Balfour Declaration

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Not to be confused with Balfour Declaration of 1926.
Balfour Declaration
Balfour portrait and declaration.JPG
An image of Balfour and the Declaration
Created 2 Nov 1917
Signatories Arthur James Balfour
Purpose Confirming support from the British government for the establishment in Palestine of a "national home" for the Jewish people

The Balfour Declaration (dated 2 November 1917) was a letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, for transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. It read:

His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[1][2]

The text of the letter was published in the press one week later, on 9 November 1917.[3] The "Balfour Declaration" was later incorporated into both the Sèvres peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, and the Mandate for Palestine. The original document is kept at the British Library.

The declaration was in contrast to the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, which promised the Arab independence movement control of the Middle East territories "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca" in exchange for revolting against the Ottoman Empire.

The issuance of the Declaration had many long lasting consequences, and was a key moment in the lead-up to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, often referred to as the world's "most intractable conflict".[4][5][6]

Background[edit]

The background of British support under Balfour for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, though idealistically embedded in 19th-century evangelical expectations, and Christian feelings that England was to play a role in the Advent of the Millenium and Christ's Second Coming, premised on an ingathering of Jews to their ancient homeland, was linked to geopolitical calculations, These were originally precipitated by the Eastern Crisis after Muhammad Ali occupied Syria and Palestine.[7] With the geopolitical shakeup occasioned by the outbreak of WWI, the earlier calculations, that had lapsed for some time—Theodor Herzl's own attempts earlier to obtain international support for his project had failed—led to a renewal of strategic assessments and political bargaining regarding the Middle and Far East.[7]

World War I[edit]

Further information: Timeline of World War I

In 1914, war broke out in Europe between the Triple Entente (Britain, France and the Russian Empire) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and later that year, the Ottoman Empire). The war on the Western Front developed into a stalemate by 1917. The immediate effect of Balfour's declaration, initially a mere declaration of intent, had little effect on the military sphere,[8] but there were larger geopolitical calculations, some visible in Lloyd George's list of nine factors motivating his decision as Prime Minister to release the declaration,[9] not least of which the view that a Jewish presence in Palestine would strengthen Britain's position on the Suez Canal and reinforce the route to Great Britain's imperial dominion in India.[9][10] Weisman had argued that one consequence of such a public commitment by Great Britain, making the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, one of the Allies' war aims, was that it would have three effects: it would swing Russia to maintain pressure on Germany's Eastern Front, since Jews had been prominent in the March Revolution of 1917. It would rally the large Jewish community in the United States to press for greater funding for the American war effort, underway since April of that year; and, lastly, that it would undermine German Jewish support for Kaiser Wilhelm II.[11] Some historians argue that British government's decision reflected what James Gelvin calls 'patrician anti-Semitism' in the overestimation of Jewish power in both the United States and Russia.[9]

Jonathan Schneer writes:

Thus the view from Whitehall early in 1916: If defeat was not imminent, neither was victory; and the outcome of the war of attrition on the Western Front could not be predicted. The colossal forces in a death-grip across Europe and in Eurasia appeared to have canceled each other out. Only the addition of significant new forces on one side or the other seemed likely to tip the scale. Britain's willingness, beginning early in 1916, to explore seriously some kind of arrangement with "world Jewry" or "Great Jewry" must be understood in this context.[12]

Zionism[edit]

Further information: Zionism

In 1896, Theodor Herzl, a Jewish journalist living in Austria-Hungary, published Der Judenstaat ("The Jews' State" or "The State of the Jews"), in which he asserted that the only solution to the "Jewish Question" in Europe, including growing antisemitism, was through the establishment of a state for the Jews. Political Zionism had just been born.[13] A year later, Herzl founded the Zionist Organization (ZO), which at its first congress, "called for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law". Serviceable means to attain that goal included the promotion of Jewish settlement there, the organisation of Jews in the diaspora, the strengthening of Jewish feeling and consciousness, and preparatory steps to attain those necessary governmental grants.[14] Herzl died in 1904 without the political standing that was required to carry out his agenda of a Jewish home in Palestine.[15]

During the first meeting between Chaim Weizmann and Balfour in 1906, Balfour asked what Weizmann's objections were to the idea of a Jewish homeland in Uganda (the Uganda Protectorate in East Africa in the British Uganda Programme), rather than in Palestine. According to Weizmann's memoir, the conversation went as follows:

"Mr. Balfour, supposing I was to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?" He sat up, looked at me, and answered: "But Dr. Weizmann, we have London." "That is true," I said, "but we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh." He ... said two things which I remember vividly. The first was: "Are there many Jews who think like you?" I answered: "I believe I speak the mind of millions of Jews whom you will never see and who cannot speak for themselves." ... To this he said: "If that is so you will one day be a force."[16]

Two months after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, Zionist British cabinet member Herbert Samuel circulated a memorandum entitled The Future of Palestine to his cabinet colleagues. The memorandum stated that "I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire".

