English tort law
English tort law concerns civil wrongs, as distinguished from criminal wrongs, in the law of England and Wales. Some wrongs are the concern of the state, and so the police can enforce the law on the wrongdoers in court – in a criminal case. A tort is not enforced by the police, and it is a civil action taken by one citizen against another, and tried in a court in front of a judge (only rarely, in certain cases of defamation, with a jury). Tort derives from middle English for "injury", from Anglo-French, from Medieval Latin tortum, from Latin, neuter of tortus "twisted", from past participle of torquēre.
- 1 History
- 2 Negligence
- 3 Specific torts
- 4 Vicarious liability
- 5 Remedies
- 6 Theory and reform
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
|Part of a series on common law|
|English tort law|
Following Roman law, the English system has long been based on a closed system[clarification needed] of nominate torts, such as trespass, battery and conversion. This is in contrast to continental legal systems, which have since adopted more open systems of tortious liability. There are various categories of tort, which lead back to the system of separate causes of action. The tort of negligence is however increasing in importance over other types of tort, providing a wide scope of protection, especially since Donoghue v Stevenson. For liability under negligence a duty of care must be established owed to a group of persons to which the victim belongs, a nebulous concept into which many other categories are being pulled.
Liability for negligence arises when one person breaches a duty of care owed to another. The landmark case of Donoghue v Stevenson, is the starting point for defining the current scope of liability. In this case, Ms Donoghue, the claimant, consumed part of a drink containing a decomposed snail, in a public house in Paisley, Scotland. The snail was not visible, as the bottle of ginger beer in which it was contained was opaque. Neither her friend, who purchased the drink for Ms Donoghue, nor the shopkeeper, were aware of the snail's presence. Ms Donoghue could not sue the shopkeeper for breach of contract or under consumer protection legislation as the drink was purchased by her friend, so she pursued Mr Stevenson instead, the manufacturer of the drink.
The members of the House of Lords agreed that Mrs. Donoghue had a valid claim, but disagreed as to why such a claim should exist. Lord MacMillan, as above, thought this should be treated as a new product liability case. Lord Atkin argued that the law should recognise a unifying principle that we owe a duty of reasonable care to our neighbour. He quoted the Bible in support of his argument, specifically the general, biblical principle that "love thy neighbour."
"The liability for negligence… is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay… The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour."
Thus, in the world of law, he created the doctrine that we should not harm our neighbours. The elements of negligence are:
- A duty of care (see Donoghue v Stevenson)
- Breach of that duty (see Nettleship v Weston)
- Breach causing harm in fact (see Smith v Leech Brain & Co.)
- The harm must be not too remote a consequence of the breach (see The Wagon Mound (No. 2))
Duty of care
The establishment of a duty of care is, like negligence itself, broken up into further elements, a three-step test (or in some cases more). Donoghue v Stevenson laid the groundwork for subsequent developments, and from the words of Lord Atkin's speech, he can be seen to refer to firstly, the concept of reasonable foreseeability of harm; secondly, the claimant and the defendant being in a relationship of proximity; and thirdly, and more loosely, it being fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on the defendant for his careless actions. This three step scheme however, did not crystallise until the case of Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman. In this somewhat complicated case, a company called Caparo took over another company, by buying up a majority of its shares. It did this because it sneakily obtained word from a company audit that the target was financially sound. The audit was prepared by a group of accountants (Dickman) and was intended for shareholders, not outsiders. Once Caparo owned the company it found that the finances were in fact pretty shoddy, and so it sued the accountants for being negligent in its audit preparation. The House of Lords found against Caparo, and established the current threefold test. Although it was "reasonably foreseeable" that outsiders might learn of the carelessly prepared information, it was not the case that Caparo and Dickman were in a relationship of "proximity". This the court used as a term of art (note, this is different from the American use of the word), to say that it should not be the case that absolutely anyone hearing something said that was stupid and acted on it can sue. The court was reacting to its concern that to allow a claim here might open the floodgates of litigation. The third element, whether liability would be "fair, just and reasonable" was an extra hurdle added, as a catch all discretionary measure for the judiciary to block further claims.
