Epistemic conservatism is a view in epistemology about the structure of reasons or justification for belief. While there are various forms, epistemic conservatism is generally the view that a person's believing some claim is a reason in support of the claim, at least on the face of it. Others formulate epistemic conservatism as the view that one is, to some degree, justified in believing something simply because one believes it.
- Fumerton (2007), p. 63.
- Christensen (1994), p. 69.
References and further reading
- Christensen, David. (1994). "Conservatism in Epistemology", Noûs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar.), pp. 69–89.
- Fumerton, Richard. (2007). "Epistemic Conservatism: Theft or Honest Toil?", Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Vol. 2, ed. by Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-923706-9
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