Battle of Pressburg
|Battle of Pozsony|
|Part of the Hungarian Conquest|
Peter Johann Nepomuk Geiger: Schlacht bei Pressburg (1850)
|East Francia||Principality of Hungary|
|Commanders and leaders|
|Louis the Child
Luitpold, Margrave of Bavaria †
Dietmar I, Archbishop of Salzburg †
Prince Sieghard †
|Grand Prince Árpád (?)
Unknown Hungarian commander
|c. 60,000||c. 20,000|
|Casualties and losses|
|Heavy, among other losses: Prince Luitpold, Margrave of Bavaria, Prince Sieghard, Archbishop Theotmar of Salzburg, 2 bishops, 3 abbots and 19 counts||Not significant|
The Battle of Pressburg (German: Schlacht von Pressburg) or Battle of Pozsony (Hungarian: Pozsonyi csata), or Battle of Bratislava (Slovak: Bitka pri Bratislave) refers to a three days long battle, fought between 4–6 July 907, during which the East Francian army consisting mainly of Bavarian troops, led by Margrave Luitpold was annihilated by Hungarian forces.
In consequence of the Battle of Pressburg, the Kingdom of East Francia could not regain the control over the Carolingian March of Pannonia including the territory of the later marchia orientalis, lost in 900.
However the most important consequence of the Battle of Pressburg is the fact that the Hungarians with this victory defended the lands gained by them during the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, from a huge German invasion, which put their future in the Carpathian Basin in danger, and with this asured their survival as a nation and independence in the lands they conquered for more than a thousand years, creating the conditions for the independent Kingdom of Hungary, the thousand years Hungarian state. As a result, this battle is considered one of the most important battles in the History of Hungary, and the event which concluded the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin.
In addition to annals, like Annales iuvavenses, Annales Alamannici, Continuator Reginonis, Annales Augienses, etc., or necrologies of the important persons (dukes, counts, kings, spiritual leaders), the most important source of the Battle of Pressburg is the chronicle of Johannes Aventinus, Annalium Boiorum VII, written in the 16th century, 600 years after the events, but used old manuscripts, contemporary with the battle, which were lost afterwards, which has the most comprehensive description of the battle.
In 900, the advisors of the new king Louis the Child led by his guardian, Hatto I, Archbishop of Mainz refused the proposal of the renewal of the East Francian (German)–Hungarian alliance which ended with the death of Arnulf of Carinthia, the former King of East Francia. As a response, in 900 the Hungarians occupied Pannonia (Transdanubia) from the Duchy of Bavaria, which was part of the East Francian Kingdom. This started a Hungarian–German war which lasted until 910. Until the Battle of Pressburg (Brezalauspurc), the main fights were between the forces of the Hungarians and the Bavarians, except the Hungarian campaign in Saxony in 906.
After loosing of Pannonia, the Margrave of Bavaria, Luitpold allied with Bavaria's former enemy Mojmir II of Moravia. In 902 the Hungarian armies, probably led by Kurszán, defeated Great Moravia, and occupied its Eastern parts, followed by the Hungarian suzeraunty over the rest of Moravia and Dalamancia (territory in the surroundings of Meissen). This interrupted Bavaria's trade routes to Northern and Eastern Europe. This economical blow for Luitpold was one of the reasons which made him to think in the necessity of a campaign against the Hungarians. Another reason was that Luitpold was not reconciled with the loss of the Bavarian political control over Pannonia, Moravia and Bohemia.
Some military events also strengthened the will of the Luitpold to start a campaign in the Hungarian territories: during the last Magyar attacks against Bavaria, some of their units were defeated by his forces in minor battles in 901 at Laibach, and in 903 at the Fischa River. Furthermore, the Bavarians feigned that they want to conclude a peace treaty with the Hungarians, in 904 invited Kurszán to negotiations, and assassinated him. After these negative events for them, for a while the Hungarians did not attack Bavaria, and this increased Luitpold's self-confidence, and made him think they were afraid of his forces. This convinced him, that the right moment had come to defeat and chase away the Hungarians from the territories occupied by the Magyars from Bavaria.
The commanders of the two armies
The leader of the attacking German forces nominally was Louis the Child, the King of East Francia, but because of being at that moment only 14 years old, the real commander was Luitpold, Margrave of Bavaria, an experienced military leader, who before fought with success against the Moravians and achieved a few military successes against some raiding Hungarian units too, but lost against them the March of Pannonia.
Although many historians thought that the commander of the Hungarian forces was Árpád, Grand Prince of the Hungarians, however there is no proof of this, it is more likely that the de facto leader of the Hungarian forces was the same brilliant commander, whose name is unknown, who lead the Magyars probably also in the battles of Brenta, Eisenach, Rednitz and Augsburg, which ended with the greatest Magyar victories, and the heaviest losses of the enemy forces (including almost every time the commanders of the enemy army) in the battles of the era of the Hungarian invasions of Europe. By analysis of these battles from the existing scarce sources, it is perceptible that the same principles of the nomadic warfare were used with great success:
- psychological warfare, for example causing terror and demoralising them by constant, repeated attacks, or fooling the enemy by making him self-conceit, lulling his vigilance, with deceiving manoeuvres or false negotiations, than striking and destroying them by surprise (Battle of Brenta, Battle of Augsburg in 910, Battle of Rednitz),
- using the tactic of feigned retreat (Battle of Brenta, Battle of Augsburg in 910),
- high importance on military intelligence, with this preventing the surprise attacks and the joining of all the German forces before the Battle of Augsburg in 910,
- rapidity in the movement of the units, surprising the enemy troops (Battle of Augsburg in 910),
- crossing in secret the geographical obstacles, which were taught by their enemies that they are impossible to cross, and attacking them unexpectedly (the Danube in 907, the river Brenta in 899, the Adriatic sea to reach Venice in 900),
- using every principle and tactic of the nomadic warfare (feigned retreat; swarming; hiding troops on the battlefield and luring the enemy to those places in ambush; big importance on surprise attacks; dispersing military units; not a solid, ever changing battle formation; exploiting of the superior mobility of the light armored cavalry; predominance of the horse archery; etc.) with such a great efficiency and perfection, shown by the catastrophic outcome for the enemy of the above-mentioned battles, which was never achieved after him,
- doubled with an extraordinary patience in waiting the right moment, even days and weeks if necessary, to make the decisive step to win the battle (like during Battle of Brenta and Battle of Augsburg in 910),
- the extraordinary discipline of his troops in respecting and perfectly executing all his orders,
- and in the four battles between 907 and 910 (Pressburg, Eisenach, Augsburg, Rednitz) the Hungarians killed the enemy commanders, which also is a principle of the nomadic warfare used every time by the Mongols, and its purpose was: weakening the enemy by "cutting his head off", creating a very effective psychological effect, making the enemy leaders fear to fight them again.
