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A dogfight, or dog fight, is an aerial battle between fighter aircraft, conducted at close range. Dogfighting first appeared during World War I, shortly after the invention of the airplane. Until at least 1992, it was a component in every major war, despite beliefs after World War II that increasingly greater speeds and longer range weapons would make dogfighting obsolete. Modern terminology for air-to-air combat is air combat maneuvering (ACM), which refers to tactical situations requiring the use of individual basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) to attack or evade one or more opponents. This differs from aerial warfare, which deals with the strategy involved in planning and executing various missions.
- 1 Etymology
- 2 History
- 2.1 Mexican Revolution
- 2.2 World War I
- 2.3 Spanish Civil War
- 2.4 World War II
- 2.5 Korean War
- 2.6 Vietnam War
- 2.7 Arab–Israeli conflicts
- 2.8 Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
- 2.9 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
- 2.10 Falklands War
- 2.11 Iran–Iraq War
- 2.12 Persian Gulf War
- 2.13 Balkans conflict
- 3 See also
- 4 Footnotes
- 5 References
- 6 Further reading
- 7 External links
The term dogfight has been used for centuries to describe a melee; a fierce, fast-paced battle between two or more opponents. The term gained popularity during World War II although its origin in air combat can be traced to the latter years of World War I. The first written reference to the modern day usage of the word comes from Fly Papers, by A. E. Illingworth, in 1919, “The battle develops into a ‘dog-fight’, small groups of machines engaging each other in a fight to the death.” The term fighter ace generally applies to any pilot who eliminates five opponent craft in the air (or, in Germany during World War I, ten aircraft), although not necessarily in a dogfight.
The first instance of plane on plane combat and the first instance of one plane intercepting another during an aerial conflict occurred during the Mexican Revolution in November 30, 1913 between two American soldiers of fortune fighting for opposing sides Dean Ivan Lamb and Phil Rader. Both men had orders to kill but neither pilot wanted to harm the other so they exchanged multiple volleys of pistol fire, intentionally missing before exhausting their supply of ammunition.
World War I
Dogfighting first emerged in World War I. Ever since "heavier than air" flights became a reality in 1903, people had been trying to figure out how to use this new technology for warfare. Aircraft were initially used as mobile observation vehicles, and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat. The new airplanes proved their worth by spotting the hidden German advance on Paris in the second month of the war.
Enemy pilots at first simply exchanged waves, or shook their fists at each other. Due to weight restrictions, only small weapons could be carried on board. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by improvised means, including throwing bricks, grenades and sometimes rope, which they hoped would entangle the enemy plane's propeller. Pilots quickly began firing hand-held guns at enemy planes, such as pistols and carbines. The first aerial dogfight occurred during the Battle of Cer (15–24 August 1914), when Serbian aviator Miodrag Tomić encountered an Austro-Hungarian plane while performing a reconnaissance mission over Austro-Hungarian positions. The Austro-Hungarian pilot initially waved, and Tomić reciprocated. The Austro-Hungarian pilot then fired at Tomić with his revolver. Tomić managed to escape, and within several weeks, all Serbian and Austro-Hungarian planes were fitted with machine-guns. In August 1914, Staff-Captain Pyotr Nesterov, from Russia, became the first pilot to ram his plane into an enemy spotter aircraft. In October 1914, an airplane was shot down by a hand gun from another plane for the first time over Rheims, France. Once machine guns were mounted to the airplane, either on a flexible mounting or higher on the wings of early biplanes, the era of air combat began.
