Egyptian Armed Forces
|Egyptian Armed Forces|
|القوات المسلحة المصرية|
Emblem of the Egyptian Armed Forces
|Motto||Victory or Martyrdom|
|Service branches|| Egyptian Army|
Egyptian Air Force
Egyptian Air Defense Forces
|Supreme Commander||Abdel Fattah el-Sisi|
|Minister of Defence & Commander-in-Chief||Mohamed Ahmed Zaki|
|Chief of Staff||Mohammed Farid Hegazy|
|Conscription||1–3 years depending on circumstances|
|Budget||US$7.4–11.1 billion (2019)|
(incl. $1.3 billion of U.S. military aid)
|Percent of GDP||2–3% (2019)|
|Domestic suppliers||Arab Organization for Industrialization Alexandria Shipyard|
|Foreign suppliers|| United States|
Air Force ranks
The Egyptian Armed Forces are the state military organisation responsible for the defense of Egypt. They consist of the Egyptian Army, Egyptian Navy, Egyptian Air Force and Egyptian Air Defense Forces.
The President of the Republic serves as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the senior uniformed officer, is Colonel General Mohamed Zaki (since June 2018), and the Chief of Staff is Lieutenant General. Mohammed Farid Hegazy (since October 2017).
Senior members of the military can convene the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, such as during the course of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, when President Mubarak resigned and transferred power to this body on February 11, 2011.
The armament of the Egyptian armed forces varies between eastern and western sources through weapons deliveries by several countries, led by the United States, Russia, France, China, Italy, Ukraine and Britain. Many of the equipment is manufactured locally at Egyptian factories. The Egyptian armed forces celebrate their anniversary on October 6 each year to commemorate the Crossing of the Suez during the October War of 1973.
The modern Egyptian armed forces have been involved in numerous crises and wars since independence, from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Suez Crisis, North Yemen Civil War, Six-Day War, Nigerian Civil War, War of Attrition, Yom Kippur War, Egyptian bread riots, 1986 Egyptian conscripts riot, Libyan–Egyptian War, Gulf War, War on Terror, Egyptian Crisis, Second Libyan Civil War, War on ISIL and the Sinai insurgency.
In the early 1950s, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion. The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was a purely political appointee who owed his position to his close friendship with Nasser. He would prove himself grossly incompetent as a general during the Suez Crisis. Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them. Tsouras writes that the Israelis "seized and held the ..initiative throughout the campaign and quickly destroyed the Egyptian defenses." In a few instances, such as at the Mitla Pass and Abu Aghelia, Egyptian defenses were well-organised and stubbornly held, but this did not make enough difference overall. Nasser ordered a retreat from the Sinai which allowed the Israelis to wreak havoc and drive on the Canal; on 5 November British and French parachute landings began in the Canal Zone; but by 7 November U.S. pressure had forced an end to the fighting.
Before the June 1967 War, the army divided its personnel into four regional commands (Suez, Sinai, Nile Delta, and Nile Valley up to the Sudan). The remainder of Egypt's territory, over 75%, was the sole responsibility of the Frontier Corps.
In May 1967, President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to passage of Israeli ships. Israel considered the closure of the straits grounds for war and prepared their armed forces to attack. On June 3, three battalions of Egyptian commandos were flown to Amman to take part in operations from Jordan. But U.S. historian Trevor N. Dupuy, writing in 1978, argues from King Hussein of Jordan's memoirs that Nasser did not intend to start an immediate war, but instead was happy with his rhetorical and political accomplishments of the past weeks. Nevertheless, Israel felt it needed to take action.
The Egyptian army then comprised two armoured and five infantry divisions, all deployed in the Sinai.  In the weeks before the Six-Day War began, Egypt made several significant changes to its military organisation. Field Marshal Amer created a new command interposed between the general staff and the Eastern Military District commander, Lieutenant General Salah ad-Din Muhsin. This new Sinai Front Command was placed under General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi, who had returned from Yemen in May 1967. Six of the seven divisions in the Sinai (with the exception of the 20th Infantry 'Palestinian' Division) had their commanders and chiefs of staff replaced. What fragmentary information is available suggests to authors such as Pollack that Amer was trying to improve the competence of the force, replacing political appointees with veterans of the Yemen war.