After 910 Hungarians won many battles against European forces (915: Eresburg; 919: Püchen, somewhere in Lombardy, 921: Brescia; 926: somewhere in Alsace; 934: W.l.n.d.r.; 937: Orléans; 940: Rome; 949: Laa, etc.) but only in the Battle of Orléans in 937 they killed the enemy commander, Ebbon of Châteauroux, who was wounded and died after the battle, however, some historians say that the battle was lost by the Hungarians. Specially after 933 it can be seen that the Hungarians lacked such a great commander and made serious mistakes, which caused them defeats, like before and in the Battle of Riade, when the Hungarians did not inform about the military reform made by Henry the Fowler, learning the new situation only in the course of the battle, which was too late, or in the Battle of Lechfeld (955). For example, in 926 a Hungarian unit camped near a river, on its both sides, the Germans attacked one of the groups, and defeated them, which shows that this Hungarian army did not attach importance on the military intelligence as 20 years before. In the Battle of Lechfeld (955) the Hungarian commanders Bulcsú and Lél, could not control their troops, which attacked the baggage of the German army, and started to plunder it, instead of being vigilant to a counter-attack, or were so wrongly calculated the course of the events, thinking that they won, and became unaware of the Frankish counter-attack led by Duke Conrad, showing that Bulcsú and Lél totally miscalculated the course of the battle, and after the defeat, they were unable to control their fleeing troops of dispersing and to prevent the massacre of the Hungarians by the German population and troops which hunted them in the way home, resulting with their capture and than hanging in Regensburg. These defeats were caused by the diminishment of the military discipline and authority of the Hungarian commanders before their soldiers probably caused by the lesser military talent of the commanders, although there were harsh punishments by their superiors, for example during the Siege of Augsburg in 955, the Hungarian warriors were driven to attack the walls with scourges.
Luitpold in 907 called for concentrating, from every Bavarian districts, a large Bavarian-German army (Heerbann) around Ennsburg in order to score a decisive victory against the Hungarians, who already formed an important principality in the Pannonian Basin. Based on Aventinus' chronicle it is certain that the Bavarian political, military and spiritual leaders gathered on 15 June 907 at Ennsburg, discussing about the campaign. and they all concluded: the Hungarians must to be eliminated from Bavaria. Lands of Bavaria refers to Pannonia, Ostmark, east from the river Enns and probably the old lands of the Great Moravia (western part of today's Slovakia and, according to some historians, maybe the lands between the Danube and the Tisza rivers), territories which belonged to Bavaria or were dependent from it before the Hungarian conquest in 900, which means the Western, greater parts of the Pannonian Basin. So this shows the crucial importance of this campaign in the future fate of the Hungarians.
Although he was only 14 years old, Louis the Child hoped that the campaign will repeat Charlemagne's success against the Avars in 803, which brought the Frank Empire's control over the Western parts of the Avar Khaganate. It was obvious that because of his young age, the king will not lead the army, but the real commander, Prince Luitpold, let him to go with them till St. Florian Monastery between the Enns and Traun rivers, which was the boundary of Bavaria and the Principality of Hungary, where the infant king stayed during the campaign, this showing his confidence in a future victory against the Hungarians. The contemporary German sources show the great conceit and presumption of the Bavarian leaders, which could be cause not only by the fact that they had killed the Hungarian "king" Kurszán in 904, and that they won some minor victories, as mentioned above, but also by some misleading political and/or military moves, made by the Hungarians, which made Luitpold to believe that his eastern neighbours are in a critical situation, and now it is the right time to eliminate them once and for all. Although there is no any proof of such moves, but it is known that the Hungarians had used that kind of tactics of psychological warfare with great success, in other battles which occurred in that period, for example in the Battle of Brenta. The fact that in the German-Bavarian army next to the political and military leaders (Prince Sieghard, a number of counts, among them were Meginward, Adalbert, Hatto, Ratold, Isangrim) there were also some of the most influential spiritual leaders of the East Francian Kingdom (Dietmar I, Archbishop of Salzburg, the Chancellor of the Realm; Zacharias, Bishop of Säben-Brixen, Utto, Bishop of Freising), together with a large number of priests, shows that the East Francians had such a great confidence in a categorical victory over the Magyars, followed by their total subjugation, that they brought so many important church dignitaries to restore Christianity with all the churches, cathedrals and abbeys were destroyed by the Hungarians in 900.
That is also a proof of the misleading psychological warfare by the Hungarians. Some historians, based on Gesta Hungarorum written by Anonymus say that the Bavarian attack was caused by the supposed death of Árpád, the Grand Prince of the Hungarians, because the Germans thought that the death of the leader will weaken the Hungarians capability to fight, but others say that there is no solid evidende that Árpád had died in 907, because all the dates about the period of the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, given by Anonymus are wrong, as historian Gyula Kristó argued. According to historian György Szabados, Árpád could die in 907, but it is unknown if he died before or after the battle, but it is certain that he did not die in the battle, because his duties as sacred grand prince, Kende, were only spiritual, therefore he never participated in any military or political actions, and this was known also by the Bavarians, so his death certainly was not caused by the skirmishes during Luitpold's campaign. As Anonymus writes that Zoltán, his youngest son succeeded Árpád as Grand Prince in 907, there were assumptions that Árpád and his three eldest sons – Tarkacsu, Jelek (or Üllő) and Jutocsa – was killed in the Battle of Pressburg however this view was already exceeded by historiography.