The biggest problem was mounting a machine gun onto an aircraft so that it could be fired forward, through the propeller, and aimed by pointing the nose of the aircraft directly at the enemy. Roland Garros solved this problem by mounting steel deflector wedges to the propeller of a Morane Saulnier monoplane. He achieved three kills, but was forced down due to engine failure down behind enemy lines, and captured before he could destroy his plane by burning it. The wreckage was brought to Anthony Fokker, a Dutch designer who built aircraft for the Germans. Fokker decided that the wedges were much too risky, and improved the design by connecting the trigger of an MG 08 Maxim machine gun to the timing of the engine. The Germans acquired an early air superiority due to the invention of the synchronization gear in 1915, transforming air combat with the Fokker E.I, the first synchronized, forward firing fighter plane. On the evening of July 1, 1915, the very first aerial engagement by a fighter plane armed with a synchronized, forward-firing machine gun occurred just to the east of Luneville, France. The German Fokker E.I was flown by Lieutenant Kurt Wintgens, earning the victory over a French two-seat observation monoplane. Later that same month, on July 25, 1915, British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) Major Lanoe Hawker, flying a very early production Bristol Scout C., attacked three separate aircraft during a single sortie, shooting down two with a non-synchronizable Lewis gun which was mounted next to his cockpit at an outwards angle to avoid hitting the propeller. He forced the third one down, and was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Battles in the air increased as the technological advantage swung from the British to the Germans, then back again. The Feldflieger Abteilung observation units of the German air service, in 1914-15, consisted of six two-seat observation aircraft each, with each unit assigned to a particular German Army headquarters location. They had but a single Fokker Eindecker aircraft assigned to each "FFA" unit for general defensive duties, so pilots such as Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke began as lone hunters with each "FFA" unit, shooting unarmed spotter planes and enemy aircraft out of the sky. During the first part of the war, there was no established tactical doctrine for air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts, conceived in 1916, are still applicable today, including use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.
British Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard ordered that all reconnaissance aircraft had to be supported by at least three fighters, creating the first use of tactical formations in the air. The Germans responded by forming Jastas, large squadrons of fighters solely dedicated to destroying enemy aircraft, under the supervision of Boelcke. Pilots who shot down five or more fighters became known as aces. One of the most famous dogfights, resulting in the death of Major Hawker, is described by the Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen,
I WAS extremely proud when, one fine day, I was informed that the airman whom I had brought down on the twenty- third of November, 1916, was the English [equivalent of] Immelmann.... First we circled twenty times to the left, and then thirty times to the right. Each tried to get behind and above the other. Soon I discovered that I was not meeting a beginner. He had not the slightest intention of breaking off the fight. He was traveling in a machine which turned beautifully. However, my own was better at rising than his, and I succeeded at last in getting above and beyond my English waltzing partner.... The impertinent fellow was full of cheek and when we had got down to about 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if he would say, "Well, how do you do?" The circles which we made around one another were so narrow that their diameter was probably no more than 250 or 300 feet. I had time to take a good look at my opponent.... When he had come down to about three hundred feet he tried to escape by flying in a zig-zag course during which, as is well known, it is difficult for an observer to shoot. That was my most favorable moment. I followed him at an altitude of from two hundred and fifty feet to one hundred and fifty feet, firing all the time. The Englishman could not help falling. But the jamming of my gun nearly robbed me of my success. My opponent fell, shot through the head, one hundred and fifty feet behind our line.
Despite the German's early lead in combat tactics and their 'Dicta Boelcke', the Allies were not slow to adapt and develop their own tactics. The Royal Flying Corps' Albert Ball was one of a band of pilots who liked to fly solo and he developed 'stalking' tactics for going after enemy two-seaters. He even used his Lewis gun in its top wing adjustable Foster mounting to fire upwards into the underside of unsuspecting enemy aircraft. Other RFC pilots such as James McCudden and Mick Mannock emphasised mutual support and the advantages of attacking from height. One RFC mantra was: "never from below, seldom from the same height, always from above".
During 1916, aerial reconnaissance patrols had most often been unaccompanied as there had been little if any aerial disputes, between the belligerents. However, just as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign ground war on the Gaza to Beersheba line came to resemble trench warfare on the western front, so too did the air war over southern Palestine come to resemble that being fought over France. After the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917 and during the Stalemate in Southern Palestine which followed, the concentration of Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and Ottoman Army forces holding established front lines grew, as associated supply dumps and lines of communications were developed. The need to know about these fuelled "intense rivalry in the air." Aerial reconnaissance patrols were regularly attacked, so it was necessary for all photography and artillery observation patrols to be accompanied by escort aircraft. These special EEF patrols which grew into squadrons, accompanied and protected the reconnaissance aircraft, attacking hostile aircraft wherever they were found, either in the air, or on the ground. However the technically superior German aircraft shot down numbers of EEF aircraft during dog fights.
By the end of the war, the underpowered machines from just ten years prior had been transformed into fairly powerful, swift, and heavily armed fighter planes, and the basic tactics for dogfighting had been laid down.
