Deportation of Cambodian immigrants from the United States

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Deportation of Cambodian immigrants from the United States violates the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and other laws,[1][2][3] unless it is done rationally and in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[4][5][6] This deportation process has long been put in place to forcefully expel, return or extradite to Cambodia failed asylum seekers and certain Cambodian immigrants convicted of a common crime in the United States.[7][8] Some of these individuals in removal proceedings were originally admitted as children with their stateless refugee family members after they had escaped from totalitarianism, genocide, torture, persecution, etc., and have continuously spent decades in the United States as legal immigrants and potential U.S. nationals (Americans).[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19]

Since most Cambodian-Americans were originally admitted to the United States as stateless refugees and received legal immigrant status,[9][10] they are statutorily admissible to the United States for their entire life,[20] even without any legal documents in their hands.[21][22][6][23][24] This legal finding is supported by latest precedents of all federal courts of appeals and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),[5] which are binding on all immigration judges and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers.[25]

History[edit]

Cambodians escaping genocide and persecution[edit]

In 1975, Congress and the Ford administration enacted the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, which permitted about 130,000 natives of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam to be admitted to the United States as refugees. The Cambodian refugees were fleeing from the genocide that was being orchestrated by the communist Khmer Rouge government.[26] In 1980, Congress and the Carter administration enacted the Refugee Act, which approved 50,000 international refugees to be firmly-resettled in the United States each year.[20][27]

Firm resettlement of Cambodian refugees in the United States[edit]

Each year, from 1975 onward, groups of Cambodian refugee families were admitted to the United States.[28] These families were issued by the U.S. Department of State travel documents. After residing for at least one year, the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) adjusted their status from "immigrants" to that of permanent residents (green card holders).[9] This process statutorily protected them for lifetime against refoulment (forceful deportation) from the United States.[20][22][6][21][5]

These families of refugee immigrants were resettled in and around Long Beach in Southern California, Lowell and Lynn in Massachusetts, and Philadelphia in Pennsylvania.[29][30] In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that "once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly."[31] That opinion was issued after Congress and the Reagan administration began admitting stateless refugees from various countries around the world to be firmly resettled in the United States.[20][27]

Congress provides statutory relief to Cambodian-Americans[edit]

"The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States."[32][33] A refugee that is admitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1157 soon becomes an "immigrant" and later a "special immigrant" after receiving a green card.[9] For INA purposes, the original "immigrant" status is statutorily conferred for life and cannot ever be taken away under any circumstances.[34][20] For this reason Congress uses the term "any immigrant" in section 1182(h)(1)(A), which manifestly includes every person that was originally admitted under section 1157 (irrespective of such person subsequently losing the "permanent resident" or "special immigrant" status as a result of an INA violation).[21][5] Any such "immigrant" that is not inadmissible to the United States is not deportable from the United States.[35][36][37] In this regard, section 1157 explicitly states the following:

The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall not be applicable to any alien seeking admission to the United States under this subsection, and the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [section 1182] ... with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.[22][12][33]

Section 1159 states the following:

The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) ... shall not be applicable to any alien 'seeking adjustment of status under this section', and the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [section 1182] ... with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.[38][12][33]

Section 1181 states the following:

The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to an alien whom the Attorney General admits to the United States under section 1157 of this title.[21][12]

And in section 1231 Congress expressly stated that:

the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[23][33]

This demonstrates that Congress clearly treated stateless refugees (i.e., established victims of persecution who have absolutely no safe country) differently than all other immigrants (who do have a safe country and are not victims of persecution).[20][39] There is nothing ambiguous in the plain language of sections 1157(c)(3), 1159(c), 1181(c), 1182(h) and 1231(b)(3).[6][5]

The penultimate provision of section 1182(h), where it repeatedly mentions the phrase "under this subsection", does not apply to any Cambodian-American requesting relief under sections 1157(c)(3), 1158(c)(3), 1159(c), 1181(c), 1229b(a), 1231(b)(3) or the CAT.[40] The Cambodian-Americans that were admitted as stateless refugees are not only legal immigrants but also stateless refugees under the INA and international law.[20][27][39] This means that any such individual who has been convicted of any offense mentioned under section 1101(a)(43) is not (and has never been) precluded from relief pursuant to sections 1157(c)(3), 1158(c)(3), 1159(c), 1181(c), 1182(h) and 1231(b)(3), including under the CAT.[6][20][21][5][23] It has long been understood that whenever "Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."[41]

The above provisions are in harmony with each other and the overall law of the United States, including with international law. Secondly, providing relief under section 1157(c)(3), 1159(c), 1181(c), 1182(h), 1229b(a), 1231(b)(3), 1255(a) or the CAT is not discretionary but mandatory if all requirements are fulfilled,[23] and the aforementioned provisions all involve legal claims (i.e., constitutional claims or questions of law).[42] As such, federal courts and agencies can review these legal claims at any time.[43][44][45][46][47][48][49]

Expansion of the group "nationals but not citizens of the United States"[edit]

A special U.S. passport that is issued to a non-citizen national of the United States.

