From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Eurocentrism (also "Western-centrism"[1]) is a political term coined in the 1980s, referring to the notion of European exceptionalism, a worldview centered on Western civilization, as it had developed during the height of the European colonial empires since the Early Modern period.

The term Eurocentrism itself dates back to the late 1980s and became prevalent in the discourse of political correctness and cultural relativism during the 1990s, especially in the context of decolonization and development aid and humanitarian aid offered by industrialised countries ("First World") to developing countries ("Third World").


The adjective Eurocentric, or Europe-centric, has been in use, in various contexts, since at least the 1920s.[2] The term is popularised (in French as européocentrique) in the context of decolonization and internationalism in the mid 20th century.[3] English usage of Eurocentric as an ideological term in identity politics is current by the mid-1980s.[4]

The abstract noun Eurocentrism (French eurocentrisme, earlier europocentrisme) as the term for an ideology was coined in the 1970s by the Egyptian Marxian economist Samir Amin, then director of the "African Institute for Economic Development and Planning" of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.[5] Amin used the term in the context of a global, core-periphery or dependency model of capitalist development. English usage of Eurocentrism is recorded by 1979.[6]

The coinage of "Western-centrism" is younger, attested in the late 1990s, and specific to English.[7]

European exceptionalism[edit]

During European colonial era, encyclopedias under "Europe", often sought to give a rationale for the predominance of European rule during the colonial period by referring to a special position taken by Europe compared to the other continents.

Thus, Johann Heinrich Zedler, in 1741, wrote that "even though Europe is the smallest of the world's four continents, it has for various reasons a position that places it before all others.... Its inhabitants have excellent customs, they are courteous and erudite in both sciences and crafts".[8][source needs translation]

The Brockhaus Enzyklopädie (Conversations-Lexicon) of 1847 still has an ostensibly Eurocentric approach and claims about Europe that "its geographical situation and its cultural and political significance is clearly the most important of the five continents, over which it has gained a most influential government both in material and even more so in cultural aspects".[9][source needs translation]

European exceptionalism is widely reflected in popular genres of literature, especially literature for young adults (for example, Rudyard Kipling's Kim) and adventure literature in general. Portrayal of European colonialism in such literature has been analysed in terms of "Eurocentrism" in retrospect, such as presenting idealised and often exaggeratedly masculine Western heroes, who conquered 'savage' peoples in the remaining 'dark spaces' of the globe.[10]


Origin in colonialism[edit]

Early Eurocentrism can be traced to the Renaissance during which the revival of learning based on classical sources were focused on the ancient Greek and Roman civilisations since they were a significant source of contemporary European civilisation.

The effects of the verity of European superiority increased during the period of European imperialism, which started slowly in the 15th century, accelerated by the Scientific Revolution, the Commercial Revolution, and the rise of colonial empires in the "Great Divergence" of the Early Modern period, and it reached its zenith in the 18th to 19th century with the Industrial Revolution and a Second European colonization wave.

The progressively mechanised character of European culture was contrasted with traditional hunting, farming and herding societies in many of the areas of the world being newly conquered and colonised by Europeans, such as the Americas, Asia, Africa and, later, the Pacific and Australasia. Many European writers of this time construed the history of Europe as paradigmatic for the rest of the world. Other cultures were identified as having reached a stage that Europe itself had already passed: primitive hunter-gatherer, farming, early civilisation, feudalism and modern liberal-capitalism. Only Europe was considered to have achieved the last stage.

For some writers, such as Karl Marx, the centrality of Europe to an understanding of world history did not imply any innate European superiority, but he nevertheless assumed that Europe provided a model for the world as a whole. Others looked forward to the expansion of modernity throughout the world through trade, imperialism or both.[citation needed]

The colonising period involved the widespread settlement of the Americas and Australasia with European people and the establishment of outposts and colonial administrations in Africa and parts of Asia. As a result, the majority populations of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand typically trace their ancestry to Europe.

The longitude meridians of world maps based on the prime meridian, placing Greenwich, London in the centre, has been in use since 1851. Various other prime meridians were in use during the Age of Exploration. The current prime meridian has the advantage that it places the International Date Line in the Pacific, inconveniencing the smallest number of people.

