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Geopolitics (from Greek γῆ ge "earth, land" and πολιτική politikē "politics") is the study of the effects of geography (human and physical) on international politics and international relations.[1] Geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy to understand, explain and predict international political behaviour through geographical variables. These include area studies, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and applied science of the region being evaluated.[2]

Geopolitics focuses on political power in relation to geographic space. In particular, territorial waters and land territory in correlation with diplomatic history. Academically, geopolitics analyses history and social science with reference to geography in relation to politics. Outside of academia, geopolitical prognosis is offered by a variety of groups including non-profit groups as well as by for-profit private institutions (such as brokerage houses[3] and consulting companies[4]).Topics of geopolitics include relations between the interests of international political actors, interests focused to an area, space, geographical element or ways, relations which create a geopolitical system.[5] "Critical geopolitics" deconstructs classical geopolitical theories, by showing their political/ideological functions for great powers during and after the age of imperialism.[6]

The term has been however used to describe a broad spectrum of ideas, from "a synonym for international relations, social, political and historical phenomena" to various pseudo-scientific theories of historical and geographic determinism.[7][8]

American geopolitical doctrine[edit]

Alfred Thayer Mahan and sea power[edit]

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a frequent commentator on world naval strategic and diplomatic affairs, believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea—and particularly with its commercial use in peace and its control in war. Mahan's theoretical framework came from Antoine-Henri Jomini, and emphasized that strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals, and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet, were conducive to control over the sea. He proposed six conditions required for a nation to have sea power:

  1. Advantageous geographical position;
  2. Serviceable coastlines, abundant natural resources, and favorable climate;
  3. Extent of territory
  4. Population large enough to defend its territory;
  5. Society with an aptitude for the sea and commercial enterprise; and
  6. Government with the influence and inclination to dominate the sea.[9]

Mahan distinguished a key region of the world in the Eurasian context, namely, the Central Zone of Asia lying between 30° and 40° north and stretching from Asia Minor to Japan [10] In this zone independent countries still survived – Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan. Mahan regarded those countries, located between Britain and Russia, as if between "Scylla and Charybdis." Of the two monsters – Russia and Britain – it was the former that Mahan considered more threatening to the fate of Central Asia. Mahan was impressed by Russia’s transcontinental size and strategically favorable position for southward expansion. Therefore, he found it necessary for the Anglo-Saxon “sea power” to resist Russia [11]

Emil Reich[edit]

The Austro-Hungarian historian Emil Reich (1854–1910) is considered to be the first having coined the acceptance in English[12] as early as 1902 and later in 1904 in his book Foundations of Modern Europe.[13]

Homer Lea[edit]

Homer Lea in The Day of the Saxon described that the entire Anglo-Saxon race faced a threat from German (Teuton), Russian (Slav), and Japanese expansionism: The “fatal” relationship of Russia, Japan, and Germany “has now assumed through the urgency of natural forces a coalition directed against the survival of Saxon supremacy.” It is “a dreadful Dreibund.” [14] Lea believed that while Japan moved against Far East and Russia against India, the Germans would strike at England, the center of the British Empire. He thought the Anglo-Saxons faced certain disaster from their militant opponents.

Mackinder and the Heartland theory[edit]

Sir Halford Mackinder's Heartland concept showing the situation of the "pivot area" established in the Theory of the Heartland. He later revised it to mark Northern Eurasia as a pivot while keeping area marked above as Heartland.

Sir Halford Mackinder's Heartland Theory initially received little attention outside geography, but some thinkers would claim that it subsequently influenced the foreign policies of world powers.[15] Those scholars who look to MacKinder through critical lenses accept him as an organic strategist tried to built a foreign policy vision for Britain with his Eurocentric analysis of historical geography.[16] His formulation of the Heartland Theory was set out in his article entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History", published in England in 1904. Mackinder's doctrine of geopolitics involved concepts diametrically opposed to the notion of Alfred Thayer Mahan about the significance of navies (he coined the term sea power) in world conflict. He saw navy as a basis of Colombian era empire (roughly from 1492 to the 19th century), and predicted the 20th century to be domain of land power. The Heartland theory hypothesized a huge empire being brought into existence in the Heartland—which wouldn't need to use coastal or transoceanic transport to remain coherent. The basic notions of Mackinder's doctrine involve considering the geography of the Earth as being divided into two sections: the World Island or Core, comprising Eurasia and Africa; and the Peripheral "islands", including the Americas, Australia, Japan, the British Isles, and Oceania. Not only was the Periphery noticeably smaller than the World Island, it necessarily required much sea transport to function at the technological level of the World Island—which contained sufficient natural resources for a developed economy.

Mackinder posited that the industrial centers of the Periphery were necessarily located in widely separated locations. The World Island could send its navy to destroy each one of them in turn, and could locate its own industries in a region further inland than the Periphery (so they would have a longer struggle reaching them, and would face a well-stocked industrial bastion). Mackinder called this region the Heartland. It essentially comprised Central and Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Western Russia, and Mitteleuropa.[17] The Heartland contained the grain reserves of Ukraine, and many other natural resources. Mackinder's notion of geopolitics was summed up when he said:

Who rules Central and Eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

Nicholas J. Spykman is both a follower and critic of geostrategists Alfred Mahan, and Halford Mackinder. His work is based on assumptions similar to Mackinder's,[18] including the unity of world politics and the world sea. He extends this to include the unity of the air. Spykman adopts Mackinder's divisions of the world, renaming some:

  1. The Heartland;
  2. The Rimland (analogous to Mackinder's "inner or marginal crescent" also an intermediate region, lying between the Heartland and the marginal sea powers); and
  3. The Offshore Islands & Continents (Mackinder's "outer or insular crescent").[19]

Under Spykman's theory, a Rimland separates the Heartland from ports that are usable throughout the year (that is, not frozen up during winter). Spykman suggested this required that attempts by Heartland nations (particularly Russia) to conquer ports in the Rimland must be prevented. Spykman modified Mackinder's formula on the relationship between the Heartand and the Rimland (or the inner crescent), claiming that "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." This theory can be traced in the origins of Containment, a U.S. policy on preventing the spread of Soviet influence after World War II (see also Truman Doctrine).

