CEILIDH

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
This article is about the cryptosystem. For the traditional Gaelic social gathering, see Céilidh.

CEILIDH is a public key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem in algebraic torus. This idea was first introduced by Alice Silverberg and Karl Rubin in 2003. The main advantage of the system is the reduced size of the keys for the same security over basic schemes.[which?]

The name CEILIDH comes from the Scots Gaelic word ceilidh which means a traditional Scottish Gathering.

Algorithms[edit]

Parameters[edit]

  • Let be a prime power.
  • An integer is chosen such that :
    • The torus has an explicit rational parametrization.
    • is divisible by a big prime where is the Cyclotomic polynomial.
  • Let where is the Euler function.
  • Let a birational map and its inverse .
  • Choose of order and let .

Key agreement scheme[edit]

This Scheme is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

  • Alice chooses a random number .
  • She computes and sends it to Bob.
  • Bob chooses a random number .
  • He computes and sends it to Alice.
  • Alice computes
  • Bob computes

is the identity, thus we have : which is the shared secret of Alice and Bob.

Encryption scheme[edit]

This scheme is based on the ElGamal encryption.

  • Key Generation
    • Alice chooses a random number as her private key.
    • The resulting public key is .
  • Encryption
    • The message is an element of .
    • Bob chooses a random integer in the range .
    • Bob computes and .
    • Bob sends the ciphertext to Alice.
  • Decryption
    • Alice computes .

Security[edit]

The CEILIDH scheme is based on the ElGamal scheme and thus has similar security properties.

If the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds the underlying cyclic group , then the encryption function is one-way.[1]

If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) holds in , then CEILIDH achieves semantic security.[1] Semantic security is not implied by the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption alone.[2] See decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for a discussion of groups where the assumption is believed to hold.

CEILIDH encryption is unconditionally malleable, and therefore is not secure under chosen ciphertext attack. For example, given an encryption of some (possibly unknown) message , one can easily construct a valid encryption of the message .

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b CRYPTUTOR, "Elgamal encryption scheme"
  2. ^ M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, P. Rogaway, "DHAES, An encryption scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman Problem" (Appendix A)
  • Karl Rubin, Alice Silverberg: Torus-Based Cryptography. CRYPTO 2003: 349–365

External links[edit]