Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional | |
|---|---|
| Abbreviation | FMLN |
| Secretary-General | Manuel Flores |
| Deputy Secretary-General | Marleni Funes |
| Founded | 10 October 1980 |
| Registered | 14 December 1992 |
| Legalized | 30 June 1992 |
| Merger of | |
| Preceded by | Unified Revolutionary Directorate |
| Headquarters | 27 Poniente Street No. 1316 Colonia Layco, San Salvador, El Salvador |
| Youth wing | FMLN Youth |
| Membership (2024) | c. 16,000 |
| Ideology |
|
| Political position | |
| Regional affiliation | Parliamentary Group of the Left |
| Continental affiliation | São Paulo Forum COPPPAL |
| Colors | Red, white |
| Anthem | "Himno del FMLN" ("Anthem of the FMLN") |
| Seats in the Legislative Assembly | 0 / 60 |
| Municipalities | 0 / 44 |
| Seats in PARLACEN | 2 / 20 |
| Party flag | |
| Website | |
| fmln | |
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, abbreviated FMLN) is a Salvadoran political party and former guerrilla rebel group.
The FMLN was established on 10 October 1980 as the merged of four leftist guerrilla groups: the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance Armed Forces (FARN), and the Armed Liberation Forces/Communist Party of El Salvador (FAL/PCES); the Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers (PRTC) joined in December 1980. In 1981, the FMLN joined forces with the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) coalition of mass organizations and were sometimes collectively referred to as the FMLN–FDR. The FMLN fought against the Salvadoran government during the country's civil war that lasted from 1979 to 1992. The FMLN launched three major offensives against the government in 1981, 1982, and 1989. The group signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords with the government that ended the civil war. As a part of the peace accords, the FMLN was demobilized and registered as a political party.
For three decades from the mid 1990s to the late 2010s, the FMLN dominated Salvadoran politics in a two-party system alongside the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). The party often finished in first or second place in the country's legislative and municipal elections. The FMLN lost the first three presidential elections it participated in, when it nominated various former civil war commanders. The party won the 2009 presidential election when it nominated journalist Mauricio Funes for President. Funes was succeeded in 2014 by Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander who narrowly won the 2014 presidential election. The FMLN lost the next two presidential elections, and after the 2024 election, it lost all its seats in the Legislative Assembly. Throughout the FMLN's history as a political party, several splinter parties have emerged from it such as the Democratic Party, Renewal Movement, and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (unrelated to the civil war-era group).
The FMLN is El Salvador's largest left-wing political party. During the civil war, the FMLN espoused Marxism–Leninism but moderated its position between 1989 and 1991 to embrace democratic socialism. The FMLN is a member of the Parliamentary Group of the Left political faction in the Central American Parliament. It is also a member of the São Paulo Forum and COPPPAL, two alliances of leftist Latin American political parties. Manuel Flores, the FMLN's 2024 presidential candidate and a former legislator, has served as the party's secretary-general since August 2024. As of 2024[update], the FMLN has around 16,000 members.
History
[edit]Background
[edit]Splintering of leftist groups during the 1970s
[edit]The Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) was established in the 1930.[1] In 1970, PCES general-secretary Cayetano Carpio split from the party and founded the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)[2] as he viewed the party's reliance on the electoral process to transform El Salvador as futile;[3] he instead called for a "prolonged popular war" modeled on the Viet Cong to overthrow the military dictatorship[2] that had ruled El Salvador since 1931.[4] In 1971, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) was established by dissidents of the PCES, FPL, and Christian Democratic Party (PDC) led by Joaquín Villalobos who called for a popular insurrection modeled on the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).[2]
Throughout the 1970s, the FPL and ERP carried out hit-and-run attacks against the Salvadoran government, and allied mass organizations organized protests and strikes to create conditions that would start a revolution.[5][6] In 1975, José Sancho established the National Resistance Armed Forces (FARN) as a splinter group from the ERP after Villalobos ordered the assassination of Roque Dalton—the leader of the ERP's political wing.[7] In 1977, PCES and FARN dissidents led by Francisco Jovel created the Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers (PRTC).[8] In 1979, Schafik Hándal, Carpio's successor as PCES general-secretary, established the Armed Liberation Forces (FAL) as the PCES's militant wing after the party adopted an "armed struggle" doctrine under Hándal's leadership.[9]
On 15 October 1979, the reformist elements of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) overthrew General Carlos Humberto Romero, the president of El Salvador, in a coup d'état and established the civil-military Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG).[10] Some leftist groups such as the PCES initially supported the JRG while others such as the ERP opposed it and renewed calls for an insurrection. Eventually, negotiations between the JRG and some communist groups fell apart after Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano lost his influence in the JRG and the junta itself being unable to curb violence by far-right death squads.[11]
Negotiations and unification
[edit]
In December 1979, Salvadoran leftist leaders met in Havana, Cuba to negotiate the establishment of a united coalition to oppose the JRG. They viewed the FSLN's victory in the Nicaraguan Revolution as a sign that they needed to set aside ideological differences and create a united vanguard to launch a successful revolution. Cuban leader Fidel Castro personally took part in the negotiations.[12] In May 1980, the FPL, FARN, and FAL/PCES established the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) as a united coalition for political and military planning.[13] DRU initially excluded the ERP due to lingering animosity over Dalton's assassination, but it later allowed the ERP to join following pressure from Castro.[3]
