Carlos Salinas de Gortari
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|Carlos Salinas de Gortari|
During a meeting with Felipe González in Madrid (1989)
|53rd President of Mexico|
December 1, 1988 – November 30, 1994
|Preceded by||Miguel de la Madrid|
|Succeeded by||Ernesto Zedillo|
|Secretary of Programming and Budget|
December 1, 1982 – October 5, 1987
|President||Miguel de la Madrid|
|Preceded by||Ramón Aguirre|
|Succeeded by||Pedro Aspe|
3 April 1948|
Mexico City, Mexico
|Political party||Institutional Revolutionary|
Cecilia Occeli (divorced)|
Ana Paula Gerard Rivero
Raúl Salinas de Gortari|
José Francisco Ruiz Massieu
Elí de Gortari
Cecilia (by Occelli)|
Emiliano (by Occelli)
Juan Cristóbal (by Occelli)
Ana Emilia (by Gerard)
Patricio (by Gerard)
Mateo  (by Gerard)
Raúl Salinas Lozano|
Margarita de Gortari Carvajal
National Autonomous University of Mexico|
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Spanish pronunciation: [ˈkarlos saˈlinaz ðe ɣorˈtaɾi]; born 3 April 1948) is a Mexican economist and politician affiliated with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) who served as President of Mexico from 1988 to 1994. Earlier in his career he worked in the Budget Secretariat eventually becoming Secretary. He was the PRI presidential candidate in 1988, and was declared elected on 6 July 1988 after a controversial electoral process and accusations of electoral fraud.
His presidency was characterized by a profundization of the neoliberal, free trade economic policies initiated by his predecessor Miguel de la Madrid, mass privatizations of state-run companies, Mexico's entry into NAFTA, negotiations with the right-wing opposition party PAN to recognize their victories in gubernatorial elections in exchange for supporting Salinas' policies, normalization of relations with the Catholic clergy, and the adoption of a new currency, among other things.
After years of economic growth, however, his last year in office saw the Zapatista uprising in January 1994 and the assassinations of Luis Donaldo Colosio (the PRI candidate for the 1994 presidential elections) and secretary-general of the PRI José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. This surge of political violence let to economic uncertainty, and less than a month after Salinas left office, Mexico entered into the worst economic crisis of its history. Shortly after, his brother Raúl Salinas de Gortari was arrested for ordering the assassination of Ruiz Massieu and Carlos left the country for many years.
- 1 Early life and education
- 2 Presidential Election 1988
- 3 Presidency 1988–1994
- 4 Election-year crises
- 5 Successor first days crises
- 6 Later years
- 7 Honours
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 External links
Early life and education
Carlos Salinas was born 3 April 1948, the second son and one of five children of economist and government official Raúl Salinas Lozano and Margarita de Gortari de Salinas. Salinas's father served as President Adolfo López Mateos's minister of industry and commerce, but was passed over as the PRI's presidential candidate in favor of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70). When Carlos Salinas was chosen the PRI's presidential candidate for the 1988 election, he told his father, "It took us more than 20 years, but we made it."
A tragedy occurred early in Carlos Salinas's life. On 18 December 1951, when he was four years old, he, his older brother Raúl, then five, and an eight-year-old friend were playing and the Salinas family's twelve-year-old maid, Manuela, was shot. It was never determined which of the three boys pulled the trigger—and the incident was declared an accident; it was given newspaper coverage in Excélsior at and La Prensa at the time. A judge blamed the Salinas parents for leaving a loaded weapon accessible to their small children. The Salinas family did not know the last name of their 12-year-old maid Manuela—only that she came from San Pedro Atzcapotzaltongo—and it is unknown whether her family ever claimed her body. They were also exonerated with the assistance of Gilberto Bolaños Cacho, maternal uncle of legendary Mexican comedian Chespirito. He has not commented publicly on this tragic early childhood incident.
Salinas attended the National Autonomous University of Mexico as an undergraduate, studying economics. He was an undergraduate when the student movement in Mexico organized against the 1968 Summer Olympics, but there is no evidence of his participation. He was an active member of the PRI youth movement and a political club, the Revolutionary Policy and Professional Association, whose members continued to be his close friends when he was president. Salinas was a skilled dressage horseman, and was a member of the Mexico national team at the Pan-American Games in Cali, Colombia in 1971.
