Champion v. Ames
||This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. (January 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)|
|This article relies too much on references to primary sources. (January 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)|
|Champion v. Ames|
|Argued February 27–28, 1901
Reargued October 16–17, 1901
Reargued December 15–16, 1902
Decided February 23, 1903
|Full case name||Charles F. Champion v. John C. Ames, United States Marshal|
|Citations||188 U.S. 321 (more)
23 S. Ct. 321; 47 L. Ed. 492; 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1283
|Prior history||Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois|
|The Court held that trafficking lottery tickets did constitute interstate commerce that could be regulated by the U.S. Congress under the Commerce Clause.|
|Majority||Harlan, joined by Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes|
|Dissent||Fuller, joined by Brewer, Shiras, Peckham|
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that trafficking lottery tickets constituted interstate commerce that could be regulated by the U.S. Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act in 1895, which prohibited the buying or selling of lottery tickets across state lines. The appellant, Charles Champion, was indicted for shipping Paraguayan lottery tickets from Texas to California. The indictment was challenged on the grounds that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to prohibit commerce of any item.
The defendants in the case were arrested under an 1895 Act of Congress that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines.
Decision of the Supreme Court
Most important in this case was that the Supreme Court recognized that Congress' power to regulate interstate traffic is plenary. That is, the power is complete in and of itself. This wide discretion allowed Congress to regulate traffic as it sees fit, within Constitutional limits, even to the extent of prohibiting goods, as here. This plenary power is distinct from the aggregate-impact theories later espoused in the Shreveport line of cases.
- Louisiana State Lottery Company
- Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), the first recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary (see Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion)
- Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), in which the Court struck down a similar law on the grounds that the federal government could not use its power to regulate interstate commerce to accomplish certain ends
|Wikisource has original text related to this article:|
|This article related to the Supreme Court of the United States is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.|