Spanish Civil War
Airplane technology rapidly increased in sophistication after World War I. By 1936, dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past, since aircraft were reaching top speeds of over 250 miles per hour (400 km/h). The experiences of the Spanish civil war proved this theory was wrong.
At the beginning of the war, new tactics were developed, most notably in the Luftwaffe Condor Legion. Lieutenant Werner Mölders advised abandoning the standard “V” formation used in combat, and pairing fighters in twos, starting the practice of having a wingman at one's side. He advised that pairs of aircraft approaching a fight should increase the distance between them instead of holding tight formations, a precursor to the combat spread maneuver. He also started the practice of training pilots to fly at night, and with instruments only. Using the new tactics, and flying the newest Bf 109 fighters, the Germans shot down 22 Spanish Republican fighters within a five-day period, suffering no losses of their own.
World War II
Strategies for fighter development
During the 1930s two different streams of thought about air-to-air combat began to emerge, resulting in two different streams of monoplane fighter development. In Japan and Italy especially, there continued to be a strong belief that lightly armed, highly maneuverable single seat fighters would still play a primary role in air-to-air combat. Aircraft such as the Nakajima Ki-27 and Nakajima Ki-43 and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero in Japan, and the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 in Italy epitomised a generation of monoplanes designed to this concept.
The other stream of thought, which emerged primarily in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States was the belief the high speeds of modern combat aircraft and the g-forces imposed by aerial combat meant that dogfighting in the classic WW I sense would be impossible. Fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Supermarine Spitfire, the Yakovlev Yak-1 and the Curtiss P-40 were all designed for high level speeds and a good rate of climb. Good maneuverability was not a primary objective.
Immediately following the Spanish civil war came World War II, during which dogfighting was most prevalent. It was widely believed that strategic bombing alone was synonymous with air power; a fallacy that would not be fully understood until Vietnam. After the failings in Spain, a greater emphasis was placed on the accuracy of air-to-ground attacks. The need to stop bombers from reaching their targets, or to protect them on their missions, was the primary purpose for most dogfights of the era.
Dogfighting over Europe
Dogfighting was very prominent in the skies over Europe. The air force in France, while a major force during World War I, was inadequate and poorly organized, and quickly fell to the German onslaught. As the first battles between the Germans and the British began, the power of the German’s anti-aircraft artillery became readily apparent, with 88 millimeter shells capable of firing 40,000 feet (12,000 m) in the air. General Wolfram von Richthofen noted that these guns were equally destructive when used for ground fire. The German Bf 109 and the British Spitfire were some of the most common fighters used in the European theater.
A typical dogfight is described by an unnamed pilot,
Pulling up into his blind spot I watched his plane grow larger and larger in my sight. But this German pilot was not content to fly straight and level. Before I could open fire his plane slewed to the right, and seeing me on his tail, he jerked back on the stick into the only defensive maneuver his plane could make. I banked my 47 over to the right and pulled back on the stick, striving to get him once more into my ring sight. The violent maneuver applied terrific G’s to my body, and I started to black out as the blood rushed from my head. Fighting every second to overcome this blackness about me, I pulled back on the stick, further and further, so that the enemy would just show at the bottom of my ring sight to allow for the correct deflection.
We were both flying in a tight circle. Just a little more and I’ll have him. Pressing the [trigger] I waited expectantly for the 109 to explode. I’ve hit his wing. A section two-feet long broke loose from the right wing as the machine gun cut like a machete through it. Too low, a little more rudder and the bullets will find his cockpit. I could see occasional strikes further up the wing, but it was too late. The 109, sensing that I was inside him on the turn, slunk into a nearby cloud. Straightening my plane, I climbed over the top of the bank, and poised on the other side, waiting for him to appear. But the 109 did not appear, and not wishing to tempt the gods of fate further, I pushed my stick forward, entered the protective cover of the clouds, and headed home.
During this time, three new Russian fighters, the LaGG-1, the Yak-1, and the MiG-3 were just coming off of the production line. The Soviet Air Defense Force had been fraught with problems since World War I. The German Barbarossa offensive on 22 June 1941, destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day, and more than 5000 before October. With great desperation, the Soviets fought in dogfights over Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine for more than a year.