On 10 October 1980,[14] the DRU established the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a merger of the DRU's members and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition of the DRU member's affiliated mass organizations.[15] The FMLN and FDR were sometimes referred to collectively as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front–Revolutionary Democratic Front (FMLN–FDR).[16] The FMLN was an umbrella group consisting of the DRU groups as its militant wing and the FDR as its political front.[13] The FMLN was named after Farabundo Martí, a peasant and communist leader who led a rebellion against the government of Brigadier General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1932 and was executed during subsequent reprisal killings known as La Matanza[17] that killed up to 40,000 people.[18] The PRTC later joined the FMLN in December 1980.[3] The FMLN was governed by five-member executive directorate that consisted of the Salvador Sánchez Cerén (representing the FPL), Villalobos (ERP), Sancho (FARN), Hándal (FAL/PCES), and Jovel (PRTC).[13]
Guerrilla coalition (1980–1992)
[edit]Early military offensives (1980–1983)
[edit]| Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front | |
|---|---|
| Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional | |
| Dates of operation | 1980–1992 |
| Allies | |
| Opponents | |
| Battles and wars | |
| Flag | |
The FMLN launched its first military offensive—known as the final offensive of 1981—on 10 January 1981 when it carried out 43 attacks against various government and military positions including the Ilopango International Airport and the headquarters of the Treasury Police. Carpio issued FMLN General Order Number 1 that called on the Salvadoran people to join the FMLN in a national uprising.[19] Although the FMLN had captured 82 cities and villages, mostly in northern El Salvador, by 17 January,[20] the JRG launched a counteroffensive and Hándal called for a "temporary tactical retreat".[21] By 26 January, the offensive failed and the FMLN acknowledged that it did not spark the national uprising it hoped for.[22] Although the offensive failed, the FMLN proved itself to be a competent fighting force and retained control of some territory.[20]
On 28 March 1982, the date of the 1982 Constitutional Assembly election, the FMLN launched the general offensive of 1982 that intended to disrupt the election's conduct, but the offensive failed to achieve this goal[23] and all 60 seats on the Constitutional Assembly were decided.[24] That year, many FMLN leaders believed that a negotiated settlement was the best way to obtain their goals, but this approach was strongly rejected by Carpio who described it as a betrayal of the revolution.[25] In January 1983, the FPL Central Committee voted Carpio out of power and replaced him with Mélida Anaya Montes. In April 1983, Carpio had Montes assassinated in Managua, Nicaragua and he committed suicide days later when the assassins were captured.[26][27]

Carpio's suicide diminished the FPL's influence within the FMLN and the coalition's members moved towards further cooperation with each other led by the ERP.[26] The FMLN divided its forces into five fronts: the Feliciano Ama Western Front (in Ahuachapán, La Libertad, Santa Ana, and Sonsonate), the Anastasio Aquino Para-Central Front (in San Vicente and parts of Cabañas and La Paz), the Modesto Ramírez Central Front (in Cuscatlán, San Salvador, and parts of Cabañas and La Paz), the Francisco Sánchez Eastern Front (in La Unión, Morazán, San Miguel, and Usulután), and the Apolinario Serrano Northern Front (in Chalatenango).[28]
Peace negotiations (1983–1989)
[edit]
Carpio's death also led to the FMLN approaching the Salvadoran government to enter negotiations ahead of the 1984 presidential election in the hopes of joining a government.[29] In 1983, the FMLN entered private negotiations with the government of President Álvaro Magaña.[30] After the 1984 election, the FMLN entered open negotiations with the PDC government of President José Napoleón Duarte.[29] The FMLN and Duarte's government held several meetings between 1984 and 1988 but were unable to come to an agreement to end the civil war.[31]
While in negotiations, the FMLN continued to carry out hit-and-run attacks against the government including assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings. FMLN militants particularly attacks American military personnel[32] as the United States was supporting the Salvadoran government with weapons, supplies, and advisors.[33] The FMLN also destroyed infrastructure, blockaded public transportation, and imposed "war taxes" on businesses (such as kidnappings and bombings) that cost the Salvadoran government US$2 billion between 1979 and 1988.[34]
Throughout the civil war, Cuba trained hundreds of FMLN personnel and Nicaragua subsidized the FMLN's operation of Radio Venceremos, the group's clandestine radio station.[35] There were unsubstantiated rumors during the civil war of direct support from the Soviet Union such as an alleged sighting of a Soviet submarine near La Unión or a Soviet soldier in Chalatenango.[36] The FMLN received materiel support from communist countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Ethiopia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, much of which was sent to the FMLN through Nicaragua.[37][38] The FMLN also received financial support from sympathetic solidarity committees in the United States, Mexico, and Europe.[37] FMLN membership varied throughout the civil war: it was as low as 4,000 members in 1981[39] to as high as 15,000 members in 1991.[40]
In December 1987, Rubén Zamora and Guillermo Ungo, two FDR leaders, announced the creation of Democratic Convergence (CVD), a left-wing political party formed from the merger of the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), and the Social Democratic Party (PSD).[41] The CVD was allowed to participate in the 1989 presidential election with Ungo as its presidential candidate,[42] and the CVD's electoral participation was approved by the FMLN.[43] Ungo finished in fourth place with 3.8 percent of the vote.[44]
Last offensive and peace accords (1989–1992)
[edit]
Duarte was succeeded by Alfredo Cristiani of the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), the winner of the 1989 election. Cristiani was more moderate than his predecessor, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, and was open to continuing negotiations[29] because he believed that FAES was unable to induce a decisive victory against the FMLN to end the civil war.[45] In November 1989, the FMLN launched the final offensive of 1989 in a bid to overthrow Cristiani's government and ignite a popular uprising, but the offensive failed and the popular uprising did not materialize. Although the FMLN was weakened by the military defeat together with the FSLN's electoral defeat in the 1990 Nicaraguan general election, the United States Congress voted to reduce funding to the Salvadoran government which also put it in a weaker position. In April 1990, the FMLN and Cristiani's government resumed peace negotiations mediated by the United Nations.[29] Additionally, by 1991, the FMLN abandoned Marxism–Leninism in favor of democratic socialism as the group received diplomatic support from European and Latin American social democratic governments that pressured it to negotiate peace.[46]