In 1986, less than a year before the CAT became effective, Congress expanded the definition of "nationals but not citizens of the United States" by adding paragraph (4) to 8 U.S.C. § 1408, which states that:

the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth: .... (4) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a national, but not a citizen, of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than seven years in any continuous period of ten years—(A) during which the national parent was not outside the United States or its outlying possessions for a continuous period of more than one year, and (B) at least five years of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.[50][12]

The natural reading of section 1408(4) demonstrates that it was not exclusively written for the 55,000 Samoan Americans but also for any legal immigrant who qualifies as a "non-citizen national" of the United States.[51][50] This means any Cambodian-American can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets (or at any time has met) the requirements of sections 1408(4), 1427, 1436, etc., and thereafter claim to be a non-citizen U.S. national.[52] Such legal claim must be plausible and not frivolous because anyone who knowingly makes a false United States citizenship or nationality claim can be prosecuted and even removed from the country.[53]

If any Cambodian-American demonstrates by "clear and convincing evidence" that he or she has continuously resided in the United States for at least 10 years without committing (in those years) any offense that triggers removability,[35][4] such individual cannot be treated as an alien. "Deprivation of [nationality]—particularly American [nationality], which is one of the most valuable rights in the world today—has grave practical consequences."[54][2][3][55][1][56][10][57][36]

Latest amendments made to the term "aggravated felony" under section 101(a)(43) of the INA[edit]

In 1988, Congress introduced the term "aggravated felony" by defining it under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).[58] Its definition was amended over the years. It basically refers to a crime for which imprisonment of one year or longer may be imposed under the controlling law.[59] As of September 30, 1996, an "aggravated felony" only applies to convictions "for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[60][36] After those 15 years successfully pass, a legal immigrant automatically becomes eligible for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, waiver of inadmissibility, etc.[6][5][23] He or she may (at any time) request these immigration benefits depending on whichever is more applicable or easier to obtain.[43][44][61]

It makes no difference if the aggravated felony was committed in the United States or in any other country.[36] Also, the current expanded definition of "aggravated felony" does not apply to a person who had taken action to violate the law (or was arrested for the offense) anytime before September 30, 1996.[62][12] To such an individual, only the pre-September 1996 definition of "aggravated felony" applies (regardless of the date of conviction).[62][63][36][37] Everything to the contrary leads to an absurd result and deprivation of rights under color of law, which is a crime that entails capital punishment.[2][3][1][56][10]

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act[edit]

Sample of a permanent resident card (green card), which lawfully permits its holder to live and work for lifetime in the United States similar to that of all other Americans.

In February 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a presidential directive in which he warned the Attorney General and others by stating the following:

Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the Attorney General... and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment....[10]

On April 1, 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) took effect,[64] which is particularly aimed at combating illegal immigration to the United States. But despite what President Clinton said in the above directive, some plainly incompetent immigration officers began deporting stateless refugees (i.e., potential Americans).[9][21][7] These legal immigrants have permanent resident cards, Social Security numbers, driver's licenses, state ID cards, corporations, bank accounts, credit cards, insurances, etc. They own homes, businesses, cars and other properties in the United States under their names. Such people statutorily qualify as Americans after continuously residing in the United States for at least 10 years without committing (in those years) any offense that triggers removability.[50] This appears to be the reason why the permanent resident card (green card) is valid for 10 years. It was expected that all Cambodian-Americans would obtain U.S. citizenship within 10 years from the date of their first lawful entry,[28] but if that was unachievable then they would statutorily become "nationals but not citizens of the United States" after the successful elapsing of such 10 years.[36] Anything to the contrary could lead to deprivation of rights under color of law.[2][3][55][1][56][54]

Child Citizenship Act of 2000[edit]

Under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), qualified applicants obtain automatic citizenship or nationality from at least one U.S. citizen parent.[11][36][65][66] The CCA states that automatic nationality applies to parents and their biological children presently and retrospectively or retroactively.[11][12] If an applicant for such citizenship or nationality is in any removal proceeding, he or she must have that proceeding legally terminated before any application for certificate of citizenship or nationality is submitted.[67] Many of the Cambodian-Americans in removal proceedings had acquired legal immigrant status,[9][6][21][5] but decades later the plainly incompetent immigration officials turned these Americans into stateless refugees.[13][15][14][20][27]

Challenging an order of removal or deportation[edit]

Any person may take his or her deportation-related case to the U.S. Supreme Court

"Only 'aliens' are subject to removal under the INA."[68] Inadmissible aliens and deportable aliens basically form a single group of people.[35] It includes the INA violators among the 75 million foreign nationals who are admitted each year as visitors or guests,[28][69][70] the 12 million or so illegal aliens,[71] and the INA violators among the hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals residing in the United States under the temporary protected status (TPS).[28]

An LPR can either be an alien or a national of the United States (American),[32] which requires a case-by-case analysis and depends mainly on the number of continuous years he or she has spent in the United States as a green card holder.[72][52][50][4] An LPR can become an aggravated felon under the INA but only if his or her "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[60][36] Such person cannot:

An order of removal or deportation may be investigated and corrected at any time.[43][44][57][48][12] Habeas proceedings that resulted in miscarriage of justice, either before or after the Real ID Act of 2005, can be reopened under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[46][47][45] The review of the order does not require the alien (or the American) to remain in the United States. It can be requested from anywhere in the world via mail (e.g., DHL, FedEx, UPS, etc.) and/or electronic court filing (ECF),[78] and the case can be filed in any federal court the alien (or the American) finds appropriate.[79] Every United States nationality claim, CAT or asylum claim, non-refoulement claim, gross miscarriage of justice claim, deprivation of rights under color of law claim, etc., is reviewed under section 1252 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 et seq.[80][72][46][44][49]

All people wrongfully placed in removal proceedings equally have a federal statutory right to request declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and/or damages.[48][57] This applies regardless if they are inside or outside the United States.[49][52] Under 8 CFR 1239.2, any Immigration Judge may at any time terminate the removal proceeding of any person who: (1) turns out to be a national of the United States; or (2) one that is simply not removable under the INA.[43][73][35] In this regard, Congress has long warned every government official and judicial officer by expressly stating the following:

'Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,' shall be subject to specified criminal penalties.[81][2][1][56][10][54]

Reasons for forceful deportation from the United States to Cambodia[edit]

Most Cambodian-Americans were deported for committing a common crime in the United States.[8] Several of them had been charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) but this charge plainly does not apply to a lawfully admitted refugee who later became a green card recipient pursuant to section 1159(a)(2).[82] Congress had clarified this in 1996 and later became a settled issue,[83] which has since been binding on all immigration judges and DHS officers.[25]

Between the years of 2003 and 2016 (per ICE), approximately 750 Cambodian-Americans were physically removed from the United States.[16] Of these, at least 12 have reportedly died (some from suicide or drug overdose) and another 17 are in Cambodian prison.[29] ICE data shows that deportation of Cambodian-Americans averaged 41 per year from 2001 through 2010, increasing to 96 in 2011 and 90 in 2012.[29] As of 2017, nearly 1,900 Cambodian-Americans have final orders of removal, meaning they can be deported from the United States at any time.[16]

Deported Cambodian-Americans are typically young men in their twenties and thirties who were either born inside Cambodia or in refugee camps in neighboring Thailand.[17][7][18][84] Most were admitted to the United States as small children of refugee families, members of the so-called 1.5 generation.[16] A 2005 survey by one immigrant advocacy organization showed that the Cambodian-American deportees had continuously resided in the United States for an average of 20 years.[85] Many of those deported after 2005 have continuously resided in the United States for over 30 years.[17][86] As such, they received most or all of their education in the United States, often speak Khmer language very poorly.[87] Many of the Cambodian-American deportees either have not visited Cambodia in decades or saw it for the first time after their deportation.[29][17][50][72]

Notable Cambodian-American deportees[edit]

The following is an incomplete list of Cambodian-Americans who were forcefully removed from the United States to Cambodia:

  • Chally Dang, born in a refugee camp in Thailand but grew up in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was convicted of assault and related charges in 1998 (around the age of 15), which was his very first conviction. He was deported to Cambodia in June 2011. His deportation separated him from his parents, spouse, and children.[88][7]
  • Tuy Sobil, a deported Cambodian-American who operates Tiny Toones, which was established as a breakdancing ("b-boying") for poor urban Cambodian children. Sobil grew up in Long Beach, California, where he was exposed to b-boying and danced for four years after seeing it in the local parks. His family immigrated to the United States as refugees in 1980, when he was an infant. He was convicted of a California robbery charge (around the age of 18). As a result of that conviction, he was refouled (involuntarily deported) to Cambodia in 2004.[19][89]
  • Kosal Khiev, spoken word artist, was deported in 2011 after serving 16 years in California prisons for his involvement in a gang-related shooting.[90]

Organizations helping Cambodian-American deportees[edit]

Demonstrations[edit]

A number of demonstrations have been witnessed in several U.S. cities over the deportation of Cambodian-Americans.[92]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

