Operation Eagle Claw
|Operation Eagle Claw|
|Part of the Iran Hostage Crisis|
Overview of the wreckage at the Desert One base in Iran
Near Tabas, South Khorasan, Iran|
President Jimmy Carter|
Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught
Col. James H. Kyle
Lt. Col. Edward R. Seiffert
Col. Charles A. Beckwith
Howard Philips Hart
|Target||Embassy of the United States, Tehran|
|Date||24–25 April 1980|
1 helicopter and 1 transport aircraft destroyed
5 helicopters abandoned/captured
8 US servicemen killed & 4 injured|
1 Iranian civilian killed
Part of a series on the
|History of the
Iran hostage crisis
Operation Eagle Claw, known as Operation Tabas (Persian: عملیات طبس) in Iran, was a United States Armed Forces operation ordered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter to attempt to end the Iran hostage crisis by rescuing 52 embassy staff held captive at the Embassy of the United States, Tehran on 24 April 1980. Its failure, and the humiliating public debacle that ensued, damaged U.S. prestige worldwide. Carter himself blamed his loss in the 1980 U.S. presidential election mainly on his failure to win the release of the hostages.
The operation encountered many obstacles and was eventually aborted. Eight helicopters were sent to the first staging area, Desert One, but only five arrived in operational condition. One encountered hydraulic problems, another got caught in a haboob, and the last one showed signs of a cracked rotor blade. During planning it was decided that the mission would be aborted if fewer than six helicopters remained, despite only four being absolutely necessary. In a move that is still discussed in military circles, the field commanders advised mission abort, which President Carter accepted and confirmed.
As the U.S. force prepared to leave, one of the helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft which contained both servicemen and jet fuel. The resulting fire destroyed both aircraft and killed eight servicemen. Operation Eagle Claw was one of Delta Force's first missions.[Note 1] The failed operation took on a legendary aspect in the revolutionary Iran, with Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, describing the sandstorms causing the failure of the mission as "angels of Allah" who foiled U.S. conspiracy to protect Iran.
- 1 Planning and preparation
- 2 Commencement of the mission
- 3 Debacle
- 4 Aftermath
- 5 In arts
- 6 Analysis
- 7 Commemoration in Iran
- 8 Units involved in the operation
- 9 Additional information
- 10 See also
- 11 Notes and references
Planning and preparation
Preparing for the operation
The Joint Task Force commander was Army Major General James B. Vaught, to be forward based at Wadi Kena, Egypt, and reporting directly to the President. Reporting to General Vaught were field commanders USAF Colonel James H. Kyle for aviation, and U.S. Army Delta Force Colonel Charlie Beckwith for ground forces.
The Tehran CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary team, led by retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer Richard J. Meadows, had two assignments: to obtain information about the hostages and the embassy grounds, and to transport the rescuers from Desert Two, a site just outside Tehran, to the embassy grounds in pre-staged vehicles. In reality, the most important information came from an embassy cook released by the Iranians. He was discovered on a flight from Tehran at the last minute by another CIA officer, and confirmed that the hostages were centrally located in the embassy compound – this was a key piece of information long sought by the planners.
On 31 March, three weeks before the operation, a U.S. Air Force Combat Controller, Major John T. Carney Jr., was flown in a Twin Otter to Desert One, a staging area in the Khorasan Province of Iran, near Tabas (now South Khorasan Province) by covert CIA operatives Jim Rhyne and Claude "Bud" McBroom for a clandestine survey and reconnoiter the proposed landing strips for the C-130s the ground force would use. Despite their casual approach to the mission, Carney successfully surveyed the airstrip, installed remotely operated infrared lights and a strobe to outline a landing pattern for pilots, and took soil samples to determine the load-bearing properties of the desert surface. At that time, the floor was hard-packed sand, but in the ensuing three weeks, an ankle-deep layer of powdery sand was deposited by sandstorms. The "box four and one" pattern acted like a gun sight, with the distant fifth light at the end of the runway lined up in the center of the near four lights positioned at the approach end. The box provided a touchdown area and the far light marked the end of the rollout area. McBroom and Rhyne were awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Cross.
Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary of State, had argued against a push by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski for a military solution to the crisis. Vance, struggling with gout, went to Florida on Thursday, 10 April, for a long weekend. On Friday, Brzezinski held a newly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council where President Carter authorized the rescue operation. Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, who attended the meeting in Vance's place, did not inform Vance. Furious, Vance handed in his resignation on principle, calling Brzezinski "evil".
The operation was designed as a complex two-night mission. On the first night, the aircraft would enter Iran in a remote coastal area 60 miles west of Chabahar, and fly to Desert One ( ) via the Dasht-e Lut desert. Desert One would be secured and established with a protection force and approximately 6,000 gallons of jet fuel would be brought to the area in collapsible fuel bladders carried by United States Air Force (USAF) C-130 aircraft. Three EC-130Es (Call signs: Republic 4 to 6) would carry the Delta Force and other protection elements and three MC-130E Combat Talons (Call signs: Dragon 1 to 3) would carry the logistical supplies.
During planning, eight United States Navy (USN) RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were positioned aboard the USS Nimitz. The crew of Nimitz were unaware of the reason for the eight helicopters' presence on their ship for months leading up to the rescue attempt; they were told that the helicopters were there to execute a minesweeping mission. The plan called for the helicopters to refuel and fly the Delta Force soldiers 260 miles further to Desert Two ( ), located 52 miles short of Tehran. Because it would be close to morning, the helicopters and ground forces would hide during the day at Desert Two. The second night would involve the rescue operation. First, CIA agents who were already inside Iran would bring trucks to Desert Two. Together, the CIA agents and ground forces would then drive from Desert Two into Tehran. While the main assault force was moving to Tehran, other US troops would disable electrical power to the area, in an effort to slow any response from the Iranian military. In addition, AC-130 gunships would be deployed over Tehran to provide any necessary supporting fire.
Lastly, Army Rangers would capture the nearby Manzariyeh Air Base (C-141 Starlifters could arrive. The ground troops would assault the embassy and eliminate the guards. Afterwards the hostages and troops would rendezvous with the helicopters across the street at the Amjadieh Stadium. Finally, the helicopters would bring everyone to the Manzariyeh Air Base, where the C-141s could fly everyone back to friendly territory. Protection for the operation was to be provided by Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8) operating from Nimitz and CVW-14 operating from the USS Coral Sea. For this operation, the aircraft bore special invasion stripes identification on their right wings. CVW-14 Marine F-4Ns had a red (VMFA-323) or yellow (VMFA-531) stripe enclosed by two black stripes. CVW-14 attack aircraft (A-7s and A-6s) had an orange stripe enclosed by two black stripes. Nimitz aircraft were marked in a similar fashion to help differentiate US aircraft from Iranian aircraft purchased from the US (F-14 Tomcats and F-4 Phantoms).) so that several
Commencement of the mission
Only the delivery of the protection element / rescue team, equipment and fuel by the C-130 aircraft went according to plan. The special operations transports took off from their staging base at Masirah Island, Oman, and flew to Desert One. Dragon 1 landed at 22:45 local time after the hidden lights were activated. The landing was made under blacked-out conditions using the improvised infrared landing light system installed by Carney on the airstrip, visible only through night vision goggles. The heavily loaded Dragon 1 required four passes to determine that there were no obstructions on the airstrip[Note 2] and to align with the runway. The landing resulted in substantial wing damage to the aircraft that later required it be rebuilt "from the ground up", but no one was hurt and it remained flyable. Dragon 1 off-loaded Kyle, a USAF Combat Control Team (CCT) commanded by Carney and Beckwith.
