Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis

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Credit rating agencies (CRAs)—firms which rate debt instruments/securities according to the debtor's ability to pay lenders back—played a significant role at various stages in the American subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2008 that led to the great recession of 2008–2009. The new, complex securities of "structured finance" used to finance subprime mortgages could not have been sold without ratings by the "Big Three" rating agencies—Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Ratings. A large section of the debt securities market—many money markets and pension funds—were restricted in their bylaws to holding only the safest securities—i.e. securities the rating agencies designated "triple-A".[1] The pools of debt the agencies gave their highest ratings to included over three trillion dollars of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and undocumented incomes through 2007.[2][3] Hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of these triple-A securities were downgraded to "junk" status by 2010,[1][4][5] and the writedowns and losses came to over half a trillion dollars.[6][7] This led "to the collapse or disappearance" in 2008–09 of three major investment banks (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch), and the federal government's buying of $700 billion of bad debt from distressed financial institutions.[7]

Impact on the crisis[edit]

source: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, p.229, figure 11.4

Credit rating agencies came under scrutiny following the mortgage crisis for giving investment-grade, "money safe" ratings to securitized mortgages (in the form of securities known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO)) based on "non-prime"—subprime or Alt-A—mortgages loans.

Demand for the securities was stimulated by the large global pool of fixed income investments which had doubled from $36 trillion in 2000 to $70 trillion by 2006—more than annual global spending—and the low interest rates from competing fixed income securities, made possible by the low interest rate policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank for much of that period.[8] These high ratings encouraged the flow of global investor funds into these securities funding the housing bubble in the US.[8]

Mortgage-related securities[edit]

Ratings were/are vital to "private-label" asset-backed securities—such as subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), "CDOs squared", and "synthetic CDOs"—whose "financial engineering" make them "harder to understand and to price than individual loans".[9]

Earlier traditional and more simple "prime" mortgage securities were issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac"enterprises" sponsored by the Federal government. Their safety wasn't questioned by conservative money managers. Non-prime private label mortgage securities were neither made up of loans to borrowers with high credit ratings nor insured by a government enterprise, so issuers used an innovation in securities structure to get higher agency ratings. They pooled debt and then "sliced" the result into "tranches", each with a different priority in the debt repayment stream of income.[10] The most "senior" tranches highest up in priority of revenue—which usually made up most of the pool of debt—received the triple A ratings. This made them eligible for purchase by the pension funds and money market funds restricted to top-rated debt,[11] and for use by banks wanting to reduce costly capital requirements under Basel II.[1][12]

The complexity of analyzing the debt pool mortgages and tranche priority, and the position of the Big Three credit rating agencies "between the issuers and the investors of securities", is what "transformed" the agencies into "key" players in the process, according to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report.[9] "Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings."[13]

According to the CEO of a servicer of the securitization industry, Jim Callahan of PentAlpha, "The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion,"[13]

From 2000 to 2007, Moody's rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities[14]—more than half of those it rated—as triple-A. In contrast only six (private sector) companies in the United States were given that top rating.[15]

By December 2008, there were over $11 trillion structured finance securities outstanding in the US bond market debt.[14]


Rating agencies were even more important in disposing of the MBS tranches that could not be rated triple A. Although these made up a minority of the value of the MBS tranches, unless buyers were found for them, it would not be profitable to make the security in the first place. And because traditional mortgage investors were risk-averse (often because of SEC regulations or restrictions in their charters), these less-safe tranches were the most difficult to sell.[16][17]

To sell these "mezzanine" tranches, investment bankers pooled them to form another security—known as a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). Though the raw material of these "obligations" was made up of BBB, A−, etc. tranches, the CRAs rated 70%[18] to 80%[19] of the new CDO tranches triple A. The 20–30% remaining mezzanine tranches were usually bought up by other CDOs, to make so-called "CDO-Squared" securities which also produced tranches rated mostly triple A by rating agencies.[20] This process was disparaged as a way of transforming "dross into gold"[21] or "ratings laundering"[22] by at least some business journalists.