Salinas was one of the Mexicans of his generation who studied at elite foreign universities. He earned a master's degree in Public Administration from Harvard University in 1973 and went on to earn a Ph.D. from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in 1978. His doctoral dissertation was published as Political Participation, Public Investment and Support for the System: A Comparative Study of Rural Communities in Mexico.
Presidential Election 1988
Carlos Salinas became presidential candidate in a difficult time for the PRI which for the first time was faced by significant opposition from the left (National Democratic Front) and from the right (National Action Party, PAN). The candidate of the PAN was Manuel Clouthier.
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano registered as an opposing candidate from a left-wing coalition called Frente Democrático Nacional. He rapidly became a popular figure, and became the first opposing candidate to fill the Zócalo with sympathizers and to seriously threaten the PRI, which had won all presidential elections since its inception in 1929. The Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación), through its Federal Electoral Commission, was the institution in charge of the electoral process, and installed a modern computing system to count the votes. On July 6, 1988, the day of the elections, the system "crashed", and when it was finally restored, Carlos Salinas was declared the official winner. Even though the elections are extremely controversial, and some maintain that Salinas won legally, the expression se cayó el sistema (the system crashed, lit. "the system fell down") became a colloquial euphemism for electoral fraud. As one observer put it, "For the ordinary citizen, it was not the computer network but the Mexican political system that had crashed."
The process involved two suspicious shutdowns of the computer system used to keep track of the number of votes. Suspicions later grew as Congress voted (with support from the Revolutionary Institutional and National Action parties) to destroy without opening the electoral documentation. Other people believed that Salinas, in fact, won the ballot, albeit probably not with an absolute majority as the official figures suggested, although that is not required under Mexican election law.
During a television interview in September 2005, Miguel de la Madrid acknowledged that the PRI lost the 1988 elections. However, he immediately clarified his comment by saying that the PRI had "at least lost a significant amount of voters". Asked for comment on De la Madrid's statements, Senator Manuel Bartlett, who was the president of the Federal Electoral Commission (Comisión Federal Electoral) during the De la Madrid administration, declared Salinas won the election albeit with the smallest margin of any PRI candidate before him. He attributed De la Madrid's remarks to his old age (71 years old as of 2005[update]) and the remarks being taken out of context by journalist Carlos Loret de Mola. Ex-president Miguel de la Madrid admitted that the elections had been rigged.
Concerns amongst the general public that the electoral process was fraudulent caused some dissension when Salinas entered office in 1988. Nevertheless, in his inaugural address in December 1988, he outlined an ambitious and important goal of "modernizing" Mexico. He contended that
The modernization of Mexico is essential if we are to meet the demands of the 85 million Mexicans of today.... In brief, we need to modernize politics, the economy, and society. The modernization of Mexico is, moreover, an absolute imperative. This is the only way we will be able to affirm our sovereignty in a world undergoing profound transformation.
During his six-year term in office (sexenio) major changes were made to the Constitution of 1917 that affected political reform; church-state relations, ending many aspects of anticlericalism restricting the Catholic Church and other religious organizations; agrarian reform, ending redistribution of land under Article 27; "indigenous peoples, human rights, economic activities of the state, [and] criminal due process."
For the first time, the PRI lost its two-thirds majority in Congress, which is necessary to conduct constitutional reforms.
At the end of Salinas' presidential term, several politically motivated assassinations occurred. The victims were: Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and a PRI official, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu.
On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) issued their first declaration from the state of Chiapas in southern Mexico. The date coincides with the date that NAFTA came into force. Salinas immediate response works for a peaceful solution: offers pardon to deposed arms; orders cease fire; appointed the peace negotiator and send Mexican Congress a General Amnesty Law.
Salinas continued with the neoliberal economic policy of his predecessor Miguel de la Madrid and converted Mexico into a regulatory state. During his presidential term, the banking system (that had been nationalized by José López Portillo) was privatized, as well as the national phone company TELMEX.