The ground force consisted of 93 Delta soldiers to assault the embassy, a 13-man special forces assault team from Detachment "A" Berlin Brigade to assault the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 Rangers forming the roadblock team, and 15 Iranian and American Persian-speakers, most of whom would act as truck drivers. The CCT established a parallel landing zone north of the dirt road and set out TACAN beacons to guide in the helicopters. The second and third MC-130s landed using both runways and discharged the remainder of the Delta soldiers, after which Dragon 1 and 2 took off at 23:15 to make room for the EC-130s and the eight RH-53Ds and to return to base to allow the crews to prepare for the second night operations.
Soon after the first crews landed and began securing Desert One, a tanker truck, apparently smuggling fuel, was blown up nearby by the Army Ranger roadblock team using a shoulder-fired rocket as it tried to escape the site. The truck's passenger was killed, but the driver managed to escape in an accompanying pickup truck. As the tanker truck was evaluated to be engaged in clandestine smuggling, the driver was not considered to pose a security threat to the mission. The resulting fire illuminated the nighttime landscape for many miles around, and actually provided a visual guide to Desert One for the disoriented incoming helicopters. A civilian Iranian bus with a driver and 43 passengers traveling on the same road, which now served as the runway for the aircraft, was forced to halt at approximately the same time and the passengers were detained aboard Republic 3.[Note 3]
While en route, Bluebeard 6 was grounded and abandoned in the desert when its pilots interpreted a sensor indication as a cracked rotor blade. Its crew was picked up by Bluebeard 8. The remaining helicopters ran into an unexpected weather phenomenon known as a haboob (an enormous, nearly opaque cloud of fine dust particles that can follow a thunderstorm). Bluebeard 5 flew into the haboob, but abandoned the mission and returned to the Nimitz when erratic flight instrumentation made flying without visual reference points impossible. The scattered formation reached Desert One, 50 to 90 minutes behind schedule. Bluebeard 2 arrived last at Desert One at 01:00 with a malfunctioning second-stage hydraulic system, leaving one hydraulic system to control the aircraft. [Note 4]
With only five helicopters remaining to transport the men and equipment to Desert Two, which Beckwith considered was the mission's abort threshold, the various commanders reached a stalemate. Helicopter commander Seiffert refused to use Bluebeard 2 on the mission, while Beckwith refused to reduce his rescue team's size. Beckwith anticipated losing additional helicopters at later stages, especially as they were notorious for failing on cold starts and they were to be shut down for almost 24 hours at Desert Two. Kyle recommended to Vaught that the mission be aborted. The recommendation was passed on by satellite radio up to the President. After two and a half hours on the ground, the abort order was received.
Fuel consumption calculations showed that the extra 90 minutes idling on the ground had made fuel critical for one of the EC-130s. When it became clear that only six helicopters would arrive at Desert One, Kyle had authorized the EC-130s to transfer 1,000 US gallons from the bladders to their own main fuel tanks, but Republic 4 had already expended all of its bladder fuel refueling three of the helicopters and had none to transfer. To make it to the air tanker refueling track without running out of fuel, it had to leave immediately, and was already loaded with part of the Delta team. In addition, RH-53 Bluebeard 4 needed additional fuel, requiring it be moved to the opposite side of the road.
To accomplish both actions, Bluebeard 3 had to be moved from directly behind the EC-130. The aircraft couldn't be moved by ground taxi and had to be moved by hover taxi (flying a short distance at low speed and altitude).[Note 5] A USAF Combat Controller attempted to direct the maneuver from in front of the aircraft, but was blasted by desert sand churned up by the rotor. As the Controller attempted to back away, Bluebeard 3's pilot perceived he was drifting backward (engulfed in a dust cloud, the pilot only had the Controller as a point of reference) and thus attempted to "correct" this situation by applying forward stick in order to maintain the same distance from the rearward moving marshaller. The RH-53 struck the EC-130's vertical stabilizer with its main rotor and crashed into the EC-130's wing root.