Fireteam, a triple of aircraft ("troika"), has been the main tactical unit used in battles since the beginning of World War II. The analysis and synthesis of fighting experience resulted in a conclusion that group tactics should have been rejected and replaced by action pairs. However, ramming an opponent was still a common practice among the pilots of the Soviet Union. Another successful maneuver was a "Sokolinnyi udar" (falcon punch) when a pilot got an advantage of power by swooping down on an opponent and using the sunlight conditions. This maneuver and many other tactical principles were introduced by Alexander Pokryshkin, one of the greatest tactician of the Soviet Air Force who showed his worth during World War II. His famous motto sounded as "Height, speed, maneuver, fire!". It became popular in the air armies and was adopted by pilots.
Struggling with morale problems, the Soviets slowly and methodically began to regain air supremacy after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. This theater is notable for including the only female fighter aces in history, Yekaterina Budanova and Lydia Litvyak.
USA and Japan
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. military tested out the Akutan Zero, a Mitsubishi A6M2 which was captured intact in 1942, advising — along the same lines that General Claire Chennault, commander of the Kunming-based Flying Tigers had already advised his pilots over a year before — "Never attempt to dogfight a Zero." Even though its engine was rather low in power, the Zero had very low wing loading characteristics, a small turn radius, a top speed over 330 mph (530 km/h), and could climb better than any fighter used by the U.S. at that time, although it was poorly armored compared to U.S. aircraft.
A pilot who realized that new tactics had to be devised was Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach, commander of Fighting Three in San Diego. He read the early reports coming out of China and wrestled with the problem of his Grumman F4F Wildcats being relatively slower and much less maneuverable than the Japanese planes. He devised a defensive maneuver called the "Thach Weave." Lieutenant Commander Thach reasoned that two planes, a leader and his wingman, could fly about 200 feet apart and adopt a weaving formation when under attack by Japanese fighters.
Thach later faced the A6M Zero during the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, for the test of his theory. Although outnumbered, he found that a Zero would lock onto the tail of one of the fighters. In response, the two planes would turn toward each other. When the Zero followed its original target through the turn it would come into a position to be fired on by the target's wingman, and the predator would become the prey. His tactic proved to be effective and was soon adopted by other squadrons. The Thach Weave helped make up for the inferiority of the US planes in maneuverability and numbers, until new aircraft could be brought into service. The usefulness of this strategy survives until today.
Another effective maneuver used by the U.S. pilots was a simple break, which consisted of turning sharply across an attacker's flight path, which worked well because the large nose of the Zero tended to obstruct the pilot's view. Still another good tactic was a high-side guns pass, which consisted of diving upon the Zero, shooting in one, high-speed pass, and using the speed to climb back above the fight to dive again. By 1943 the U.S. technology began to produce planes that were better matched against the Japanese planes, such as the Grumman F6F Hellcat, and the Vought F4U Corsair.
Technology advanced extremely fast during World War II in ways that would change dogfighting forever. Jet propulsion had been demonstrated long before the war, by German engineer Hans von Ohain in 1934, and by British engineer Frank Whittle in 1937. The Messerschmitt Me 262 was the first jet fighter to be used in battle, with a speed over 500 mph (800 km/h), and began taking a toll on Allied bombing missions in 1944. The British were testing a jet that same year, the Gloster Meteor, which would later see action in the Korean War. Although U.S. General Hap Arnold test flew the XP-59A in 1942, the plane was never used in combat. Other prime inventions of the era include radar and air-to-air missiles.
Enemy pilots were construed as weak and evil. For example, in World War II, describing the Soviet tactics, the Luftwaffe claimed that, "The characteristic feature of the average Soviet fighter pilot were a tendency toward caution and reluctance instead of toughness and stamina, brute strength instead of genuine combat efficiency, abysmal hatred instead of fairness and chivalry...."
After World War II, the question began to rise about the future usefulness of fighter aircraft. This was especially true for the U.S., where the focus was placed on small, fast, long-range bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs. The Korean War began in June 1950, and the North Koreans were outmatched by the U.S. Air Force. The war was nearly over by October, with the occupation of North Korea when, on November 1, Chinese MiG-15s attacked. The Chinese began supplying North Korea with troops and provisions, and the war quickly resumed.
