Cogito ergo sum
Cogito ergo sum[a] (/ /, also //, //; Classical Latin: [ˈkoːɡitoː ˈɛrɡoː ˈsʊm], "I think, therefore I am", or better "I am thinking, therefore I exist") is a philosophical proposition by René Descartes. The simple meaning of the Latin phrase is that thinking proves a thinker exists. As Descartes explains, "[W]e cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt … ." If valid it refutes scepticism, since to doubt one exists is self-contradictory.
This proposition became a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it was perceived to form a foundation for all knowledge. While other knowledge could be a figment of imagination, deception or mistake, the very act of doubting one's own existence arguably serves as proof of the reality of one's own existence, or at least of one's thought.
Descartes' original phrase, je pense, donc je suis (French pronunciation: [ʒə pɑ̃s dɔ̃k ʒə sɥi]), appeared in his Discourse on the Method (1637), which was written in French rather than Latin to reach a wider audience in his country than scholars. He used the Latin cogito ergo sum in the later Principles of Philosophy (1644).
The argument is popularly known in the English speaking world as "the cogito ergo sum argument" or, more briefly, as "the cogito".
- 1 In Descartes' writings
- 2 Interpretation
- 3 Predecessors
- 4 Criticisms
- 5 See also
- 6 Notes
- 7 References
- 8 Further reading
- 9 External links
In Descartes' writings
Descartes first wrote the phrase in French in his 1637 Discours de la Méthode. He referred to it in Latin without explicitly stating the familiar form of the phrase in his 1641 Méditationes de Prima Philosophia. The earliest written record of the phrase in Latin is in his 1644 Principia Philosophiae, where, in a margin note, he provides a clear explanation of his intent. Fuller forms of the phrase are attributable to other authors. [Formatting note: cogito variants in this section are highlighted in boldface to facilitate comparison; italics are used only as in originals.]
In Discours de la Méthode
The phrase first appeared (in French) in Descartes' 1637 Discours de la Méthode (full title in English: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences). From the first paragraph of Part IV:
- French: "… Ainsi, à cause que nos sens nous trompent quelquefois, je voulus supposer qu'il n'y avoit aucune chose qui fût telle qu'ils nous la font imaginer; et parce qu'il y a des hommes qui se méprennent en raisonnant, même touchant les plus simples matières de géométrie, et y font des paralogismes, jugeant que j'étois sujet à faillir autant qu'aucun autre, je rejetai comme fausses toutes les raisons que j'avois prises auparavant pour démonstrations; et enfin, considérant que toutes les mêmes pensées que nous avons étant éveillés nous peuvent aussi venir quand nous dormons, sans qu'il y en ait aucune pour lors qui soit vraie, je me résolus de feindre que toutes les choses qui m'étoient jamais entrées en l'esprit n'étoient non plus vraies que les illusions de mes songes. Mais aussitôt après je pris garde que, pendant que je voulois ainsi penser que tout étoit faux, il falloit nécessairement que moi qui le pensois fusse quelque chose; et remarquant que cette vérité, je pense, donc je suis [italics in original], étoit si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n'étoient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvois la recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchois."
- English: "… Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search."[b][c]
In Méditationes de Prima Philosophia
In 1641, Descartes published (in Latin) Méditationes de Prima Philosophia (English: Meditations on first philosophy) in which he referred to the proposition, though not explicitly as "cogito ergo sum" in Meditation II:
- Latin: "… hoc pronuntiatum: ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum."
- English: "… this proposition: I am, I exist, whenever it is uttered from me, or conceived by the mind, necessarily is true."[d]
In Principia Philosophiae
In 1644, Descartes published (in Latin), Principia Philosophiae (English: Principles of Philosophy) where the phrase "ego cogito, ergo sum" appears in Part 1, article 7:
- Latin: "Sic autem rejicientes illa omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam, falsa esse fingentes, facilè quidem, supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos, non habere manus, nec pedes, nec denique ullum corpus, non autem ideò nos qui talia cogitamus nihil esse: repugnat enim ut putemus id quod cogitat eo ipso tempore quo cogitat non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum [italics in original], est omnium prima & certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat."
