Battle of Nola (214 BC)
| This article relies largely or entirely upon a single source. (September 2014) |
| Third Battle of Nola | |||||||
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| Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Hannibal | Marcus Claudius Marcellus | ||||||
The Third Battle of Nola was fought in 214 BC between Hannibal and a Roman army led by Marcus Claudius Marcellus. It was Hannibal's third attempt to take the town of Nola. Once again, Marcellus successfully prevented the town's capture.
Background[edit]
Upon Hannibal's descent from the alps he had for 3 years won an impressive string of victories against Rome[1] The battle of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae were some of the more notable victories that he'd won[2] These had been disastrous defeats for the Romans, especially the latter battle. This victory brought the Romans to the brink of despair.[3] The Senate had issued a decree that forbade anyone to say the word, "Peace"[3] within the city itself. Mourning was legislatively circumscribed to 30 days,[3] women were not permitted to cry in the public venues.[3] In spite of these and other like measures, there was much despair in the city and there were a number of young Romans of high birth who proposed desertion to all in the army and to establish a new colony elsewhere.[4] This proposed defection was put down and all thoughts of surrender were circumscribed.[4]
However, in spite of the tremendous blow to the cause of Rome, Hannibal could not take the city itself - he did not think he had the resources that a siege of the city itself would have required[3]- and as a result did not attempt it. There were two reasons that Hannibal thought this was the proper course; he did not believe that he had the resources necessary for a siege of Rome itself,[2] secondly thus far - and even after the battle of Cannea he had not been able to break up the Roman Symmachy.[2] Not a single member of the Italian Confederacy ever broke its treaty with Rome,[3] the roots of Roman power in the peninsula were sown deep, based upon time and the mutual benefit that both Rome and her subordinate allies had received from the alliance.[2] To be sure, there were colonies that had been detached from the Confederacy in Cisalpine Gaul, but no seriously demoralizing blow had been struck at the Symmachy.[2]
So after Cannae, Hannibal set about just this task.[5] It was indeed upon the basis of his being able to detach the confederates of Rome, that Hannibal had calculated upon a lasting victory. Without them, nothing serious could be brought about.[5] So after the battle itself, Hannibal started to conduct diplomacy to this effect. Phillip of Macedon promised a navy and an army to descend on Italy - it was in this way that he hoped to simultaneously strike a blow at Rome herself while regaining Epirus to his kingdom. In addition to this, Hiero II of Syracuse recently passed, and his successor concluded a treaty with Hannibal. With the end of detaching more confederates from the Roman Symmachy, after the battle Hannibal released all soldiers that had been enlisted under the banners as a result of their cities treaty with Rome without request for ransom.[6]
However, in spite of the seeming ascendancy of Hannibal over Rome, his cause was in reality anything but that.[6] His military chest was stretched to its limit,[6] and to this effect he sent a deputation to Rome that requested money in return for hostages.[6] This deputation was forbidden to even enter the city, and the Senate forbid anyone from purchasing hostages from the Carthaginians on an individual basis - deeming the enrichment of Hannibal through the wealth of Rome and its citizens to be unacceptable.[6]
What happened at this point, was a number of Roman Allies - although no Latin confederate[2] - were detached.[7] Capua, the second city of all Italy and in a commanding position on the crucial plain of Campania was detached.[7] This city had been much oppressed by the Romans, and faced discriminitory treatment by the Senate and the chief magistrates of the Republic.[6] This city was said to be able to furnish Hannibal with 30,000 foot[8] and 4,000[8] cavalry. This was a major blow to the Symmachy, and was in and of itself as demoralizing as the defeat at Cannae had been. Following the example of Capua was; Uxuntum, much of Bruttia, much of Lucaria, the Picentes of Salernia, the Harpini, almost all of Samnium[8] Amongst whom the Samnites were noted for their prowess in battle, even still.[6] Hannibal had effectively won over all of southern Italy.[9] From the mouth of the Vulturnus river to the peninsula of Mons Garganus and south nothing could be found except a string of Roman forts holding out and adherents of Hannibal.[6]
Citations[edit]
- ^ Dodge 1994
- ^ a b c d e f Dodge 1994, p. 382
- ^ a b c d e f Dodge 1994, p. 386
- ^ a b Dodge 1994, p. 388
- ^ a b Dodge 1994, p. 383
- ^ a b c d e f g h Dodge 1994, p. 391
- ^ a b Dodge 1994, p. 393
- ^ a b c Dodge 1994, p. 392
- ^ Dodge 1994, p. 397
References[edit]
- Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal. Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill Books. ISBN 9781853671791. Reprint of 1891 work.