Breach of duty
Once a duty of care has been established, it must be shown that a duty has been breached. The question the courts ask is whether the behaviour exhibited by the defendant fell below the threshold of a "reasonable man" (the objective test). In some cases where the defendant was in a special profession, e.g. being a doctor, the court will ask what standard of care a "reasonable doctor" or the like might have done. Allowance is usually made for the defendants age and a lower standard of a "reasonable child of a certain age" is applied to children. On the other hand, no allowance is made for other personal circumstances, such as the fact that the defendant was inexperienced in the task he set out to perform. He is expected to perform this task as a reasonably skilled and competent person.
Causation and remoteness
Causation is complex, and is usually discussed in two parts. Simple causation is a question of whether "but for" the action by the defendant harm would have resulted. There has been some deal of discussion over whether a contributory cause is enough.
- Barnett v Kensington & Chelsea NHS Trust
- McGhee v National Coal Board
- Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority
- Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd
- Gregg v Scott
After the complexities under the "but for" test have been addressed, the courts may still deny compensation if the harm was a very remote consequence of the initial wrong. So long as a type of damage is foreseeable, however, the manner in which it occurred – however remote – is of no concern to the courts.
- Scott v Shepherd (1773) 96 ER 525
- Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co  3 KB 560
- Wagon Mound (No.1)  AC 388
- Hughes v Lord Advocate  AC 837
Finding a successful defence absolves the defendant from full or partial liability for damages, which makes them valuable commodities in the court. There are three main defences to tortious liability are to argue the claimant voluntarily undertook the risk of his harm, that he contributed to the harm, or that he engaged in illegal activity.
Volenti non fit injuria is Latin for "to the willing, no injury is done". It operates when the claimant either expressly or implicitly consents to the risk of loss or damage. For example, if a regular spectator at an ice hockey match is injured when a player strikes the puck in the ordinary course of play, causing it to fly out of the rink and hit him or her, this is a foreseeable event and regular spectators are assumed to accept that risk of injury when buying a ticket. A slightly more limited defence may arise where the defendant has been given a warning, whether expressly to the plaintiff/claimant or by a public notice, sign or otherwise, that there is a danger of injury. The extent to which defendants can rely on notices to exclude or limit liability varies from country to country. This is an issue of policy as to whether defendants should not only warn of a known danger, but also take active steps to fence the site and take other reasonable precautions to prevent the known danger from befalling those foreseen to be at risk.
Contributory negligence is a mitigatory defence, whereby a claimant's damages are reduced in accordance with the percentage of contribution made by the claimant to the loss or damage suffered. Thus, in evaluating a collision between two vehicles, for example, if the wronged driver were not wearing a seatbelt, he would most likely be contributorily negligent. The court will then quantify the damages for the actual loss or damage sustained, and then reduce the amount paid to the claimant by 20%. Contributory negligence can also function as a full defence, when it is assessed at 100%, as in Jayes v IMI Kynoch.
Ex turpi causa non oritur actio is the illegality defence, the Latin for "no right of action arises from a despicable cause". If the claimant is involved in wrongdoing at the time the alleged negligence occurred, this may extinguish or reduce the defendant's liability. Thus, if a burglar is verbally challenged by the property owner and sustains injury when jumping from a second story window to escape apprehension, there is no cause of action against the property owner even though that injury would not have been sustained "but for" the property owner's intervention. However, a trespasser may be able to recover damages due to the unsafe state of the premises (see Occupiers' Liability below).
Historically, English courts have been reluctant to allow claims for nervous shock. Early claims involved ladies who suffered what the courts referred to as a "malady of the mind." It was not expected for men to succumb to such problems.
Today, courts are considerably less cautious but additional hurdles are still imposed upon claimants under certain circumstances. The following criteria must be satisfied:
- The injury must have been an event caused by the defendant – the defendant must have owed a duty of care to the claimant, but not a unilateral duty covering every eventuality, and it must have been precisely identified what duty was owed and whether the harm could have been foreseen.
- The claimant must have been involved in the injury (i.e. proximity must be demonstrated).