His National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) published in 1989 had 4 objectives:
- Protecting sovereignty
- Economic recovery
- Improving the living standard.
By the end of his term, inflation had been reduced to 7% in 1994, the lowest figure in 22 years. Shortly after leaving office, due to the so-called December Mistake, inflation rose again to 51%.
During his term, the peso devalued from 2.65 MXP to 3.60 MXN per U.S. dollar by November 30, 1994, the last day of his term; thus the peso devalued far less than it had in the two previous terms. (The peso was later devalued from 4 per dollar to 7.2 in a single week due to the December Mistake.)
He negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with the United States and Canada. Critics say that NAFTA has had mixed results for Mexico: while there has been huge increase in commerce and foreign investment, this hasn't been at all the case for employment and salaries. Salinas also renegotiated Mexico's foreign debt.
Mexico reestablished diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Moreover, Mexico became member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The First Ibero-American Summit was held and the Chapultepec Peace Accords, a peace agreement for El Salvador, were signed.
Carlos Salinas's popularity and credibility at the time was high. The economic bubble gave Mexico a prosperity not seen in a generation. This period of rapid growth coupled with low inflation prompted some political thinkers and the media to state that Mexico was on the verge of becoming a "First World nation". In fact, it was the first of the "newly industrialized nations" to be admitted into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in May 1994. It was known that the peso was overvalued, but the extent of the Mexican economy's vulnerability was either not well known or downplayed by both the Salinas administration and the media. This vulnerability was further aggravated by several unexpected events and macroeconomic mistakes made in the last year of his administration.
Several economists and historians have analyzed some of the events and policy mistakes that precipitated the crisis of December 1994. In keeping with the PRI election-year practices, Salinas launched a spending spree to finance popular projects, which translated into a historically high deficit. This budget deficit was coupled with a current account deficit, fueled by excessive consumer spending as allowed by the overvalued peso. In order to finance this deficit, the Salinas administration issued tesobonos, an attractive debt instrument that insured payment in dollars instead of pesos. This may have been a response to three important events that had shaken investor confidence in the stability of the country: the Zapatista uprising, the assassination of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and the assassination of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, Salinas' former brother-in-law, who was also the Secretary General of the PRI and whose murder was never solved during Salinas' presidency, even when Mario Ruiz Massieu (Francisco's brother) was the attorney general and in charge of the investigation.
He was also known to have been the decision maker in who was the head boss of the Mexican cartels. He justified these actions by saying in private meetings that "he felt they could do their best in picking the better of the bad apples". These events, along with the fact that he was linked to personally overseeing who ran the heads of each Mexican cartel, together with the increasing current account deficit fostered by government spending, caused alarm among Mexican and foreign T-bill (tesobono) investors, who sold them rapidly, thereby depleting the already-low central bank reserves (which eventually hit a record low of $9 billion). The economically orthodox thing to do, in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate (at 3.3 pesos per dollar, within a variation band), would have been to sharply increase interest rates by allowing the monetary base to shrink, as dollars were being withdrawn from the reserves. Given the fact that it was an election year, whose outcome might have changed as a result of a pre-election-day economic downturn, the Bank of Mexico decided to buy Mexican Treasury Securities in order to maintain the monetary base, and thus prevent the interest rates from rising. This, in turn, caused an even more dramatic decline in the dollar reserves. These decisions aggravated the already delicate situation, to a point at which a crisis became inevitable and devaluation was only one of many necessary adjustments. Ernesto Zedillo took office on December 1, 1994.
Successor first days crises
Soon after taking office, Zedillo announced that his government would let the fixed exchange rate band increase 15 percent (up to 4 pesos per US$), by stopping the unorthodox measures employed by the previous administration to keep it at the previous fixed level (e.g., by selling dollars, assuming debt, and so on). This measure, however, was not enough, and the government was unable to hold this line, and decided to let the exchange rate float. While experts agree that devaluation was necessary, some critics of Zedillo's 22-day-old administration argue that, although economically coherent, the way the crisis was handled was a political mistake. By having announced its plans for devaluation, they argue that many foreigners withdrew their investments, thus aggravating the effects. Whether the effects were aggravated further or not, the result was that the peso crashed under a floating regime from four pesos to the dollar (with the previous increase of 15%) to 7.2 to the dollar in the space of a week.