This article in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. ^ a b c d e "Article 3". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
  2. ^ a b c d e "Deprivation of rights under color of law". U.S. Dept. of Justice. 6 August 2015. Retrieved May 31, 2021. Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
  3. ^ a b c d "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264. Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    • "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739. Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
      • "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136. Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
  4. ^ a b c 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) ("In the proceeding the Service has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.")
    • 8 CFR 1240.8(a) ("A respondent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.")
    • 8 CFR 1240.46(a) ("A determination of deportability shall not be valid unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.")
      • "Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 23, 1967. p. 636. When the Government seeks to strip a person of citizenship already acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.' (footnotes omitted)
      • "Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 12, 1966. p. 286. We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.
      • "Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 14, 1960. pp. 351–56.
      • "Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 9, 1953. p. 596-97. It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
      • "Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 18, 1945. p. 149. [D]etention under an invalid order of deportation is established where an alien is ordered deported for reasons not specified by Congress.
        • "Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 3, 2006. p. 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a provides that the burden of proof is on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.
        • "Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 27, 2006. p. 138.
        • "Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 6, 1990. p. 670 n.7.
        • "Rodriguez v. Attorney General, 844 F.3d 392". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 19, 2016. p. 399. Essential to the due process rights of a noncitizen permanent resident is that 'before his expulsion[,] he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal.'
        • "United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 26, 2009. p. 349. To convict him of this offense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (inter alia) he is an 'alien,'
        • "Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 15, 2013. p. 605. In addition to the Ninth Circuit and our Circuit, the First, and the Fifth Circuits have faced the same fact pattern and have held that the government must prove inadmissibility by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
        • "Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 15, 2015. p. 417.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I&N Dec. 380". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 17, 2021. A person who enters the United States as a refugee and later adjusts in the United States to lawful permanent resident status is not precluded from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2018), based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, because he or she has not 'previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence' under that provision.
    • "Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 12, 2015. An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.
    • "Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 30, 1998. An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.
      • "De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2015. p. 1232. Mr. Obregon next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J-H-J- he is correct.
      • "Sambare v. Attorney General, 925 F.3d 124". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 28, 2019. p. 126. In October 2013, however, an Immigration Court granted Sambare's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus restored his status as a lawful permanent resident.
      • "Zamora v. Attorney General, 633 F. App'x 570". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 11, 2015. p. 573.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "Matter of C-A-S-D-, 27 I&N Dec. 692". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 1, 2019. p. 694. Section 209(c) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may waive certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Act 'with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.' (emphasis added)
    • "Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 13, 1999. p. 1040. Pursuant to section 209 of the Act, an alien admitted into the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), may have his or her status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. In making such a determination, it is clear from the statute that the Attorney General has the power to grant a waiver of inadmissibility to an alien who may be inadmissible. (emphases added)
      • "City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 740 F.3d 379 (1985)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. July 1, 1985. p. 439. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.
  7. ^ a b c d "NBC Asian America Presents: Deported". NBC News. March 16, 2017. Retrieved 2018-10-11.
  8. ^ a b "Historical Data: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Removals". TRAC Reports, Inc. 2016. Retrieved 2018-10-11.
  9. ^ a b c d e f
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) ("The term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens....")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) ("The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) ("The term 'special immigrant' means—(A) an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad....")
  10. ^ a b c d e f "Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 28, Presidential Documents" (PDF). U.S. Government Publishing Office. February 10, 1995. p. 7888. (emphases added)
    • "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 25, 2018. p. 122. The Constitution protects both citizens and non-citizens.
    • "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 378". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 27, 2020. p. 385. The Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings... because the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. (citations and quotation marks omitted)
    • "Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 12, 2017. p. 213. In other words, petitioners must receive 'a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and a decision on the merits of their claim by a 'neutral and impartial arbiter.' (citations omitted)
  11. ^ a b c "Child Citizenship Act of 2000 ('CCA'), Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000)" (PDF). United States Congress. October 30, 2000. p. 1633. The amendments made by this title shall take effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date. (emphases added)
    • "H.R.1593 - Adoptee Citizenship Act of 2021". U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Congress. March 3, 2021. Currently, adoptees who were over the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, do not automatically acquire citizenship. (emphasis added)
    • "H.R.2731 - Adoptee Citizenship Act of 2019". U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Congress. May 14, 2019.
      • "Gomez-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 913". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 7, 2003. p. 915. The Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, revised the manner in which children of non-citizens born outside the United States are eligible to become U.S. citizens.