After the war began on 5 June 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, destroyed its air force on the ground, and occupied the Sinai Peninsula. The forward deployed Egyptian forces were shattered in three places by the attacking Israelis. Field Marshal Amer, overwhelmed by events, and ignoring previous plans, ordered a retreat by the Egyptian Army to the Suez Canal. This developed into a rout as the Israelis harried the retreating troops from the ground and from the air.
In July 1972, President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet Armed Forces advisors from Egypt. The Soviet advisors had previously had significant access and influence. When the Yom Kippur War began in October 1973, the Egyptians were initially successful in crossing the Suez Canal and establishing a bridgehead on the eastern bank. In the costly and brutal Battle of the Chinese Farm, the Israeli Defence Force shouldered aside portions of the Second Army on the eastern bank, then crossed the canal and rapidly advanced, destroying surface-to-air missile sites and then cutting off the Third Army. Peace was only imposed after the United States and Soviet Union stepped in.
When Sadat and the Israelis made peace in the Camp David Accords of September 1978, part of the quid pro quo for the Egyptians accepting peace was that the U.S. would provide substantial military assistance to Egypt. Today the U.S. provides annual military assistance often quoted at some nominal $1.3 billion to the Egyptian armed forces ($1.55 billion in 2020). This level is second only to Israel.
Scholars such as Kenneth Pollack, deAtkine, and Robert Springborg have identified a number of reasons why Arab (and Egyptian) armies performed so poorly against Israel from 1948 to 1991 and afterwards. In battle against Israel from 1948–91, junior officers consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to manoeuvre, ‘innovate, improvise, take initiative, or act independently’. Ground forces units suffered from constant manipulation of information and an inattention to intelligence gathering and objective analysis. Units from the two divisions dispatched to Saudi Arabia in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, consistently reported fierce battles even though they actually encountered little or no resistance. This occurred whether or not they were accompanied by U.S. military personnel or journalists. Later researchers such as Springborg have confirmed that the tendencies identified in the 1980s and 1990s persist in the Armed Forces in the twenty-first century.
In the second decade of the 21st century, the Armed Forces enjoy considerable power and independence within the Egyptian state. They are also influential in business, engaging in road and housing construction, consumer goods, resort management, and own vast tracts of real estate. A significant amount of military information is not made publicly available, including budget information, the names of the general officers and the military’s size (which is considered a state secret). According to journalist Joshua Hammer, "as much as 40% of the Egyptian economy" is controlled by the Egyptian armed forces, and other authoritative works such as Springborg reinforce this trend.
Egypt is a participant in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue forum.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the President of the Republic, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a former Army officer (as have been most Presidents of Egypt). All branches, forces, armies, regions, bodies, organs and departments of the Armed Forces are under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who is at the same time the Minister of Defense.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCA) is composed of 23 members, chaired by the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense, and is represented by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Commanders of military areas (central, northern, western, southern), heads of bodies (operations, armament, logistics, engineering, training, finance, military justice, Armed Forces Management and Administration), directors of my departments (officers and Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance), and assistant secretary of defense for constitutional and legal affairs. The Secretary of the Board is the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense.
Conscripts for the Egyptian Army and other service branches without a university degree serve three years as enlisted soldiers. Conscripts with a General Secondary School Degree serve two years as enlisted personnel. Conscripts with a university degree serve one year as enlisted personnel or three years as a reserve officer. Officers for the army are trained at the Egyptian Military Academy.
The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) is the aviation branch of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Currently, the backbone of the EAF is the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. The Mirage 2000 is the other modern interceptor used by the EAF. The Egyptian Air Force has 216 F-16s (plus 20 on order). It has about 579 combat aircraft and 149 armed helicopters as it continues to fly extensively upgraded MiG-21s, F-7 Skybolts, F-4 Phantoms, Dassault Mirage Vs, and the C-130 Hercules among other planes. Egypt currently operates 24 Dassault Rafale a French twin-engine fighter aircraft as of 2019.