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence[edit]

Henry McMahon had exchanged letters with Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca in 1915, in which he had promised Hussein control of Arab lands with the exception of "portions of Syria" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo". Palestine lay to the southwest of the Vilayet of Damascus and wasn't explicitly mentioned. That modern-day Lebanese region of the Mediterranean coast was set aside as part of a future French Mandate. After the war the extent of the coastal exclusion was hotly disputed. Hussein had protested that the Arabs of Beirut would greatly oppose isolation from the Arab state or states, but did not bring up the matter of Jerusalem or Palestine. Dr. Chaim Weizmann wrote in his autobiography Trial and Error that Palestine had been excluded from the areas that should have been Arab and independent. This interpretation was supported explicitly by the British government in the 1922 White Paper.

On the basis of McMahon's assurances the Arab Revolt began on 5 June 1916. However, the British and French also secretly concluded the Sykes–Picot Agreement on 16 May 1916.[17] This agreement divided many Arab territories into British- and French-administered areas and allowed for the internationalisation of Palestine.[17] Hussein learned of the agreement when it was leaked by the new Soviet government in December 1917, but was satisfied by two disingenuous telegrams from Sir Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner of Egypt, assuring him that the British government's commitments to the Arabs were still valid and that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not a formal treaty.[17]

Hussein called on the Arab population in Palestine to welcome the Jews as brethren and co-operate with them for the common welfare.[18] Following the publication of the Declaration the British had dispatched Commander David George Hogarth to see Hussein in January 1918 bearing the message that the "political and economic freedom" of the Palestinian population was not in question.[17] Hogarth reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain".[19] Continuing Arab disquiet over Allied intentions also led during 1918 to the British Declaration to the Seven and the Anglo-French Declaration, the latter promising "the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations."[17][20]

Lord Grey had been the Foreign Secretary during the McMahon-Hussein negotiations. Speaking in the House of Lords on 27 March 1923, he made it clear that he entertained serious doubts as to the validity of the British government's interpretation of the pledges which he, as foreign secretary, had caused to be given to Hussein in 1915. He called for all of the secret engagements regarding Palestine to be made public.[21] Many of the relevant documents in the National Archives were later declassified and published. Among them were the minutes of a Cabinet Eastern Committee meeting, chaired by Lord Curzon, which was held on 5 December 1918. Balfour was in attendance. The minutes revealed that in laying out the government's position Curzon had explained that: "Palestine was included in the areas as to which Great Britain pledged itself that they should be Arab and independent in the future".[22]

Sykes–Picot Agreement[edit]

Further information: Sykes–Picot Agreement

In May 1916 the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Russia signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement, which defined their proposed spheres of influence and control in Western Asia should the Triple Entente succeed in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The agreement effectively divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian peninsula into areas of future British and French control or influence.

The agreement proposed that an "international administration" would be established in an area shaded brown on the agreement's map, which was later to become Palestine, and that the form of the administration would be "decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca". Zionists believed their aspirations had been passed over. William Reginald Hall, British Director of Naval Intelligence criticised the agreement on the basis that "the Jews have a strong material, and a very strong political, interest in the future of the country" and that "in the Brown area the question of Zionism, and also of British control of all Palestine railways, in the interest of Egypt, have to be considered".

Motivation for the Declaration[edit]

Impact on foreign governments[edit]

Ahead of the American entry into World War I, it became clear that Woodrow Wilson and his advisors were in favor of Zionism. Six months before the Declaration, this front page article from the Charlotte Observer notes the announcement that Balfour and Wilson had "informally discussed" the project.

James Gelvin, a Middle East history professor, cites at least three reasons for why the British government chose to support Zionist aspirations. Issuing the Balfour Declaration would appeal to two of Woodrow Wilson's closest advisors, who were avid Zionists.