Mexican businesses with debts to be paid in dollars, or that relied on supplies bought from the United States, suffered an immediate hit, with mass industrial lay-offs and several suicides. To make matters worse, the devaluation announcement was made mid-week, on a Wednesday, and for the remainder of the week foreign investors fled the Mexican market without any government action to prevent or discourage the flight until the following Monday, when it was too late.
Salinas faced widespread criticism in Mexico. He was widely blamed for the collapse of the economy and his privatization of several government-run businesses such as Telmex. With respect to the collapse of the economy, he rapidly responded by blaming Zedillo's "inept" handling of the situation, coining the term "December mistake" to refer to the crisis and Zedillo's mistakes. He then argued that he had talked to Zedillo of a possibility of "sharing the burden" of the devaluation by allowing the peso to devaluate a certain percent before his term was over, and the rest of the necessary devaluation would have been done during Zedillo's administration.
On February 9, 1995, Ernesto Zedillo's 71-day-old administration ignited a tremendous social crisis. After he announced Subcomandante Marcos to be Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente. In counterproductive turn of events, President Ernesto Zedillo made a series of decisions that broke the peaceful solution strategy action plan defined by Carlos Salinas that kept the peace since the Zapatista Army of National Liberation uprising and the agreements Zedillo authorized his Secretary of Interior Esteban Moctezuma to compromise with Marcos 3 days before in Guadalupe Tepeyac. No matter there was an amnesty law by Salinas and without knowing exactly who Marcos was, only with the PGR single presumption that Marcos was a dangerous guerrilla. President Ernesto Zedillo decided to launch a military offence to capture or annihilate Marcos. In a televised special broadcast, President Ernesto Zedillo alleged Marcos to be a terrorist in Nicaragua. There was a storm of political pressures claiming for a fast military solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis. Conflicting signals got strengthened for a fast military solution. Facts seemed to confirm Manuel Camacho Solís June 16, 1994 accusations that the reason for his resignation as the Chiapas Peace Commissioner was due to sabotage done by then presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo. Faced with this situation, Rafael Guillén's childhood friend and colleague, at the Jesuits College Instituto Cultural Tampico, Max Appedole played a major role with the Mexican government to avoid a military solution by demonstrating that, contrary to the accusations announced by President Ernesto Zedillo, Rafael Guillén was no terrorist. Max Appedole identified his linguistic fingerprint based in Marcos specific, unique way of speaking, his very own idiolect, encompasses vocabulary, grammar, and pronunciation that differs from the way other people talk. Recognized his literary style in all Marcos' manifestos that were published in the media, linked them to their literary tournaments organized by the Jesuits in which they competed in Mexico. Confirming that he had no doubt that Marcos was his friend Rafael Guillén, a pacifist. Max Appedole asked for help from Edén Pastora, the legendary Nicaraguan "Commander Zero", to prepare a report for under-Secretary of the Interior Luis Maldonado Venegas; the Secretary of the Interior Esteban Moctezuma and the President Ernesto Zedillo about Marcos natural pacifist vocation and the terrible consequences of a tragic outcome. The document concluded that the marginalized groups and the radical left that exist in Mexico, have been vented with the Zapatistas movement, while Marcos maintains an open negotiating track. Eliminate Marcos and his social containment work would cease and the radical groups would take control of the movement. They will response to violence with violence. Terrorist activities would begin. The country would be in a dangerous spiral, which could lead to very serious situations because not only there is discomfort in Chiapas, but in many places in Mexico. Under a big political pressure of a highly radicalized situation in Mexico, Luis Maldonado Venegas reestablished the Mexican government-Zapatista Army of National Liberation dialog to search for peace by demonstrating Marcos' natural peace vocation and the terrible consequences of a military solution. Time showed that the policy initiated since the uprising by Carlos Salinas to achieve a peaceful solution to the Zapatista uprising was legal, politically and honorably correct, saving many lives in Mexico.