"European miracle", a term coined by Eric Jones in 1981,[11] refers to the surprising rise of Europe during the Early Modern period. During the 15th to 18th centuries, a "great divergence" took place, comprising the European Renaissance, age of discovery, the formation of the colonial empires, the Age of Reason, and the associated leap forward in technology and the development of capitalism and early industrialisation. The result was that by the 19th century, European powers dominated world trade and world politics.

Early anticolonialism[edit]

Even in the 19th century, anticolonial movements had developed claims about national traditions and values that were set against those of Europe. In some cases, as China, where local ideology was even more exclusionist than the Eurocentric one, Westernisation did not overwhelm longstanding Chinese attitudes to its own cultural centrality, but some would state that idea itself is a rather desperate attempt to cast Europe in a good light by comparison.[12]

Orientalism develops in the 19th century as a disproportionate Western interest in and idealization of "Eastern" (i.e. Asian) cultures. By the early 20th century, some historians, such as Arnold J. Toynbee, were attempting to construct multifocal models of world civilizations. Toynbee also drew attention in Europe to non-European historians, such as the medieval Tunisian scholar Ibn Khaldun. He also established links with Asian thinkers, such as through his dialogues with Daisaku Ikeda of Soka Gakkai International.[clarification needed]

Debate since 1990s[edit]

In treatises on historical or contemporary Eurocentrism that appeared since the 1990s, Eurocentrism is mostly cast in terms of dualisms such as civilized/barbaric or advanced/backward, developed/undeveloped, core/periphery, implying "evolutionary schemas through which societies inevitably progress", with a remnant of an "underlying presumption of a superior white Western self as referent of analysis" (640[clarification needed]).[13] Eurocentrism and the dualistic properties that it labels on non-European countries, cultures and persons have often been criticized in the political discourse of the 1990s and 2000s, particularly in the greater context of political correctness, race in the United States and affirmative action.[14][15]

There has been some debate on whether historical Eurocentrism qualifies as "just another ethnocentrism", as it is found in most of the world's cultures, especially in cultures with imperial aspirations, as in the Sinocentrism in China; in the Empire of Japan (c. 1868-1945), or during the American Century. James M. Blaut (2000) argued that Eurocentrism indeed army beyond other ethnocentrisms, as the scale of European colonial expansion was historically unprecedented and resulted in the formation of a "colonizer's model of the world".[16]

Eurocentrism has been a particularly important concept in development studies.[17]Eurocentrism has been criticised as a form of cultural relativism claiming the universal desirability of concepts like "development", democracy, human rights and technological progress while it ignored potentially beneficial concepts and knowledge found in non-Western societies.

Proponents of political Hinduism have posited a notion of Integral Humanism, based on specifically Hindu values as transcending the western dichotomy of capitalism vs. communism.

The notion of cultural relativism, questioning the ultimate subjectivity of the Western tradition of academia that developed alongside the scientific revolution, has become widely popular within western academia itself by the later part of the 20th century and has become part of the discourse of postmodernism.

Brohman (1995) argued that Eurocentrism "perpetuated intellectual dependence on a restricted group of prestigious Western academic institutions that determine the subject matter and methods of research".[18]

The separation of Eurasia into Europe and Asia criticized as Eurocentric by Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen in their book, The Myth of Continents (1997): "In physical, cultural and historical diversity, China and India are comparable to the entire European landmass, not to a single European country. A better (if still imperfect) analogy would compare France, not to India as a whole, but to a single Indian state, such as Uttar Pradesh."[19] The logical inconsistency of the traditional continent system is uniquely apparent in the case of India, which, despite occupying its own tectonic plate and having clearer boundaries than traditionally defined Europe (via the Himalayas), is still not considered a separate continent.

