Conservatism in Russia

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Conservatism in Russia is a broad system of political beliefs in Russia that is characterised by support for Judeo-Christian values, Russian imperialism, statism, anti-communism, economic intervention, advocacy for the historical Russian sphere of influence and a rejection of Western culture, economic liberalism and modernism.[1]

As opposed to other conservative movements, Russian conservatism is seen as defending the established institutions of its time, such as the Tsarist and Soviet strong-man rule. Therefore, Russian conservatism is unique in rejecting the concept of liberty prevalent in Western conservatism, and instead supports a mixed economy, as opposed to libertarian ideals such as economic liberalism. This makes Russian conservatism largely populist in its promotion of anti-establishment views, strong nationalism and social conservatism. Russian conservatives believe that the state should control both economic and social policy, as it aligns with its origins in tsarism and the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church.[2]

Overview[edit]

The strong history of authoritarian ideals and anti-liberal sentiment in Russia has been largely caused by a lack of political forum and support for hierarchy. The growth of liberalism during the 19th and 20th century was unable to flourish in Russia as it did in Western European nations such as Germany, Italy and Spain. The succession of autocratic governments has therefore shaped the political ideologies of Russia in a unique way to Western democracies. Due to the stagnation of libertarian ideals of both economic and social liberalism in Russia, Russian conservatism is unique in its support for a mixed economy and its condemnation of liberty and Western democracy. After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the two main political parties in Russia have been United Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party.[3]

State Control[edit]

Russian conservatives believe in the government largely controlling both economic and social policy, with a strong centralised state influenced by nationalist and imperialist ideologies. They also believe in opposition to Western globalism, and the promotion of Russian ideals and culture with support for the Russian sphere of influence through art and media. The authoritarian ideals in both Tsarist and Soviet Russia of devotion to the state and strong nationalism are supported by Russian conservatives, who believe in a return to Russian ideals in reaction to modernism and globalism, with strong opposition to the globalist organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO. With classical liberalism playing major roles in the development of conservatism in Western democracies, Russia largely differs from conservatism in other parts of the world with its belief in state control. With Russian conservatives holding largely interventionist views in international affairs, they hold deep contempt with the United States and strong support for CIS countries other than Georgia and Ukraine.[4]

Social Views[edit]

Social views held by conservative Russians are largely influenced by traditionalism and the Russian orthodox church. Russian conservatism, alike conservatives in other parts of the world, believe in the promotion of Christian ideals in its opposition to abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia and its support for gender roles in the government and in civil life. Influenced by the totalitarian and autocratic views held by the Russian Tsar and the Bolsheviks, Russian conservatives believe in the rule of law, and the cult of personality. Strong nationalist sentiments are largely held, influencing the support for national and state unity against foreign influence. The suppression of individual freedoms are believed to be necessary in law enforcement and halting social progressivism. Western culture and modernism are largely opposed in favour of realism, seen as largely a product of the consumerist cultures of Western democracies. Under Vladimir Putin, the leader of the Russian government since 1999, Russia has expressively condemned foreign influences, and believed in expanding Russia's own influence, since with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and opposed nuclear disarmament.[5]

Economic Views[edit]

Although economic liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism has been key in the history of conservatism in country such as the United States, the historical role of state control in Russia, has resulted in the development of state interventionist views of Russian conservatives in respect to the economy. Although both major conservative parties post-USSR largely condemn communism, Russian conservatives largely believe in a mixed economy, with a mixture of regulations in the private sector with market freedoms, public ownership of several key industries such as energy and defence, and low to moderate distributions of wealth across the economy. Russian conservatives believe in the government intervening in markets and regulating the private sector, as it has a necessary role in the framework of a capitalist economy. Along with other conservatives in the world, Russian conservatives believe in protectionism, and the regulation of global interaction with the Russian economy, through the use of tariffs and government subsidies to domestic producers.[6]

Religious Views[edit]

As strong adherents to the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian conservatives largely espouse traditional Christian views on social issues as mentioned previously, the church collaborating closely with the state in social and cultural affairs under Putin. The rise of globalisation and social freedoms in Western democracies has been largely quelled in Russia under Putin, with direct influences from the church, who's deep condemnation of homosexuality and support for Russian expansion into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has been largely criticised as the church under Patriarch Kirill of Moscow have halted social progressivism in Russia and developed the violation of human rights in Russia for homosexuals.[7]

History[edit]

Ivan lll laid the foundations of Tsarist autocracy, a system of governance which would influence the authoritarian nature of Russian conservatism.