At 100 mph (160 km/h) faster, the MiG-15 was more than a match for the U.S. P-80 Shooting Star, using the same dive and shoot tactic that the Americans found so useful against Japan. The U.S. jets had inferior weaponry, and suffered from problems with production and parts. The U.S. resorted to using mainly the more maneuverable propeller driven fighters during the war, such as the P-51 Mustang which was carried over from World War II. The P-47 Thunderbolt was not used in Korea. Used mainly in the close air support role, Mustangs were more vulnerable to being shot down (and many were lost due to anti-aircraft fire). Some former P-47 pilots suggested the more durable Thunderbolt should have been sent to Korea; however, the P-51D was available in greater numbers in the USAF and ANG inventories. (See footnote  under Wikipedia article on P-47 Thunderbolt.)
To combat the MiGs, the F-86 Sabre was put into production. The U.S. pilots had a number of major advantages over the Chinese, including the G-suit and the radar-ranging gunsight. Chinese fighters were often seen spinning off out of control during a hard turn because the pilot had lost consciousness. The Chinese were very competent in a dogfight, and large swirling battles were fought in the skies over Korea. However, it is highly suspected by many U.S. pilots that some of the opponents they faced over Korea were in fact well-trained Soviet pilots, who the Americans referred to as "hanchos," (a Japanese word, meaning "bosses"). Major Robinson Risner recalls,
Seeing one another about the same time, the MiG flight and my flight dropped [our extra fuel] tanks.. He was so low he was throwing up small rocks. I dropped down to get him, but to hit him I had to get down in his jet wash. He'd chop the throttle and throw out his speed brakes. I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.
The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions. Later after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet records showed that Russian pilots were indeed in the air. Some at times in the fury of combat reverted to the Russian language over the radio.
The Vietnam War "was the first 'modern' air war" in which air-to-air missiles were the primary weapons during aerial combat, and was the only confrontation between the latest aerial and ground defense technologies between the former Soviet Union and the United States. If U.S. air power could successfully conduct war against Soviet doctrine and equipment in the skies over North Vietnam, then it could expect to successfully operate against the Soviet Union during a massive war in Europe. Over the skies of North Vietnam, U.S. aircraft would be attacking the "most formidable and most heavily defended targets in the history of aerial warfare."
By this time, dogfighting techniques had fallen out of favor in U.S. training doctrines, as missiles were considered to be all that was necessary to shoot down the big bombers expected to be deployed by the Soviet Union. As a result, air combat methods known by fighter pilots since World War I became all but lost as veterans from WWII and Korea retired and didn't pass them on to succeeding generations. American fighter pilots would meet in the skies in secret to engage in mock combat to try and maintain some level of proficiency. It wasn't until TOPGUN was established for the Navy in 1969 and Red Flag was started for the Air Force in 1975 that pilots were formally trained in dogfighting again.
Both U.S. and Soviet-built jet fighters were primarily designed for intercepting bombers, and then shooting them down with air-to-air missiles. With possibly a few exceptions, such as the U.S. Navy's F-8 Crusader and the U.S. Air Force's F-100 Super Sabre, which each mounted 4 20mm cannons, jets were not designed for dog fighting other jet aircraft. Soviet doctrine called for their interceptors to be strictly vectored towards their targets by Ground Control Intercept (GCI) operators. As a consequence, U.S. RF-101 Voodoo's conducting reconnaissance missions, or F-102 Delta Daggers, F-104 Starfighters performing MiGCAP duties, and the strike aircraft themselves, such as F-105 Thunderchiefs, A-4 Skyhawks, A-6 Intruders, F-4 Phantoms, and B-52's flying over North Vietnam were met by MiG-17s (or Chicom J-5s), MiG-19s (Chicom J-6s), and MiG-21s being vectored directly to them by GCI operators who worked in conjunction with surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews. U.S. aircraft which successfully made it through the NVAF MiGs were then confronted with the SAMs and AAA batteries.
This triad defense system of GCI-controlled MiGs, Missiles (SAMs), and AAA enabled the North Vietnamese MiGs to utilize their aircraft's design capabilities as their designers had intended, that of, in the vernacular of the time, making "one pass, and then hauling ass", which was, in practice, quickly firing at their targets and then speeding away. By 1967 the Soviets had supplied the NVAF with enough missile-firing MiG-21s to allow the North Vietnamese to routinely engage U.S. aircraft, and to rely less and less on their aged MiG-17s, although many North Vietnamese pilots still preferred the MiG-17s agility and easy maintenance. With the arrival of the additional MiG-21s, and by 1969 MiG-19s (J-6s) imported from Red China, engagements between U.S. and NVAF jets became generally divided into two arenas; MiG-21s engaged at higher altitudes, while MiG-17s and MiG-19s would try to give battle at lower altitudes where their cannons were more effective.