Eric Sheppard, in 2005, argued that contemporary Marxism has Eurocentric traits when it supposes that the third world must go through a stage of capitalism before "progressive social formations can be envisioned".[20]

"Afrocentrism" vs. "Eurocentrism" continues to play a role in the political discourse on race in the United States and "Critical Whiteness Studies", aiming to expose "white supremacism" and supposed "white privilege".[21]

Afrocentrist scholars, such as Molefi Asante, have argued that there is a prevalence of Eurocentric thought in the processing of much of academia on African affairs. On the other hand, in an article, 'Eurocentrism and Academic Imperialism' by Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi, from the University of Tehran, states that Eurocentric thought exists in almost all aspects of academia in many parts of the world, especially in the humanities.[22] Edgar Alfred Bowring states that in the West, self-regard, self-congratulation and denigration of the ‘Other’ run more deeply and those tendencies have infected more aspects of their thinking, laws and policy than anywhere else.[23] Luke Clossey and Nicholas Guyatt have measured the degree of Eurocentrism in the research programs of top history departments.[24]

Philosophical methods are well suited for unpacking the political, ontological, and epistemological conditions that foster racism and hold white supremacy in place. However, on the whole, philosophy as a discipline has remained relatively untouched by interdisciplinary work on race and whiteness. In its quest for certainty, Western philosophy continues to generate what it imagines to be colorless and genderless accounts of knowledge, reality, morality, and human nature

— Alison Baile, "Philosophy and Whiteness"[25]

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Hobson, John (2012). The Eurocentric conception of world politics : western international theory, 1760-2010. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 185. ISBN 1107020204. . Eurocentrism and its discontents, American Historical Association, ""Eurocentrism" can function as shorthand for Western-centrism but it can also mean a more specific privileging of Europe. Then there is the ambiguous status of Russia and eastern Europe."
  2. ^ The German adjective europa-zentrisch ("Europe-centric") is attested in the 1920s, unrelated to the Marxist context of Amin's usage. Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des pazifischen Ozeans (pp. 11–23, 110-113, passim). The context is Haushofer's comparison of the "Pacific space" in terms of global politics vs. "Europe-centric" politics.
  3. ^ A Rey (ed.) Dictionnaire Historique de la langue française (2010): À partir du radical de européen ont été composés (mil. XXe s.) européocentrique adj. (de centrique) « qui fait référence à l'Europe » et européocentrisme n.m. (variante europocentrisme n.m. 1974) « fait de considérer (un problème général, mondial) d'un point de vue européen » ."
  4. ^ Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression (1985), 63ff: "Fanon and Eurocentric Psychology", where "Eurocentric psychology" refers to "a psychology derived from a white, middle-class male minority, which is generalized to humanity everywhere".
  5. ^ "Anciens directeurs" ( ("Samir AMIN (Egypte) 1970-1980").
  6. ^ Alexandre A. Bennigsen, S. Enders Wimbush , Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (1979), p. 19.
  7. ^ "pluralistic cultural coexistence as opposed to Western centrism and Asian centrism" (unhyphenated) in: Mabel Lee, Meng Hua, Cultural dialogue & misreading (1997), p. 53. "our incomplete perception of Chinese behavior, which tends to be 'Western-centric.'" (using scare-quotes) in: Houman A. Sadri, Revolutionary States, Leaders, and Foreign Relations: A Comparative Study of China, Cuba, and Iran (1997), p. 35. "Euro- or western-centrism" in the context of the "traditional discourse on minority languages" in: Jonathan Owens (ed.), Arabic as a Minority Language (2000), p. 1. Use of Latinate occido-centrism remains rare (e.g. Alexander Lukin, Political Culture of the Russian 'Democrats' (2000), p. 47).
  8. ^ "[German: Obwohl Europa das kleinste unter allen 4. Teilen der Welt ist, so ist es doch um verschiedener Ursachen willen allen übrigen vorzuziehen.... Die Einwohner sind von sehr guten Sitten, höflich und sinnreich in Wissenschaften und Handwerken.] "Europa". In: Zedlers Universal-Lexicon, Volume 8, Leipzig 1734, columns 2192–2196 (citation: column 2195).
  9. ^ "[German: [Europa ist seiner] terrestrischen Gliederung wie seiner kulturhistorischen und politischen Bedeutung nach unbedingt der wichtigste unter den fünf Erdtheilen, über die er in materieller, noch mehr aber in geistiger Beziehung eine höchst einflussreiche Oberherrschaft erlangt hat.] Das große Conversations-Lexicon für die gebildeten Stände, 1847. Vol. 1, p. 373.
  10. ^ Daniel Iwerks, "Ideology and Eurocentrism in Tarzan of the Apes," in: Investigating the Unliterary: Six Readings of Edgar Rice Burroughs' Tarzan of the Apes, ed. Richard Utz (Regensburg: Martzinek, 1995), pp. 69-90.
  11. ^ Jones, Eric (2003). The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. ISBN 0-521-52783-X. 
  12. ^ Cambridge History of China, CUP,1988
  13. ^ Sundberg, Juanita. "Eurocentrism". International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (2009): 638-643.
  14. ^ Green, John. Crashcourse "Eurocentrism" (2012):
  15. ^ Loewen, James "lies My teacher told me"(1995)
  16. ^ Blaut, James M. (2000), Eight Eurocentric Historians, Guilford Press, New York
  17. ^ Brohman, John. "Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From Modernization to Neoliberalism". :'Third World Quarterly 16.1 (1995): 121-140.
  18. ^ Brohman, John. "Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From Modernization to Neoliberalism". Third World Quarterly 16.1 (1995): 121-140.
  19. ^ Lewis, Martin W.; Kären E. Wigen (1997). The Myth of Continents: a Critique of Metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. ?. ISBN 0-520-20742-4, ISBN 0-520-20743-2. 
  20. ^ Sheppard, Eric". Jim Blaut's Model of The World". Antipode 37.5 (2005): 956-962.
  21. ^ Alison Baile in "Philosophy and Whiteness" Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society. Towards a Bibliography of Critical Whiteness Studies,[year needed] p. 9.: "Philosophical methods are well suited for unpacking the political, ontological, and epistemological conditions that foster racism and hold white supremacy in place. However, on the whole, philosophy as a discipline has remained relatively untouched by interdisciplinary work on race and whiteness. In its quest for certainty, Western philosophy continues to generate what it imagines to be colorless and genderless accounts of knowledge, reality, morality, and human nature".
  22. ^ "Eurocentrism and Academic Imperialism". ZarCom Media. 2011-10-27. Retrieved 2015-10-14. 
  23. ^ E. C. Eze, Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader (Blackwell, 1997); M. Shahid Alam, “Articulating Group Differences: A Variety of Autocentrisms,” Science and Society (Summer 2003): 206-18.
  24. ^ Clossey, Luke; Guyatt, Nicholas (2013). "It's a Small World After All". Small World History. Simon Fraser University. Retrieved 24 December 2015. 
  25. ^ Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society. Towards a Bibliography of Critical Whiteness Studies, p. 9