Catholic Church crisis
On February 11, 1995, Ernesto Zedillo 73-day old administration, without considering the political, social and religious consequences, ignited a crisis with the Roman Catholic Church, hurting, recently restored Mexico-Vatican diplomatic relations, already seriously damaged because of the May 24, 1993 political assassination of the Guadalajara, Mexico Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo that precisely that Agency, PGR, has left unresolved. PGR pressured the loved by the people in Chiapas, highly reputed, honored in the Vatican San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas Catholic bishop Samuel Ruiz García for aiding to conceal the Zapatistas guerrilla activity, even though the Catholic bishop's collaboration had been strategic and strongest instrument to keep the peace since the uprising and the EZLN activity was public years before the uprising.
Exile and Raúl Salinas controversies
On February 28, 1995, Ernesto Zedillo 90-day-old administration ignited a tremendous political crisis versus Carlos Salinas; for this, he staged a brief hunger strike to protest the arrest of his older brother Raúl Salinas de Gortari (see below) as well as the accusations of responsibility for the country's economic travails that his successor as President, Ernesto Zedillo, aimed at him. He abandoned his campaign, which had been backed by the United States, to become the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. He left Mexico for self-imposed exile and settled in Ireland. Beyond the disputes over responsibility for Mexico's economic problems, Salinas's reputation was to be further clouded by a series of controversies involving close family members.
In November 1995, Raúl Salinas's wife, Paulina Castañón, and his brother-in-law, Antonio Castañón, were arrested in Geneva, Switzerland, after attempting to withdraw $84 million USD from an account owned by Raúl Salinas under an alias. Their capture led to the unveiling of a vast fortune spread around the world and amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, even though Raúl Salinas had never officially received an annual income of more than $190,000. A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office indicated that Raúl Salinas had transferred over $90 million out of Mexico into private bank accounts in London and Switzerland through a complex set of transactions between 1992 and 1994. In 2008, the government of Switzerland turned over $74 million, out of the $110 million in frozen bank accounts held by Raúl Salinas, to the government of Mexico. The Swiss Justice Ministry indicated that the Mexican government had demonstrated that $66 million of the funds had been misappropriated, and the funds, with interest, were returned to Mexico. The Salinas family would not receive back any of the frozen funds.
In January 1999, after a four-year trial, Salinas's older brother Raúl Salinas de Gortari was convicted of ordering the murder of the PRI official (and Salinas' brother-in-law) José Francisco Ruiz Massieu and sentenced to 50 years in prison. In July 1999, an appeals court cut the sentence to 27 1/2 years. In June 2005, the conviction was overturned, and Raúl Salinas was freed.
Salinas divorced his first wife soon after leaving office and married Ana Paula Gerard. He has six children: Cecilia, Emiliano and Juan Cristóbal from his first marriage; Ana Emilia, Patricio and Mateo from his second marriage.
In the last years of Zedillo's term, Carlos Salinas returned to Mexico to announce the publication of his book, Mexico: The Policy and the Politics of Modernization. Written during his stay in Ireland and full of quotations from press articles and political memoirs, it defended his achievements and blamed Zedillo for the crisis that followed his administration.
As of May 2010, Salinas was still living in Dublin, Ireland. Salinas also attended his son's civil wedding in Mexico City and promised to attend the subsequent religious wedding in late September.
- Camp, Roderic Ai (1995). Mexican Political Biographies, 1935–1993 (3 ed.). University of Texas Press. p. 641. ISBN 978-0-292-71181-5. Retrieved 2009-11-13.
- Del Collado, Fernando (November 29, 2012). "El árbol genealógico de los herederos de Los Pinos" (in Spanish). Retrieved 5 August 2014.
- Ex-President in Mexico Casts New Light on Rigged 1988 Election New York Times, 9 March 2004
- Coerver, Don M. (2004). Mexico: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Culture and History. ABC-CLIO. p. 460.
- Jorge A. Vargas, "Freedom of Religion and Public Worship in Mexico: A Legal Commentary on the 1992 Act on Religious Matters". BYU Law Review, 421 (1998), issue 2. Article 6.
- Rivera Ayala, Clara (2008). Historia de México II. Cengage Learning Editores. p. 389.
- "The peso crisis, ten years on: Tequila slammer". The Economist. 2004-12-29. Retrieved 2014-07-08.