The British did not know quite what to make of President Woodrow Wilson and his conviction (before America's entrance into the war) that the way to end hostilities was for both sides to accept "peace without victory." Two of Wilson's closest advisors, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, were avid Zionists. How better to shore up an uncertain ally than by endorsing Zionist aims? The British adopted similar thinking when it came to the Russians, who were in the midst of their revolution. Several of the most prominent revolutionaries, including Leon Trotsky, were of Jewish descent. Why not see if they could be persuaded to keep Russia in the war by appealing to their latent Jewishness and giving them another reason to continue the fight? ... These include not only those already mentioned but also Britain's desire to attract Jewish financial resources.[23]

At that time the British were busy making promises. At a War Cabinet meeting, held on 31 October 1917, Balfour suggested that a declaration favourable to Zionist aspirations would allow Great Britain "to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America."[24]

The cabinet believed that expressing support would appeal to Jews in Germany and America, and help the war effort.[25] It was also hoped to encourage support from the large Jewish population in Russia. According to James Renton, Senior Lecturer at Edge Hill University, and author of The Zionist Masquerade: the Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance: 1914–1918, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of the United Kingdom supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine because "it would help secure post-war British control of Palestine, which was strategically important as a buffer to Egypt and the Suez Canal."[26] In addition, Palestine was to later serve as a terminus for the flow of petroleum from Iraq via Jordan, three former Ottoman Turkish provinces that became British League of Nations mandates in the aftermath of the First World War. The oil officially flowed along the Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline from 1935–1948, and unofficially up until 1954.

American Zionism was still in its relative infancy; in 1914 the Zionist Federation had a small budget and only 12,000 members, despite an American Jewish population of three million.[27] However, the Zionist organizations had recently succeeded in a show of force within the American Jewish community in arranging a Jewish congress to debate the Jewish problem as a whole.[28] This impacted British and French government estimates of the balance of power within the American Jewish public.[28]

David Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time of the Balfour Declaration, told the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937 that the Declaration was made "due to propagandist reasons."[29] Citing the position of the Allied and Associated Powers in the ongoing war, Lloyd George said, in the Report's words, "In this critical situation it was believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry, and would make it more difficult for Germany to reduce her military commitments and improve her economic position on the eastern front." Lloyd George then said

The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.[29]

Regarding the intended future of Palestine, Lloyd George testified:

The idea was, and this was the interpretation put upon it at the time, that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth.[29]

In his Memoirs, published in 1939, Lloyd George further elucidated his position:[30]

The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandist reasons.... The Zionist Movement was exceptionally strong in Russia and America.... It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.

Britain planned that once Palestine had been conquered, the establishment of a national home for Jewish people, will ward off the inevitable French pressure for an international administration [31][32]

Weizmann-Balfour relationship[edit]

Lord Balfour's desk, in the Museum of the Jewish Diaspora, in Tel Aviv

In his War Memoirs, Lloyd-George wrote of meeting Weizmann in 1916 that Weizmann:

... explained his aspirations as to the repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they had made famous. That was the fount and origin of the famous declaration about the National Home for the Jews in Palestine .... As soon as I became Prime Minister I talked the whole matter over with Mr Balfour, who was then Foreign Secretary.

This may, however, have been only a part of a longer series of discussions about Britain and Zionism held between Weizmann and Balfour which had begun at least a decade earlier. In late 1905 Balfour had requested of Charles Dreyfus, his Jewish constituency representative, that he arrange a meeting with Weizmann, during which Weizmann asked for official British support for Zionism; they were to meet again on this issue in 1914.[33]

Jewish national home vs. Jewish state[edit]

Further information: Homeland for the Jewish people

The Balfour Declaration was carefully worded, and ambiguous. The phrase 'Jewish homeland' had no legal value in international law, as opposed to 'state' while the choice of stating such a homeland would be found 'in Palestine' rather than 'of Palestine' was also no accident.[9] Explication of the wording has been sought in the correspondence leading to the final version of the declaration. The phrase "national home" was intentionally used instead of "state" because of opposition to the Zionist program within the British Cabinet. Following discussion of the initial draft the Cabinet Secretary, Mark Sykes, met with the Zionist negotiators to clarify their aims. His official report back to the Cabinet categorically stated that the Zionists did not want "to set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in Palestine immediately"[34] but rather preferred some form of protectorate as provided in the Palestine Mandate. In approving the Balfour Declaration, Leopold Amery, one of the Secretaries to the British War Cabinet of 1917–18, testified under oath to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in January 1946 from his personal knowledge that:

"The phrase 'the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people' was intended and understood by all concerned to mean at the time of the Balfour Declaration that Palestine would ultimately become a 'Jewish Commonwealth' or a 'Jewish State', if only Jews came and settled there in sufficient numbers."[35]

Both the Zionist Organization and the British government devoted efforts over the following decades, including Winston Churchill's 1922 White Paper, to denying that a state was the intention.[a] However, in private, many British officials agreed with the interpretation of the Zionists that a state would be established when a Jewish majority was achieved.[36]

The initial draft of the declaration, contained in a letter sent by Rothschild to Balfour, referred to the principle "that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people."[37] In the final text, the word that was replaced with in to avoid committing the entirety of Palestine to this purpose. Similarly, an early draft did not include the commitment that nothing should be done which might prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish communities. These changes came about partly as the result of the urgings of Edwin Samuel Montagu, an influential anti-Zionist Jew and Secretary of State for India. Montagu, the only Jewish member of the British cabinet, voiced his opposition by declaring:

'The policy of His Majesty's Government is anti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallying ground for anti-Semites in every country of the world.'[38]

The draft was circulated and during October the government received replies from various representatives of the Jewish community. Lord Rothschild took exception to the new proviso on the basis that it presupposed the possibility of a danger to non-Zionists, which he denied.[39] At San Remo, as shown in the transcript of the San Remo meeting on the evening of 24 April, the French proposed adding to the savings clause so that it would save for non-Jewish communities their "political rights" as well as their civil and religious rights. The French proposal was rejected.

Authorship[edit]

Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh of the new Middle East department of the Foreign Office discovered that the correspondence prior to the declaration was not available in the Colonial Office, 'although Foreign Office papers were understood to have been lengthy and to have covered a considerable period'." The 'most comprehensive explanation' of the origin of the Balfour Declaration the Foreign Office was able to provide was contained in a small 'unofficial' note of Jan 1923 affirming that:

little is known of how the policy represented by the Declaration was first given form. Four, or perhaps five men were chiefly concerned in the labour – the Earl of Balfour, the late Sir Mark Sykes, and Messrs. Weizmann and Sokolow, with perhaps Lord Rothschild as a figure in the background. Negotiations seem to have been mainly oral and by means of private notes and memoranda of which only the scantiest records seem to be available.[b]

In his posthumously published 1981 book The Anglo-American Establishment, Georgetown University history professor Carroll Quigley explained that the Balfour Declaration was actually drafted by Alfred, Lord Milner. Quigley wrote:

This declaration, which is always known as the Balfour Declaration, should rather be called "the Milner Declaration," since Milner was the actual draftsman and was, apparently, its chief supporter in the War Cabinet. This fact was not made public until 21 July 1937. At that time Ormsby-Gore, speaking for the government in Commons, said, "The draft as originally put up by Lord Balfour was not the final draft approved by the War Cabinet. The particular draft assented to by the War Cabinet and afterwards by the Allied Governments and by the United States...and finally embodied in the Mandate, happens to have been drafted by Lord Milner. The actual final draft had to be issued in the name of the Foreign Secretary, but the actual draftsman was Lord Milner."[41]

More recently, William D. Rubinstein, Professor of Modern History at Aberystwyth University, Wales, wrote that Conservative politician and pro-Zionist Leo Amery, as Assistant Secretary to the British war cabinet in 1917, was the main author of the Balfour Declaration.[42]

Reaction to the Declaration[edit]

Arab opposition[edit]

The most popular Palestinian Arab newspaper, Filastin (La Palestine), published a four-page editorial addressed to Lord Balfour in March 1925.