- The event must have caused a recognised psychiatric injury (e.g. pathological grief (Vernon v Bosley or post-traumatic stress disorder (Leach v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire).
The courts had been cautious for a number of reasons, including the fear of floodgates (indeterminate liability), potential for fraud (brought on by people exaggerating their claims), problems of proof and diagnosis (including the costs of expert opinion), psychiatric illness may be considered less serious than physical harm, the claimant is often a secondary victim, and finally, the courts argued that Parliament is better suited to dealing with this area.
But recently, in many cases, it has been recognised that psychiatric injury is more dangerous than physical injury. Claims can arise in a number of circumstances:
In the case of Dulieu v White  2 KB 669, the claimant, Mrs Dulieu, was working in a public house. While she was serving, the defendant negligently drove his horse-drawn van into the bar. She suffered shock which resulted in a miscarriage, and she sued the defendant. Mr White was held liable for causing nervous shock resulting in miscarriage, as the claimant reasonably believed herself to be in danger.
Similarly, in Page v Smith  AC 155, it was held that Mr Smith was liable for causing Mr Page psychiatric injury (chronic fatigue syndrome) after a car crash, because Mr Smith could have reasonably foreseen that Mr Page would suffer physical injury for the crash. So liability for causing psychiatric injury depends on the foreseeability of the physical injury, as long as the psychiatric illness is medically recognised.
In Young v Charles Church (Southern LTD)(1997) 39 BMLR 146, the claimant was a "participant" in the event (i.e. a primary victim – Evans & Hitchinson LJJ). He and Mr Cook were raising scaffolding poles in an area that was not secured by the employers; the power lines were not switched off. Mr Cook touched a pole to the electric wiring and suffered a horrific death which caused Mr Young great distress. Even though he never feared for the loss of his own life, the court held that Mr Young was in the area of potential damage, so he was entitled to claim compensation.
Finally, in McLoughlin v Jones  QB 1312, there was an allegation that Mr McLoughlin was a bad landlord, threatening and beating up tenants to get their rent from them in cash. He was charged for a criminal offence and sentenced to prison. He claimed that his solicitors (Jones and Others) had acted without the evidence, especially the witness-statement of a person who knew that Mr McLoughlin was not present when the beatings allegedly took place. It soon became apparent that he was actually an upstanding member of society and he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of the imprisonment and loss of reputation. (Note that solicitors have a pre-existing duty of care towards their clients.)
The case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police established a Proximities-Control Device consisting of three stages to establish whether a secondary victim can succeed.
- Foreseeability – there must be a close relationship of love and affection between the secondary victim and the primary victim.
- Proximity – there must be temporal and spatial proximity between the claimant and the accident
- How the accident was caused, or proximity of perception.
Case-law where this test applies includes McLoughlin v O'Brian  AC 410, in which the husband and children of the claimant were involved in a car accident that was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The claimant found out about the accident an hour later and, when she got to the hospital two hours later, one child had already died. She saw her husband and children suffering and suffered shock, depression and a change of personality. The court established a spectrum of proximity; a pedestrian should be able to withstand seeing the accidents that occur in everyday life, but a family member of the victims will inevitably suffer greater emotional harm. Nonetheless, simply seeing the aftermath of the accident and not witnessing it is insufficient proximity. Similarly, seeing a video of the accident is insufficient.
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992) HL was a 'test' case in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, where 95 spectators were crushed to death and 400 injured in a stadium. The event was televised and broadcast on radio. In Alcock, claims for damages for psychiatric illness were brought by fifteen relatives of the victims of the tragedy; some of them had been present at the match - but not in the area where the disaster occurred - and others had seen it on television or heard it on the radio. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police denied that he owed the claimants a duty of care. On the basis of the three principles mentioned above, all claims were ruled out.
Pure economic loss
- Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd  QB 27
- Murphy v Brentwood District Council  1 AC 398
- Aswan Engineering Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd  1 WLR 1
- Smith v Eric S Bush  1 AC 831
|This section requires expansion. (June 2008)|
|This section requires expansion. (June 2008)|
Omissions and third parties
In consumer protection, with the Product Liability Directive in the European Union, where businesses making defective products that harm people must pay for any damage resulting. Liability for defective products is strict (see strict liability) in most jurisdictions. The theory of risk spreading provides support for this approach. Since manufacturers are the 'cheapest cost avoiders', because they have a greater chance to seek out problems, it makes sense to give them the incentive to guard against product defects.