On 16 January 1992, the FMLN and Salvadoran government signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords that ended the civil war. The peace accords implemented various political and military reforms within the Salvadoran government. In exchange, the FMLN agreed to demobilize. The peace accords also legalized the FMLN as a political party.[47][48] According to the Truth Commission for El Salvador, around 5 percent of human rights abuses during the civil war were committed by the FMLN, in contrast to 85 percent committed by the government.[49] According to the University of Pittsburgh's Mitchell A. Seligson and Vincent McElhinny, between 58,382 and 92,823 people were killed during the civil war, of whom, between 12,274 and 23,840 were FMLN combatants.[50]
Political party (1992–present)
[edit]Transition to a political party (1992–1994)
[edit]On 30 June 1992, the Legislative Assembly formally legalized the FMLN, and on 14 December, the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) registered the FMLN as a political party.[51] Although the FMLN was now a registered political party, its now-demobilized component militant groups continued to exist.[52] The ERP (rebranded as the Renewed Expression of the People) and FARN wanted to moderate the FMLN and move it towards social democracy. Conversely, the FPL and PCES believed that the FMLN criticized those who wanted to moderate the FMLN, and PCES member Dagoberto Gutiérrez argued that the FMLN should continue the civil war but as an opposition political party.[53]
Ahead of the 1994 general election, the first election held after the end of the civil war,[54] the ERP and FARN proposed that the party should nominate a center-right reformist politician for president, but the FPL, PCES, and PRTC rejected this and instead nominated Zamora.[a][53] Zamora advanced to the second round where he lost to ARENA's Armando Calderón Sol with 31.7 percent of the vote.[44] The FMLN also won 21 of 84 seats in the Legislative Assembly,[55] 15 of 262 municipalities,[56] and 4 of El Salvador's 20 seats in the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).[57] The FMLN was most successful in territories it controlled during the civil war.[52]
In opposition and political splits (1994–2009)
[edit]The FMLN's elected officials assumed office in May 1994. The FMLN's legislators affiliated with the ERP and FARN voted in favor of ARENA's national budget resulting in the party suspending their membership. The ERP and FARN also wanted to dissolve the FMLN's five lingering factions, but the FPL, PCES, and PRTC rejected this. In December, 7 legislators and 14 mayors affiliated with the ERP and FARN left the FMLN and later founded the Democratic Party (PD) in March 1995.[58] That same year, the FPL, PCES, and PRTC dissolved and fully merged into the FMLN.[52]
In the 1997 legislative and municipal elections, the FMLN won 27 seats in the Legislative Assembly[59] and 49 municipalities.[60] San Salvador, El Salvador's capital city, was among one of the FMLN's municipal victories.[52] Meanwhile, the PD lost all its seats and was deregistered by the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) for its poor performance, and the FMLN recuperated the seats that it had lost when the PD split from it. Ahead of the 1999 presidential election, FMLN leaders such as Hándal and Sánchez Cerén wanted to maintain the party's "orthodox" revolutionary socialist identity while leaders such as Jovel, Facundo Guardado, and Raúl Mijango wanted to make the party resemble European parties that support social democracy. Jovel, Guardado, and Mijango represented the party's Renewal Movement (MR).[61] The party ultimately nominated Guardado[b] and he finished in second behind ARENA's Francisco Flores Pérez with 29 percent of the vote.[63] Zamora also ran as a member of the United Democratic Center (CDU)[64] and finished in third.[62]
The FMLN held a party convention in May 2001 to hold its internal leadership election, but Guardado and Jovel boycotted the revolutionary socialist-dominated convention and held his own rival convention to get social democrats elected to party leadership positions. For this, the FMLN expelled both from the party in October. In March 2002, they and five FMLN legislators registered the Renewal Movement as a political party with the TSE. At the 2003 legislative election, the FMLN won 31 seats in the Legislative Assembly while the MR failed to surpass the 3 percent threshold as had its party registration canceled by the TSE.[65]
Ahead of the 2004 presidential election, Hándal vetoed the pre-candidacy of journalist Mauricio Funes as he was not a historic FMLN member and defeated reformist Óscar Ortiz in the primary election.[66][67] Hándal lost the presidential election to ARENA's Antonio Saca with 35.7 percent of the vote.[68] The revolutionary socialists winning the FMLN's 2004 internal leadership election led to another split in the party. In June 2005, 7 FMLN legislators left the party and formed the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR, no relation to the civil war-era organization). In the 2006 legislative election, the FDR lost all its seats in the Legislative Assembly[67] while the FMLN won 32 seats.[69]
Ahead of the 2009 elections, Ortiz proposed to nominate Funes as the FMLN's presidential candidate. The party's leadership accepted Funes' candidacy on the condition that Sánchez Cerén was his running mate.[70] Critics such as ARENA's candidate, Rodrigo Ávila, claimed that Sánchez Cerén would be the power behind the throne and that Funes would be little more than a puppet.[71][72] The FMLN won 35 seats in the January legislative election;[73] Funes won the presidential election two months later with 51.3 percent of the vote.[74] Funes' victory coincided with the Latin American pink tide.[75] The FDR performed poorly in the same election and was deregistered by the TSE.[67]
Control of the presidency (2009–2019)
[edit]
Funes assumed office on 1 June 2009[75] becoming the FMLN's first president after 15 years of participating in elections.[76] Some of Funes' presidential acts included reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba,[77] implementing social reforms and anti-poverty programs,[78] and apologizing for past state atrocities from the civil war[79][80] and other eras of Salvadoran history.[81] Additionally, the FMLN entered into a coalition government with the National Coalition Party (PCN) and Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) in the Legislative Assembly, and in February 2011, the FMLN's Sigfrido Reyes Morales became the president of the Legislative Assembly as a part of the coalition agreement.[82] Funes' coalition with the right-wing GANA and PCN was criticized by more hardline FMLN members.[83] The FMLN–PCN–GANA coalition lost control of the legislature after the 2012 election[84] and negotiated with ARENA to create a grand coalition government, but Reyes retained his position as president of the legislature.[85]