Trust in rating agencies was particularly important for CDOs for another reason—their contents were subject to change, so CDO managers "didn't always have to disclose what the securities contained". This lack of transparency did not affect demand for the securities. Investors "weren't so much buying a security" as they "were buying a triple-A rating", according to business journalists Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera.[23]

Still another structured product was the "synthetic CDO". Cheaper and easier to create than original "cash" CDOs, these securities did not provide funding for housing. Instead synthetic CDO-buying investors were in effect providing insurance (in the form of "credit default swaps") against mortgage default. Synthetics "referenced" cash CDOs, and rather than providing investors with interest and principal payments from MBS tranches, they paid insurance premium-like payments from credit default swap "insurance". If the referenced CDOs defaulted, investors lost their investment, which was paid out as insurance.[24] Because synthetics referenced another (cash) CDO, more than one—in fact numerous—synthetics could be made to reference the same original. This multiplied the effect if a referenced security defaulted.[25][26]

Here again the giving of triple-A ratings to "large chunks"[27] of synthetics by the rating agencies was crucial to the securities' success. The buyer of synthetic tranches (who often went on to lose his investment) was seldom an analyst "who had investigated the mortgage-backed security", was aware of deteriorating mortgage underwriting standards, or that the payments they would receive were often coming from investors betting against mortgage-backed security solvency. Rather, "it was someone who was buying a rating and thought he couldn't lose money."[28]

Downgrades and writedowns[edit]

By the end of 2009, over half of the collateralized debt obligations by value[29] issued at the end of the housing bubble (from 2005–2007) that rating agencies gave their highest "triple-A" rating to, were "impaired"—that is either written-down to "junk" or suffered a "principal loss" (i.e. not only had they not paid interest but investors would not get back some of the principal they invested).[30][31][32][33][34] The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission estimates that by April 2010, of all mortgage-backed securities Moody's had rated triple-A in 2006, 73% were downgraded to junk.[35]

Mortgage underwriting standards deteriorated to the point that between 2002 and 2007 an estimated $3.2 trillion in loans were made to homeowners with bad credit and undocumented incomes (e.g., subprime or Alt-A mortgages)[6] and bundled into MBSs and collateralized debt obligations that received high ratings and therefore could be sold to global investors. Higher ratings were believed justified by various credit enhancements including over-collateralization (i.e., pledging collateral in excess of debt issued), credit default insurance, and equity investors willing to bear the first losses. But as of September 2008, bank writedowns and losses on these investments totaled $523 billion.[6][7][36]

MBS Credit Rating Downgrades, By Quarter[37]

Rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $1.9 trillion in mortgage backed securities from the third fiscal quarter (1 July—30 September) of 2007 to the second quarter (1 April–30 June) of 2008. One institution, Merrill Lynch, sold more than $30 billion of collateralized debt obligations for 22 cents on the dollar in late July 2008.

The net worth of financial institutions owning the newly downgraded securities declined, requiring the institutions to acquire additional capital, to maintain capital ratios, which in turn often lowered the net-worth value of the institutions above and beyond the low of value of the downgraded securities.[37] Adding to the financial chain reaction were regulations—governmental or internal—requiring some institutional investors to carry only investment-grade (e.g., "BBB" and better) assets. A downgrade below that meant forced asset sales and further devaluation.[38]


In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2010, the rating agencies came under criticism from investigators, economists, and journalists. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)[39] set up by the U.S. Congress and president to investigate the causes of the crisis, and publisher of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (FCIR), concluded that the "failures" of the Big Three rating agencies were "essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction" and "key enablers of the financial meltdown".[40] It went on to say

The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use them, or regulatory capital standards were hinged on them. This crisis could not have happened without the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms."[40]

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Commissioner Kathleen Casey complained the ratings of the large rating agencies were "catastrophically misleading", yet the agencies "enjoyed their most profitable years ever during the past decade" while doing so.[41] The Economist magazine opined that "it is beyond argument that ratings agencies did a horrendous job evaluating mortgage-tied securities before the financial crisis hit."[42]

Economist Joseph Stiglitz considered "the rating agencies as one of the key culprits... They were the party that performed the alchemy that converted the securities from F-rated to A-rated. The banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the rating agencies."[43] In their book on the crisis—All the Devils Are Here—journalists Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera criticized rating agencies for continuing "to slap their triple-A [ratings]s on subprime securities even as the underwriting deteriorated—and as the housing boom turned into an outright bubble" in 2005, 2006, 2007.[1]

Legal actions[edit]