  • Bairoch, Paul (1993). Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. University Of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-03462-3. 
  • Baudet, E. H. P. (1959). Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man. Translated by Elizabeth Wentholt. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ASIN B0007DKQMW. (1965). 
  • Lefkowitz, Mary (1996). Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-09837-1. 
  • Malhotra, Rajiv (2013). Being Different: An indian challenge to western universalism. Noida: Harpercollins India. 
  • Preiswerk, Roy; Dominique Perrot (1978). Ethnocentrism and History: Africa, Asia, and Indian America in Western Textbooks. New York and London: NOK. ISBN 0-88357-071-8. 
  • Rüsen, Jörn (2004). "How to Overcome Ethnocentrism: Approaches to a Culture of Recognition by History in the Twenty-First Century". History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History (43:2004): 118–129. 
  • Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1965). The Rise of Christian Europe. London: Thames and Hudson. ASIN B000O894GO. 
  • Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, Monthly Review Press, 1974.
  • Samir Amin: L’eurocentrisme, critique d’une idéologie. Paris 1988, engl. Eurocentrism, Monthly Review Press 1989, ISBN 0-85345-786-7
  • J.M. Blaut: The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History. Guilford Press 1993. ISBN 0-89862-348-0
  • J.M. Blaut: Eight Eurocentric Historians. Guilford Press 2000. ISBN 1-57230-591-6
  • Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des pazifischen Ozeans, Berlin, Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1924.
  • Vassilis Lambropoulos, The rise of Eurocentrism: Anatomy of interpretation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993
  • Ella Shohat; Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: multiculturalism and the media, Routledge 1994, ISBN 0-415-06325-6
  • Jose Rabasa, Inventing America: Spanish Historiography and the Formation of Eurocentrism (Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory, Vol 2), University of Oklahoma Press 1994
  • Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: multiculturalism and the media, Routledge 1994
  • Ilia Xypolia, Eurocentrism and Orientalism, The Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies, 2016.