The East Francian army, which crossed the Hungarian border on 17 June 907, divided into three and started to follow the Danube's course towards East: Luitpold with the main forces on the northern banks, Dietmar's forces on the south, together with Zacharias, Bishop of Säben-Brixen and Utto, Bishop of Freising, marched forward and camped near Brezalauspurg (Pressburg). On the river Danube a fleet under Prince Sieghard and the counts Meginward, Hatto, Ratold, Isangrim asured the communication among these corps, and also transported food and heavy armored pedestrians, as an auxiliary force to be disembarked, if one of the Bavarian army corps was attacked. We can observe that Charlemagne in his famous campaign against the Avars from 791, divided his army exactly in the same way: two of his troops marching on the both sides of the Danube, and a fleet asured the connection between them. Maybe Luitpold taught that copying Charlemagne's campaign against the Avars, will assure his success against their successors: the Magyars. The Bavarian commander did not calculated that the Hungarians, will act differently than the Avars did in 791 (abandoning their fortified capital to the Franks), and that they could have different war methods and strategies, and that the Hungarians can lure the fleet away from the two marching troops, making with this its mission: to keep the connection between them, impossible. So we can say that, although it followed Charlemagne's strategy, the division of the East Francian army in three corps was the biggest mistake made by Luitpold, because this made possible for the Hungarians to attack and defeat all these army corps separately, concentrating, without any fear of being surprised, all their troops on one enemy army corp, and after its destruction to attack the other, and than the third, because the Danube prevented the German commanders to send help to each other, but in the same time crossing the river was not very hard to the Hungarians, as we will see below.
Aventinus writes that the Hungarians were aware of the German attack, and they prepared for a very long time. This shows that the Hungarian intelligence gained information about the German attack even before the army gathered, making it possible for the Magyar armed forces to gather and prepare for the battle. As mentioned above, one of the most important factors of the Hungarian successes in the first decades of the 10th century was the exceptional military intelligence, as an important part of the nomadic warfare.
There is no information about the size of the two armies, but the Bavarians were sure about their superiority, splitting their army in three parts. This shows that they taught that every single army corp from the three, taken alone was bigger than the whole Hungarian army. The number of the Hungarian army is unknown, but from the Persian geographer Ahmad ibn Rustah, who wrote his work between 903 and 920 it is known that the Magyar ruler had 20 000 soldiers, which, in the opinion of the Hungarian historians, could refer to the number of all available warriors of the Principality of Hungary in those times. As Constantine VII the Purple-born writes in his work De Administrando Imperio, that the Magyar tribes had an agreement that in the case of a foreign attack against one Hungarian tribe, all the 8 tribes forces must come and fight together against the enemy, so it is presumable that during the German attack from 907 the majority of the Hungarian warriors, from all the tribes, gathered to fight the Bavarian forces. Thus when all the Hungarian forces came together, according to ibn Rustah they had to be around 20 000 men, which is probably the number of the Magyar warriors which participated in the Battle of Pressburg. Knowing the self-confidence and haughtiness of the German commanders, mentioned above, it is assumed that their army was far more bigger than the Hungarian forces, maybe around 60 000 men (?).
The contemporary European sources usually mention only that the battle occurred, and the Bavarian army was annihilated, but they do not write anything about the order of the events, the fights and the skirmishes which led to the disaster of the Western army. The Bavarian Renaissance humanist, historian and philologist Johannes Aventinus (1477–1534), 600 years after the events, in his work Annals of the Bavarians (Annalium Boiorum, volume VII), basing on documents and chronicles from the 10th century which had not survived until today, wrote a pretty enough detailed description of the battle.
As mentioned before, the Hungarians knew about the attack well before the Bavarian army started to move eastwards, and they probably withdrew all the population from the march areas, called in Hungarian gyepű, which lived between the river Enns and Pressburg to east (which was much easier in a nomadic society, like the Hungarian Principality, than in a state based on sedentary life), taking towards east the livestock or destroying every food, which couldn't be taken away, thus using the scorched earth tactic, used very often by the nomadic states and tribes even in the ancient times, for example the Scythians against Darius I and Alexander the Great, or the Avars against Charlemagne, and more than 100 years after the Battle of Pressburg (1030), Hungary's first king, Stephen I defeated the invasion of the German Emperor Conrad II, using scorched earth, causing famine among the enemies soldiers. In the same way king Andrew I of Hungary defeated in 1051, another German invasion led by the emperor Henry III using the same tactic of the scorched earth. As we can see, even after the creation of the Christian and feudal state of Hungary, the principles of the nomadic warfare were still used as an effective way to defeat huge imperial armies.
Aventinus wrote that when the German army crossed the Hungarian border, the Hungarian commanders, sent some small light armored mounted archer formations to disrupt the Germans communications lines, kill their envoys to each other, harass the army corps with their arrows, putting them in constant pressure and combat readiness (which caused fatigue and demoralisation) and lure them into battle. Probably the Hungarian harassing archers attacked, shot arrows and when the Bavarians started to chase them, they rode away unharmed on their horses, because they were much more faster do to the fact that they had no or very few armor and, except of bows and arrows, no other weapons (although the troops which fought the hand-to-hand combats in the main parts of the battle were much better equipped, so heavier, with curved sabre, lance, battle axe, mace, mail, lamellar armour), while the German cavalry was heavily armored, and this slowed them significantly. The constant harassment of the Hungarian mounted archer groups slowed the movement of the Bavarian army even more, forcing them to stop, defend themselves, luring them forward and backward with their continuous attacks, trying to demoralize them before the battle. This is why the distance of 246 km from Ennsburg to Pressburg was made very slowly by the East Francians: in 18 days (17 June - 4 July). This long time made possible the concentration of the Hungarian troops near Pressburg, which the Hungarian commanders chose very carefully, because its favourable conditions for a nomadic army, to be the future battlefield.
As the Hungarians harassed the both army corps which marched towards east, distracting their attention from the main attack of the bulk of the Hungarian army, on 4 July, which, concentrating on the southern shore of the Danube, attacked the southern army corp (of the bishops) led by Archbishop Dietmar.