Dozens of suits involving claims of inaccurate ratings were filed against the rating agencies by investors.[44] Plaintiffs have included by collateralized debt obligation investors (the state of Ohio for losses of $457 million,[45][46] California state employees for $1 billion[47]), the bankrupt investment bank Bear Stearns (for losses of $1.12 billion from alleged "fraudulently issuing inflated ratings for securities"[48]), bond insurers.[49] The U.S. Government is also a plaintiff (suing S&P for $5 billion for "misrepresenting the credit risk of complex financial products").[50][51][52]

SEC actions[edit]

On 11 June 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed far-reaching rules designed to address perceived conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of structured securities. The proposal would, among other things, prohibit a credit rating agency from issuing a rating on a structured product unless information on assets underlying the product was available, prohibit credit rating agencies from structuring the same products that they rate, and require the public disclosure of the information a credit rating agency uses to determine a rating on a structured product, including information on the underlying assets. The last proposed requirement is designed to facilitate "unsolicited" ratings of structured securities by rating agencies not compensated by issuers.[53]

On 3 December 2008, the SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies, following a ten-month investigation that found "significant weaknesses in ratings practices," including conflicts of interest.[54][55]

Explanations for inaccurate ratings[edit]

The FCIC commission found that agencies' credit ratings were influenced by "flawed computer models, the pressure from financial firms that paid for the ratings, the relentless drive for market share, the lack of resources to do the job despite record profits, and the absence of meaningful public oversight."[56] McLean and Nocera blame credit ratings lapses on "an erosion of standards, a willful suspension of skepticism, a hunger for big fees and market share, and an inability to stand up to" the investment banks issuing the securities.[1]

Competitive pressure to lower standards[edit]

Structured investment mortgage-related securities were the rating agencies' "golden goose"—in the words of one agency manager.[36] Agencies earned as much as three times more for grading these complex products as for corporate bonds, their traditional business. On top of revenue generated for issuing credit ratings, agencies often earned $300,000–500,000 and as much as $1 million to construct a structured investment vehicle.[47] By 2007 the business accounted for just under half of the total ratings revenue and all of the revenue growth for Moody's—one of the largest agencies.[57] But there was always a danger of losing out on this lucrative business. Issuers played the three big credit agencies off one another, 'shopping' around to find the best ratings.

Richard Michalek, a former vice president and senior credit officer at Moody's, testified to the FCIC that even when they were not realized, "The threat of losing business to a competitor ... absolutely tilted the balance away from an independent arbiter of risk ...." When asked if the investment banks frequently threatened to withdraw their business if they didn't get their desired rating, former Moody team managing director Gary Witt told the FCIC,

“Oh God, are you kidding? All the time. I mean, that's routine. I mean, they would threaten you all of the time. . . . It's like, ‘Well, next time, we're just going to go with Fitch and S&P.'”[58]

At Standard & Poor's rating service one subpoenaed email sent by a security-issuing banker angry over possible revision of residential mortgage-backed security ratings, told an analyst: "Heard your ratings could be 5 notches back of moddys [sic] equivalent, Gonna kill you resi biz. May force us to do moddyfitch [S&P competitors Moody's and Fitch Rating] only ..."[59]

Another email between colleagues at Standard & Poor's written before the bubble burst, suggests awareness of what would happen to the securities they were giving top ratings to: "Rating agencies continue to create and [sic] even bigger monster--the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters."[60][61]

Conflicts of interest[edit]

Critics have claimed there was a conflict of interest for agencies—a conflict between accommodating clients for whom higher ratings of debt mean higher earnings, and accurately rating the debt for the benefit of the debt buyer/investor customers, who provide no revenue to the agencies.[62][63] Being a publicly traded firm intensifies the pressure to grow and increase profits.[64] Of the two biggest agencies Moody's became a public firm in 2001, while Standard & Poor's is part of the publicly traded McGraw-Hill Companies.

One study of "6,500 structured debt ratings" produced by Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, found ratings by agencies "biased in favour of issuer clients that provide the agencies with more rating business. This result points to a powerful conflict of interest, which goes beyond the occasional disagreement among employees."[51]

Unwillingness to spend on human resources[edit]

While Moody's and other credit rating agencies were quite profitable—Moody's operating margins were consistently over 50%, higher than famously successful Exxon Mobil or Microsoft, and its stock rose 340% between the time it was spun off into a public company and February 2007[65]—salaries and bonuses for non-management were low by Wall Street standards and its employees complained of overwork.