In the ensuing explosion and fire, eight servicemen died: five of fourteen USAF aircrew in the EC-130, and three of the five USMC aircrew in the RH-53, with only the helicopter's pilot and co-pilot (both badly burned) surviving.[Note 6] During the frantic evacuation to the EC-130s by the helicopter crews, attempts were made to retrieve their classified mission documents and destroy the aircraft. The helicopter crews boarded the EC-130s. Five RH-53 aircraft were left behind mostly intact, some damaged by shrapnel. Bluebeards 2 and 8 now serve with the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy. EC-130E Republic 5 which returned successfully, was retired by the USAF in June 2013 and is now on display at the Carolinas Aviation Museum.
The EC-130s carried the remaining forces back to the intermediate airfield at Masirah Island, where two C-141 medical evacuation aircraft from the staging base at Wadi Abu Shihat, Egypt (referred to as Wadi Kena by the US forces due to its location near Qena, Delta Force members, and returned to Wadi Kena. The injured were then transported to Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The Tehran CIA team left Iran, unaware of their compromised presence.), picked up the injured personnel, helicopter crews, Rangers and
The White House announced the failed rescue operation at 1:00 a.m. the following day. The embassy hostages were subsequently scattered across Iran to make a second rescue attempt impossible. Iranian Army investigators found nine bodies, eight Americans and one Iranian civilian. The 44 Iranian civilians captured on the bus gave eyewitness accounts of the operation.
Eight US service members died during the mission. A memorial honoring them is located in the Arlington National Cemetery. On 25 April 1980, Major General Robert M. Bond read President Jimmy Carter's eulogy at a memorial service to them.
Retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III led the official investigation in 1980 into the causes of the operation's failure on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Holloway Report primarily cited deficiencies in mission planning, command and control, and inter-service operability, and provided a catalyst to reorganize the Department of Defense, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
The various services' failure to cohesively work together prompted the establishment of a new multi-service organization several years later. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) became operational on 16 April 1987. Each service now has its own special operations forces under USSOCOM's overall control.[Note 7]
The lack of well-trained Army helicopter pilots who were capable of the low-level night flying needed for modern special operations missions prompted the creation of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) (Night Stalkers). In addition to the 160th SOAR's creation, the US Defense Department now trains many military helicopter pilots in low-level penetration, aerial refueling and use of night-vision goggles. MH-47, CH-53E, MH-60 and MV-22 aircraft all include special operations capabilities.
Second rescue plan
Planning for a second rescue mission was authorized under the name Project Honey Badger shortly after the first failed. Plans and exercises were conducted, but the manpower and aircraft requirements grew to involve nearly a battalion of troops, more than fifty aircraft, and such contingencies as transporting a 12-ton bulldozer to rapidly clear a blocked runway. Even though numerous rehearsal exercises were successful, the helicopters' failure during the first attempt resulted in development of a subsequent concept involving only fixed-wing STOL aircraft capable of flying from the US to Iran using aerial refueling, then returning to land on an aircraft carrier for medical treatment of wounded.
The concept, called Operation Credible Sport, was developed but never implemented. It called for a modified Hercules, the YMC-130H, outfitted with rocket thrusters fore and aft to allow an extremely short landing and take-off in Amjadieh Stadium. Three aircraft were modified under a rushed secret program. The first fully modified aircraft crashed during a demonstration at Duke Field at Eglin Air Force Base on 29 October 1980, when its landing braking rockets were fired too soon. The misfire caused a hard touchdown that tore off the starboard wing and started a fire. All on board survived without injury. The impending change of administration in the White House forced this project's abandonment.
Despite Credible Sport's failure, the Honey Badger exercises continued until after the 1980 US presidential election, when they became superfluous. Even so, numerous special operations applications and techniques were developed which became part of the emerging USSOCOM repertoire.
President Carter continued to attempt to secure the hostages' release before his presidency's end. On 20 January 1981, minutes after Carter's term ended, the 52 US captives held in Iran were released, ending the 444-day Iran hostage crisis.