The battle started with the Hungarian archers riding towards the troops led by archbishop Dietmar and shooting a "shower of arrows" from their "horn bows" (corneis arcubus - which refers to the famous composite bows of the nomadic Hungarians, made of wood, bone and horn) on the moving East Francian army corp, taken totally by surprise, then they retreated. When the Bavarians managed to enter in battle order, due to their light armors and faster horses, the Hungarians repeated many times these attacks, appearing from nowhere (accidented terrains, river beds, woods, hills, and other places where they could hide out of sight of the Germans), shot their arrows from distance on the Bavarians, than disappearing suddenly, attacked again, than retreated, shooting arrows and throwing lances on the pursuers, but when the Bavarian cavalry started to chase them, they suddenly dispersed, gallopped away from their enemies eyesight, than after regruping, suddenly turned and attacked again, surprising the Germans, causing them many losses. The famous nomadic battle tactic of the feigned retreat is easily recognizable here. But besides of this, the Hungarians applied in this battle all the specific military maneuvres of the nomadic armies, presented very good by Byzantine emperor Leo VI the Wise in his work Tactica: "[The Hungarians] love mostly to fight from the distance, to lay in ambush, to encircle the enemy, to feign retreat and to turn back, to use dispersing military maneuvres". As Aventinus points, the Hungarians used many tricks, fast movements, sudden attacks and disappearances from the battlefield, and these totally confused the enemy commanders, who did not knew what to do, did nod understand which is a decisive attack, or which is just for bluff. As a result, the East Francians demoralized and the unity had been loosened in the armies actions, and their battle order was compromised. In the end, when the decisive moment came, when, thanks to the relentless Hungarian attacks and misleading tactics and psychological warfare, the battle order and the control of the commanders was totally lost, and the soldiers were completely demoralized, tired, losing any hope, the Hungarians suddenly attacked them from front, back and sides, encircled and annihilated the southern corp led by Archbishop Dietmar. From this description one can suppose that the decisive moment of the first day of the battle was that the Hungarians, with the tactic of the feigned retreat, lured the army corp of Dietmar in a trap, which had to be a place which was near to a wood or a river bed or an accidented terrain, where a part of the Hungarian units were hidden, and when the German soldiers arrived there, chasing the feignly fleeing Magyar army, they suddenly came out, attacked from back and sides the Germans, and together with the main army, which turned back, encircled and annihilated Dietmar's forces. This was preceded by those attacks and retreats of the Hungarian archer troops, about which Aventinus writes, which resulted the loosening the enemies endurance, fighting spirit, and inflict in it desperation and uncertainty about what to do, which later easened their decision to attack with disintegrated battle order, which brought their destruction. All this time it seems that Luitpold, whose army was on the northern bank of the Danube, was unable to help Dietmar's forces, because he could not pass the river, although the fleet under the command of Prince Sieghard was still there, but it is not known why this did not happened. Perhaps the fleet by an unknown reason moved apart from the proximity of the land forces, and this moment was used by the Hungarian army to attack and destroy the southern army corps led by the archbishop. Nevertheless, this first day of the battle brought with it the massacre of the southern corp of the attacking army, together with Archbishop Dietmar, the bishops Utto of Freising and Zachariah of Säben-Brixen, the abbots Gumpold, Hartwich and Heimprecht.
In that night the Hungarian army crossed in secret the Danube, and attacked the forces of Prince Luitpold in their camp, during their sleep. It can be observed that, similarly to the Battle of the Brenta river in 899, the enemy taught that he is safe, because the river will prevent the Hungarians from crossing it, and he was fooled by his false belief: in 899 the Hungarians crossed the Brenta river, in 907 the mighty Danube, and took the unsuspecting enemy totally by surprise. The Hungarians used animal skins (goat, sheep, maybe cow) tied up to form something like a huge bota bag, filled with air, tied on their horses sides, which helped the warrior and his horse to float in order to cross rivers or even the seas like the Adriatic Sea, like they did in 900, to attack Venice. The attack took the East Francians by surprise, the Hungarians arrows killing many of them, some of them probably in their sleep. Than the Hungarians probably encircled totally the fortified camp, preventing the Bavarians to come out, and form their battle formation, or simply to flee (however those who managed to break out from the camp, were killed by the Magyars), transforming their camp into a death trap (in the same way as 300 years after that, in 1241, the nomadic Mongols did with the now sedentary Hungarians in the Battle of Mohi), making them totally defenceless, and shot a rain of arrows on them relentlessly, until they killed everybody. This Western army corp, because its false sense of security, seems that did not put not at all, or just little attention on the guarding of the camp, had no chance, almost all the soldiers, together with Luitpold, the Master of the Stewards Isangrim and other 15 commanders were massacred. The fact that the Hungarians could take the sleeping East Francian army by surprise, and this attack was so successful, shows that maybe Luitpold had no knowledge of the defeat of Archbishop Dietmar's forces, and this shows that his army was pretty far from the first battlefield (according to the newest opinions, when the battle from the first day occurred, the two Bavarian army corps were one day distance from each others, do to the fact that the main engagements of the battle occurred on consecutive days), because if he would knew what happened to the southern army, he would pay more attention on the guard, preventing such a surprise. Probably the light Hungarian cavalries lured the southern and the northern Bavarian forces so away from each other, that from there it was impossible for one group to learn what happened to the other (the same thing happened also on the First Battle of Augsburg, when the Hungarians lured the German cavalry away from the infantry and annihilated it, without the knowledge of the infantry).
During the next day the Hungarians attacked the East Francian fleet under Prince Sieghard. Aventinus writes nothing about the way they managed to attack the fleet; he points only on the easiness of the Hungarians victory and the paralyzing terror of the Germans, who could do nothing to defend themselves. Although there is nothing known about the way that made for Hungarians this uneasy task - destroying the Bavarian fleet - easy, can be outlined that they did it in the following way: the Magyar army, aligning on both the shores of the Danube, shot burning arrows on the ships, setting them on fire, like they did so many times during the period of the Hungarian invasions of Europe, when the Magyars set many cities on fire shooting, from great distance, burning arrows on the roofs of the houses behind the city walls, like they did with the towns of Bremen (915), Basel (917), Verdun (921), Pavia (924), Cambrai (954). Setting wooden ships on fire was not harder than to burn cities with fiery arrows. The distance of the ships which floated on the Danube, was also not an impediment to them. The width of the Danube at Pressburg is between 180 to 300 meters, but the range of the arrows shot from the nomadic composite bows could reach the extraordinary distance of 500 meters, so it is no doubt that the Hungarian arrows could reach the ships, which, if they were in the middle of the river, they had to be only 90 to 150 meters from the shore. Maybe the fire started on the ships by the arrows caused the terror and panic among the Bavarians, about which Aventinus writes, who initially thought that they are save. We can presume that those Bavarians who wanted to escape from the burning ships jumped in water, and there a part of them drowned, and those who arrived to the shore, were killed by the Hungarians. As a result, the majority of the Bavarians from the ships, together with their commanders, Prince Sieghard, counts Meginward, Hatto, Ratold and Isangrim, died on the last day of the battle.
The three days of the battle brought an almost incredible number of casualties among the German army, the majority of the soldiers together with their commanders: Prince Luitpold, Archbishop Dietmar, Prince Sieghard, Bishop Utto of Freising, Bishop Zachariah of Säben-Brixen, 19 counts, three abbots. Among many other contemporary documents, Annales Alamannici (Swabian Annals) writes: Unexpected war of the Bavarians with the Hungarians, duke Luitpold and their [his peoples] superstitious haughtiness was crushed, [just] a few Christians escaped, the majority of the bishops and counts were killed. About the Hungarian victims of the battle unfortunately there is no account, because the German chronicles, annals and necrologues, which are the only sources, say nothing about this. Despite this, some Hungarian modern authors think that in this battle died Árpád and his sons, but this is nothing but an attempt to romanticise and mythicise the historical events by presenting the hero of the Hungarian Conquest as somebody who also sacrificed his life for his country.