A delegation of the Muslim-Christian Association, headed by Musa al-Husayni, expressed public disapproval on 3 November 1918, one day after the Zionist Commission parade marking the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.[43] They handed a petition signed by more than 100 notables to Ronald Storrs, the OETA military governor:

We have noticed yesterday a large crowd of Jews carrying banners and over-running the streets shouting words which hurt the feeling and wound the soul. They pretend with open voice that Palestine, which is the Holy Land of our fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors, which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages, who loved it and died in defending it, is now a national home for them... We Arabs, Muslim and Christian, have always sympathized profoundly with the persecuted Jews and their misfortunes in other countries... but there is wide difference between such sympathy and the acceptance of such a nation...ruling over us and disposing of our affairs.[44][45]

The group also protested the carrying of new "white and blue banners with two inverted triangles in the middle". They drew the attention of the authorities to the serious consequences of any political implications in raising the banners.[46]

Balfour's stance was seen as a betrayal of British understandings with Arabs.[11] Later that month, on the first anniversary of the occupation of Jaffa by the British, the Muslim-Christian Association sent a lengthy memorandum and petition to the military governor protesting once more any formation of a Jewish state.[47]

Zionist reaction[edit]

Balfour Declaration as published in The Times 9 November 1917

The publication of the intent galvanized Zionism, which finally had obtained an official charter. In the ongoing Sinai and Palestine Campaign, both Gaza and Jaffa fell within several days. Once under British military occupation, large transfers of funds were possible, and a major effort began to drain the marshy land of the Valley of Jezreel, whose redemption as the breadbasket of Palestine became the priority of the Third Aliyah settlers, mainly from Eastern Europe.[8]

Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, the principal Zionist leaders based in London, had asked for the reconstitution of Palestine as "the" Jewish national home. As such, the declaration fell short of Zionist expectations.[48]

British opinion[edit]

British public and government opinion became increasingly less favourable to the commitment that had been made to Zionist policy. In February 1922, Winston Churchill telegraphed Herbert Samuel asking for cuts in expenditure and noting:

In both Houses of Parliament there is growing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by recent Northcliffe articles.[49] I do not attach undue importance to this movement, but it is increasingly difficult to meet the argument that it is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, already overwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost of imposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.[50]

Response by Central Powers[edit]

Immediately following the publication of the declaration Germany entered negotiations with Turkey to put forward counter proposals. A German-Jewish Society was formed: Vereinigung jüdischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte der Juden des Ostens (V.J.O.D.) and in January 1918 the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat, issued a statement which promised legislation by which "all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to find their fulfilment".[51]

Longer term impact[edit]

The declaration had two indirect consequences, the emergence of a Jewish state and a chronic state of conflict between Arabs and Jews throughout the Middle East.[11]

Jonathan Schneer's 2010 study concluded that because the buildup to the declaration was characterized by "contradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking", the declaration sowed dragon's teeth and "produced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting even today."[52][53] The foundational stone for modern Israel had been laid, but the prediction that this would lay the groundwork for harmonious Arab-Jewish cooperation proved to be wishful thinking.[54]