US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, believing that the operation would not work and would only endanger the lives of the hostages, opted to resign, regardless of whether the mission was successful or not. His resignation was confirmed several days later.
Who crushed Mr. Carter's helicopters? We did? The sands did! They were God's agents. Wind is God's agent... These sands are agents of God. They can try again!
- 1997 Iranian movie Sand Storm (Persian: توفان شن), directed by Javad Shamaghdari
- "Ham Avaz-e Toofan" (Persian: همآواز طوفان, "Singing with the Storm"), a song by Hamed Zamani
Various reasons for the mission failure have been argued, with most analysts agreeing that poor planning, flawed command structure, lack of adequate pilot training and poor weather conditions were all contributing factors and combined to doom the operation.
Commemoration in Iran
The incident is considered as a US defeat by Iranians and is commemorated annually in Iran; people of neighboring cities gather in Tabas, accompanied by some local officials and religious figures, for this. The ceremony includes displaying the wreckage of the American planes and helicopters from the incident. A "Mosque of Thanks" (Persian: مسجد شکر, Masjed-e-Shokr) was built at the crash site.
Units involved in the operation
US Air Force
- 1st Special Operations Wing: 8th Special Operations Squadron (EC-130)
- 436th Military Airlift Wing
- 437th Military Airlift Wing
- 438th Military Airlift Wing
- 322d Airlift Division
- BRAND X, Combat Controllers
Aircraft on display
Iran's damage claim
In April 2014 Iran's parliament claimed it was preparing a bill to oblige the government to estimate the damage the country suffered from the operation. The decision was introduced a few days after the US seized Iran's assets in Manhattan which included a skyscraper that lodged the headquarters of its Alavi Foundation.
George Cave: October 1980"
In 2013, retired CIA spy George Cave self-published a novel "October 1980" interpreting the so-called October Surprise. Of Cave's novel, Dewey Clarridge, the CIA's former Latin America director, told Newsweek in April 2016, "What George tells you is the real story. The whole novel is really true." A blogger in San Francisco noted the novel's description of the October Surprise matched exactly the retelling of the events by Barack Obama to Jeffrey Goldberg in an essay published the same month in the Atlantic Monthly and speculated the novel was an official account slightly fictionalized to protect sources. The blogger noted the Newsweek article was published on the same day as Eagle Claw: April 24th 3:01 PM Eastern Time: exactly 25 years later to the minute, Tehran time. Anniversaries are very important in Persian culture.
The novel relates Eagle Claw from the perspective of the Ayatollah's head of intelligence. It suggests the mission was not intended to rescue the hostages, and was intended to fail:
Incidentally there are some officers in our intelligence organization who believe the rescue mission was supposed to fail...It was all too pat. As you know, we found a perfectly usable helicopter left behind in the desert. At the site near Tabas, several helicopters and transport aircraft were burned to cinders. What made us suspicious was the small amount of weapons recovered. There was a fierce fire, which would have made it impossible to recover any heavy weapons. What we recovered were only small arms and not very many of them. We estimate that given the number of transport aircraft involved, the attack party must have been between seventy five and one hundred well-trained troops, probably drawn from the U.S. special forces...We find it difficult to believe a well-trained military organization could blunder so badly as to accidentally destroy half a dozen helicopters and transport aircraft. It is also unlikely that such a well-trained organization would leave behind a complete 'top-secret' briefing book untouched by the flames and placed so we could conveniently find it. We also suspect that the eight corpses we found at the site were taken there dead and left to be charred in the burning wreckage.