When the news of the defeat came to the young king who stood at the period of the campaign near the Hungarian border, he was brought in haste in the city of Passau, which had huge walls, to escape from the rage of the Hungarian warriors, who immediate after the battle started to chase the fliers, and kill every one in their reach. The Bavarian population rushed in the big cities like Passau, Regensburg, Salzburg or in the Alps mountains in woods and marshes, to escape the Hungarian punitive campaign, which devastated Bavaria and occupied new territories in the Eastern parts of the country, pushing Hungary's borders, way deep in the Bavarian territory, over lands westwards the Enns river, the former border.
Luitpold's forces consisting of three battle groups succumbed to the Eurasian nomad tactics of the mounted Magyar soldiers. In a storm of arrows, a large part of the East Francian army was kettled in, crushed and destroyed. In this battle the Hungarians overcame such unexpected military challenges for a nomadic army like fighting against a fleet, and won a great victory. This is why the commander of the Magyars had to be a military genius, who also led them to great victories in the battles of Brenta, Eisenach, Rednitz, Augsburg.
The precise location of this battle is not known. The only contemporary source mentioning a location of the battle are the Annales iuvavenses maximi (Annals of Salzburg); however, the reliability of these annals is questionable, as they survive only in fragments copied in the 12th century. According to the annals the battle took place in the vicinity of Brezalauspurc, east from Vienna. Some interpretations claim that Brezalauspurc refer to Urbs Paludarum – Braslav's fortress at Zalavár (Mosapurc) near Lake Balaton in Pannonia, others equal Brezalauspurc with a place east from Vienna: the modern-day Bratislava.
Many historians were intrigued by the question why no Hungarian chronicles (Gesta Hungarorum of Anonymus, Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum of Simon of Kéza, Chronicon Pictum, etc.) mention this crucial victory in the history of the Hungarians, and only the German annals and chronicles saved the memory of this battle for the modern times. This is why some of them (mainly in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century) tried to identify the Battle of Pressburg with the Battle of Bánhida, mentioned in the Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum by Simon of Kéza, which narrates about a great victory of the Hungarians against the Great Moravian forces led by Svatopluk II, and try to locate the battle at this place.
The majority of the historians, relying on the most detalied account on the battle: Annalium Boiorum VII of Johannes Aventinus, written in the 16th century, which presents the fights on the northern, the southern shores of the Danube (Danubium) river, and on the river itself, near the city of Vratislavia (Pressburg), involving a Bavarian fleet, which came on the Danube, accept the location of the battle the surroundings of today's city of Bratislava. This is the only place among the locations discussed by the historians as the possible location of the battle, with a river which makes possible for a fleet of battle ships to move. If Zalavár was the place of the battle, that means that the whole description of Aventinus is only an invention, which is impossible,[according to whom?] because it gives so many details (the list of the names of all the German political, military and spiritual leaders, nobles who participated and died in the battle, the events which led to the battle, etc.), which can be proven by the sources from the 10th century.
About what happened after the battle, Annalium Boiorum VII narrates that the Hungarian army immediately attacked Bavaria, and the Bavarian army led by Louis the Child was defeated at Ansburg/Anassiburgium (Ennsburg) or Auspurg (Augsburg), and after some days, they defeated another Bavarian army at Lengenfeld, than at the border between Bavaria and Franconia, they won another victory, killing Gebhard, the "king" of Franks, and Burghard, the "tetrarch" of the Thuringians, occupied many cities and monastreies, and made gruelsome deeds, destroying churches, killing and taking hostages thousands of people. However, from the Continuator Reginonis, Annales Alamannici, the contemporary sources with the events, we can understand that the battle of Ennsburg/Augsburg and that from the boundary of Bavaria and Franconia, occurred in reality in 910, as the battles of Augsburg and Rednitz. And Burchard, Duke of Thuringia died not at Rednitz, but in the Battle of Eisenach in 908.
Taking out these events, which obviously did not happened in 907, from Aventinus's text, we can reconstruct the events which occurred immediately after the Battle of Pressburg in the following way. The Hungarians attacked Bavaria immediately after the battle of Pressburg. They entered Bavaria, plundered and occupied cities and fortresses. They occupied St. Florian Monastery, and other places near the Enns river, and the people run away to cities like Salzburg (Iuvavia), Passau (Bathavia), Regensburg (Reginoburgium), or in the mountains in woods and marshes, or fortresses.
Than Aventinus refers to the fact that in the Hungarian army could be woman warriors too, which fought in the war, believing that they will have in the afterlife so many servants as many they will kill in the battle. Traces of woman warriors in the nomadic societies in that period (VIII-X. centuries) can be found in Central Asia, and in the legends of the period of the Hungarian invasions of Europe we can find the belief, that the killed enemy will become the slave of his killer in the after life in the legend about the Horn of Lehel (Lehel kürtje).
After that the Hungarians crossed the river Enns, swimming with their horses (amnem equis tranant), in southern Bavaria and plundered the cities and monasteries they found on they way, occupying and burning Schliersee, Kochel, Schlehdorf, Polling, Dießen am Ammersee, Sandau, Thierhaupten, etc. They crossed the Danube at Abach, heading to North, than took prisoners monks, children, girls and women, binding them with animal hair. According to Aventinus they even occupied and burned Regensburg, the capital city of the Duchy of Bavaria (the city being later strengthened with huge walls wide of 2 and high of 8 meters by the new Bavarian prince Arnulf), and Osterhofen. On the Hungarians way back home, the Bavarians, who wanted to take their spoils away, tried to ambush them at Lengenfeld, at the road which takes to the village, but the Magyars defeated, put them down and swept them away.
This battle is a vivid example of the military superiority of the light armored, quick moving nomadic horse archer warfare over the peak of the Central and Western European style of warfare of those times: the post-Carolingian Germanic armies, represented by heavy armored, slow moving cavalry and pedestrians, the nomadic Hungarians heavily defeating them in the most categorical way possible.