The implementation of the declaration fed a disenchantment among the Arabs that alienated them from the British Mandatory Authorities[11] Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi has argued that following the Balfour Declaration, there ensued, 'what amounts to a hundred years of war against the Palestinian people.'[55]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ See the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, UN Document A/364, 3 September 1947
  2. ^ Full text of note included CO 733/58, Secret Cabinet Paper CP 60 (23), 'Palestine and the Balfour Declaration, January 1923. FO unofficial note added 'little referring to the Balfour Declaration among such papers as have been preserved'. Shuckburgh's memo asserts that 'as the official records are silent, it can only be assumed that such discussions as had taken place were of an informal and private character'.[40]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ "The Balfour Declaration". Israeli Ministry of Foriegn Affairs. 2013. 
  2. ^ Yapp, M.E. (1 September 1987). The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923. Harlow, England: Longman. p. 290. ISBN 978-0-582-49380-3. 
  3. ^ Schneer 2010, p. 342.
  4. ^ Chris Rice, quoted in Munayer Salim J, Loden Lisa, Through My Enemy's Eyes: Envisioning Reconciliation in Israel-Palestine, quote: "The Palestinian-Israeli divide may be the most intractable conflict of our time."
  5. ^ Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, page 67, "Britain's contradictory promises to Arabs and Jews during World War I sowed the seeds of what would become the international community's most intractable conflict later in the century."
  6. ^ Avner Falk, Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoanalytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chapter 1, page 8, "Most experts agree that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most intractable conflict in our world, yet very few scholars have produced any psychological explanation—let alone a satisfactory one—of this conflict's intractability"
  7. ^ a b Freddy Liebreich (2004). Britain's Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine, 1945-1949. Routledge. pp. 8-9.
  8. ^ a b Rafael N. Rosenzweig, The Economic Consequences of Zionism, BRILL, 1989 pp.25-28.
  9. ^ a b c d Gelvin 2014, p. 82ff.
  10. ^ Gresh, Alain; Vidal, Dominique (2004). The New A-Z of the Middle East (2 ed.). I.B.Tauris. p. 42. 
  11. ^ a b c d Tim Watts, 'The Balfour Declaration,' in Spencer C. Tucker, Priscilla Roberts (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, The: A Political, Social, and Military History: A Political, Social, and Military History, ABC-CLIO, 2008 p.190.
  12. ^ Schneer 2010, p. 152.
  13. ^ Friedman, Isaiah. "Herzl, Theodor." Encyclopaedia Judaica. Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. 2nd ed. Vol. 9. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 54–66. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 15 April 2010.
  14. ^ Avish, Shimon. "Herzl, Theodor [1860–1904]." Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. Ed. Philip Mattar. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 1021–1022. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 15 April 2010.
  15. ^ [Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. Print. p.224]
  16. ^ Weizmann, Trial and Error, p.111, as quoted in W. Lacquer, The History of Zionism, 2003, ISBN 978-1-86064-932-5. p.188
  17. ^ a b c d e Khouri, Fred John (1985). The Arab-Israeli Dilemma. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-2340-3, pp. 8–10.
  18. ^ Palestine, a Twice-promised Land?: The British, the Arabs & Zionism, 1915–1920 By Isaiah Friedman, page 171
  19. ^ Huneidi, Sahar (2000). A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925. IB Tauris. ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5, p. 66.
  20. ^ Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex A, paragraph 19.
  21. ^ Report of a Committee Set Up To Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sharif of Mecca Archived January 30, 2009 at the Wayback Machine
  22. ^ cited in Palestine Papers, 1917–1922, Doreen Ingrams, page 48 from the UK Archive files PRO CAB 27/24.
  23. ^ Gelvin 2014, p. 82-83.
  24. ^ Palestine Papers 1917–1922, Doreen Ingrams, page 16
  25. ^ Wall Street Journal review of Jonathan Shneer, Balfour Declaration "As Mr. Schneer documents, the declaration was, among much else, part of a campaign to foster world-wide Jewish support for the Allied war effort, not least in the U.S."
  26. ^ James Renton, The Balfour Declaration: its origins and consequences, Jewish Quarterly, Spring 2008, Number 209, http://www.jewishquarterly.org/issuearchive/articleea91.html
  27. ^ Shareen Blair Brysac; Karl E. Meyer (12 October 2009). Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East. W. W. Norton. p. 115. ISBN 978-0-393-34243-7. As the lawyer and historian David Fromkin has shrewdly noted, out of an estimated three million Jews living in the United States in 1914, a mere twelve thousand belonged to an amateurishly led Zionist Federation, which claimed but five hundred members in New York. Its annual budget prior to 1914 never exceeded $5,200, and the largest single gift it received totalled $200. 