There are some other mysterious touches. If this was in fact a top-secret operation, why did they open fire on a petrol truck and set it on fire in the middle of the night? ...They made no attempt to catch the driver, who ran away...they also stopped a bus and took everyone on the bus into custody. When they captured the bus, they were already preparing to leave. My question is why did they take these forty-odd Iranians along with them and then arrange for their travel back to Iran? What is important is that the Americans described it as a failed rescue mission. It occurred on the twenty-fifth of April. A month later, we received a message from Nakha'i who said the Americans want to negotiate with us for the release of the hostages. At the same time, they leaked the fact that they were planning a second rescue mission. Was all of this just done to get us to the negotiating table?
...Tabas may have been part of a larger operation. However, we have no evidence of any other military activity initiated by the Americans. The Air force did not pick up any other unidentified flights over Iranian territory on the twenty-fifth of April...I should add that there is additional evidence that makes my colleagues and me suspect this operation was not intended to rescue the hostages. First, there are the Iranians who were taken prisoner, flown to Cairo, and then allowed to return to Iran. They all speak of a large number of men armed with light-infantry weapons. Fortunately six of the group had served in the army. They provided a good description of the weapons the Americans carried. They all spoke of the excellent physical condition of the American soldiers. We conculde they were members of a special forces unit...some curiosities developed...not one of the peoples saw any vehicles either on the ground in Tabas or on any of the planes.
Let us assume this was a rescue mission. The force that landed in Tabas contained for our five helicopters. They were of the fifty-three class...this helicopter is routinely used as a troop carrier...but this helicopter makes a lot of noise. they would have had to fly over numerous towns and small cities ...including several kilometers over Tehran itself. We believe we would have been alerted before they reached the target, presumably the American Embassy compound...from the radar tracks...the helicopters were probably flown in with no passengers. This is because the flight distance from the Arabian Sea to Tabas is at the extreme range for this class of helicopters. The strike force was flown in by C-130 aircraft along with a refueling aircraft...they would have been very low on fuel by the time they reached their target...If this was a real operation, we assume a second site like Tabas had already been selected...if what occurred at Tabas was part of a larger operation
...We have the manufacturer's plate on the helicopter we recovered in the desert. We also recovered two other manufacturer's plates at Tabas. The helicopters were all relatively old. Our experts tell us what such old helicopters are subject to frequent breakdowns. Why would the Americans use such old helicopters on such an important mission?...Our experts also told us that the standard neavigational equipment on the helicopters is not suited for long flights. The helicopter we recovered intact in the desert was equipped with an Omega navigational system. Such a system would be necessary for the helicopters to reach a specific destination near Tabas. This leads us to believe that someone had surveyed the area and found that C-130 aircraft could land there....whatever whas planned at Tabas was quite possibly something other than a rescue mission.
...On April the twenty-fifth there was no moon. For such an operation, a moonless night is essential. But why do it in April? The best time would have been during the new-moon period in January or February. The nights are much longer...and there is very little traffic in the desert because of the cold. They also mounted the operation during the stormy season in the Persian Gulf...I find it incomprehensible that an elite group would plan and mount an operation at the worst possible time."
In this scenario, if the dead soldiers died elsewhere, such as in an accident, it is possible Carter did not order a single soldier to his or her death during his entire presidency. Elsewhere in the novel, it is noted prior to the Iranian revolution, intelligence regarding strong Iraninan discontent did not reach the President and policy makers and following the revolution, there was concern about Iran's vulnerability. The intentional failure also suggests a darker possibility: a Naval coup to throw the campaign by discrediting Carter in the media.
- The Canadian Caper, the successful joint Canadian-CIA covert extraction operation of six fugitive American diplomats out of Iran.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Operation Eagle Claw.|
Notes and references
- The Holloway Commission blamed the ad hoc nature of the task force and an excessive degree of security, both of which intensified command-and-control problems.
- This was done by use of a Forward looking infrared (FLIR) pass before attempting to land.
- It was originally planned to simulate a head-on accident between the tanker and the bus, flying the bus passengers out of Iran aboard Dragon 3 and then returning them to Manzaniyeh on the second night.