According to journalists McLean and Nocera, "The analysts in structured finance were working 12 to 15 hours a day. They made a fraction of the pay of even a junior investment banker. There were far more deals in the pipeline than they could possibly handle. They were overwhelmed. Moody's top brass ... wouldn't add staff because they didn't want to be stuck with the cost of employees if the revenues slowed down."[66]

Moody's Team manager Gary Witt complained that "penny-pinching" and "stingy" management was reluctant to pay up for experienced employees. "The problem of recruiting and retaining good staff was insoluble. Investment banks often hired away our best people. As far as I can remember, we were never allocated funds to make counter offers. We had almost no ability to do meaningful research."[67] When asked about this by the FCIC, Moody's president Brian Clarkson admitted that investment banks paid more than his agency so retaining employees was "a challenge".[68]

Manipulation of ratings[edit]

Journalist Michael Lewis argues that the low pay of credit rating agency employees allowed security issuers to game the ratings of their securities. Lewis quotes one Goldman Sachs "trader-turned hedge fund manager" telling him, "guys who can't get a job on Wall Street get a job at Moody's," as Moody's paid much less. This was despite the fact that a job at Moody's—or any of the other rating agencies—gave an analyst the power to upgrade or downgrade a security, whereas the higher paid analysts' recommendations at Wall Street investment banks had no such impact on the market.[69] However, the difference in pay meant that the "smartest" analysts at the credit rating agencies "leave for Wall Street firms where they could use their knowledge (of criteria used to rate securities) to manipulate the companies they used to work for." Consequently, it was widely known on Wall Street that the "inner workings" of the rating models used by the credit rating agencies, while "officially, a secret", "were ripe for exploitation."[70] At least one other investment firm that bet against the agencies' credit ratings with huge success believed "there was a massive amount of gaming going on."[71]

When asked by the FCIC Commission about "the high turnover" and "revolving door that often left raters dealing with their old colleagues, this time as clients", Moody's officials stated their employees were prohibited from rating deals by a bank or issuer while they were interviewing for a job with that particular institution, but notifying management of any such interview was the responsibility of the employee. After getting a job at an investment bank, former employees were barred from interacting with Moody's on "the same series of deals they had rated while in its employ", but not on any other deals with Moody's.[68]

Ways of "gaming"[edit]

What was it ex-rating agency analysts might show their new employers? According to the hedge fund managers Michael Lewis talked to who had bet against mortgages securities, there were a number of ways to game[72] or "reverse-engineer" the raters' models.[36]

Rating agencies judged creditworthiness of a pool of loans in part by looking at the averages of credit scores of borrowers who made up the security. The agencies used FICO, the "best-known and most widely used credit score model". The average FICO score needed to be about 615 for a pool of loans to meet rating agencies' minimum standard and allow a maximum percentage of triple-A rated tranches.[72]

While using an average was less work than getting a list of the borrowers' individual scores or finding the standard deviation of the pool of scores, it left out useful information. A pool of loans composed of borrowers all of whom had a FICO score of 615 was likely far fewer defaults than a pool of loans with the same average but more dispersion—e.g.composed of borrowers half of whom had FICO scores of 550 and half 680, since someone who had earned a FICO score as low as 550 "was virtually certain to default". Knowing this blind spot, securities issuers who could no longer find high-FICO-scoring families who wanted to take out a mortgage found other ways to raise the average pool score.[72]

One way was to convince immigrants to buy homes. People who had not been in the country long, often had "never failed to repay a debt, because they had never been given a loan". Such people had surprisingly high FICO scores if you ignored the short credit history or "thin file". Rating agencies did, and FICO scores ignored and personal or household income.[72] Thus did low income immigrants increase the percentage of pool of loans that could be declared triple-A"[73] and explain otherwise unlikely sounding press reports of a "Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $14,000 and no English" being "lent every penny he needed to buy a house of $724,000".[73][74]

Other "opportunities" for issuers manipulating credit raters included

  • Moody's and S&P favoring of "floating-rate mortgages with low teaser rates over fixed-rate" mortgages;
  • their lack of interest in whether "a loan had been made in a booming real estate market or a quiet one";
  • whether a lender had a 'silent second',[75] i.e. an undisclosed second mortgages that left the homeowner with no equity in his home and thus no financial incentive not abandon it if real estate prices declined; and
  • "the fraud implicit in no doc loans".[72]

"The models used by the rating agencies were riddled with these sorts of opportunities", according to Lewis. "The trick was finding them" before other security issuers did.[72]


In 2006, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was passed, intending to break the dominance of the "big three" agencies—Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch—by making it easier to qualify as a "nationally recognized" ratings agency.