Air Defense Forces
The Egyptian Air Defense Forces or ADF (Quwwat El Diffaa El Gawwi in Arabic) is Egypt's military command responsible for air defense. Egypt patterned its Air Defense Force (ADF) after the Soviet Air Defence Force, which integrated all its air defense capabilities – antiaircraft guns, rocket and missile units, interceptor planes, and radar and warning installations. It appears to comprise five subordinate divisions, 110 surface-to-air missile battalions, and 12 anti-aircraft artillery brigades. Personnel quality may be 'several notches below' that of the Air Force personnel.
The Egyptian Navy existed thousands of years ago, specifically during the Early Dynastic period in 2800 BC, However, Egyptians had boats and ships centuries before but were weaker and only used for transportation through the Nile River. As the Ancient Egyptian state declined both Army and Navy were abolished.
During the early modern era, in 1805 Muhammad Ali of Egypt became the Wali of the country forming his own autonomous rule over Egypt to build the empire he always wished, and to build it he needed a strong military so he managed to build prepare that military starting with the army then the Navy. During his reign the Navy already existed but it was only used for troop transportation, its first engagement was during the Wahhabi War where it was used to transport troops from Egypt to Yanbu in Hejaz. Later in 1815, Muhammad Ali built Alexandria Shipyard to build warships not just transport ships. The Navy then participated in the Greek War of Independence where in 1827 it had over 100 warships and hundreds of transport ships. after the Second World War. Some fleet units are stationed in the Red Sea, but the bulk of the force remained in the Mediterranean. Navy headquarters and the main operational and training base are located at Ras el Tin near Alexandria.
The current commander is Vice Admiral Ahmed Khaled Hassan Saeed, who relieved Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish. The Chief of Staff of the Navy is Rear Admiral Mohamed Abdel Aziz El Sayed.
The Navy also controls the Egyptian Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is responsible for the onshore protection of public installations near the coast and the patrol of coastal waters to prevent smuggling. The IISS Military Balance 2017 listed the Coast Guard with 2,000 personnel, 14 fast patrol boats (PBF) and 65 patrol boats (including 15 Swiftships, 21 Timsah, three Type-89 and nine Peterson-class.
The Armed Forces Medical Service Department provides many military health services. The Armed Forces College of Medicine in Heliopolis, Cairo, provides medical training. As of February 2020, the AFCM commandant was Maj. Gen. Dr. Amr Hegab.
Egypt also maintains 397,000 paramilitary troops. The Central Security Forces comes under the control of the Ministry of Interior. As of 2017, the Egyptian Border Guard Corps falls under the control of the Ministry of Interior as well. Circa 2017, according to the IISS Military Balance 2017, they comprised an estimated 12,000, in 18 border regiments, with light weapons only (IISS 2017, p.375).
Military equipment and industry
The inventory of the Egyptian armed forces includes equipment from the United States, France, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. This wide range of sources can cause serviceability difficulties. Equipment from the Soviet Union is being progressively replaced by more modern U.S., French, and British equipment, a significant portion of which is built under license in Egypt, such as the M1A1 Abrams tank.
The Arab Organization for Industrialization supervises nine military factories which produce civilian goods as well as military products. Initially the owners of AOI were the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, before the latter governments gave their shares back to Egypt in 1993, valued at $1.8 billion. AOI now is entirely owned by the government of Egypt. AOI has about 19,000 employees out of which are 1250 engineers. AOI fully owns 10 factories and shares in 2 joint ventures, plus the Arab Institute for Advanced Technology
There is an undergraduate military school for each branch of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and they include:
- Commanders and Staff College
- Reserve Officer College
- Nasser Higher Military Academy
- Egyptian Military Academy
- Egyptian Naval Academy
- Egyptian Air Academy
- Egyptian Air Defense Academy
- Egyptian Military Technical College
- Armed Forces Technical Institute
- Armed Forces Institute for NCOs
- Armed Forces Institute for Nursery
- Thunderbolt School
- Airborne School (Egypt)
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