      • "Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543". Eleventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 14, 2013. p. 545. A child acquires derivative citizenship by operation of law, not by adjudication.
      • "Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 13, 2018. p. 138. [T]he derivative citizenship statute as amended by the CCA promotes 'Congress's remedial purposes' of 'keep[ing] families intact.'
      • "United States v. Ashurov, 726 F.3d 395". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 12, 2013. p. 398. As the District Court recognized, 'such' means 'of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied.'
      • "United States v. A.M., 927 F.3d 718". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 20, 2019. p. 721.
      • Judge Fernandez, dissenting, ed. (June 22, 2001). "Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. p. 760. As I see it, the language could be construed to allow coverage of individuals who had reached the age of 18 years before the CCA's effective date.
        • "Matter of Fuentes-Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 893" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 25, 1997. p. 896 n.4. A person who claims to have derived United States citizenship by naturalization of a parent may apply to the Attorney General for a certificate, but a certificate is not required.
        • Board Member Rosenberg, dissenting, ed. (July 24, 2001). "Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. pp. 170–71. Accordingly, in my view, 'as in effect on the effective date' clearly refers to the conditions that 'have been fulfilled' and exist now. No matter whether these conditions were met previously, or what the individual's status was previously, these are the rules that determine the person's citizenship status as of the February 27, 2001, effective date, i.e., now.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153. The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. (internal quotation marks omitted)
  13. ^ a b "U.S. citizen mistakenly put in deportation proceedings finally returns to America". NBC News. February 4, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-04.
  14. ^ a b "First Cambodian to return after deportation inspires others after gaining U.S. citizenship". NBC News. July 16, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-04.
  15. ^ a b "Cambodian refugee who advocates say was wrongly deported returns to U.S." NBC News. February 28, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-04.
  16. ^ a b c d Federis, Marnette (March 10, 2018). "After deportation, a family from Wisconsin will start anew in Cambodia". Public Radio International (PRI). Retrieved 2018-09-27.
  17. ^ a b c d McCormick, Andrew (August 25, 2017). "Strangers in their homeland: the Khmerican Cambodians Trump deported". South China Morning Post (SCMP). Retrieved 2018-09-26. For many deportees, the United States had been home for decades. Now, they struggle to adjust to life in the country of their birth
  18. ^ a b Barros, Aline (December 7, 2017). "US Set to Deport 70 Cambodians". Voice of America. Retrieved 2018-09-26.
  19. ^ a b Mydans, Seth (November 30, 2008). "Californian finds new life in Cambodia". New York Times. Retrieved September 26, 2018.
  20. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 20, 2006. p. 185. That the INA addresses termination of refugee status in only one provision—8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)—might suggest, as Mr. Romanishyn argues, that refugee status persists indefinitely unless it is terminated pursuant to that provision. (emphasis added)
  21. ^ a b c d e f g h i j 8 U.S.C. § 1181(c) ("Nonapplicability to aliens admitted as refugees")
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 28, 2012. p. 263. An alien seeking 'admission' to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed 'inadmissible' on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182.
  22. ^ a b c d e f 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (emphases added)
  23. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added)
    • "INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 3, 1999. p. 420.
      • "Luziga v. Attorney General, 937 F.3d 244". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. September 5, 2019. pp. 251–52. Withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief that prevents removal of a noncitizen to a country where that individual's life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
  24. ^ a b "Anwari v. Attorney General, No. 18-1505". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. November 6, 2018. p. 6. To qualify for deferral of removal under the CAT, an applicant must show that he is 'more likely than not' to be tortured.
    • "Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270" (PDF). Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 5, 2002. p. 279. Although the respondents are statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal by virtue of their convictions for 'particularly serious crimes,' the regulations implementing the [CAT] allow them to obtain a deferral of removal notwithstanding the prior criminal offenses if they can establish that they are 'entitled to protection' under the Convention.
  25. ^ a b "Board of Immigration Appeals". U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 16, 2018. Retrieved 2018-11-21. BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.
    • 8 CFR 1003.1(g)(1) ("Except as Board decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board and decisions of the Attorney General are binding on all officers and employees of DHS or immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States.")
    • "Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 17, 2013. p. 199. The [Supreme] Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
  26. ^ "Cambodia: Khmer Rouge leaders guilty of genocide, court rules". Al Jazeera. November 16, 2018. Retrieved 2018-11-16. Verdict after years of trial is first time any Khmer Rouge leaders were found guilty of genocide for 1975-79 terror.
  27. ^ a b c d "Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 17, 2014. p. 393.
  28. ^ a b c d "Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 7, 2021. pp. 1182–83. The INA generally defines the words 'admission' and 'admitted' as 'the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.'
    • "Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 12, 2012. p. 766. With regard to refugees, the language of both the Act and the regulations states that they are 'admitted' to the United States.
  29. ^ a b c d e "Cambodian-Americans confronting deportation". Olesia Plokhii and Tom Mashberg. Boston Globe. January 27, 2013. Retrieved 2014-05-10.
  30. ^ Pert, Charlotte Pert (June 26, 2016). "Torn families of Cambodian refugees deported from US". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2018-09-28.
  31. ^ "Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 15, 1982. p. 32.
  32. ^ a b 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (emphasis added)
  33. ^ a b c d "Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 27, 2018. p. 855. The term 'or' is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings. (quotation marks omitted)
  34. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) ("Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph (1) ... as an immigrant under this chapter....") (emphasis added)
  35. ^ a b c d "Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 23, 2020. p. 1446. The umbrella statutory term for being inadmissible or deportable is 'removable.'
  36. ^ a b c d e f g h "Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 26, 2004. p. 534. It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms. (quotation marks omitted)
  37. ^ a b "Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 18, 1997. p. 341. The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