The traditions of autocracy and patrimonialism developed in Russia in the 17th and 18th century, as Ivan lll built upon Byzantine traditions of autocracy, allowing for the development of Tsarism and the monarchy of the Romanov dynasty in the 19th and 20th centuries. This payed the groundwork for the development of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union after the Russian revolution, with Stephen White describing the fabric of Russian identity being interwoven with autocracy. This progression of autocratic governments didn't allow for the spread and rapid development of liberals ideals as seen in Western Europe, with state interventionism remaining the key ideology in all Russian parties. This influenced the development of conservative thought post the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, with state control playing a key role in Russian traditionalism.[8]

Attempts at liberal restructuring of the Soviet economy and political landscape through the Perestroika reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, were largely suppressed by the return to authoritarian politics under the conservative Putin government, after his predecessor Boris Yeltsin was unable to keep on course with social and economic reform. The Russian youth played a key role in the 2000s, developing conservative ideas away from the traditional western libertarian sense, with the Gorbachev and Yeltsin liberal reforms being seen as a time of political upheaval and chaos. A 1987 survey undertaken by Russian sociologist Yuri Levada, found the ageing soviet citizens of the 1980s or "Homo Sovieticus", who still had memories of Stalinism and totalitarian Soviet governments, were a "dying breed" as the younger and more naive generations in Russia began to shape the political climate of the future. A disdain for liberal reform and lack of knowledge for the reign of terror under Stalin allowed for the youth in Russian to develop into the hardline nationalist faction of Russian politics, allowing for the polarisation of Russian politics and development of totalitarian ideas in conservatism.[9]

Current Political Parties[edit]

The two main conservative parties in Russia are the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and United Russia, led by its de facto leader Vladimir Putin. United Russia is the ruling party of Russia and largest party of Russia, holding 74.4% of seats in the state Duma.[10]

The United Russia party was established in 2001 after the merger of the Fatherland - All Russia and Unity parties. As a populist party, United Russia supports the administration rather than a coherent ideology, in order to break the pattern of the right-left dichotomy in Russia, that dominated politics throughout the 1990s. Although the party in 2009 claims its ideological roots in Russia conservatism, the party attempts to capture the minds of non-ideological voters, by emphasising stasis in Russia. The 2007 Duma elections saw the United Russia party's popularity soar to 64.4%, a peak which would decline to 49.32% in 2011. However the 2016 elections saw its popularity increase back up to 54.2%. In its political manifesto, The Path of National Success, the party states its goal in unifying all aspects of society through minimising differences between social classes and divisions. The party believes through the economic policies of Russian conservatism it can combine state regulation and market freedoms, maximising benefits to all stakeholders in the economy. Putin has formed think tanks such as the Izvorsky Club formed in 2012, to stress the conservative values of Russian nationalism, opposition to modern liberalism and a yearning for a return to Russian greatness through imperialism.[11]

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia or LDRP was founded in 1992 by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As a more ideological Conservative party, the LDRP scored 22.9% of votes in the 1993 state Duma elections, opposing the right-left dichotomy in Russia alike the United Russia party. In 2016, the party received 13.4% of the vote, giving it 39 of the 450 seats in the State Duma. During the 1990s, Zhirinovsky and the LDPR formed a component of the political opposition to Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, however members of the party largely voted against impeaching Yeltsin in 1999. In recent years, the LDPR has often supported the agenda of the United Russia party and Putin government when voting in the Duma, leading some to believe that the party receives funding from the Kremlin.[12]

Criticism[edit]

Although the ideology itself hasn't been poorly received by the general public, political parties such as United Russia have come under intense scrutiny as a party of “crooks and thieves”. This term coined by activist Alexey Navalny amidst the corruption in Russian politics, was consistently used by opposition parties during the 2011 election to characterise the United Russia party as being corrupted and concerned with “maintaining and strengthening their own power”. The 2011-2013 Russian protests show the Russians public perception of a flawed election process in Russia, and the yearning for a more democratic process against what they believe has become an authoritarian government.[13]