- English: "While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly."[e]
Descartes' margin note for the above paragraph is:
- Latin: "Non posse à nobis dubitari, quin existamus dum dubitamus: at que hoc esse primum quod ordine philosophando cognoscimus."
- English: "That we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt, and that this is the first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize in order."[e]
The proposition is sometimes given as dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum. This fuller form was penned by the eloquent French literary critic, Antoine Léonard Thomas, in an award-winning 1765 essay in praise of Descartes, where it appeared as "Puisque je doute, je pense; puisque je pense, j'existe." In English, this is "Since I doubt, I think; since I think I exist"; with rearrangement and compaction, "I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am", or in Latin, "dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum".[f]
A further expansion, dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum—res cogitans ("…—a thinking thing") extends the cogito with Descartes' statement in the subsequent Meditation, "Ego sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam et sentiens …", or, in English, "I am a thinking (conscious) thing, that is, a being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant of many …".[g] This has been referred to as "the expanded cogito".
The phrase cogito ergo sum is not used in Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy but the term "the cogito" is used to refer to an argument from it. In the Meditations, Descartes phrases the conclusion of the argument as "that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (Meditation II)
At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt — his argument from the existence of a deceiving god — Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence, he finds that it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon), one's belief in their own existence would be secure, for there is no way one could be deceived unless one existed in order to be deceived.
But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I, too, do not exist? No. If I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all], then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who deliberately and constantly deceives me. In that case, I, too, undoubtedly exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII 25; CSM II 16–17)
There are three important notes to keep in mind here. First, he claims only the certainty of his own existence from the first-person point of view — he has not proved the existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of the meditations. Second, he does not say that his existence is necessary; he says that if he thinks, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle). Third, this proposition "I am, I exist" is held true not based on a deduction (as mentioned above) or on empirical induction but on the clarity and self-evidence of the proposition. Descartes does not use this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can stand as he works to restore his beliefs. As he puts it:
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable. (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)
According to many Descartes specialists, including Étienne Gilson, the goal of Descartes in establishing this first truth is to demonstrate the capacity of his criterion — the immediate clarity and distinctiveness of self-evident propositions — to establish true and justified propositions despite having adopted a method of generalized doubt. As a consequence of this demonstration, Descartes considers science and mathematics to be justified to the extent that their proposals are established on a similarly immediate clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence that presents itself to the mind. The originality of Descartes' thinking, therefore, is not so much in expressing the cogito — a feat accomplished by other predecessors, as we shall see — but on using the cogito as demonstrating the most fundamental epistemological principle, that science and mathematics are justified by relying on clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence. Baruch Spinoza in "Principia philosophiae cartesianae" at its Prolegomenon identified "cogito ergo sum" the "ego sum cogitans" (I am a thinking being) as the thinking substance with his ontological interpretation. It can also be considered that Cogito ergo sum is needed before any living being can go further in life".
Although the idea expressed in cogito ergo sum is widely attributed to Descartes, he was not the first to mention it. Plato spoke about the "knowledge of knowledge" (Greek νόησις νοήσεως - nóesis noéseos) and Aristotle explains the idea in full length:
But if life itself is good and pleasant (...) and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist... (Nicomachean Ethics, 1170a25 ff.)
Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei writes Si […] fallor, sum ("If I am mistaken, I am") (book XI, 26), and also anticipates modern refutations of the concept. Furthermore, in the Enchiridion Augustine attempts to refute skepticism by stating, "[B]y not positively affirming that they are alive, the skeptics ward off the appearance of error in themselves, yet they do make errors simply by showing themselves alive; one cannot err who is not alive. That we live is therefore not only true, but it is altogether certain as well" (Chapter 7 section 20). Another predecessor was Avicenna's "Floating Man" thought experiment on human self-awareness and self-consciousness.
There have been a number of criticisms of the argument. One concerns the nature of the step from "I am thinking" to "I exist." The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists", a premise Descartes did not justify. In fact, he conceded that there would indeed be an extra premise needed, but denied that the cogito is a syllogism (see below).