  28. ^ a b Reinharz, Jehuda (1988). "Zionism in the USA on the Eve of the Balfour Declaration". Studies in Zionism 9 (2): 131–145. doi:10.1080/13531048808575933.  "At the Zionist Emergency Conference in August 1914, Poalei-Zion demanded the convening of a Jewish congress which would debate the Jewish problem as a whole... During a year of fruitless discussions, the AJC would only agree only to a limited convention of specific organizations, rather than a congress based on democratic elections. In March 1916, therefore, the Zionists invited a number of other organizations to set up a congress. The internal strife among American Jewry, which had been so widely feared, broke out in full force... The elections were held in June, two months after the United States had entered the war; 325,000 voted, 75,000 of whom were from the Zionist workers' camp. This was an impressive demonstration of the ability of the immigrant Zionists to rally massive support. Immediately after came President Wilson's suggestion to Wise not to hold the congress while the war was on, and the opening session was thus postponed from September 2, 1917, until "peace negotiations will be in prospect". The PZCs acceptance of the deferment again aroused the ire of supporters of the congress, who described it as a degrading surrender. However, in the eyes of other observers of that generation, the matter took on a different form. British and French estimates of the balance of power in the American Jewish public were greatly affected by this success in the struggle for a congress. It was a victory for Zionists under the leadership of close advisers to the Wilson Administration, such as Brandeis and Frankfurter, against the desires of the bankers from Wall Street, the AJC, and the National Workers' Committee. It spurred an impressive growth in organized membership: from 7,500 in 200 Zionist societies in 1914 to 30,000 in 600 societies in 1918. One year later, the number of members reached 149,000. In addition, the FAZ and the PZC collected millions of dollars during the war years. This demonstration of support for Zionism among the masses of American Jews played a vital role in the British considerations which led to the Balfour Declaration. The American Government (or, at least, the State Department), which did not particularly want to support the Declaration, did so almost in spite of itself – apparently because of the growing strength of Zionists in the United States."
  29. ^ a b c Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd 5479, 1937, pp23–24.
  30. ^ David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume II, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939; chapter XXIII, pp. 724-734
  31. ^ Grainger, John D. (2006). The Battle for Palestine, 1917. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1-84383-263-8.  p. 178
  32. ^ James Barr (27 October 2011). A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East. Simon & Schuster. pp. 60–. ISBN 978-1-84983-903-7. to ward off the inevitable French pressure for an international administration once Palestine had been conquered 
  33. ^ Harry Defries, Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews 1900–1950, Routledge, 2001, ISBN 978-0-7146-5221-4. pp.50–51.
  34. ^ Strawson, John (2010). Partitioning Palestine: Legal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict. London: Penguin Books. p. 33. ISBN 9780745323244. 
  35. ^ The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1984. Martinus Nijhoff. 1997. p. 48. ISBN 9789041103383. 
  36. ^ Mansfield, Peter (1992). The Arabs. London: Penguin Books. pp. 176–77. 
  37. ^ Stein 1961, p. 470.
  38. ^ Saree Makdisi, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, W. W. Norton & Company, 2010 p.239.
  39. ^ Ingrams, Doreen (2009). Palestine Papers 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict. Eland Books. p. 13. ISBN 9781906011383. 
  40. ^ Huneidi, Sahar (2001). A Broken Trust: Sir Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. I.B.Tauris. p. 256. ISBN 9781860641725. Retrieved 2014-07-12. 
  41. ^ Quigley, Carroll (June 1981). The Anglo-American Establishment. New York: Books in Focus. p. 169. ISBN 978-0-945001-01-0. [dead link]
  42. ^ William D. Rubinstein (2000). "The Secret of Leopold Amery". Historical Research (Institute of Historical Research) 73 (181, June 2000): 175–196. doi:10.1111/1468-2281.00102. 
  43. ^ Wasserstein 1991, p. 31.
  44. ^ Wasserstein 1991, p. 32.
  45. ^ Storrs to OETA headquarters, 4 Nov. 1918 (ISA 2/140/4A)
  46. ^ Zu'aytir, Akram, Watha'iq al-haraka a-wataniyya al-filastiniyya (1918–1939), ed. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut. Beirut 1948. Papers, p. 5. Cited by Huneidi, Sahar "A Broken Trust, Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians". ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5 p.32.
  47. ^ 'Petition from the Moslem-Christian Association in Jaffa, to the Military Governor, on the occasion of the First Anniversary of British Entry into Jaffa', 16 November 1918, Zu'aytir papers pp. 7–8. Cited by Huneidi p.32.
  48. ^ Balfour Declaration. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 12 August 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
  49. ^ Defries, Harry (2001). Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews, 1900-1950. Psychology Press. p. 103. ISBN 9780714652214. Retrieved 2014-07-12. 
  50. ^ CO 733/18, Churchill to Samuel, Telegram, Private and Personal, 25 February 1922. Cited Huneidi, Sahar "A Broken Trust, Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians" 2001, ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5, p.57.
  51. ^ MacMunn, Lieut.-General Sir George (1928) Military Operations. Egypt and Palestine. From the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917. HMSO. Pages 219,220.
  52. ^ Schneer 2010, p. 370: "Because it was unpredictable and characterized by contradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking, the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration sowed dragon's teeth. It produced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting even today"
  53. ^ Review: ‘The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Jim Miles, April 4, 2012, "The conclusion reached by Schneer, stated twice, "Because it was unpredictable and characterized by contradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking, the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration sowed dragon's teeth…. It produced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting even today.""
  54. ^ Schneer 2010, p. 361.
  55. ^ Ian Black,'Middle East still rocking from first world war pacts made 100 years ago ,' The Guardian 30 December 2015.

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