- "The Tequila crisis in 1994". Rabobank. 2013-09-19. Archived from the original on 2015-04-10. Retrieved 2014-07-27.
- ,Salinas' Brother Charged in Mexican Assassination New York Times March 1, 1995 
- "El poder de Salinas" (in Spanish). Vanguardia. 2015-11-18.
- "MONITOR POLÍTICO: EL PODER DE CARLOS SALINAS" (in Spanish). Periódico Express. 2018-01-08.
- quoted in Jane Bussey, "Carlos Salinas de Gortari" in Encyclopedia of Mexico, vol. 2, p. 1330.
- Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil: Harvard and Murder: The Case of Carlos Salinas", The Nation 29 May 1995, 747-745. Cockburn builds his article around accounts in the Mexican newspaper Excélsior, especially Alberto R. de Aguilar, "Tres Niñitos 'Fusilaron' a una Sirvienta", Excélsior 18 December 1951, 1.
- Cockburn, "The Case of Carlos Salinas", 745.
- Roberto Gómez Bolaños (31 August 2007). Sin querer queriendo (in Spanish). Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial México. ISBN 978-607-11-1056-5.
- Bussey, "Carlos Salinas de Gortari", p. 1330.
- Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Political Participation, Public Investment and Support for the System: A Comparative Study of Rural Communities in Mexico. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego 1982.
- Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power. New York: HarperCollins 1997, p. 770.
- Valdés, Leonardo; Piekarewicz Sigal, Mina (1990). "La organización de las elecciones". In González Casanova, Pablo. México, el 6 de julio de 1988 : segundo informe sobre la democracia (in Spanish). Mexico City: Siglo Vientiuno Editores : Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Humanidades, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. ISBN 978-968-23-1651-7. OCLC 23953244. Retrieved 2009-04-19.
- Aguayo Quezada, Sergio (January 16, 2008). "Las boletas" (PDF) (in Spanish). Reforma. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 3, 2011. Retrieved 2009-04-19.
El 88 terminó siendo un detonante de la transición y caló muy hondo la ignominiosa quema de las boletas electorales de 1988 aprobada por el PRI y el PAN
- "Perdió el PRI en el 88: De la Madrid" (in Spanish). Noticieros Televisa. Archived from the original on August 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-04-19.
No, más bien yo creo que la elección del 88 nos dejó otra serie de fenómenos, como la crisis económica que mi gobierno tuvo que afrontar con medidas de austeridad, con medidas que apretaron el bolsillo de la gente, yo creo que esa fue la razón por la que el PRI perdió las elecciones del 88, o por lo menos perdió una gran parte del electorado al que estaba acostumbrado
- Barredas, Francisco (September 20, 2005). "Refuta Bartlett declaraciones de Miguel de la Madrid" (in Spanish). Noticieros Televisa. Archived from the original on April 11, 2009. Retrieved 2009-04-19.
- Ginger Thomompson (9 March 2004). "Ex-President in Mexico Casts New Light on Rigged 1988 Election". The New York Times. Retrieved 25 September 2017 – via www.nytimes.com.
- Roberto Blancarte, "Recent Changes in Church-State Relations in Mexico: An Historical Approach". Journal of Church and State Autumn 1993, Vol. 35, Issue 4, p. 1.
- Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Inaugural Address (Dec. 1, 1988) quoted in Jorge A. Vargas, Jorge A. Vargas, "Freedom of Religion and Public Worship in Mexico: A Legal Commentary on the 1992 Act on Religious Matters". BYU Law Review, 421 (1998), issue 2. Article 6, fn. 40.
- Jorge A. Vargas, "Freedom of Religion and Public Worship in Mexico: A Legal Commentary on the 1992 Act on Religious Matters". BYU Law Review, 421 (1998), issue 2. Article 6.
- Tim Golden (May 13, 1994). "Mexico Invites U.N. to Attend Election to Observe the Observers". The New York Times.
- Delgado de Cantú, Gloria M. (2003). México, estructuras política, económica y social. Pearson Educación. p. 484.
- Rivera Ayala, Clara (2008). Historia de México II. Cengage Learning Editores. p. 388.