The Hungarian victory shifted the balance of power between the Hungarian state and the Duchy of Bavaria and the East Francian state definitive in favor of Hungary. The Germans did not attack Hungary for more than 100 years. The Hungarian victory forced the new Bavarian prince, Luitpold's son, Arnulf to conclude peace with the Hungarians, according to which the prince recognized the loss of Pannonia (Transdanubia) and Ostmark[disambiguation needed], river Enns as borderline between the two political entities, paid tribute and agreed to let the Hungarian armies, which went to war against Germany or other countries in Western Europe, to pass the duchies lands (although this agreement, Arnulf did not feel safe, and strengthened the Bavarian capital, Regensburg, with huge walls, and organized an army which, he hoped, he could defeat the Hungarians, but he never had the courage to turn definitively against them). This brought for the East Francian duchies and West Francia almost 50 years (908–955) of attacks and plunderings, which repeated almost every year, because Bavaria did not represented an impediment for the Hungarian forces anymore.
Although Arnulf concluded peace with the Hungarians, The German king, Louis the Child continued to hope, that he, concentrating all the troops of the duchies of the kingdom (Saxony, Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria, Lotharingia) will defeat the Hungarians, and stop their devastating raids. Howewer after his defeats in the First Battle of Augsburg and the Battle of Rednitz in 910, he also had to conclude peace and accept to pay tribute to them.
The Battle of Pressburg was a major step in the creating of the Hungarian military superiority in Southern, Central and Western Europe, which lasted until 933, resulting in successful raids in Europe from Southern Italy, Northern Germany, France, until the border with Hispania, and payments of tribute from many of the kingdoms and duchies from these lands. Although their defeat in the Battle of Riade in 933 ended the Hungarian military superiority in Northern Germany, the Magyars continued their campaigns in Germany, Italy, Western Europe, and even Spain (942) until 955, when a German force at the Second Battle of Lechfeld near Augsburg, defeated a Hungarian army, and after the battle executed three captured major Hungarian chieftains (Bulcsú, Lehel and Súr), which put an end of the Magyar campaigns in the territories which lie westwards from Hungary. The Germans did not follow up this victory: despite being at the height of their unity and power, after defeating the Hungarians, conquering many territories under Otto I in Southern, Eastern and Western Europe, establishing the Holy Roman Empire, they did not saw the victory against the Hungarians from 955 as an opportunity to attack Hungary in order to eliminate or subdue it, until the middle of the XI. century (however this time too without success), because they cleverly didn't over-estimated the importance of this battle, calculating the dangers which an expedition in Hungarian territories could create for the invaders, basing on the frightening and painful memory of the Battle of Pressburg.
In the long run, thanks to their victory at Pressburg, the Principality of Hungary defended itself from the ultimate objective of the East Francian and Bavarian military, political and spiritual leaders: the annihilation, giving a categorical response for those foreign powers who planned to destroy this state and its people. We can say that thanks to this victory, Hungary and the Hungarians today exist as a country and nation, because, in the case of a German victory, even if they wouldn't had kept their promise, sparing the Hungarians from annihilation or expulsion, without an independent state and church, the Magyars would have had little chance to organise themselves as a Christian nation and culture, and probably they would have shared the fate of other nations or tribes which were not Christian when they had been conquered by the Carolingian and its successor, the Holy Roman Empire: the Avars, the Polabian Slavs, or the Old Prussians: disparition, or assimilation in the German or Slavic populations. The Battle of Pressburg created the possibility of an independent Hungarian state, with its own church and culture, the premise of the survival of the Hungarians until this day.
Notes and references
- Magyar, Hajnalka. "Át kell írni a tankönyveket?" (in Hungarian). Retrieved 2015-06-26.
- Szabados György, 907 emlékezete, Tiszatáj, LXI. évf., 12. sz., p. 72-73
- Bóna István 2000 p. 34
- "Bavaria". Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-23.
- Bóna, István (2000). A magyarok és Európa a 9-10. században ("The Hungarians and Europe in the 9th-10th centuries") (in Hungarian). Budapest: História - MTA Történettudományi Intézete. pp. 76–81. ISBN 963-8312-67-X.
- Szabados György, 907 emlékezete, Tiszatáj 61, (2007)/12, p. 69
- Werra, Joseph: Über den Continuator Reginonis; Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 68
- Werra, Joseph 1883, p. 68
- Werra, Joseph 1883, p. 70
- Aventinus, Johannes. "Annalium Boiorum Libri Septem, 1554 p. 480-481" (in Latin). Retrieved 2015-06-26.
- Bóna István 2000 p. 33
- Vajay Szabolcs, Der Eintritt des ungarischen Staemmebundes in die Europaeische Geschichte (862-933) Ungarisches Institut München. V. Hase & Koehler Verlag. Mainz, 1968, p. 33
- Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 41
- Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 42
- Baják László: A fejedelmek kora. A korai magyar történet időrendi vázlata. II. rész. 900-1000 ("The Era of the Princes. The chronological sketch of the early Hungarian history. II. part. 900-1000"); ÓMT, Budapest, 2000 p. 9
- Baják László 2000 p. 9
- Kristó Gyula: Levedi törzsszövetségétől Szent István Államáig; Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1980, p. 237
- Lipp Tamás: Árpád és Kurszán; Kozmosz Könyvek, Budapest, 1988, p. 99
- Bóna István 2000, p. 31
- Bóna István 2000, p. 37
- Györffy György 2002 p. 214 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin: "Lajos király már megérkezett összetoborzott sokaságával Augsburgba, amikor jelentik azt a nem remélt, vagy inkább nem óhajtott hírt, hogy e nép ott van a szomszédságukban." English translation from the Hungarian: "King Louis with his recruited crowd [huge army] arrived to Augsburg, when he was informed of the unhoped, better to say unwished news that this people [the Hungarians] is in his neighborhood"
- Bóna István 2000, p. 32
- Baják László 2000 p. 14-27
- Bóna István 2000 p. 49
- Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 234-235
- Györffy György 2002 p. 228
- Györffy György 2002 p. 238-239
- Bóna István 2000 p. 54
- Aventinus, Johannes: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480. Original Latin text: "Ibi decretum omnium sententia Ugros Boiariae regno eliminandos esse." English translation from the Latin: "The order for all was: The Hungarians must be eliminated from the land of the Bavarians".
- Püspöki-Nagy Péter: Nagymorávia fekvéséről ("On the location of Great Moravia"); Tudományos Ismeretterjesztő Társulat, Valóság/XXI, p 60-82
- Clifford J. Rogers, Bernard S. Bachrach, Kelly DeVries, The Journal of Medieval Military History, Boydell Press, 2003, pp 58–59 ISBN 978-0-85115-909-6
- Werra, Joseph: Über den Continuator Reginonis; Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 68 Annales Alamannici for the year 907, Latin text: "...Liutpaldus dux et eorum superstieiosa superbia...". English translation: "...Prince Liutpold and their [his peoples] superstitious haughtiness...".