At the conclusion of the air war in 1973, U.S. airmen had downed 202 communist MiGs, including 2 downed by B-52 tailgunners from their quad .50 caliber machine guns; this at a cost of 90 U.S. aircraft to NVAF MiGs. The USAF claimed 137 MiGs while the USN/USMC brought down 65 in air-to-air combat. From these figures, the USAF had 40 gun kills, and the USN claimed 8 cannon victories. This number approached parity with the NVAF MiG's 37 gun kill figures.
Approximately 612 radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow missiles were fired during the war, scoring 56 MiG kills, while 454 heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinders were launched achieving 81 aerial victories. During Operation Rolling Thunder 54 AIM-4 Falcon missiles were fired, obtaining 5 kills. By contrast, NVAF MiG-21s obtained 53 air-to-air kills with their AA-2 "Atoll" missiles, from an unknown number of launchings. At least 3 MiG-21s, and all of the MiG-17s and MiG-19s (J-6s) made the remaining 37 kills, from their 90 total, with their 23mm, 30mm and 37mm cannons.
As part of the North Vietnamese triad system of defense, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had become an ever-increasing threat. U.S Air Force Brigadier General Robin Olds describes a typical encounter with surface-to-air missiles, which during a period of time in Vietnam was referred to as either a "MiG day" or a "Sam day", this was a Sam day.
Here come the SAMs. The trick is seeing the launch. You can see the steam. It goes straight up, turns more level, then the booster drops off. If it maintains a relatively stable position, it's coming right for you and you're in trouble. You're eager to make a move but can't. If you dodge too fast it will turn and catch you; if you wait too late it will explode near enough to get you. What you do at the right moment is poke your nose down, go down as hard as you can, pull maybe three negative Gs at 550 knots and once it follows you down, you go up as hard as you can. It can't follow that and goes under.
This passage from a USAF booklet explained a MiG day:
"If you know a MiG-21 is in your area or you lose sight of one and want to find it again: Roll out wings level for 15 seconds, then look in your 6 o'clock about 1.5 miles. It will be there. Probably you'll see mach 2 Atoll (air-to-air missile) smoke trail first before you see the MiG. But remember that's where the MiG-21 is! Just ask one of the 20 aircrews shot down during Linebacker that never knew they were under attack."
The Arab–Israeli conflicts were a series of wars between the country of Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors. Those that involved dogfighting occurred between 1948 and 1985. The wars escalated on 14 May 1948, the day Israel declared its sovereignty from Britain. The War of Independence was followed by the Suez-Sinai War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the First Lebanon War in the early 1980s.
The wars began with both sides using propeller planes, such as Spitfires, Avia S-199s, and P-51s, then progressed to older jets like MiG-15s, Dassault Mysteres and Dassault Mirages. In the latter wars dogfighting ensued between modern aircraft, like F-15s and F-16s against MiG-21s and MiG-25s. Although usually outnumbered, the Israelis managed to defeat the air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in dogfights, often achieving kill ratios ranging from 10:1 to over 20:1, which is usually attributed to better training of the Israeli pilots and a technological advantage.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 aircraft against its own losses of 19, while India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own. Despite the intense fighting, the conflict was effectively a stalemate.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
By late 1971, the intensification of the independence movement in erstwhile East Pakistan lead to the Bangladesh Liberation War between India and Pakistan . On 22 November 1971, 10 days before the start of a full-scale war, four PAF F-86 Sabre jets attacked Indian and Mukti Bahini positions at Garibpur, near the international border. Two of the four PAF Sabres were shot down and one damaged by the IAF's Folland Gnats. On 3 December, India formally declared war against Pakistan following massive preemptive strikes by the PAF against Indian Air Force installations in Srinagar, Ambala, Sirsa, Halwara and Jodhpur. However, the IAF did not suffer significantly because the leadership had anticipated such a move and precautions were taken. The Indian Air Force was quick to respond to Pakistani air strikes, following which the PAF carried out mostly defensive sorties.