- Rivera Ayala, Clara (2008). Historia de México II. Cengage Learning Editores. p. 389.
- Rivera Ayala, Clara (2008). Historia de México II. Cengage Learning Editores. p. 393.
- Hufbauer and Schoot (2005)
- Hufbauer & Schott, 2005
- «pretende negociar la paz y lanza ofensiva militar»
- «Tampico la conexión zapatista» Archived November 3, 2013, at the Wayback Machine.
- «Marcos en la mira de Zedillo»
- «Marcos sí es Sebastián Guillén»
- «La Otra Campana Pintada de Azul»
- «Maestros y condiscípulos de Tampico recuerdan a Rafael Guillén»
- «Relaciones entre México y el Vaticano»
- «Obispo en el centro de la polémica»
- «Sedena sabía de la guerrilla chiapaneca desde 1985»
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- "Switzerland will return blocked Salinas funds to Mexico – swissinfo". Swissinfo.ch. 2008-06-18. Retrieved 2012-02-16.
- BBC. "Mexico frees ex-leader's brother". 10 June 2005. Accessed on 9/3/12 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4079372.stm
- Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico: The Policy and Politics of Modernization, translated by Peter Hearn and Patricia Ross. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés 2002.
- "Cercano a Enrique Peña Nieto" (in Spanish). Carlos Salinas de Gortari: El padrino político de Enrique Peña Nieto. January 4, 2010. Retrieved April 10, 2012.
No lo digo yo. Lo dicen los periodistas Francisco Cruz Jiménez y Jorge Toribio Montiel en su libro "Negocios de familia: la biografía no autorizada de Enrique Peña Nieto y el Grupo Atlacomulco" publicado por editorial Planeta.
- Cruz, Francisco (2009). Negocios de Familia: la Biografía no Autorizada de Enrique Peña Nieto y el Grupo Atlacomulco (in Spanish) (11 ed.). Editorial Planeta. ISBN 978-607-07-0172-6. Retrieved 2012-04-10.
Enrique Peña Nieto se perfila como la carta más fuerte para enarbolar la candidatura presidencial del PRI en 2012. La trayectoria de Peña Nieto es también la de una gran familia: los apellidos Peña, Montiel, Nieto, Del Mazo, Fabela, González, Vélez, Sánchez y Colín, han dado al Estado de México seis gobernadores, todos ellos unidos por sólidos lazos familiares y de poder. Se han valido de la corrupción, compra de lealtades, imposiciones y otras maniobras similares para conservar y heredar el mando de generación en generación, a pesar de algunos intervalos. Como actual gobernador del Estado de México, Peña Nieto se ha convertido en la cabeza visible del Grupo Atlacomulco; su ascenso fue labrado escrupulosamente y está lejos de ser una obra del azar o una maniobra caprichosa de su antecesor Arturo Montiel. Negocios de familia desentraña la verdad detrás de la carismática figura de Peña Nieto y el entramado político para alcanzar la Presidencia de la República. La presencia cercana de Carlos Salinas de Gortari: llegó muy puntual al funeral de Enrique Peña del Mazo (padre de Peña Nieto), al velorio de Mónica Pretelini Sáenz, sus visitas secretas a la Casa de Gobierno, su asistencia a la toma de protesta de Peña Nieto.
- "Senarai Penuh Penerima Darjah Kebesaran, Bintang dan Pingat Persekutuan Tahun 1991" (PDF).
- Salinas's book, print edition: Carlos Salinas de Gortari, México, un paso difícil a la modernidad (Mexico, a difficult step into modern times), Plaza & Janés, ISBN 84-01-01492-1.
- Mexico under Salinas, Mexico Resource Center, Austin, TX, by Philip L. Russell. ISBN 0-9639223-0-0.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Carlos Salinas de Gortari.|
- (in Spanish) Extended biography and presidential tenure by CIDOB Foundation
- (in Spanish) Response of Manuel Bartlett to De la Madrid remarks.
- Appearances on C-SPAN
Miguel de la Madrid
| President of Mexico
|Party political offices|
Miguel de la Madrid
| PRI presidential candidate
Luis Donaldo Colosio (assassinated)