Funes' government implemented a controversial truce with the country's largest street gangs, MS-13 and 18th Street gang, in a bid to lower the country's homicide rate. Mijango and Funes' defense minister, Divisional General David Munguía Payés, were two of the truce's principal negotiators,[86][87] but Sánchez Cerén denied that the FMLN itself was responsible for the truce.[88] The truce was a major campaign topic during the 2014 presidential election.[89] The FMLN nominated Sánchez Cerén and Ortiz as its presidential and vice presidential candidates, respectively.[90] Sánchez Cerén narrowly defeated ARENA's Norman Quijano in the second round with 50.1 percent of the vote.[91] Gutiérrez split from the FMLN in 2013 and attempted to get the splinter New Country Movement (MNP) registered with the TSE in time for the election, but the party failed to accumulate enough signatures to be registered.[90]
Sánchez Cerén was inaugurated on 1 June 2014 becoming the first former guerrilla to serve as President of El Salvador.[92] During his presidency, he attempted to remove restrictions on El Salvador's abortion ban (but this was blocked by right-wing parties),[93] banned metal mining for environmental and public health concerns,[94] and established diplomatic relations with China over Taiwan.[95] The gang truce also collapsed by the time Sánchez Cerén assumed office[96] and homicides spiked during his presidency, peaking at a rate of 104 homicides per 100,000 people in 2015.[97] The FMLN retained control of the Legislative Assembly after the 2015 legislative election; it formed a coalition with GANA and Lorena Peña served as the legislature's president from 2015 to 2016 as a part of the coalition agreement.[98][99]
In 2017, the FMLN expelled Nayib Bukele, then the mayor of San Salvador, from the party after allegedly throwing an apple at a fellow party member.[100] During the 2018 legislative and municipal elections, Bukele called on his supporters to spoil their vote or not vote instead of voting for the FMLN.[101] The FMLN had its worst electoral showing since 1994 and won only 23 seats. Meanwhile, ARENA gained control of the Legislative Assembly and right-wing parties were able to override Sánchez Cerén's presidential veto.[102] The FMLN's Hugo Martínez finished in third place in the 2019 presidential election behind ARENA's Carlos Calleja and Bukele, who won the election as a third-party candidate.[103] After Bukele's victory, Roberto Lorenzana, the presidential communications secretary, stated that the FMLN's expulsion of Bukele was a mistake that cost the party votes.[104]
Return to opposition (2019–present)
[edit]
Bukele's 2019 victory ended the FMLN–ARENA duopoly on controlling the presidency.[105][106][107] The FMLN opposed Bukele's government in the Legislative Assembly. In February 2021, FMLN and ARENA legislators briefly considered removing Bukele from office for being "mentally unfit" after he accused the FMLN of staging the deaths of two of its supporters at a rally prior to that month's midterm election.[108][109] In the election, Bukele's allies won a supermajority in the Legislative Assembly[110] while the FMLN won only 4 seats.[111]
The FMLN remained in the opposition for the duration of the 2021–2024 legislative term.[110] The party opposed various electoral and constitutional reforms ahead of the 2024 elections such as the TSE allowing Bukele to seek immediate re-election,[112] the reduction of seats in the Legislative Assembly from 84 to 60, and the reduction of municipalities from 262 to 44. Ortiz, then the secretary-general of the FMLN, described the reductions as "institutional fraud" by Bukele's government.[113] The FMLN nominated former legislator Manuel Flores for president;[114] he finished in second place with 6.4 percent of the vote behind Bukele.[115] In the legislative election, the FMLN lost all its seats in the Legislative Assembly extraparliamentary party for the first time since participating in elections in 1994.[116] It furthermore failed to win any municipal race.[117]
The FMLN has convoked its primary elections to elect candidates for the 2027 presidential, legislative, and municipal elections.[118]
Ideology
[edit]Civil war-era ideology
[edit]
When the FMLN was established, its members had a wide range of center-left to far-left political positions,[119] but it was largely dominated by its more far-left components.[120] The PCES adhered to Marxism–Leninism,[121] the FPL was Maoist,[5] the ERP followed Marxism–Leninism and Che Guevara's foquismo, the FARN had close relations with social democrats and liberals, and the PRTC was Trotskyite (although it later moderated to Marxism–Leninism after it joined the FMLN).[8] The Havana negotiations and subsequent formations of the DGU and FMLN were done to counteract ideological infighting among the leftist militant organizations and unite themselves under a single vanguard.[12] Under the FMLN, its member militant groups united under the banner of Marxism–Leninism.[122]
Although the FMLN was largely united, some disagreements remained between the various factions. Questions of whether to attain victory through a prolonged war or a rapid insurrection or on how much of the struggle should be based on political or military action continued to divide the FMLN, but many of these disagreements faded following Carpio's suicide in 1983.[123] The vast majority of FMLN components also opposed receiving support from the Soviet Union, viewing it as corrupt and oppressive. Most groups instead opted for support from Cuba and Nicaragua. Only FAL/PCES and some hardline FPL members supported Soviet aid, while the ERP promoted nationalism and was suspicious of Cuban support.[124]
The FMLN's members were largely in agreement on supporting the implementation of a mixed economy rather than a command economy, and most also supported non-alignment.[124] In 1984, the FMLN stated that it was in a "struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, and apartheid".[125] The FMLN also utilized liberation theology to rally support from the country's Catholic population.[126]
Post-civil war ideology
[edit]Between 1988 and 1991, the FMLN gradually began to abandon Marxism–Leninism. By 1991, the group embraced democratic socialism. Ignacio Ellacuría, a Jesuit priest and civil war observer, described the FMLN's shift towards democratic socialism as its own version of aggiornamento or a Second Vatican Council.[46] Although the FMLN is traditionally described as left-wing,[75][107] it is sometimes still described as far-left.[127]
During Funes' presidency, the FMLN embraced left-wing populism during Funes' presidency. El Salvador did not join the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) as Funes did not want to follow Chavismo, but some local FMLN chapters created ALBA Petróleo that sold discounted gas from ALBA members.[83]