However, in 2013, McClatchy Newspapers found that "little competition has emerged in rating the kinds of complex home-mortgage securities whose implosion led to the 2007 financial crisis".[76] In the 12 months that ended in June 2011, the SEC reported that the big three issued 97% of all credit ratings, down only 1% from 98% in 2007.[76][77] Critics have complained that the criteria to designate a rating agency as "a nationally recognized statistical rating organization" was written by a "yet-to-be-identified official of one of the big three ratings agencies", and is so difficult that it has "prevented at least one potential competitor from winning approval and have dissuaded others from even applying".[76] Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker complained in a September 2013 article on banking and the shortcoming of post-crisis financial reform, that "no meaningful reform of the credit-rating agencies has been undertaken".[78] In the spring of 2013, Moody's and Standard & Poor's settled two "long-running" lawsuits "seeking to hold them responsible for misleading investors about the safety of risky debt vehicles that they had rated". The suits were filed in 2008 and had sought more than $700 million of damages. Settlement terms were not disclosed in both cases, and the lawsuits were dismissed "with prejudice", meaning they cannot be brought again.[46] Other lawsuits are still outstanding as of September 2013.[79]

In the dozens of suits filed against them by investors involving claims of inaccurate ratings[44] the rating agencies have defended themselves using a First Amendment defense (based on the precedent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). This maintains a credit rating is an opinion protected as free speech and requires plaintiffs to prove actual malice by the agency[80] However, some wonder if the defense will ultimately prevail.[81][82]

According to columnist Floyd Norris at least one rating agency—S&P—responded to the credit crisis by first tightening up its standards and sacrificing market share to restore its reputation,[83] after which it loosened standards again "to get more business",[84] tripling its market share in the first half of 2013.[85] This is because, according to Norris, for rating franchises to be worth anything, they must seem to be credible to investors. But once they overcome that minimal hurdle, they will get more business if they are less critical than their competitors.[84]