  38. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (emphases added)
  39. ^ a b "Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 2, 2004. p. 1120. Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.
  40. ^ "Tima v. Attorney General, 903 F.3d 272". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 6, 2018. p. 276. Congressional drafting manuals instruct drafters to break statutory sections down into subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, clauses, and subclauses. Lowercase letters mark subsections, Arabic numerals mark paragraphs, capital letters mark subparagraphs, romanette numerals mark clauses, and Roman numerals mark subclauses.
  41. ^ "United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 18, 1972. p. 722.
  42. ^ "Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 23, 2020. p. 1072. The statutory history and precedent, as well as the legislative history, thus support the conclusion that the statutory term 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to established facts.
  43. ^ a b c d 8 C.F.R. 1003.2 ("(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion solely in order to correct a ministerial mistake or typographical error in that decision or to reissue the decision to correct a defect in service.... The time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings:...
    (v) For which a three-member panel of the Board agrees that reopening is warranted when the following circumstances are present, provided that a respondent may file only one motion to reopen pursuant to this paragraph (c)(3): (A) A material change in fact or law underlying a removability ground or grounds specified in section 212 or 237 of the Act that occurred after the entry of an administratively final order that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to the alien; and (B) The movant exercised diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen;
    (vi) Filed based on specific allegations, supported by evidence, that the respondent is a United States citizen or national....") (emphasis added)
    • "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 108". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 29, 2017. p. 111. [T]he 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.
    • "Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. March 30, 2021. p. 718 n.8. We have held that these regulations also apply to claims under the Convention Against Torture.
    • "Nolasco-Amaya v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-70187". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. September 28, 2021. p. 5.
  44. ^ a b c d "Vazquez v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 18-70329". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 12, 2021. p. 6.
  45. ^ a b
    • "Howell v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. October 21, 2020. p. 59. The overarching question in this case is whether Howell has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to gain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) – relief that would serve as a gateway past the procedural default of his having untimely filed his habeas petition, thus allowing the petition to be considered.
    • "Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 13, 2014. p. 1134. A federal habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default, including a failure to comply with the statute of limitations, by demonstrating actual innocence of the crime underlying his conviction.
    • "Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 28, 2011. p. 1047. A petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.
    • "United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 26, 1993. p. 736. The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant....
  46. ^ a b c
    • "Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. August 17, 2020. p. 638. Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from a final judgment under limited circumstances, including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or any other reason that justifies relief.
    • "Baxter v. Bressman, 874 F.3d 142". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 18, 2017. p. 149. Rule 60 has no applicability where, as here, a party requests relief from a final judgment in response to an opponent's alleged fraud on the court.
    • "Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d 290". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 5, 2018. p. 294. Under Rule 60(b)(2), a party may request relief because of 'newly discovered evidence.' The movant needs to show by clear and convincing evidence (1) that it exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and (2) that the evidence is material, i.e., would have clearly resulted in a different outcome.
    • "United States v. Handy, No. 18-3086". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 18, 2018. p. 5. [W]hen Rule 60(b)(4) is applicable, 'relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.' And the rule 'is not subject to any time limitation.' (citation omitted)
    • "United States v. Sierra, No. 17-12418". Eleventh Circuit. Casetext.com. January 29, 2018. pp. 6–7.
    • Hague, David R. (March 2016). "Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 Nev. L.J. 707 (2016)". Nevada Law Journal. William S. Boyd School of Law. 16 (2): 725.
  47. ^ a b "Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 8, 2017. p. 20 n.9. In determining whether Congress intended [§ 1252(b)(1)] to be jurisdictional, we consider context, including this Court's interpretations of similar provisions in many years past, as probative of Congress' intent... we have made plain that most statutory time bars are nonjurisdictional. (brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted)
  48. ^ a b c d "Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 27, 2001. p. 74. [I]njunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.
    • "Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 22, 2009. p. 428. When a court employs 'the extraordinary remedy of injunction,' Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers.
    • Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, ed. (July 3, 2014). "Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 2810. Under our precedents, '[a]n injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.'
    • Chief Justice Roberts, in chambers, ed. (September 30, 2010). "Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 1307. To obtain injunctive relief from a Circuit Justice, an applicant must demonstrate that the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear. (citation and quotation marks omitted)
  49. ^ a b c d See, e.g.,
    • "11061.1: Facilitating the Return to the United States of Certain Lawfully Removed Aliens" (PDF). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. February 24, 2012. Retrieved 2021-10-29. 3.1. Facilitate an Alien's Return. To engage in activities which allow a lawfully removed alien to travel to the United States (such as by issuing a Boarding Letter to permit commercial air travel) and, if warranted, parole the alien into the United States upon his or her arrival at a U.S. port of entry. Facilitating an alien's return does not necessarily include funding the alien's travel via commercial carrier to the United States or making flight arrangements for the alien.
    • "Cheneau v. Garland, No. 15-70636". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. May 18, 2021. p. 3. Cheneau is a citizen of the United States. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA's decision, and REMAND with instructions to terminate Cheneau's removal proceedings.
    • "Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. October 10, 2014. p. 1119. The government has failed to carry its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Medina has been convicted of an aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense....