- Kristó Gyula 1980, p. 237-238
- Szabados György, 907 emlékezete, Tiszatáj, p. 68-69
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480. Original Latin text: "Belli deinde periti, omnes copias in tria agmina partiuntur. Luitpoldus, Austriaci limitis dux, ripa Aquilonari, Meridionali uero in parte Theodomarus Archimysta Iuuauensis, Zacharias Sabonensis, Otto Fruxinensis cum Monachorum praesulibus Gumpoldo, Hartuico, Helmprechto Vratislauiam usque procedunt ibicque castra faciunt. Eodem in Danubio nauibus copias Sighardus Senonum princeps cognatus regis, Ratholdus, Hattochus, Meginuuardus et Eysengrinus Dynastae Boiorum perducunt." English translation from the Latin: "The commanders divided the army in three parts. Luitpold, the duke of the Austrian borders on the northern banks, Dietmar the bishop of Salzburg, the bishops, Zacharias from Säben, Udo from Freising, and the superiors of the monasteries, Gumpold, Hartwich and Heimprecht moved on the southern shore; and advanced till Pressburg, and set up camp. On the Danube on boats, the relative of the king, the chief of the Semnons, Sieghard and the Bavarian lords, Rathold, Hatto, Meginward and Isangrim led the troops"
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor), years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin/ 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Zrínyi Média, Budapest, 2011 p. 40
- Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne's Cavalry Myth and Reality, In. Bernard S. Bachrach: Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West, Variolum, 1993, ISBN 0-86078-374-X, p.6
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480. Original Latin text: "Nec Vgri segniciei atque socordiae, ubi se tantis apparatibus peti uident, se dedunt. Cuncta antea, quae necessaria forent, arma, uiros, equos comparant..." English translation from the Latin: "But either the Hungarians did not remained inactive, they appeared seriously prepared, putting well in advance everything what they could benefit from, men, horses, in readiness..."
- Zubánics László (editor), „Feheruuaru_rea_meneh_hodu_utu_rea”. Magyar történelmi szöveggyűjtemény. A magyar történelem forrásai a honfoglalástól az Árpád-ház kihalásáig (1301), Intermix Kiadó. Ungvár-Budapest, 2008, p. 5.
- Szabados György: Magyar államalapítások a IX-XI. században; Szegedi Középkori Könyvtár, Szeged, 2011, p. 108-110
- Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 117
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 48
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 56
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 87-88
- Koszta, László (2009). Magyarország története 3. Válság és megerősödés (History of Hungary 3. Crisis and Strengthening) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó. p. 23. ISBN 978-963-09-5681-9.
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481
- U. Kőhalmi Katalin: A steppék nomádja lóháton, fegyverben; Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1972, p. 184-194
- Coupland, Simon. "Carolingian Arms and Armor in the Ninth Century". Retrieved 2015-07-08.
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 43
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480
- Sándor Horváth, Géza Körtvélyesi, László Legeza, Statics of the Traditional Hungarian Composite Reflex Bow, Acta Polytechnica Hungarica, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2006 p. 74.
- Györffy György 2002 p. 109
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480. Original Latin text: "Et tantus in illis dolus, tanta velocitas, tanta peritia militiae inerat, ut absentes an praesentes, fugitantes an instantes, pacem simulantes an bellum gerentes perniciosiores essent, in incerto haberetur. Dum igitur uasto impetu aduolant, rursus verso equo instant: utroque modo spicula spargunt, tela ingerunt, dextra, laeva, á fronte, á tergo incursant: nostros defatigant: tandem undique ingruunt, undique Boios fessos inuadunt, superant, sternunt, caedunt quinto Idus Augusti." English translation from the Latin: "They fight as they use to, using tricks, sometimes they retreat, sometimes they beset their enemies, and all these they do with such an innate viliness, with such a great speed, military experience, that it is hard to decide when are they more dangerous to us: when they are there, or when they already went away, or when they flee away, or when they attack, or when they pretend that they want peace, or when they fight. Because when they appear with an overwhelming attack, they disappear with the same rapidity, first they simulate flight, then, turning their horses, they attack, but all this time they shoot arrows, throw lances, gallop swiftly from left, right, front or back, tire our troops, than charge us from all sides, and attack the deadbeat Bavarians, surmount them, stamp them out and murder them all on the fifth day of the ides of August."
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480–481. Original Latin text: "Noctuque clanculum Danubium tranant, Luitpoldum legatum Ludouici, Eysengrinum epularum magistrum, cum omnibus copiis, cum quindecim Dynastis in castris trucidant." English translation from the Latin: "And in the night the Hungarians cross in secret the Danube, and kill in the camp Luitpold, the delegate of Louis, Isangrim, the master of the stewards, with all their troops and fifteen chieftains."
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 49
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480-481
- Gubcsi Lajos (editor): 1000-1100 years ago. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, Budapest 2011 p. 42
- Torma Béla, A pozsonyi csata, 907. július 4–5, Új Honvédségi Szemle, 17. évf. (2007)7. p. 86
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481. Original Latin text: "Postridie, hoc est tertio Idus Augusti, eos qui ad naues erant, facile absque labore, metu perterritos, simili strage adficiunt." English translation from the Latin: "On the next day, namely the third day of the Ides of August they slaughtered with ease and without effort those who were on the ships, terrified and with fear."
- Bóna István 2000 p. 38
- Baják László 2000 p. 15
- Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 220
- Bóna István 2000 p. 52-53
- Ellen Wohl: A World of Rivers. Environmental Change on Ten of the World's Great Rivers; The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011, p. 121
- Antony Karasulas, Mounted archers of the Steppe 600 BC – AD 1300, Osprey Publishing, Elite 120, 2004, p. 23
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481. Original Latin text: "Tres dies commenter irato coelo pugnatum. Maxima pars nobilitatis Boiariae perit, vulgus promiscuum sine numero occisum." English translation from the Latin: "The battle continues without stop three days, under the angry sky. The majority of the Bavarian nobility perished, together with and the common people is slain without number"
- Werra, Joseph: Über den Continuator Reginonis; Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 68 Annales Alamannici for the year 907, Latin text: "Item bellum Baugauriorum cum Ungaris insuperabile, atque Liutpaldus dux et eorum superstitiosa superbia occisa paucique christianorum evaserunt, interemptis multis episcopis comitibuisque.".