  1. ^ a b c d e McLean, Bethany and Joe Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, the Hidden History of the Financial Crisis, Portfolio, Penguin, 2010 (p.111)
  2. ^ (the raw material of the debt securities)
  3. ^ Smith, Elliot Blair (September 24, 2008). "Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge". Bloomberg. Driven by competition for fees and market share, the New York-based companies stamped out top ratings on debt pools that included $3.2 trillion of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and undocumented incomes between 2002 and 2007.
  4. ^ $300 billion collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) issued in 2005–2007 (over half of the CDOs by value during that time period) that rating agencies gave their highest "triple-A" rating to, were written down to "junk" by the end of 2009. (source:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 228–9.)
  5. ^ Barnett-Hart, Anna Katherine. "The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis" (PDF). March 19, 2009. Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved 28 May 2013. Overall, my findings suggest that the problems in the CDO market were caused by a combination of poorly constructed CDOs, irresponsible underwriting practices, and flawed credit rating procedures.
  6. ^ a b c Bloomberg-Smith-Bringing Down Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge| By Elliot Blair Smith || September 24, 2008
  7. ^ a b c Smith, Elliot Blair (September 24, 2008). "Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge". Bloomberg. Without those AAA ratings, the gold standard for debt, banks, insurance companies and pension funds wouldn't have bought the products. Bank writedowns and losses on the investments totaling $523.3 billion led to the collapse or disappearance of Bear Stearns Cos., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. and compelled the Bush administration to propose buying $700 billion of bad debt from distressed financial institutions.
  8. ^ a b "Giant Pool of Money (transcript)". Originally aired 05.09.2008. This American Life (radio program) from WBEZ. 9 May 2008. Retrieved 3 September 2013. Adam Davidson: And by the way, before you finance enthusiasts start writing any letters, we do know that $70 trillion technically refers to that subset of global savings called fixed income securities. ... Ceyla Pazarbasioglu: This number doubled since 2000. In 2000 this was about $36 trillion. Adam Davidson: So it took several hundred years for the world to get to $36 trillion. And then it took six years to get another $36 trillion
  9. ^ a b The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 43–44. Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of return than ultra-safe Treasury notes without much extra risk—at least in theory. However, the financial engineering behind these investments made them harder to understand and to price than individual loans. To determine likely returns, investors had to calculate the statistical probabilities that certain kinds of mortgages might default, and to estimate the revenues that would be lost because of those defaults. Then investors had to determine the effect of the losses on the payments to different tranches. This complexity transformed the three leading credit rating agencies—Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Fitch—into key players in the process, positioned between the issuers and the investors of securities.
  10. ^ Here's how a CDO works| Upstart Business Journal| December 5, 2007
  11. ^ Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). GPO. 2011. p. 119. Credit ratings also determined whether investors could buy certain investments at all. The SEC restricts money market funds to purchasing "securities that have received credit ratings from any two NRSROs ... in one of the two highest short-term rating categories or comparable unrated securities." The Department of Labor restricts pension fund investments to securities rated A or higher. Credit ratings affect even private transactions: contracts may contain triggers that require the posting of collateral or immediate repayment, should a security or entity be downgraded. Triggers played an important role in the financial crisis and helped cripple AIG.
  12. ^ "under Basel II, a AAA rated securitization requires capital allocation of only 0.6%, a BBB requires 4.8%, a BB requires 34%, whilst a BB(-) securitization requires a 52% allocation"
  13. ^ a b The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 44. Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings. "The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion," Jim Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry, and years ago he worked on some of the earliest securitizations
  14. ^ a b Benmelech, Efraim; Dlugosz, Jennifer (2009). "The Credit Rating Crisis" (PDF). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
  15. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. xxv.
  16. ^ Morgenson and Rosner Reckless Endangerment, 2010 p.278
  17. ^ see also Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, p. 127
  18. ^ 70%. "Firms bought mortgage-backed bonds with the very highest yields they could find and reassembled them into new CDOs. The original bonds ... could be lower-rated securities that once reassembled into a new CDO would wind up with as much as 70% of the tranches rated triple-A. Ratings arbitrage, Wall Street called this practice. A more accurate term would have been ratings laundering." (source: McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, 2010 p. 122)
  19. ^ 80%. "In a CDO you gathered a 100 different mortgage bonds—usually the riskiest lower floors of the original tower ... They bear a lower credit rating triple B. ... if you could somehow get them rerated as triple A, thereby lowering their perceived risk, however dishonestly and artificially. This is what Goldman Sachs had cleverly done. it was absurd. The 100 buildings occupied the same floodplain; in the event of flood, the ground floors of all of them were equally exposed. But never mind: the rating agencies, who were paid fat fees by Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms for each deal they rated, pronounced 80% of the new tower of debt triple-A." (source: Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine WW Norton and Co, 2010, p. 73)