Party structure
[edit]
The FMLN's headquarters is located at 27 Poniente Street No. 1316 in Colonia Layco, San Salvador, the country's capital city.[128] Since since 4 August 2024, Flores and Marleni Funes have served as the party's secretary-general and deputy secretary-general, respectively.[129] As of 2024[update], the FMLN has around 16,000 members.[130] The FMLN Youth is the party's youth wing[131] and "Anthem of the FMLN" ("Himno del FMLN") is the party's anthem.[132]
In PARLACEN, the FMLN is a member of the Parliamentary Group of the Left.[133] The FMLN is also a member of COPPPAL and the São Paulo Forum, two coalitions of left-wing Latin American political parties.[134][135]
Electoral history
[edit]Presidential elections
[edit]
| Election | Candidate | First round | Second round | Result | Ref. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes | % | Votes | % | ||||
| 1994 | Rubén Zamora[a] | 331,629 | 378,980 | Lost |
[136] | ||
| 1999 | Facundo Guardado[b] | 343,472 | — | Lost |
[63] | ||
| 2004 | Schafik Hándal | 812,519 | — | Lost |
[68] | ||
| 2009 | Mauricio Funes | 1,354,000 | — | Elected |
[137] | ||
| 2014 | Salvador Sánchez Cerén | 1,315,768 | 1,495,815 | Elected |
[138] | ||
| 2019 | Hugo Martínez | 389,289 | — | Lost |
[139] | ||
| 2024 | Manuel Flores | 204,167 | — | Lost |
[140] | ||
| 2027 | To be determined | [118] | |||||
Legislative Assembly elections
[edit]| Election | Votes | % | Position | Seats | +/– | Status in legislature | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 287,811 | 21.39 | 21 / 84
|
New | Opposition | [55] | |
| 1997 | 369,709 | 33.02 | 27 / 84
|
Opposition | [59] | ||
| 2000 | 426,289 | 35.22 | 31 / 84
|
Opposition | [141] | ||
| 2003 | 475,043 | 33.96 | 31 / 84
|
Opposition | [142] | ||
| 2006 | 785,072 | 39.29 | 32 / 84
|
Opposition | [69] | ||
| 2009 | 943,936 | 42.60 | 35 / 84
|
Coalition government | [73] | ||
| 2012 | 804,760 | 36.76 | 31 / 84
|
Coalition government | [143] | ||
| 2015 | 847,289 | 37.23 | 31 / 84
|
Coalition government | [144] | ||
| 2018 | 521,257 | 24.54 | 23 / 84
|
Opposition | [145] | ||
| 2021 | 173,330 | 6.94 | 4 / 84
|
Opposition | [111] | ||
| 2024 | 195,920 | 6.28 | 0 / 60
|
Extraparliamentary | [146] | ||
| 2027 | To be determined | [118] | |||||
Municipal elections
[edit]| Election | Votes | % | Position | Municipalities | +/– | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 15 / 262
|
New | [56] | |||
| 1997 | 365,176 | 32.63 | 49 / 262
|
[60] | ||
| 2000 | 412,087 | 33.83 | 80 / 262
|
[147] | ||
| 2003 | 471,042 | 33.41 | 74 / 262
|
[148] | ||
| 2006 | 781,234 | 39.04 | 54 / 262
|
[149] | ||
| 2009 | 886,161 | 39.89 | 93 / 262
|
[150] | ||
| 2012 | 807,644 | 34.94 | 94 / 262
|
[151] | ||
| 2015 | 892,882 | 37.73 | 85 / 262
|
[152] | ||
| 2018 | 672,183 | 29.18 | 64 / 262
|
[145] | ||
| 2021 | 287,321 | 10.86 | 30 / 262
|
[153] | ||
| 2024 | 125,733 | 7.78 | 0 / 44
|
[154] | ||
| 2027 | To be determined | [118] | ||||
PARLACEN elections
[edit]| Election | Votes | % | Position | Seats | +/– | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 287,811 | 21.39 | 4 / 20
|
New | [57] | |
| 2000 | 426,289 | 35.22 | 7 / 20
|
[141] | ||
| 2006 | 785,072 | 39.29 | 8 / 20
|
[155] | ||
| 2009 | 943,936 | 42.53 | 9 / 20
|
[156] | ||
| 2015 | 854,621 | 39.82 | 8 / 20
|
[157] | ||
| 2021 | 181,475 | 7.30 | 1 / 20
|
[158] | ||
| 2024 | 122,926 | 8.26 | 2 / 20
|
[159] |
See also
[edit]- List of political parties in El Salvador
- Politics of El Salvador
- Similar Central American political parties
Notes
[edit]- ^ a b Rubén Zamora's 1994 presidential candidacy was a part of a coalition between the FMLN, Democratic Convergence, and the Revolutionary National Movement.[44]
- ^ a b Facundo Guardado's 1999 presidential candidacy was a part of a coalition between the FMLN and the Social Christian Union.[62]
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ White 1973, p. 97.
- ^ a b c Haggerty 1990, p. 237.
- ^ a b c Allison 2016, p. 719.
- ^ Ching 1997, pp. 2–3 & 491.
- ^ a b Haggerty 1990, p. 30.
- ^ LeoGrande & Robbins 1980, p. 1088.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, pp. 237–238.
- ^ a b Haggerty 1990, p. 238.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 239.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 34.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 39.
- ^ a b Haggerty 1990, pp. 39–40.
- ^ a b c Haggerty 1990, p. 240.
- ^ Paszyn 1996, p. 137.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, pp. 40 & 240.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. xx.
- ^ Ghanem 2023, p. 97.
- ^ Tulchin & Bland 1992, p. 167.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 83.
- ^ a b Crandall 2016, p. 177.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 100.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 102.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 110.
- ^ Krennerich 2005, p. 281.
- ^ Ghanem 2023, pp. 98–99.
- ^ a b Haggerty 1990, p. 241.
- ^ Central Intelligence Agency 1984, p. 10.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, pp. 242–243.
- ^ a b c d Ghanem 2023, p. 99.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, pp. 244–245.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 245.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 242 & 244.
- ^ McClintock 1985, p. 326.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 244.
- ^ Coll 1985, pp. 11–13.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 68.
- ^ a b Ghanem 2023, p. 98.
- ^ Coll 1985, p. 11 & 16.
- ^ Bosch 1999, p. 61.
- ^ Acosta & Rogers 2020, p. 379.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. xxiv.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 172.
- ^ a b c Krennerich 2005, p. 290.
- ^ Chávez 2015, p. 1788.
- ^ a b Chávez 2015, p. 1787–1788.
- ^ Chávez 2015, p. 1793.
- ^ Ghanem 2023, p. 100.
- ^ Chávez 2015, pp. 1792–1793.
- ^ Seligson & McElhinny 1996, pp. 214–217.
- ^ Peace Accords Matrix.
- ^ a b c d Acosta & Rogers 2020, p. 380.
- ^ a b Allison 2016, pp. 720–721.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 1994, p. 5.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1994, pp. 43–50.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1994, p. 51.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1994, p. 37.
- ^ Allison 2016, p. 721.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1997, p. 37.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1997, pp. 45–48.
- ^ Allison 2016, pp. 722–723.
- ^ a b Krennerich 2005, p. 291.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 1999, p. 75.
- ^ Allison 2016, p. 722.
- ^ Allison 2016, p. 723.
- ^ López Bernal 2016, p. 113.
- ^ a b c Allison 2016, p. 724.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2004, p. 110.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2006, pp. 226 & 228.