Putin's social policy has largely been criticised as being a puppet of the Russian Orthodox Church's radical views on homosexuality and human rights. Close collusion with the church under Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has shown how the policy prescriptions of the Russian Orthodox theology, influenced Putin's expansionist policy into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Human rights organisations have accused Putin as being undemocratic with the persecution of political critics and activists, labelling his government as totalitarian. Putin's autocratic rule and lack of rotation in power, cited by the corruption of fair elections and rigged ballots called for the 2017-18 Russian protests. Censorship and political propaganda in media has also been highlighted through these protests as undemocratic and a violation of human rights.[14][15]

The ideology of Russian conservatism itself, through its roots in statism, has been described as authoritarian and an oppressive system of governance. Opposition from both right and left wing groups has characterised the Putin governments harsh laws in promoting stability in the country, as being exercised to cement the governments own power. Regulations on freedom of the press and economic interventionism has been opposed starkly by right-libertarian while social views on abortion and Putin's ban on LGBT rights propaganda has been criticised by anarchist and left wing groups.[16]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Нагорная, Оксана (2016). "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas". Ab Imperio. 2016 (3): 429–434. doi:10.1353/imp.2016.0076. ISSN 2164-9731.
  2. ^ Hamburg, G. M. (2006-12-01). "RICHARD PIPES. Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 216. $30.00". The American Historical Review. 111 (5): 1630–1631. doi:10.1086/ahr.111.5.1630. ISSN 0002-8762.
  3. ^ Hamburg, Gary M. (2005). "The Revival of Russian Conservatism". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 6 (1): 107–127. doi:10.1353/kri.2005.0006. ISSN 1538-5000.
  4. ^ Alexeev, Denis (2014). "Russian Politics in Times of Change: Internal and External Factors of Transformation". Connections: The Quarterly Journal. 14 (1): 105–120. doi:10.11610/connections.14.1.05. ISSN 1812-1098.
  5. ^ Flynn, James T. (December 1998). "Alexander M. Martin.Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I:Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I Alexander M. Martin". The American Historical Review. 103 (5): 1652. doi:10.2307/2650077. ISSN 0002-8762.
  6. ^ LARUELLE, MARLENE (2016-09-04). "The Izborsky Club, or the New Conservative Avant-Garde in Russia". The Russian Review. 75 (4): 626–644. doi:10.1111/russ.12106. ISSN 0036-0341.
  7. ^ Mäkinen, Sirke (June 2011). "Surkovian Narrative on the Future of Russia: Making Russia a World Leader". Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 27 (2): 143–165. doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.564084. ISSN 1352-3279.
  8. ^ Pipes, Richard (March 1971). "Russian Conservatism in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century". Slavic Review. 30 (01): 121–128. doi:10.2307/2493447. ISSN 0037-6779.
  9. ^ "From Totalitarianism to Welfare Authoritarianism", Ruling Russia, Princeton University Press, pp. 130–163, ISBN 9781400880836, retrieved 2019-06-11
  10. ^ Sakwa, Richard (2013-09-13). "Power and Policy in Putin's Russia". doi:10.4324/9781315876184. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  11. ^ "Kremlin-Backed Opposition Party Foundering as Elections Loom". web.archive.org. 2018-03-27. Retrieved 2019-06-11.
  12. ^ Gel’Man, Vladimir (2014), "Trajectories of Russian Politics: An Interpretation", Developments in Russian Politics 8, Macmillan Education UK, pp. 247–263, ISBN 9781137392138, retrieved 2019-06-11
  13. ^ "Большинство тех, кто голосовал против ПЖиВ, не читали Навального, не ужасались происшествию на Ленинском проспекте. У каждого из них случился какой-то свой персональный Ленинский проспект". Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). 2011-12-06. Retrieved 2019-06-11.
  14. ^ Osborn, Andrew (2011-12-10). "Bloggers who are changing the face of Russia as the Snow Revolution takes hold". ISSN 0307-1235. Retrieved 2019-06-11.
  15. ^ http://www.washingtontimes.com, The Washington Times. "Vladimir Putin, Patriarch Kirill alliance puts atheists at risk in Russia". The Washington Times. Retrieved 2019-06-11.
  16. ^ Mendras, Marie (2017-11-01). "The future is history: how totalitarianism reclaimed Russia". International Affairs. 93 (6): 1489–1491. doi:10.1093/ia/iix209. ISSN 0020-5850.