  20. ^ "According to data compiled by the FCIC, tranches from CDOs rose from an average of 7% of the collateral in mortgage-backed CDOs in 2003 to 14% by 2007. CDO-Squared deals—those engineered primarily from the tranches of other CDOs—grew from 36 marketwide in 2005 to 48 in 2006 and 41 2007." Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, p. 203
  21. ^ Morgenson, Gretchen; Rosner, Joshua (2011). Reckless Endangerment : How Outsized ambition, Greed and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon. New York: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company. p. 280. ISBN 9780805091205. Morgenson and Rosner Reckless Endangerment, 2010.
  22. ^ McLean, and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p. 122)
  23. ^ McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, 2010 p. 121
  24. ^ "Unlike the traditional cash CDO, synthetic CDOs contained no actual tranches of mortgage-backed securities ... in the place of real mortgage assets, these CDOs contained credit default swaps and did not finance a single home purchase." (source: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011, p. 142)
  25. ^ McLean, and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.263)
  26. ^ "The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going (Single Page)-April 2010". Archived from the original on 2010-04-10. Retrieved 2017-06-30.
  27. ^ McLean and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p. 265)
  28. ^ McLean and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p. 266)
  29. ^ worth $300 billion
  30. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 228–9, figure 11.4. Retrieved 3 November 2013.
  31. ^ Norris, Floyd (2 November 2007). "Being Kept in the Dark on Wall Street". The New York Times. Retrieved 30 April 2010.
  32. ^ Buiter, Willem (21 September 2007). "Basel II: back to the drawing board?". The Financial Times.
  33. ^ Kerr, Duncan (15 October 2007). "Banks learn to reprice risk in post-crisis credit market". Financial News. eFinancialNews Limited. Retrieved 29 June 2012.
  34. ^ Wadden IV, William "Biv" (2002). "Interpreting Moody's Historical Default Rate Data" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-01-17. Retrieved 2013-09-04.
  35. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 122. Retrieved 5 November 2013.
  36. ^ a b c Bloomberg-Smith-Race to Bottom at Rating Agencies Secured Subprime Boom, Bust| By Elliot Blair Smith || September 25, 2008
  37. ^ a b The woman who called Wall Street's meltdown| By Jon Birger| August 6, 2008| Fortune Magazine
  38. ^ "Credit markets, CDOh no!". The Economist. 2007-11-08. Archived from the original on July 7, 2012. Retrieved 2020-12-29. With trades scarce and losses mounting, it is going to be a harsh winter{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  39. ^ the ten-member commission appointed by the United States government with the goal of investigating the causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2010
  40. ^ a b FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION Final Report-Conclusions-January 2011
  41. ^ Casey, Kathleen. ""In Search of Transparency, Accountability, and Competition: The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies", remarks at "The SEC Speaks in 2009"". February 6, 2009. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved 21 August 2013.
  42. ^ TE (5 February 2013). "Free speech or knowing misrepresentation?". The Economist.
  43. ^ Ratings agencies suffer 'conflict of interest', says former Moody's boss| Rupert Neate| The Guardian| 22 August 2011
  44. ^ a b "S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say". 4 February 2013. Huff Post. 4 February 2013. Retrieved 4 September 2013. Investors, including public pension funds and foreign banks, lost hundreds of billions of dollars, and have since filed dozens of lawsuits against the agencies.
  45. ^ Ohio Jumps On The Rating Agency Lawsuit Bandwagon| Daniel Indiviglio|| Nov 20 2009| quote from Ohio's attorney general="credit rating agencies, in exchange for fees, departed from their objective, neutral role as arbiters,"
  46. ^ a b "Credit Rating Agencies Settle 2 Suits Brought by Investors". Reuters. April 27, 2013. Retrieved 8 August 2013.
  47. ^ a b Wayne, Leslie (15 July 2009). "Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securities". The New York Times.
  48. ^ "Liquidators of failed Bear Stearns funds sue rating agencies". July 10, 2013. Reuters. 10 July 2013. Retrieved 7 August 2013.
  49. ^ Bond Insurer Sues Credit-Rating Agencies| July 17, 2013|
  50. ^ Snyder, Peter (18 July 2013). "Federal judge denies credit rating agency's motion to dismiss fraud lawsuit". July 18, 2013. Paper Chase Newsburst. Retrieved 7 August 2013. The five billion dollar lawsuit accuses S&P of misrepresenting the credit risk of complex financial products including residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) [SEC backgrounder] and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) ...
  51. ^ a b Corrupted credit ratings: Standard & Poor's lawsuit and the evidence| Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, 18 June 2013
  52. ^ Standard & Poor's Says Civil Lawsuit Threatened By DOJ Is Without Legal Merit And Unjustified|| 2013/02/04
  53. ^ "SEC Proposes Comprehensive Reforms to Bring Increased Transparency to Credit Rating Process". U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-19.
  54. ^ "SEC — Rating Agency Rules". 2008-12-03. Retrieved 2009-02-27.
  55. ^ Tomlinson, Richard; Evans, David (1 June 2007). "CDOs mask huge subprime losses, abetted by credit rating agencies". International Herald Tribune.
  56. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Final Report-Conclusions
  57. ^ McLean, and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.124)
  58. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 210.