To argue that the cogito is not a syllogism, one may call it self-evident that "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists". In plain English, it seems incoherent to actually doubt that one exists and is doubting. Strict skeptics maintain that only the property of 'thinking' is indubitably a property of the meditator (presumably, they imagine it possible that a thing thinks but does not exist). This countercriticism is similar to the ideas of Jaakko Hintikka, who offers a nonsyllogistic interpretation of cogito ergo sum. He claimed that one simply cannot doubt the proposition "I exist". To be mistaken about the proposition would mean something impossible: I do not exist, but I am still wrong.
Perhaps a more relevant contention is whether the "I" to which Descartes refers is justified. In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. Apparently, the first scholar who raised the problem was Pierre Gassendi. He "points out that recognition that one has a set of thoughts does not imply that one is a particular thinker or another. Were we to move from the observation that there is thinking occurring to the attribution of this thinking to a particular agent, we would simply assume what we set out to prove, namely, that there exists a particular person endowed with the capacity for thought". In other words, "the only claim that is indubitable here is the agent-independent claim that there is cognitive activity present". The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I," is more than the cogito can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche criticized the phrase in that it presupposes that there is an "I", that there is such an activity as "thinking", and that "I" know what "thinking" is. He suggested a more appropriate phrase would be "it thinks." In other words the "I" in "I think" could be similar to the "It" in "It is raining." David Hume claims that the philosophers who argue for a self that can be found using reason are confusing "similarity" with "identity". This means that the similarity of our thoughts and the continuity of them in this similarity do not mean that we can identify ourselves as a self but that our thoughts are similar.
Williams' argument in detail
In addition to the preceding two arguments against the cogito, other arguments have been advanced by Bernard Williams. He claims, for example, that what we are dealing with when we talk of thought, or when we say "I am thinking," is something conceivable from a third-person perspective; namely objective "thought-events" in the former case, and an objective thinker in the latter.
Williams provides a meticulous and exhaustive examination of this objection. He argues, first, that it is impossible to make sense of "there is thinking" without relativizing it to something. However, this something cannot be Cartesian egos, because it is impossible to differentiate objectively between things just on the basis of the pure content of consciousness.
The obvious problem is that, through introspection, or our experience of consciousness, we have no way of moving to conclude the existence of any third-personal fact, to conceive of which would require something above and beyond just the purely subjective contents of the mind.
Søren Kierkegaard's critique
The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard provided a critical response to the cogito. Kierkegaard argues that the cogito already presupposes the existence of "I", and therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard's argument can be made clearer if one extracts the premise "I think" into two further premises:
I am that "x"
Therefore I think
Therefore I am
Where "x" is used as a placeholder in order to disambiguate the "I" from the thinking thing.
Here, the cogito has already assumed the "I"'s existence as that which thinks. For Kierkegaard, Descartes is merely "developing the content of a concept", namely that the "I", which already exists, thinks.
Kierkegaard argues that the value of the cogito is not its logical argument, but its psychological appeal: a thought must have something that exists to think the thought. It is psychologically difficult to think "I do not exist". But as Kierkegaard argues, the proper logical flow of argument is that existence is already assumed or presupposed in order for thinking to occur, not that existence is concluded from that thinking.
John Macmurray's Form of the Personal
The Scottish philosopher John Macmurray rejects the cogito outright in order to place action at the center of a philosophical system he entitles the Form of the Personal. "We must reject this, both as standpoint and as method. If this be philosophy, then philosophy is a bubble floating in an atmosphere of unreality."  The reliance on thought creates an irreconcilable dualism between thought and action in which the unity of experience is lost. Thus dissolving the integrity of our selves, and destroying any connection with reality. In order to formulate a more adequate cogito, Macmurray proposes the substitution of "I do" for "I think". Ultimately leading to a belief in God as an agent to whom all persons stand in relation.
Many philosophical skeptics and particularly radical skeptics would say that indubitable knowledge does not exist, is impossible, or has not been found yet, and would apply this criticism to the assertion that the "cogito" is beyond doubt.
- The cogito ergo sum phrase was not capitalized by Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae.