Occupiers' Liability is another example. Governed by the Occupier's Liability Acts, 1957 and 1984 whereby an occupier, such as a shop owner, who invites others onto land, or has trespassers, owes a minimum duty of care for people's safety. One early case was Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland  AC 229, in which Lord Macnaughton felt that children who were hurt whilst looking for berries on a building site, should have some compensation for their unfortunate curiosity.
Other statutory torts
Other statutory torts can be found in regulation concerning food safety, health and safety and environmental law. For example, liability under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, or liability imposed on utility (gas and electricity) companies to ensure the safety of their products, all of which are strict liability. While a statute has said nothing specific, a tortious duty may have arisen. This will be a question of statutory interpretation (e.g. Stovin v Wise  AC 923).
The tort of nuisance allows a claimant (formerly plaintiff) to sue for most acts that interfere with their use and enjoyment of their land. A good example of this is in the case of Jones v Powell (1629). A brewery made stinking vapors waft to neighbours' property, damaging his papers. Because he was a landowner, the neighbour sued in nuisance for this damage. But Whitelocke J, speaking for the Court of the King's Bench, said that because the water supply was contaminated, it was better that the neighbour's documents were risked. He said "it is better that they should be spoiled than that the common wealth stand in need of good liquor." Nowadays, interfering with neighbours' property is not looked upon so kindly. Nuisance deals with all kinds of things that spoil a landowner's enjoyment of his property.
Rylands v Fletcher
A subset of nuisance is known as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher where a dam burst into a coal mine shaft. So a dangerous escape of some hazard, including water, fire, or animals means strict liability in nuisance. This is subject only to a remoteness cap, familiar from negligence when the event is unusual and unpredictable. This was the case where chemicals from a factory seeped through a floor into the water table, contaminating East Anglia's reservoirs.
A trespass is a direct injury to a person, his property or land, committed directly and intentionally by the defendant, for example, walking on someone's land is not tresspass but cutting a gate into pieces with a saw is. However, this rule did not cater for anything injured indirectly by a person, for example if a farmer sets fire to a field, and someone's home is subsequently damaged. Trespass by the case did, however, provide a legal writ for injury caused indirectly by an action.
Defamation means tarnishing the reputation of someone. It is divided into two parts, slander and libel. Slander is spoken defamation and libel is defaming somebody through print (or broadcasting). Both share the same features. To defame someone, you must (a) make a factual assertion (b) for which you cannot provide evidence of its truth. Defamation does not affect the voicing of opinions, but comes into the same fields as rights to free speech in the European Convention's Article 10.
Intentional torts are any intentional acts that are reasonably foreseeable to cause harm to an individual, and that do so. Intentional torts have several subcategories, including tort(s) against the person, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. Property torts involve any intentional interference with the property rights of the claimant. Those commonly recognised include trespass to land, trespass to chattels, and conversion.
Economic torts and competition
Economic torts protect people from interference with their trade or business. The area includes the doctrine of restraint of trade and has largely been submerged in the twentieth century by statutory interventions on collective labour law and modern antitrust or competition law. The "absence of any unifying principle drawing together the different heads of economic tort liability has often been remarked upon."
Two cases demonstrated economic tort's affinity to competition and labour law. In Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. the plaintiff argued he had been driven from the Chinese tea market by competitors at a 'shipping conference' that had acted together to underprice his company. But this cartel was ruled lawful and "nothing more [than] a war of competition waged in the interest of their own trade." Nowadays, this would be considered a criminal cartel. In labour law the most notable case is Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. The House of Lords thought that unions should be liable in tort for helping workers to go on strike for better pay and conditions, but it riled workers so much that it led to the creation of the British Labour Party and the Trade Disputes Act 1906. Further torts used against unions include conspiracy, interference with a commercial contract or intimidation.