- The second-stage hydraulics system powers the number-one automatic flight control system and a portion of the primary flight controls
- Either because of a deflated nose gear tire, because of the layer of soft sand, or both. It had originally been positioned behind the EC-130 by a flight technique in which its nose gear was held off the ground while it rolled on its main gear.
- The 5 US Airmen killed were Major Richard L. Bakke, Navigator; Major Harold L Lewis Jr., Pilot & Aircraft Commander; TSgt Joel C. Mayo, Flight Engineer; Major Lyn D. McIntosh, Co-Pilot; and Captain Charles T. McMillan, Navigator. The 3 US Marine fatalities were Sgt John D. Harvey, Cpl George N. Holmes Jr., and SSgt Dewey L Johnson, the 3 of them were Marine Helicopter crewmen & riflemen. USMC Majors Jim Schaefer, pilot, and Les Petty, co-pilot, were casualties.
- For example, the Army has its own special operations command, which controls its special operations forces. The USAF special operations units that supplied the rescue attempt's MC-130 elements were awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for both that year and the next, had the initial squadron of nine HH-53 Pave Low helicopters transferred from Military Airlift Command to its jurisdiction for long-range low-level night flying operations, and became co-hosts at its home base of Hurlburt Field with Air Force Special Operations Command.
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<ref>tag; name "Cave" defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- Schou, Nicholas (April 24, 2016q). "The 'October Surprise' Was Real, Legendary Spymaster Hints in final Interview". Newsweek Magazine.
- Goldberg, Jeffrey (April 2016). "The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President talks through his hardest decisions about America's role in the World." The Atlantic Monthly.
- Busse, Thomas (April 26, 2018). "Barack Hussein Obama: Whistleblower in Chief". Voice of San Francisco.
- Busse, Thomas. "Eagle Claw's Failure was Intentional".
- Bird, Kai. "Some 'October Surprise' conspiracies turn out to be true". Los Angeles Times.
- Beckwith, Col. Charlie A., US Army (Ret.) (2000). Delta Force: The Army's Elite Counter Terrorist Unit. Avon. ISBN 0-380-80939-7.
- Bottoms, Mike (2007). "Carney receives Simons Award" (pdf). Tip of the Spear. United States Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office. pp. 26–31. Retrieved 11 November 2010.
- Bowden, Mark (2006). Guests Of The Ayatollah: The First Battle In America's War With Militant Islam. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-925-1.
- Gabriel, Richard A. (1985). Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win. Hill and Wang. ISBN 0-374-52137-9.
- Haney, Eric (2002). Inside Delta Force: The Story Of America's Elite Counter Terrorist Unit. Random House. ISBN 0-385-33603-9.
- Kamps, Charles Tustin (2006). "Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission". Air & Space Power Journal.
- Department of Transportation, US Government (2012). Aeronautical Information Manual (PDF). U.S. Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration. p. 4–3–18. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 March 2013.
- Thigpen (2001). The Praetorian STARShip : the untold story of the Combat Talon. DIANE Publishing. ISBN 9781428990432.
- Additional Reading
- Kyle, Col. James H., USAF (Ret.) (1990). The Guts to Try. New York: Orion Books. ISBN 0-517-57714-3.
- Lenahan, Rod (1998). Crippled Eagle: A Historical Perspective Of U.S. Special Operations 1976–1996. Narwhal Press. ISBN 1-886391-22-X.
- Olausson, Lars, Lockheed Hercules Production List 1954–2005, Såtenäs, Sweden, annually, no ISBN.
- Ryan, Paul B. (1985). The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why if Failed?. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-321-0.
- "The Desert One Debacle" – The Atlantic, May 2006
- Modern Warfare: Special Operations, Operation Eagle Claw – The first part of a series of articles on Kuro5hin
- Pictorial overview
- Airman magazine – Archive of interviews with surviving participants
- The Holloway Report – The official DoD investigation into the incident
- Charles Cogan, "Desert One and Its Disorders", The Journal of Military History 67.1 (2003) 201–216