- ^ López Bernal 2016, pp. 113–114.
- ^ Booth 2009.
- ^ Bremer & Barrera 2009.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2009, p. 196.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2009, p. 87.
- ^ a b c Goodfriend 2019.
- ^ Allison 2016, pp. 724–725.
- ^ France 24 2009.
- ^ Center for Democracy in the Americas 2009, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Malkin 2010.
- ^ Renteria 2010.
- ^ El Salvador Noticias 2010.
- ^ Baires Quezada 2011.
- ^ a b Ulloa 2010.
- ^ El Faro 2012.
- ^ Aguilar, Labrador & Carías 2012.
- ^ Cerón 2023.
- ^ Looft 2012.
- ^ Córdoba 2014.
- ^ Robbins 2013.
- ^ a b Allison 2016, p. 725.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2014, p. 144.
- ^ BBC News 2014.
- ^ L'Orient–Le Jour 2017.
- ^ Deutsche Welle 2017.
- ^ Hurton 2018.
- ^ Univision 2014.
- ^ Reed 2016.
- ^ La Prensa Gráfica 2015.
- ^ Diario Co Latino 2016.
- ^ Laguan 2017.
- ^ Cohen 2024, p. 137.
- ^ Goodfriend 2018.
- ^ Palumbo & Malkin 2019.
- ^ Última Hora 2019.
- ^ Gans, 2019 & 86.
- ^ Nagovitch 2019.
- ^ a b Zaino & Herrera 2024, p. 3.
- ^ Harrison 2021.
- ^ Alemán 2021.
- ^ a b Harrison 2022.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2021, p. 213.
- ^ Lemus 2023.
- ^ Peñate 2023.
- ^ Harrison 2024.
- ^ El Mundo 2024.
- ^ Contra Punto 2024.
- ^ Campos Madrid 2024.
- ^ a b c d El Mundo 2026.
- ^ Gans 2019, p. 90.
- ^ Gans 2019, p. 84.
- ^ Haggerty 1990, p. 15.
- ^ Ghanem 2023, p. 96.
- ^ Allison 2016, p. 720.
- ^ a b Paszyn 1996, p. 160.
- ^ Central Intelligence Agency 1984, p. 12.
- ^ Crandall 2016, pp. 56–57.
- ^ O'Grady 2012.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2026.
- ^ Guzmán 2024.
- ^ Chávez 2024.
- ^ Diario Co Latino 2019.
- ^ Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.
- ^ Central American Parliament.
- ^ COPPPAL.
- ^ Contra Punto 2016.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 1994, pp. 60 & 64.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2009, p. 60.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2014, pp. 131 & 144.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2019, p. 111.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2024, pp. 207–208.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2000, p. 104.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2003, pp. 76–90.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2012, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2015, p. 266.
- ^ a b Supreme Electoral Court 2018, p. 104.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2024, p. 209.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2000, p. 135.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2003, pp. 91–92.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2006, p. 246.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2009, pp. 218–219.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2012, pp. 122–123.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2015, pp. 287 & 318.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2021, p. 214.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2024, p. 256.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2006, p. 227.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2009, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2015, p. 240.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2021, p. 212.
- ^ Supreme Electoral Court 2024, p. 255.
Bibliography
[edit]Books
[edit]- Bosch, Brian J. (1999). The Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981. Jefferson, North Carolina; London: McFarland & Company Incorporated Publishers. ISBN 0786406127. LCCN 99-26678. OCLC 41662421. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- Cohen, Mollie J. (2024). "The Downstream Consequences of Invalid Vote Campaigns". None of the Above: Protest Voting in Latin American Democracies. University of Michigan Press. pp. 137–151. doi:10.3998/mpub.12738341. ISBN 9780472904280. JSTOR 10.3998/mpub.12738341.12. OCLC 1398507112. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Crandall, Russell (2016). The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992. Davidson, North Carolina: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316471081.017. ISBN 9781316471081. OCLC 952149463. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- Haggerty, Richard A., ed. (1990). El Salvador: A Country Study (2nd ed.). Washington, D.C., United States: Federal Research Division. ISBN 9780525560371. LCCN 89048948. OCLC 1044677008. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- Krennerich, Michael (2005). "El Salvador". In Nohlen, Dieter (ed.). Elections in the Americas A Data Handbook Volume 1: North America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 270–299. ISBN 9780191557934. OCLC 58051010. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- López Bernal, Carlos (2016). "Schafik Jorge Hándal: Y la Reconfiguración del Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (1992–2014)" [Schafik Jorge Hándal: And the Reconfiguration of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (1992–2014)]. In González Arana, Roberto; Schneider, Alejandro (eds.). Sociedades en Conflicto: Movimientos Sociales y Movimientos Armados en América Latina [Societies in Conflict: Social Movements and Armed Movements in Latin America] (in Spanish). Latin American Council of Social Sciences. pp. 95–118. doi:10.2307/j.ctvtxw20d.9. ISBN 9789877225273. JSTOR j.ctvtxw20d.9. OCLC 961453090.
- McClintock, Michael (1985). The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador. Vol. 1. London, United Kingdom: Zed Books. ISBN 9780862322403. OCLC 1145770950. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- Tulchin, Joseph S. & Bland, Gary, eds. (1992). Is There a Transition to Democracy in El Salvador?. L. Rienner Publishers. ISBN 9781555873103. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- White, Alastair (1973). El Salvador. Nations of the Modern World. London and Tonbridge: Ernest Benn Limited. ISBN 0510395236. LCCN 73175341. OCLC 1391406624. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
Election results
[edit]- Memoria Anual de Labores Correspondiente a 1994 y Memoria de Labores de las Elecciones de 1994 [Annual Memory of Labors Correspondent to 1994 and Memory of Labors of the 1994 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 1994. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial del Proceso y Evento Electoral: Elecciones de Diputados y Concejos Municipales 16 de Marzo de 1997 [Special Memory of the Process and Electoral Event: Elections for Deputies and Municipal Councils 16 March 1997] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 1997. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elección de Presidente y Vicepresidente de la República 7 de Marzo de 1999 [Special Memory: Election for President and Vice President of the Republic 7 March 1999] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 1999. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2000 [Special Memory: 2000 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2000. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2003 [Special Memory: 2003 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2003. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elección Presidencial 2004 [Special Memory: 2004 Presidential Election] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2004. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2006 [Special Memory: 2006 Election] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2006. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2009 [Special Memory: 2009 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2009. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2012 [Special Memory: 2012 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2012. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2014 [Special Memory: 2014 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2014. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2015 [Special Memory: 2015 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2015. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2018 [Special Memory: 2018 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2018. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2019 [Special Memory: 2019 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2019. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2021 [Special Memory: 2021 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2021. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Memoria Especial: Elecciones 2024 [Special Memory: 2024 Elections] (PDF) (in Spanish). San Salvador, El Salvador: Supreme Electoral Court. 2024. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
Journals
[edit]- Acosta, Benjamin & Rogers, Melissa Ziegler (September 2020). "When Militant Organizations Lose Militarily But Win Politically". Cooperation and Conflict. 55 (3). Sage Publishing: 365–387. doi:10.1177/0010836720904400. ISSN 0010-8367. JSTOR 48663281. OCLC 10116412409.