Through a recent development in common law, beginning with Hedley Byrne v Heller in 1964, and further through the Misrepresentations Act 1967, a victim of the tort of misrepresentation will be compensated for purely economic loss due to the misconception of the terms of the contract.
The English doctrine of restraint of trade was the catalyst for much of what is now called "competition laws" (or sometimes "antitrust"). These laws are a way of restraining those who would restrain "free competition" in the market economy, through monopolising production, setting up cartels, imposing unfair trading conditions, prices and so on. The English approach has traditionally been very flexible and liberal in its scope, but draconian when it did deem certain behaviour to be in restraint of trade. Many of these laws around the end of the nineteenth century were focused on the emasculation of trade unionism, until the reforming government of 1906 and the Trade Disputes Act 1906. Aside from the common law, legislation was introduced shortly after the second world war to foot policy on a statutory basis, the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948, followed later by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 and the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965.
Since 1972 however, the U.K. fell under the cross-border competition law regime of the European Community, which is found primarily in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of the European Community. Companies who form a cartel or collude to disrupt competition (Article 81) or abuse a dominant position on the market, for instance through a monopoly (Article 82) face fines from the public enforcement authorities, and in some cases a cause of action in tort, for the purposes of private enforcement may arise. A huge issue in the E.U. is whether to follow the U.S. approach of private damages actions to prevent anti-competitive conduct. In other words, the question is what should be seen as a private wrong (as was held in the vertical restraints case of Courage Ltd v Crehan) and what should be seen as a public wrong where only public enforcers are competent to impose penalties. In 1998 the United Kingdom brought its legislation up to date, with the Competition Act 1998, followed by the Enterprise Act 2002, a regime mirroring that of the European Union. The domestic enforcers are the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission.
|"If a slave man or woman damages any piece of someone else's property, then provided the person who suffers the loss was not himself partly to blame because of inexperience or careless conduct, the slave's owner must either make good the damage in full, or hand over the actual offender."|
|Plato, The Laws, Book 11, §25, Damage by slaves.|
Vicarious liability refers to the idea of an employer being liable for torts committed by their employees, generally for policy reasons, and to ensure that victims have a means of recovery. The word "vicarious" derives from the Latin for 'change' or 'alternation' and the old Latin for the doctrine is respondeat superior. To establish vicarious liability, the courts must find first that there exists a relationship of employee and employer. The torts of independent contractors generally do not impose vicarious liability on employers; however, Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Brothers Ltd demonstrates this principle does not apply where particularly hazardous activities are contracted for, or a non-delegable duty is owed. Secondly, the tort must have been committed 'in the course of employment'; or while an employee is going about the business of their employer. A preferred test of the courts for connecting torts to the course of employment was formulated by John William Salmond, which states that an employer will be held liable for either a wrongful act they have authorised, or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of an act that was authorised. Where in Limpus v London General Omnibus Company an omnibus driver chose to disobey strict instructions from his employer, to obstruct a rival company, they were still liable, as he was merely engaging in his duties in an unauthorised way. However, in the contrasting case of Beard v London General Omnibus Company, there was no liability where a conductor drove an omnibus negligently, as it was no part of his duties. Under the test, employers were generally not held liable for intentional torts of their employees. Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd established a newer test, stating that employers would be liable for torts which were closely connected to the duties of an employee.
The main remedy against tortious loss is compensation in 'damages' or money. In a limited range of cases, tort law will tolerate self-help, such as reasonable force to expel a trespasser. This is a defence against the tort of battery. Further, in the case of a continuing tort, or even where harm is merely threatened, the courts will sometimes grant an injunction. This means a command, for something other than money by the court, such as restraining the continuance or threat of harm.
For people who have died as a result of another person's tort, the damages that their estate or their families may gain is governed by the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (replacing the Fatal Accidents Act 1846). Under s.1A the spouse or dependent of a victim may receive £11,800 in bereavement damages.
As a remedy to tort, injunctions are most commonly used in cases of Nuisance. The court may impose an injunction on a tortfeasor, such as in Sturges v Bridgman. This legally obliges the tortfeasor to stop or reduce the activity causing the nuisance and its breach could, potentially, be a criminal offence. Injunctions may be used instead of or as well as the awarding of damages (above).