Within the first two weeks, the IAF had carried out almost 12,000 sorties over East Pakistan and also provided close air support to the advancing Indian Army. IAF also assisted the Indian Navy in its operations against the Pakistani Navy and Maritime Security Agency in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. On the western front, the IAF destroyed more than 20 Pakistani tanks, 4 APCs and a supply train during the Battle of Longewala. The IAF undertook strategic bombing of West Pakistan by carrying out raids on oil installations in Karachi, the Mangla Dam and a gas plant in Sindh. Similar strategy was also deployed in East Pakistan and as the IAF achieved complete air superiority on the eastern front, the ordnance factories, runways, and other vital areas of East Pakistan were severely damaged. By the time Pakistani forces surrendered, the IAF destroyed 94 PAF aircraft The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing; and reconnaissance. In contrast, the Pakistan Air Force, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent’s skies within the first week of the war. Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight. Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), and the independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was confirmed. The IAF had flown over 16,000 sorties on both East and West fronts; including sorties by transport aircraft and helicopters. while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close-support and interdiction, and according to neutral assessments about 45 IAF aircraft were lost while, Pakistan lost 75 aircraft. Not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors. But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 9,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan. Towards the end of the war, IAF's transport planes dropped leaflets over Dhaka urging the Pakistani forces to surrender, demoralising Pakistani troops in East Pakistan.
The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas) began on 2 April 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland islands (Spanish: Islas Malvinas), and then the island of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which were small disputed British dependencies. Because Britain had no military bases nearby, and few aircraft carriers, the Argentinians did not expect a response from Britain, but on 5 April the British sent carriers sailing to the Falklands with Sea Harrier 'Jump-jets' on board. The Sea Harrier, being initially designed as a ground-attack fighter, was equipped not for dogfighting but for Soviet bomber interception; thus the aircraft had to undergo many modifications, and the pilots needed extra training.
The Argentinians had superior numbers, but their forces mainly consisted of older jets from the 1960s, such as Dassault Mirage IIIs and Israeli Daggers. The Argentinians were also handicapped by the long distance from mainland airfields and a lack of refuelling tankers. Neither side was ready for war, but both prepared all through April as diplomacy failed. The fighting started on May 1, and was to become the largest naval and air conflict since World War II. By the end of the war, Argentina lost 20 fighters in dogfights, while Britain only lost one Sea Harrier to ground fire. The Americans supplied late model Sidewinder missiles to the British; this and the analysis of French Mirage combat tactics made the difference.
In the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 (also known as first Gulf War) many dogfights happened between Iranian Air Force and Saddam Hussein's Iraq Air Force. At early years of the war IRIAF had the superiority (see for example Operation Sultan 10 and Operation Morvarid); however, at the end of the war, Iranian Air Force lost its superiority due to the lack of their western made aircraft spare parts and outdated equipment, while Iraq was introducing new French and Soviet weapons in its air force.
The Iran–Iraq War also saw the only confirmed helicopter dogfights in history, with Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1J Internationals (usually the TOW-capable ones) entering combat against Iraqi Army Air Corps' Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships. Hinds are stronger and faster, while AH-1Js are more agile. The result of the skirmishes are disputed. There were even engagements between Iranian AH-1J and Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft. The AH-1Js scored three confirmed kills against MiG-21s, claimed a Su-20, and shared in the destruction of a MiG-23—all using their 20 mm calibre canon.
Persian Gulf War
In the Gulf War of 1990–91, dogfighting once again proved its usefulness when the Coalition Air Force had to face off against the Iraqi Air Force, which at the time was the fifth largest in the world. By the second day of the war, the Coalition achieved air superiority. Many dogfights occurred during the short conflict, often involving many planes. By the end of January, 1991, the term "furball" became a popular word to describe the hectic situation of many dogfights, occurring at the same time within the same relatively small airspace. By the end of the war, the U.S. claimed 39 Iraqi aircraft in air-to-air victories to the loss of only one F/A-18 and one drone. Of the 39 victories, 36 were taken by F-15 Eagles.
During the Balkans conflict, in 1999 (the Kosovo War), five MiG-29s of the Yugoslav Air Force were shot down in dogfights with NATO aircraft. The first was on the 24th of March by a Dutch F-16AM Falcon and two were downed on the same night by U.S. F-15s. A day later two more MiG 29's were shot down by an F-16 and F-15.
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