- This translation, from Discours de la méthode at Project Gutenberg, inserted the uppercase Latin phrase “COGITO ERGO SUM” in parentheses after the "I think, therefore I am". However, as this was not in the original French, it has been removed here.
- The 1637 Discours was translated to Latin in the 1644 Specimina Philosophiae but this is not referenced here because of issues raised regarding translation quality.
- This combines, for clarity and to retain phrase ordering, the translations of Cress and Haldane.
- Translation from The Principles of Philosophy at Project Gutenberg.
- The 1765 work, Éloge de René Descartes, by Antoine Léonard Thomas, was awarded the 1765 Le Prix De L'académie Française and republished in the 1826 compilation of Descartes' work, Oeuvres de Descartes by Victor Cousin. The French text is available in more accessible format at Project Gutenberg. The compilation by Cousin is credited with a revival of interest in Descartes.
- This translation by Veitch is the first English translation from Descartes as "I am a thinking thing".
- Burns, William E. (2001). The scientific revolution: an encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. p. 84. ISBN 0-87436-875-8.
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- Descartes, René (1986). Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by Donald A. Cress. p. 65. ISBN 978-1-60384-551-9.
- Descartes, René (1960). Meditations on first philosophy. Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane. p. 29. ISBN 978-1-61536-207-3.
- Thomas, Antoine Léonard (1765). Éloge de René Descartes.
- Cousin, Victor (1824). Oeuvres de Descartes.
- The Edinburgh Review for July, 1890 … October, 1890. Leonard Scott Publication Co. 1890. p. 469.
- Descartes, René (2007). The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes. Translated by Lisa Shapiro. University of Chicago Press. p. 5. ISBN 978-0226204420.
- Veitch, John (1880). The Method, Meditations and Selections from the Principles of René Descartes (7th ed.). Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. p. 115.
- Kline, George, L. (1967). Naturalism and Historical Understanding. SUNY Press. p. 85.
|last1=in Editors list (help)
- Vesey, Nicholas (2011). Developing Consciousness. United Kingdom: O-Books. p. 16. ISBN 978-1-84694-461-1.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Leaman, Oliver (1996), History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 315, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-13159-6.
- Radhakrishnan, S. (1948), Indian Philosophy, vol II, p. 476, George Allen & Unwin Ltd,
- Fisher, Saul (2005). "Pierre Gassendi". Retrieved 1 December 2014. from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Kierkegaard, Søren. Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Hong, Princeton, 1985. p. 38-42.
- Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. A Confusion of the Spheres. Oxford, 2007. p.168-170.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Hong, Princeton, 1985. p. 40.
- Archie, Lee C., "Søren Kierkegaard, God's Existence Cannot Be Proved". Philosophy of Religion. Lander Philosophy, 2006.
- Macmurray, John. The Self as Agent. Humanity books, 1991. p. 78.
- Descartes, René (1644). Principia Philosophiae.
- Abraham, W.E. "Disentangling the Cogito", Mind 83:329 (1974)
- Boufoy-Bastick, Z. Introducing 'Applicable Knowledge' as a Challenge to the Attainment of Absolute Knowledge , Sophia Journal of Philosophy, VIII (2005), pp 39–52.
- Descartes, R. (translated by John Cottingham), Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. II (edited Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch; Cambridge University Press, 1984) ISBN 0-521-28808-8
- Hatfield, G. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations (Routledge, 2003) ISBN 0-415-11192-7
- Kierkegaard, S. Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, 1985) ISBN 978-0-691-02081-5
- Kierkegaard, S. Philosophical Fragments (Princeton, 1985) ISBN 978-0-691-02036-5
- Williams, B. Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry (Penguin, 1978) OCLC 4025089
- Baird, Forrest E.; Walter Kaufmann (2008). From Plato to Derrida. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-158591-6.
- Macmurray, John. "The Self as Agent" 1951
- See External Links for Descartes' 1637 Discourse on the Method
- See External Links for Descartes' 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy
- See External Links for Descartes' 1644 Principles of Philosophy
- Descartes' Epistemology entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Descartes — The Cogito Argument