canwell, Diane (2011). Vichy Air Force at War: The French Air Force that Fought the Allies in World War II. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-84884-336-3.


  • Thomas, Martin (1997). "After Mers-el-Kébir: The Armed Neutrality of the Vichy French Navy, 1940–43". English Historical Review. 112 (447). ISSN 0013-8266.

Further reading[edit]

  • Collier, Paul (2003). The Second World War: The Mediterranean 1940–1945. Vol. IV. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84176-539-6.
  • Ehrengardt, Christian-Jacques Ehrengardt; Shores, Christopher J. (1985). L'aviation de Vichy au combat: les campagnes oubliées 3 juillet 1940 – 27 novembre 1942 [The Vichy Air Force in Combat: The Forgotten Campaigns]. Grandes batailles de France. Vol. I. Paris: C. Lavauzelle. ISBN 978-2-7025-0092-7.
  • Jenkins, E. H. (1979). A History of the French Navy: From its Beginnings to the Present Day. London: Macdonald and Jane's. ISBN 978-0-356-04196-4.
  • Lasterle, Philippe (2003). "Could Admiral Gensoul Have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kebir?". Journal of Military History. 67 (3): 835–844. doi:10.1353/jmh.2003.0234. ISSN 0899-3718. S2CID 159759345.
  • Paxton, R. O. (1972). Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944. New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-394-47360-4.

External links[edit]