  59. ^ Nocera; McLean (2010). All the Devils Are Here. Penguin. ISBN 9781591843634. [Example from page 118] "UBS banker Rovert Morelli, upon hearing that S&P might be revising its RMSBS ratings, sent an e-mail to an S&P analyst. 'Heard your ratings could be 5 notches back of moddys [sic] equivalent, Gonna kill you resi biz. May force us to do moddyfitch only ...'"
  60. ^ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Oversight and Reform (2008-10-22). "Committee Holds Hearing on the Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis" (PDF). Archived from the original on 2009-02-26. Retrieved 2008-10-23.
  61. ^ Meyer, Chris (2006-12-15). "Email to Belinda Ghetti and Nicole Billick" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on October 28, 2008. Retrieved 2008-10-23.
  62. ^ "Credit and blame". The Economist. 2007-09-06.
  63. ^ Bogle, John (30 April 2009). "Aspiring to Build a Better Financial World" (PDF). Princeton University. And let's not forget our credit rating agencies, which happily bestowed AAA ratings on securitized loans in return for enormous fees that were paid in return by the issuers themselves. (It's called "conflict of interest.")
  64. ^ Bogle, John (2005). The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-11971-8.
  65. ^ McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here 2010, (p.124)
  66. ^ McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, 2010, (p.123)
  67. ^ The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (PDF). National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 149.
  68. ^ a b see also National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2010). Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (PDF). GPO. p. 150.
  69. ^ Lewis, Michael (February 2011). The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine. WW Norton and Co. p. 156. ISBN 9780393338829. Nobody gives a f**k if Goldman Sachs likes General Electric paper, if Moody's downgrades GE paper, it is a big deal. So why does the guy at Moody's want to work at Goldman Sachs? The guy who is a bank analyst at Goldman's should want to go to Moody's. It should be that elite.
  70. ^ Lewis, Michael The Big Short, 2010, (p.156)
  71. ^ see also National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2010). Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (PDF). GPO. p. 193. Betting against CDOs was also, in some cases, a bet against the rating agencies and their models. Jamie Mai and Ben Hockett, principals at the small investment firm Cornwall Capital, told the FCIC that they had warned the SEC in 2007 that the agencies were dangerously overoptimistic in their assessment of mortgage-backed CDOs. Mai and Hockett saw the rating agencies as "the root of the mess," because their ratings removed the need for buyers to study prices and perform due diligence, even as "there was a massive amount of gaming going on."
  72. ^ a b c d e f Lewis, Michael (2010). The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine. WW Norton and Co. pp. 99–100. ISBN 9780393338829.
  73. ^ a b Lewis, Michael (2010). The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine. WW Norton and Co. p. 97. ISBN 9780393338829.
  74. ^ "Yearly Income, $14,000. Purchase of House, $720,000. Have we All Lost our Minds???". May 03, 2007. Dr. Housing Bubble. Retrieved 27 August 2013.
  75. ^ "Silent Second Mortgages". April 16, 2007, Revised May 23, 2007. The Mortgage Professor. ... both Moody's and S&P favored floating-rate mortgages with low teaser rates over fixed-rate ones. Or that they didn't care if a loan had been made in a booming real estate market or a quiet one. Or that they were seemingly oblivious to the fraud implicit in no-doc loans. Or that they were blind to the presence of 'silent seconds' -- second mortgages that left the homeowner with no equity in his home and thus no financial incentive not to hand the keys to the bank and walk away from it.
  76. ^ a b c Gordon, Greg (August 7, 2013). "Industry wrote provision that undercuts credit-rating overhaul". McClatchy. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
  77. ^ Status quo for rating agencies Archived 2017-03-16 at the Wayback Machine (chart of percentage of outstanding credit ratings reported to the SEC 2007 and 2011; and Moody's revenue and income 1996, 2000, 2010, 2012)|
  78. ^ Volcker, Paul (August 15, 2013). "The Fed & Big Banking at the Crossroads". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 2013-09-20. Retrieved 2020-12-29.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  79. ^ "S.&P. Calls Federal Fraud Suit Payback for Credit Downgrade". The New York Times. REUTERS. September 3, 2013. Retrieved 4 September 2013. S.& P. said that the lawsuit was an effort to punish it for exercising its First Amendment rights ... It said the government's "impermissibly selective, punitive and meritless" lawsuit was brought "in retaliation for defendants' exercise of their free-speech rights with respect to the creditworthiness of the United States of America."
  80. ^ Nagy, Theresa. "Note, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation" (PDF). 2009. Minnesota Law Review. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
  81. ^ "S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say". 4 February 2013. Huff Post. 4 February 2013. Retrieved 4 September 2013. For nearly four years, credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor's have tried to use the First Amendment as a shield against angry investors who have demanded compensation for bad bets on the housing market.
  82. ^ Stempel, Jonathan (25 November 2011). "US credit raters set back on First Amendment--judge". 25 November 2011. Reuters. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
  83. ^ Popper, Nathaniel (July 31, 2013). "Banks Find S.&P. More Favorable in Bond Ratings". The New York Times. The company rated only 22 percent of the bonds issued in 2011, down from 80 percent in 2006.
  84. ^ a b Norris, Floyd (August 1, 2013). "Pick Your Own Judge". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
  85. ^ Popper, Nathaniel (July 31, 2013). "Banks Find S.&P. More Favorable in Bond Ratings". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 September 2013.

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