- Allison, Michael E. (2016). "Why Splinter? Parties that Split from the FSLN, FMLN and URNG". Journal of Latin American Studies. 48 (4). Cambridge University Press: 707–737. doi:10.1017/S0022216X1600136X. ISSN 0022-216X. JSTOR 26168309. OCLC 8271530265.
- Chávez, Joaquín M. (2015). "How Did the Civil War in El Salvador End?". The American Historical Review. 120 (5). Oxford University Press: 1784–1797. doi:10.1093/ahr/120.5.1784. ISSN 0002-8762. OCLC 6911206396.
- Coll, Alberto R. (1985). "Soviet Arms and Central American Turmoil". World Affairs. 148 (1). Wiley: 7–17. ISSN 0043-8200. JSTOR 20672043. OCLC 9990627448.
- Gans, Duncan (2019). "Midterm Decline in Comparative Perspective". Honors Projects. 121. Bowdoin Digital Commons. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- LeoGrande, William M. & Robbins, Carla Anne (1980). "Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador". Foreign Affairs. 58 (5). Council on Foreign Relations: 1084–1103. doi:10.2307/20040583. ISSN 0015-7120. JSTOR 20040583. OCLC 5546899083.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. & McElhinny, Vincent (1996). "Low Intensity Warfare, High-Intensity Death: The Demographic Impact of the Wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua" (PDF). Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. 21 (42). Taylor & Francis: 211–241. ISSN 0826-3663. JSTOR 41799994. OCLC 9983726023. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 October 2015. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
Theses
[edit]- Ching, Erik K. (1997). From Clientelism to Militarism: The State, Politics and Authoritarianism in El Salvador, 1840–1940 (PhD thesis). Santa Barbara, California: University of California, Santa Barbara. OCLC 39326756. ProQuest 304330235.
- Ghanem, Maria (2023). The Democratic Contributions of Political Parties that were Linked to Former Armed Groups (PDF) (PhD thesis). OCLC 1407415099. HAL tel-04272190. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- Paszyn, Danuta (1996). The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America 1979–1990, Case Studies: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (PDF) (Master of Philosophy thesis). London, United Kingdom: University of London. OCLC 1222803730. ProQuest 10016707. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
Newspapers
[edit]- Aguilar, Jimena; Labrador, Gabriel & Carías, Patricia (2 May 2012). "El FMLN Impone su Ley" [The FMLN Imposes Its Law]. El Faro (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Alemán, Marcos (9 February 2021). "El Salvador Opposition Proposes President's Removal". AP News. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- "ARENA y FMLN Experimentan la Derrota Electoral más Grande Desde 1994" [ARENA and FMLN Experience the Largest Electoral Defeat Since 1994]. Contra Punto (in Spanish). 19 February 2024. Retrieved 21 February 2024.
- Baires Quezada, Rodrigo (1 February 2011). "Las Promesas del Día de Reyes" [Reyes' Promises of the Day]. El Faro (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Booth, William (9 March 2009). "In El Salvador Vote, Big Opportunity for Leftists". The Washington Post. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Bremer, Catherine & Barrera, Alberto (16 March 2009). Beech, Eric (ed.). "Factbox: Salvadoran President-Elect Mauricio Funes". Reuters. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Campos Madrid, Gabriel (4 March 2024). "Cambios en Municipios Importantes" [Changes in Important Municipalities]. La Prensa Gráfica (in Spanish). Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Cerón, Leonardo (29 May 2023). "Condenan a Funes y Munguía Payés por la Tregua" [Funes and Munguía Payés are Condemned for the Truce]. El Mundo (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Chávez, Gerson (9 April 2024). "El FMLN Perdió Casi 24,400 Afiliados en los Últimos Cinco Años". Diario El Salvador. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Córdoba, Armando (21 April 2014). "Is El Salvador's Revamped Truce Plan a Political Stunt?". InSight Crime. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Diez Partidos Políticos Convocaron a Internas Hacia Elecciones 2027: Fechas y Plazos" [Ten Political Parties Convokes Primary Elections for 2027: Dates and Deadlines]. El Mundo (in Spanish). 8 April 2026. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- "Dos Años Después el FMLN Reconoce que fue un Error Expulsar a Nayib Bukele" [Two Years Later the FMLN Recognizes that Expelling Nayib Bukele was an Error]. Última Hora (in Spanish). 12 February 2019. Retrieved 23 March 2024.
- "El Salvador Bans Mining". Deutsche Welle. 30 March 2017. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "En Vivo: Cierre de Escrutinio Final de la Elección de Presidente y Vicepresidente 2024" [Live: The Final Scrutiny of the 2024 Election for President and Vice President Closes]. El Mundo (in Spanish). 9 February 2024. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- "Ex-Rebel Becomes El Salvador Leader". BBC News. 1 June 2014. Retrieved 27 March 2021.
