GGH encryption scheme

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The Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi (GGH) lattice-based cryptosystem is an asymmetric cryptosystem based on lattices. There is also a GGH signature scheme.

The Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi (GGH) cryptosystem makes use of the fact that the closest vector problem can be a hard problem. It was published in 1997 by Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Shai Halevi, and uses a trapdoor one-way function that is relying on the difficulty of lattice reduction. The idea included in this trapdoor function is that, given any basis for a lattice, it is easy to generate a vector which is close to a lattice point, for example taking a lattice point and adding a small error vector. But to return from this erroneous vector to the original lattice point a special basis is needed.

The GGH encryption scheme was cryptanalyzed in 1999 by Phong Q. Nguyen.

Operation[edit]

GGH involves a private key and a public key.

The private key is a basis of a lattice with good properties (such as short nearly orthogonal vectors) and a unimodular matrix .

The public key is another basis of the lattice of the form .

For some chosen M, the message space consists of the vector in the range .

Encryption[edit]

Given a message , error , and a public key compute

In matrix notation this is

.

Remember consists of integer values, and is a lattice point, so v is also a lattice point. The ciphertext is then

Decryption[edit]

To decrypt the cyphertext one computes

The Babai rounding technique will be used to remove the term as long as it is small enough. Finally compute

to get the messagetext.

Example[edit]

Let be a lattice with the basis and its inverse

and

With

and

this gives

Let the message be and the error vector . Then the ciphertext is

To decrypt one must compute

This is rounded to and the message is recovered with

Security of the scheme[edit]

1999 Nguyen showed at the Crypto conference that the GGH encryption scheme has a flaw in the design of the schemes. He showed that every ciphertext reveals information about the plaintext and that the problem of decryption could be turned into a special closest vector problem much easier to solve than the general CVP.

Bibliography[edit]

  • Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Shai Halevi. Public-key cryptosystems from lattice reduction problems. In CRYPTO ’97: Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 112–131, London, UK, 1997. Springer-Verlag.
  • Phong Q. Nguyen. Cryptanalysis of the Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi Cryptosystem from Crypto ’97. In CRYPTO ’99: Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 288–304, London, UK, 1999. Springer-Verlag.