Categories of beliefs
- Beliefs that are properly basic, in that they do not depend upon justification of other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief (a "non-doxastic justification")
- Beliefs that derive from one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity
Description of basic beliefs
Within this basic framework of foundationalism exist a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as properly basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs.
In classical foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either self-evident axioms, or evident to the senses (empiricism). However Anthony Kenny and others have argued that this is a self-refuting idea.
- In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or incorrigible. One such axiom is René Descartes's axiom, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. uncorrectable) beliefs are those one can believe without possibly being proven wrong. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion.
- In what Keith Lehrer has called "fallible foundationalism", also known as "moderate foundationalism", the division between inferential and non-inferential belief is retained, but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This, it is claimed, allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility.
- In reformed epistemology, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible world view.
- Doxastic logic
- Mental model
- Mental representation
- Set (psychology)
- Schema (psychology)
Notes and references
- Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, (London Notre Dame, 1983) pp. 39-44. Here Plantinga is basing his analysis on the ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas.
- Anthony Kenny, What is Faith? Oxford: OUP 1992 ISBN 0-19-283067-8 pp. 9-10. This particular chapter is based on a 1982 lecture, which may explain the shift in the meaning of the term "foundationalism" since then.
- Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, (London Notre Dame, 1983) pp. 58-59. Here Plantinga references John Locke and René Descartes.
- Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). See also "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-09-08. Retrieved 2007-03-31.
- "It makes sense for people to believe what they perceive through their experience and therefore, individuals are justified in those beliefs. "Truth Awakens on Foundationalism Archived February 28, 2007, at the Wayback Machine.
- J. Childers/G. Hentzi, The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism (1995) p. 100