- "FMLN Pierde Control Legislativo y ARENA Gana 33 Diputados" [The FMLN Loses Legislative Control and ARENA Wins 33 Deputies]. El Faro (in Spanish). 11 March 2012. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Guillermo Gallegos Llama a la Concertación Nacional" [Guillermo Gallegos Calls on the National Coalition]. Diario Co Latino (in Spanish). 10 November 2016. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Horton, Chris (21 August 2018). "El Salvador Recognizes China in Blow to Taiwan". The New York Times. Taipei, Taiwan. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Guzmán, Jessica (4 August 2024). "Manuel "El Chino" Flores Asume Dirección del FMLN: "El Pueblo no Necesita un FMLN Bravucón"" [Manuel "El Chino" Flores Assumes Leadership of the FMLN: "The People Does Not Need a Bully FMLN"]. El Mundo (in Spanish). Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- "Jasael Torres Electo como Secretario de la Juventud del FMLN" [Jasael Torres Elected as the Secretary of the FMLN Youth]. Diario Co Latino (in Spanish). 27 May 2019. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Laguan, Jonathan (10 October 2017). "Nayib Bukele, Expulsado del FMLN por Estas Razones" [Nayib Bukele, Expelled from FMLN for These Reasons]. La Prensa Gráfica (in Spanish). Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- "Leftist Leader Sworn in as President, Reopens Ties with Cuba". France 24. 2 June 2009. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Lemus, Lissette (26 June 2023). "Manuel Flores, Precandidato del FMLN, le Recuerda a Bukele que la Reelección es "Inconstitucional"" [Manuel Flores, Pre-Candidate of the FMLN, Reminds Bukele that Re-Election is "Unconstitutional"]. El Diario de Hoy (in Spanish). Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Looft, Christopher (21 March 2012). "Church Brokered El Salvador Gang Truce: Bishop". InSight Crime. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Lorena Peña: Acuerdo para Designar Presidencia AL no Fue Fácil" [Lorena Peña: Agreement to Designate the Legislative Assembly's Presidency was Not Easy]. La Prensa Gráfica (in Spanish). 15 May 2015. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Malkin, Elisabeth (24 March 2010). "El Salvador Leader Apologizes for Archbishop's Assassination". The New York Times. Mexico City, Mexico. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- O'Grady, Mary Anastasia (19 August 2012). "El Salvador's VP Campaigns for Votes in N.Y." Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Palumbo, Gene & Malkin, Elisabeth (3 February 2019). "Nayib Bukele, an Outsider Candidate, Claims Victory in El Salvador Election". The New York Times. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Peñate, Susana (2 June 2023). "FMLN Califica de "Fraude" Reducción de Municipios y Diputados Antes de Elecciones 2024" [FMLN Describes the Reduction of Municipalities and Deputies Before the 2024 Elections as "Fraud"]. El Mundo (in Spanish). Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- "Presidente de El Salvador Reconoce Fracaso de Tregua Entre Pandillas" [The President of El Salvador Recognizes the Collapse of the Truce with the Gangs]. Univision (in Spanish). 26 May 2014. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Presidente Funes Pide Perdón a Comunidades Indígenas por Persecución y Exterminio de Otros Gobiernos" [President Funes Asks for Forgiveness from Indigenous Communities for Persecution and Extermination by Previous Governments]. El Salvador Noticias (in Spanish). 12 October 2010. Archived from the original on 28 October 2010. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Reed, Betsy (4 January 2016). "Violent Deaths in El Salvador Spiked 70% in 2015, Figures Reveal". The Guardian. Retrieved 25 February 2023.
- Renteria, Nelson (16 January 2010). Cooney, Peter (ed.). "El Salvador's Funes Apologizes for Civil War Abuses". Reuters. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Robbins, Seth (5 August 2013). "Can El Salvador Gang Truce Survive Presidential Campaign?". InSight Crime. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Salvador: 30 Ans de Prison Pour Une Ado Violée Ayant Perdu son Bébé" [El Salvador: 30 Years in Prison for a Raped Teenager Who Lost Her Baby]. L'Orient–Le Jour (in French). 7 July 2017. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
Web sources
[edit]- "A New Chapter for El Salvador: The First Hundred Days of President Mauricio Funes" (PDF). Center for Democracy in the Americas. 9 November 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 August 2011. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "El Himno del FMLN es un Llamado a la Unidad" [The Anthem of the FMLN is a Call to Unity]. Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 15 May 2021. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
- "El Salvador: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. April 1984. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 January 2017. Retrieved 19 March 2024.
- "Electoral/Political Party Reform – 1992". Peace Accords Matrix. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Foro de Sao Paulo en El Salvador es por Reconocimiento al FMLN" [São Paulo Forum in El Salvador to Recognize the FMLN]. Contra Punto (in Spanish). 15 June 2016. Retrieved 4 May 2025.
- Goodfriend, Hilary (22 March 2018). "El Salvador's Left in Crisis". North American Congress on Latin America. Archived from the original on 23 March 2024. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Goodfriend, Hilary (14 February 2019). "El Salvador's Backslide". North American Congress on Latin America. Archived from the original on 9 December 2024. Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Grupos Parlamentarios 2025-2026" [Parliamentary Groups 2025–2026]. Central American Parliament (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- Harrison, Chase (18 February 2021). "Explainer: El Salvador's 2021 Legislative Elections". AS/COA. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Harrison, Chase (31 May 2022). "In El Salvador, a Chastened Opposition Looks to Find Its Way". AS/COA. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Harrison, Chase (31 January 2024). "Explainer: El Salvador's 2024 Presidential and Legislative Elections". AS/COA. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Nagovitch, Paola (6 June 2019). "Nayib Bukele's First Steps as El Salvador's President". AS/COA. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- "Países y Partidos Miembros de la COPPPAL" [Countries and Party Members of COPPPAL]. COPPPAL (in Spanish). Retrieved 4 May 2026.
- "Partidos Políticos" [Political Parties]. Supreme Electoral Court (in Spanish). 2026. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- Ulloa, Félix (11 February 2010). "Mauricio Funes: His Way". Americas Quarterly. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- Zaino, Christine & Herrera, Sofia (1 November 2024). No Policies, No Party: Four Cases from Latin America. Atlantic Council (Report). JSTOR resrep64867.
External links
[edit]- Official website (in Spanish)
- "Anthem of the FMLN" on YouTube
- Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
- 1980 establishments in El Salvador
- Catholic political parties
- Christian socialist organizations
- Communist guerrilla organizations
- Democratic socialist parties
- Marxist–Leninist parties
- Organizations of the Salvadoran Civil War
- Political parties established in 1980
- Political parties in El Salvador