Theory and reform
Scholars and lawyers have identified conflicting aims for the law of tort, to some extent reflected in the different types of damages awarded by the courts: compensatory, aggravated and punitive or exemplary. In The Aims of the Law of Tort (1951), Glanville Williams saw four possible bases on which different torts rested: appeasement, justice, deterrence and compensation.
From the late 1950s a group of legally oriented economists and economically oriented lawyers emphasised incentives and deterrence, and identified the aim of tort as being the efficient distribution of risk. They are often described as the law and economics movement. Ronald Coase, one of the movement's principal proponents, submitted, in his article The Problem of Social Cost (1960), that the aim of tort should be to reflect as closely as possible liability where transaction costs should be minimised.
Calls for reform of tort law come from diverse standpoints reflecting diverse theories of the objectives of the law. Some calls for reform stress the difficulties encountered by potential claimants. Because of all people who have accidents, only some can find solvent defendants from which to recover damages in the courts, P. S. Atiyah has called the situation a "damages lottery". Consequently, in New Zealand, the government in the 1960s established a "no-fault" system of state compensation for accidents. Similar proposals have been the subject of Command Papers in the UK and much academic debate.
There is some overlap between crime and tort, since tort, a private action, used to be used more than criminal laws in centuries gone. For example, an assault is both a crime and a tort (a form of trespass to the person). A tort allows a person, usually the victim, to obtain a remedy that serves their own purposes (for example by the payment of damages to a person injured in a car accident, or the obtaining of injunctive relief to stop a person interfering with their business). Criminal actions on the other hand are pursued not to obtain remedies to assist a person — although often criminal courts do have power to grant such remedies — but to remove their liberty on the state's behalf. That explains why incarceration is usually available as a penalty for serious crimes, but not usually for torts.
-  AC 563, 561
-  AC 562
- Donoghue v Stevenson  A.C. 532, 580
- Caparo Industries plc v Dickman  Full text from BaiLII.org UKHL 2
- Blyth v Company Proprietors of the Birmingham Water Works (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781
- Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 2 All ER 118
- Mullin v Richards  1 All ER 920
- Nettleship v Weston  3 All ER 581, Wells v Cooper (1958) 2 All ER 527
-  ICR 155
- Jones v Powell (1629) 123 Eng. Rep. 1155
- Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Exch 265
- Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc  2 AC 264
- p.509 Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (2003 5th Ed.) OUP)
- Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) LR 23 QBD 598
- per Bowen LJ, (1889) LR 23 QBD 598, 614
- Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants  AC 426
- Quinn v Leatham  AC 495
- Torquay Hotels Ltd v Cousins 
- Rookes v Barnard  AC 1129
-  AC 465
- Although this area of law clearly overlaps with contract, misrepresentation is a tort as confirmed by Bridge LJ in Howard Marine and Dredging Co. Ltd. v A Ogden & Sons  QB 574
- Richard Whish, Competition Law (2003) 5th Ed., Lexis Nexis, Ch. 10
- C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan  ICR 457
- Steele, Jenny (2007). Tort Law: Text, Cases, & Materials. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924885-0., p. 567
- vicarious – Definition from the Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary
- Heuston, R.E.V.; Buckley, R.A. (1996). Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts. Sweet & Maxwell. ISBN 0-421-53350-1., p. 443
- Miller v Jackson 
- see, SI 2007/3489 Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sums) (England and Wales) Order) Art.2
- Williams, G.  "The Aims of the Law of Tort", Current Legal Problems 137
- Coase, R. H. (1960). "The Problem of Social Cost". The Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1): 1–44. doi:10.1086/466560., repreinted in Coase, R. H. (1990). The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago: Chicago University Press. pp. pp95–156. ISBN 0-226-11101-6., online version
- Atiyah, P. S. (1997) The Damages Lottery
- S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis, Tort Law (2003) 5th Ed. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-925711-6
- M Lunney, K Oliphant, Tort Law – Texts, Cases (2003) 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-926055-9
- Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law ISBN 1-84113-139-3