This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these template messages)(Learn how and when to remove this template message)
|Part of a series on|
The Jain list of pramanas (valid sources of knowledge) includes sense perception, valid testimony, extra-sensory perception, telepathy, and kevala, the state of omniscience of a perfected soul. Inference, which most other Indian epistemologies include, is interestingly absent from this list. However, discussion of the pramanas seem to indicate that inference is implied in the pramana that provides the premises for inference. That is, inference from things learned by the senses is itself knowledge gained from the senses; inference from knowledge gained by testimony is itself knowledge gained by testimony, etc. Later Jain thinkers would add inference as a separate category, along with memory and tarka or logical reasoning.
Since reality is multi-faceted, none of the pramanas gives absolute or perfect knowledge. Consequently, all knowledge is only tentative and provisional. This is expressed in Jain philosophy in the doctrine of naya, or partial predication (also known as the doctrine of perspectives or viewpoints). This insight generates a sevenfold classification of predications, which can be schematized as follows:
- Perhaps a is F (syat asti).
- Perhaps a is not-F (syat nasti).
- Perhaps a is both F and not-F (syat asti-nasti).
- Perhaps a is indescribable (syat avaktavyam).
- Perhaps a is indescribable and F (syat asti-avaktavyam).
- Perhaps a is indescribable and not-F (syat nasti-avaktavyam).
- Perhaps a is indescribable, and both F and not-F (syat asti-nasti-avaktavyam).
'Perhaps' here is used as a translation of syat which can also be translated as ‘from a perspective,’ or ‘somehow.’
Early Jain texts (e.g. Tattvartha Sutra) indicate that for any object and any predicate, all seven of these predications are true. Hence, for every object a and every predicate F, there is some circumstance in which, or perspective from which, it is correct to make claims of each of these forms. This view has been criticized (by Shankaracharya, among others) on the ground of inconsistency. While both a proposition and its negation may well be assertable, the conjunction, being a contradiction, cannot. This leads some commentators to understand the syat operator to mean ‘from a perspective.’ Since it may well be that from one perspective, a is F, and from another, a is not-F, then one and the same person can appreciate those facts and assert them both together. Given the multifaceted nature of the real, every object is in one way F, and in another way not-F.
One problem with this epistemology is that it seems to be self-defeating. If reality is multifaceted, the doctrines that underlie Jain epistemology are themselves equally tentative. The doctrine itself must then fall short of complete accuracy. Therefore, we should say, "Perhaps (or “from a perspective") reality is multifaceted." At the same time, "Perhaps reality is not multifaceted." Jain epistemology gains assertibility for its own doctrine, but at the cost of being unable to deny contradictory doctrines.
In SN 12.17 it says: "'He who performs the act also experiences' — what you, Kassapa, first called "suffering caused by oneself" — this amounts to the Eternalist theory. 'One person performs the act, another experiences,' — which to the person affected seems like "suffering caused by another" — this amounts to the Annihilationist theory. Avoiding both extremes, Kassapa, the Tathagata teaches a doctrine of the middle."
These Sutras express two extreme views: 'Eternalism' and 'Annihilationism' (Pali: sassatavāda / ucchedavāda ; Skt: śāśvatavāda / ucchedavāda; Tib: རྟག་མཐའ and ཆད་མཐའ) collectively known as the two extremes (Skt: dvayānta, Tib: མཐའ་གཉིས) which correlate to 'asti/nasti' found in contemporaneous Jain (and other) philosophy. Both of these views are considered extremes and are denied in Buddhism. Instead, these Sutras assert the view called 'the doctrine of the middle'.
Pramana, forms one part of a tripuţi (trio) concerning pramā (the correct knowledge of any object arrived at by thorough reasoning, Sanskrit), namely,
Pramātā (< pramātŗ), the subject, the knower Pramāņa, the means of obtaining the knowledge Prameya, the object, the knowable