Epistemic virtue

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The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one's own life and personal experiences. Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition. The list below[citation needed] substantially overlaps with his.

Being an epistemically virtuous person is often equated with being a critical thinker.[1]

Note that in this context curiosity bears the modern connotation of inquisitiveness, in contrast to the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things.

These can be contrasted to the epistemic vices such as:

Note that in this context curiosity bears the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things, in contrast to the positive studious (or perhaps inquisitive).

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Bishop, M., & Trout, J. D. 2004. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  2. ^ Greco, John. 2011. "Virtue Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. .


Other sources to consult
  • W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (InterVarsity Press, 1998)
  • Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2007)
  • Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
  • Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. Intellectual Virtue (Oxford University Press, 2003)

External links[edit]