    • "Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. December 14, 2020. p. 1268 n.4. We note that Petitioner's removal has not mooted his petition for review because, 'in the event this court grants his petition, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] would facilitate his return to the United States pursuant to its Facilitation of Return Policy.'
    • "Singh v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 878 F.3d 441". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2017. p. 443. The government conceded that Singh's removal was improper given the Ninth Circuit's stay. Consequently, in May 2007, Singh was temporarily paroled back into the United States by the Attorney General, who exercised his discretion to grant temporary-parole to certain aliens.
    • "Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 12, 2016. pp. 589–90.
    • "Orabi v. Attorney General, 738 F.3d 535". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 2, 2014. p. 543. The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, with instructions that the Government, pursuant to its August 12, 2013 letter, be directed to return Orabi to the United States in accordance with the ICE regulations cited.
      • "Avalos-Palma v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-5481(FLW)". U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Casetext.com. July 16, 2014. p. 3. On June 2, 2012, approximately 42 months after the improper deportation, ICE agents effectuated Avalos-Palma's return to the United States.
        • "In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062". Board of Immigration Appeals. Scribd. November 30, 2011. pp. 1–2. As related in his brief on appeal, the respondent was physically removed from the United States in June 2004, but subsequently returned to this country under a grant of humanitarian parole.... Accordingly, the proceedings will be terminated.
  50. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (emphasis added)
  51. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1452(b) ("Application to Secretary of State for certificate of non-citizen national status....")
  52. ^ a b c "Saliba v. Attorney General, 828 F.3d 182". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 8, 2016. p. 189. [A]n applicant for naturalization has the burden of proving 'by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.'
  53. ^ See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1015
  54. ^ a b c "Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 18, 1963. p. 160. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
    • "Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 25, 2012. p. 395. Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.
  55. ^ a b 18 U.S.C. § 2441 ("War crimes")
  56. ^ a b c d "Chapter 11 - Foreign Policy: Senate OKs Ratification of Torture Treaty" (46th ed.). CQ Press. 1990. pp. 806–7. Retrieved 2018-09-27. The three other reservations, also crafted with the help and approval of the Bush administration, did the following: Limited the definition of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment to cruel and unusual punishment as defined under the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution....
  57. ^ a b c 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) ("Judicial review ... is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except as provided in subsection (b)...."); 28 U.S.C. § 2344 ("The petition shall contain a concise statement of—(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought; (2) the facts on which venue is based; (3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and (4) the relief prayed.") (emphasis added)
  58. ^ "Subtitle J—Provisions Relating to the Deportation of Aliens Who Commit Aggravated Felonies, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4469-79, § 7342" (PDF). U.S. Congress. U.S. Government Publishing Office. November 18, 1988. pp. 289–90. Retrieved 2018-09-26. Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: '(43) The term 'aggravated felony' means murder, any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code], or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act, committed within the United States.' (emphases added)
  59. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) ("(A) The term 'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. (B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.") (emphases added)
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) ("Any alien who—(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years ... after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.") (emphasis added)
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)
      • "United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 10, 2019. p. 1224. In sum, the Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment.
      • "United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 28, 2019. p. 844. None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
      • "United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 973". Ninth Circuit. Casetext. July 16, 2021. The panel held that the Washington offense of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree was not 'punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year' when the statutory maximum sentence exceeded one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines did not. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that the defendant committed a Grade B supervised release violation.
      • "United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881". Eighth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 25, 2011. p. 884.
      • "United States v. Hisey, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-3106". Tenth Circuit. Casetext. September 14, 2021.
  60. ^ a b 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) ("The term ['aggravated felony'] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.") (emphases added)
    • "Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 19, 2016. p. 1627. The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law.
      • "Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 15, 2002. p. 211. This penultimate sentence, governing the enumeration of crimes in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, refers the reader to all of the crimes 'described in' the aggravated felony provision.
      • "Zivkovic v. Holder, 724 F.3d 894". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 31, 2013. p. 911. Because Zivkovic's aggravated felony convictions were more than a decade old before the 1988 statute took effect, they cannot be used as a ground for removal (although they can be used for many other purposes under the statute).
      • "Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1059". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 29, 2010. p. 1080. Ledezma-Galicia is not removable by reason of being an aggravated felon, because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to convictions, like Ledezma-Galicia's, that occurred prior to November 18, 1988.
  61. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v)
  62. ^ a b "Subtitle B—Criminal Alien Provisions, Sec. 321. Amended Definition of Aggravated Felony" (PDF). U.S. Congress. U.S. Congress. p. 628. Retrieved 2021-10-27. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred....
  63. ^ "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 25, 2001. p. 320.
    • "Francisco-Lopez v. Attorney General, 970 F.3d 431". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 13, 2020. p. 436. Retroactivity is not favored in the law. This applies with full force to the BIA's retroactive application of new law.
    • "Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 18, 2014. p. 769. Although we generally defer to agency interpretations of statutes that are ambiguous, 'a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.'
    • "Jeudy v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 15, 2014. p. 605. Applying § 1229b(d)(l)(B) in this case would impose a new disability on pre-IIRIRA conduct without a clear statement from Congress indicating its intent to impose that disability. We therefore hold that Jeudy's 1995 drug conviction did not 'stop time' for his continuous residence in the United States.