- Bátonyi Pál, A magyarok letelepedése a Kárpát-medencében, Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia 24, (2009)/2, p. 30
- Szabados György, 907 emlékezete, Tiszatáj 61, (2007)/12 p. 68–69
- Kristó Gyula 1980, p. 237
- Burghardt, Andrew Frank (1962). Borderland: a historical and geographical study of Burgenland, Austria. University of Wisconsin Press, original from the University of California. p. 60.
- Timothy Reuter, Germany in the Early Middle Ages 800–1056 (New York: Longman, 1991), 138–139.
- Bowlus, Charles R. (2006). The battle of Lechfeld and its aftermath, August 955: the end of the age of ... p. 83.
- Bowlus, Charles R. (1995). Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Struggle for the Middle Danube, 788-907. pp. 258-9.
- Bowlus, Charles R. (2006). The battle of Lechfeld and its aftermath, August 955: the end of the age of migrations in the Latin West. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. p. 223. ISBN 978-0-7546-5470-4.
- Bóna István 2000 p. 37-38
- Kézai Simon, Kézai Simon mester Magyar krónikája, 7. §. Szvatoplugról és atyjáról Marótról
- Szûcs László, Bánhidai csata: a magyar történelem örök talánya, Honvédelem, 2010-01-29
- Kristó Gyula 1980, p. 235
- Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 43
- Timothy Reuter 1991, p. 129
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481-482
- Werra, Joseph, Über den Continuator Reginonis, Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 58-59
- Chronicon Hermanni Contracti: Ex Inedito Hucusque Codice Augiensi, Unacum Eius Vita Et Continuatione A Bertholdo eius discipulo scripta. Praemittuntur Varia Anecdota. Subiicitur Chronicon Petershusanum Ineditum. 1, Typis San-Blasianis, 1790, p. CVIII, Text from: Gesta Francorum excerpta, ex originali ampliata, Latin text: "908 [...] Ungari in Saxones. Et Burchardus dux Toringorum, et Reodulfus epsicopus, Eginoque aliique quamplurimi occisi sunt devastata terra..". English translation: "908 [...] The Hungarians against the Saxons. And Burchard duke of the Thuringia, bishop Rudolf, and Egino were killed with many others and [the Hungarians] devastated the land"
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481. Original Latin text: "Vgri tanta perpetrata caede, potiti castris, & praeda, fugientium uestigia insequuntur." English translation from the Latin: "The Hungarians after they made such a huge carnage, took over the enemy camp and the war spoils, they start to chase the fugitives."
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481. Original Latin text: "Ugri bis triumphatores tanto rerum successu elati, nondum sanguine humano satiati, totam Boiariam caede, rapina, incendiis, luctu, cadaueribus complent: urbes quidem, oppida, arces, loca munita declinant, quippe ui oppugnare, expugnare, obsidere, adhuc ipsis res incognita erat." English translation from the Latin: "The twice victorious Hungarians, proud of such a huge victory, but yet unsaturated of human blood, fill Bavaria with carnage, robbery, fire, mourning and corpses, even the cities, fortresses are getting weaker [because of their attacks], although attack, occupying and siege was unknown even for them [the Hungarians, knowing that the nomads were usually not skilled in sieges of the cities and castles]."
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 482. Original Latin text: "Eadem ferocitas faeminis inerat. Tot seruitia, post fata in alio mundo contingere, quod hostes mactassent, credebant." English translation from the Latin: "The women had the same ferocity as well. They believed that after they die, they will have so many slaves as many enemies they will slaughter."
- Âşık, Alpaslan. "Yeni bir Arkeolojik Buluntu: Tuura Suu Balbalı, Gazi Türkiyat, Bahar 2013/12, p. 161" (in Turkish). Retrieved 2015-07-19.
- Képes Krónika, Lél és Bulcsú kapitányok haláláról
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 482
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 482. Original Latin text: "Rectacque Danubii ripa ad Abudiacum [Abach] perueniunt, Monachoru numerum per maximum, ueluti pecorum gregem ante seabigunt: pueros, puellas, mulieres capillis colligarant." English translation from the Latin: "They reach on the right shore of the Danube near Abudiacum (Abach), take captive many monks, like sheep herds, [driving] before them children, girls and women bound with animal hair."
- Bóna István 2000 p. 36
- Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 482. Original Latin text: "Boii rursus aleam belli tentare statuunt, iuxta Lengenfeld, uicum uiam prohibituri, praedamcquae excussuri, armatos se opponunt, sed uincuntur, funduntur, sternuntur ab Vgris." English translation from the Latin: "The Bavarians decide again to try the risk of war near Lengenfeld, [trying] todefend the road on the way to the village, [hoping that] they will take from them the spoils of war, withstand with weapons, but they are defeated, put down and swept away by the Hungarians."
- Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák A History of Hungary, Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 12-17.
- Timothy Reuter 1991, p. 130
- Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 47
- Györffy György 2002 p. 214 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin: "A magyaroknak teljesült ugyan az óhajuk, de aljas természetüket mégsem elégítette ki a keresztények ily mérhetetlen legyilkolása, hanem, hogy álnokságuk dühét jóllakassák, keresztülszáguldoznak a bajorok, svábok, frankok és szászok országán, mindent felperzselve. Nem is akadt senki, aki megjelenésüket máshol, mint a nagy fáradtsággal, vagy a természettől fogva megerősített helyeken bevárta volna. A nép itt jó néhány éven keresztül adófizetőjük lett" English translation from the Hungarian: "Although the Hungarians fulfilled their wish, their mean nature was not satisfied by the so immeasurable slaughtering of the Christians, but in order to satisfy the anger of their perfidy, they galloped along through the county of the Bavarians, Swabians, Francians and Saxons, burning everything. Indeed, nobody remained who could wait until they arrived, in other place than the places fortified with great effort or by nature. The people who lived here paid them tribute many years from now on"
- Baják László 2000 p. 11-20
- Honfoglalás, /Út_az_új_hazába_A_magyar_nemzet_története_Levédiától_1050-ig./ Út az új hazába. A magyar nemzet története Levédiától 1050-ig., p. 12
- Makk Ferenc, A magyarok hispániai kalandozása, Tiszatáj, LXI. évf., 12. sz., 2007, p. 71-74
- Szabados György, 907 emlékezete, Tiszatáj, LXI. évf., 12. sz., p. 73