    • "Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 22, 2006. p. 1192. We also hold... that the permanent stop-time rule of § 240A(d)(l) ... may not be applied retroactively to prevent Sinotes-Cruz from fulfilling the sevenyear continuous residence requirement ... for cancellation of removal.
  64. ^ "Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 29, 2013. p. 265.
  65. ^ "H.R. Rep. No. 106-852" (PDF). House of Representatives. U.S. Congress. September 14, 2000. p. 13. [I]f the biological child is able to qualify for U.S. citizenship subsequent to birth, the conferral of U.S. citizenship is not retroactive to birth but occurs as of the date he or she fills the statutory qualifications of Section 320, 321, or 322 of the INA.
  66. ^ "Immigration Library: Court Decisions". Greenberg Traurig. January 28, 2002. Although the INS appears to have taken the position that the act is not retroactive, the language of the CCA's and Congress' intent have not yet been universally determined, and there may still be room for individuals to continue arguing in favor of its retroactive application....
  67. ^ See, e.g.,
  68. ^ "Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 26, 2007. p. 341.
  69. ^ "Destination USA: 75 million international guests visited in 2014". share.america.gov. 2015-09-24. Retrieved 2018-09-30.
  70. ^ "International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation" (PDF). U.S. Department of Commerce. 2015. p. 2. Retrieved 2018-09-30.
  71. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) ("An illegal alien ... is any alien ... who is in the United States unlawfully....")
  72. ^ a b c
  73. ^ a b "Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462". Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 18, 2018. Immigration judges may dismiss or terminate removal proceedings only under the circumstances expressly identified in the regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c), (f), or where the Department of Homeland Security fails to sustain the charges of removability against a respondent, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c).
  74. ^ Chung, Andrew (April 17, 2018). "Supreme Court restricts deportations of immigrant felons". Reuters.
  75. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi)
  76. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)
  77. ^ "United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 15, 2013. pp. 1013–14 n.2. Voluntary departure is not available to an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony.
  78. ^
  79. ^
    • "Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 19, 2016. p. 969. We join the noncontroversial holding—shared by the nine other circuits which have addressed this issue in detail—that § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional.
    • "United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 1, 2001. p. 590. Venue is not jurisdictional....
  80. ^ "Tazu v. Attorney General, 975 F.3d 292". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. September 14, 2020. p. 294. For an alien challenging his removal, that path begins with a petition for review of his removal order, not a habeas petition.
  81. ^ "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. pp. 264–65 n.3. (emphases added)
  82. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Jack v. Barr, 966 F.3d 95". Second Circuit. Casetext.com. July 16, 2020. p. 96. On appeal, both Jack and Ag argue that the BIA should have granted their motions to terminate the removal proceedings against them because the New York statutes of conviction apply to conduct that is not a removable offense under federal law. We agree.
    • "Flores-Abarca v. Barr, 937 F.3d 473". Fifth Circuit. Castext.com. August 28, 2019. p. 476. On the merits, we hold that the Oklahoma misdemeanor of transporting a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle is not one of the firearms offenses listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
    • "United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 17, 2014. p. 637. A conviction under California Penal Code § 12021(c)(1) is therefore not a categorical match for the § 1227(a)(2)(C) firearms offense.
    • "Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022". Eleventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 28, 2004. p. 1029. [T]he INS was required to prove that the crime for which Adefemi was convicted was, in fact, a firearms offense and not some other offense.
    • "Lemus-Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 652". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 26, 2003. p. 655. So Lemus-Rodriguez is not barred from claiming that his criminal use of the rifle had a 'cultural purpose.'
    • "Matter of Rainford, 20 I&N Dec. 598" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 9, 1992.
    • "Commonwealth v. Schilling, 288 Pa. Super. 359, 431 A.2d 1088". Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. June 12, 1981. p. 364. We find this contention to be persuasive and hold that a pellet or 'B-B' gun is not contemplated as a 'firearm' under the Uniform Firearms Act.
    • "Matter of Granados, 16 I&N Dec. 726" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 26, 1979.
  83. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1298" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 21, 2000. A firearms offense that renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996), is not one 'referred to in section 212(a)(2)' and thus does not stop the further accrual of continuous residence or continuous physical presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
    • "Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 22, 2018. p. 1077. [T]he structure and text of the statute indicate that the fact of conviction (not the underlying conduct) is the relevant transaction for purposes of the retroactivity analysis.
    • "Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 18, 2014. p. 769. Although we generally defer to agency interpretations of statutes that are ambiguous, 'a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.'
    • "Jeudy v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 15, 2014. p. 605. Applying § 1229b(d)(l)(B) in this case would impose a new disability on pre-IIRIRA conduct without a clear statement from Congress indicating its intent to impose that disability. We therefore hold that Jeudy's 1995 drug conviction did not 'stop time' for his continuous residence in the United States.
    • "Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 22, 2006. p. 1192. We also hold... that the permanent stop-time rule of § 240A(d)(l) ... may not be applied retroactively to prevent Sinotes-Cruz from fulfilling the sevenyear continuous residence requirement ... for cancellation of removal.
  84. ^ Mintier, Tom (November 19, 2002). "One-way ticket for convicted Cambodians". CNN. Retrieved 2006-10-03.
  85. ^ Schwartzapfel, Beth (May 14, 2005). "Fighting to Stay". AlterNet. Retrieved 2006-10-03.
  86. ^ Men, Kimseng (April 6, 2018). "Cambodian-Born US Man Deported Back to Country He Doesn't Remember". Voice of America. Retrieved 2018-10-11.
  87. ^ Montlake, Simon (February 11, 2003). "Cambodians deported home". BBC. Retrieved 2006-10-03.
  88. ^ Sarah, Hoye (September 1, 2011). "Federal deportation review comes too late for some". CNN. Retrieved 2018-10-12.
  89. ^ Cambodian Son. Studio Revolt. 2014. Event occurs at 2014. Retrieved 2014-04-27.
  90. ^ Raguraman, Anjali (Apr 18, 2016). "Cambodian spoken word artist Kosal Khiev went from prison to poetry". The Strait Times. Retrieved Dec 27, 2018.
  91. ^ https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/sentencedhome/film.html[bare URL]
  92. ^ "Rally for Mout and Chally – Front & Champlost – 09.23.10". September 23, 2010. Retrieved 2018-10-12.

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