Another famous follower of Mackinder was Karl Haushofer who called Mackinder’s Geographical Pivot of History a “genius' scientific tractate.”[20] He commented on it: “Never have I seen anything greater than those few pages of geopolitical masterwork.”[21] Mackinder located his Pivot, in the words of Haushofer, on “one of the first solid, geopolitically and geographically irreproachable maps, presented to one of the earliest scientific forums of the planet – the Royal Geographic Society in London”[22] Haushofer adopted both Mackinder’s Heartland thesis and his view of the Russian-German alliance – powers that Mackinder saw as the major contenders for control of Eurasia in the twentieth century. Following Mackinder he suggested an alliance with the Soviet Union and, advancing a step beyond Mackinder, added Japan to his design of the Eurasian Bloc.[23]

Kissinger, Brzezinski and the Grand Chessboard[edit]

Two famous Security Advisers from the Cold War period, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, cared lest the United States lose its geopolitical focus on Eurasia and, first and foremost, on Russia despite the fall of Communism and the end of the ideological struggle. Ideological Cold warriors, both turned into convinced geopoliticians after the end of the Cold War,[24] and each wrote an influential book on the subject in the 1990s—Diplomacy (Kissinger 1994) and The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.[25] The Anglo-American classical geopolitical theories were revived.

Students of geopolitics and history, Kissinger wrote in Diplomacy, are uneasy about the approach that hostile intentions have disappeared and traditional foreign policy considerations no longer apply. “They would argue … that Russia, regardless of who govern it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland, and is the heir to one of the most potent imperial traditions.” The United States must “maintain the global balance of power vis-à-vis the country with a long history of expansionism.”[26]

After Russia, the second geopolitical threat traditionally remained Germany and, as Mackinder had feared ninety years ago, its partnership with Russia. During the Cold War, Kiisinger argues, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that, “unless America is organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to involve itself later under circumstances far less favorable to both sides of the Atlantic. That is even more true today. Germany has become so strong that existing European institutions cannot by themselves strike a balance between Germany and its European partners. Nor can Europe, even with Germany, manage by itself … Russia…” It is in no country’s interest that Germany and Russia should fixate on each other as principal partner. They would raise fears of condominium. Without America, Britain and France cannot cope with Germany and Russia; and “without Europe, America could turn … into an island off the shores of Eurasia."[27]

Spykman’s vision of Eurasia was strongly confirmed: “Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the large landmass of Euraisa, whose resources and population far exceed those of the United States. The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia’s two principal spheres—Europe and Asia—remains a good definition of strategic danger for America. Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily. That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events.”[28] The main interest of the American leaders is maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia[29]

Having converted from ideologist into geopolitician, Kissinger in retrospect interpreted the Cold War in geopolitical terms—an approach not characteristic for his works during the Cold War. Now, however, he stressed on the beginning of the Cold War: “The objective of moral opposition to Communism had merged with the geopolitical task of containing the Soviet expansion.”[30] Nixon, he added, was geopolitical rather than ideological cold warrior [31]

Three years after Kissinger’s Dilpomacy, Brzezinski followed suit, launching The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives and, after three more years, The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia. The Grand Chessboard described the American triumph in the Cold War in terms of control over Eurasia: for the first time ever, a “non-Eurasian” power had emerged as a key arbiter of “Eurasian” power relations.[32] The book states its purpose: “The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book.”[33] Although the power configuration underwent a revolutionary change, Brzezinski confirmed three years later, Eurasia was still a megacontinent.[34] Like Spykman, Brzezinski acknowledges that: “Cumulatively, Eurasia’s power vastly overshadows America’s.”[32]

In classical Spykman terms, Brzezinski formulized his geostrategic “chessboard” doctrine of Eurasia, which aims to prevent the unification of this megacontinent.

"Europe and Asia are politically and economically powerful…. It follows that… American foreign policy must…employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter.… Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and that struggle involves geo- strategy – the strategic management of geopolitical interests…. But in the meantime it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America… For America the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia…and America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained."[35]

Eurasia in the American doctrine[edit]

All the named geopoliticians and many others have focused on Eurasia as a pivotal land mass. All have agreed that "who rules Eurasia, rules the world." In this they are also in agreement with the German Geopolitik and the Russian Eurasianism. The only difference is that the Eurasian unity was the greatest fear of Mahan, Mackinder, Homer Lea, and Spykman and the greatest hope of Haushofer; traditionally, a generation later it is the greatest fear of Kissinger and Brzezinski and the greatest hope of the most famous Eurasianist, Alexander Dugin.[36]

Regarding a more specific key-region—Heartland, Rimland, Shutter-Belt, East Europe, or introduced by Mackinder in 1943 North American Heartland—the dispute remained unresolved. Mackinder himself stated that it is not any permanent in time and every century has its own pivotal region. A recent research on geopolitics suggested that geopolitics alone cannot identify a pivotal region of the world, but it can be done combining geopolitics with climatology (see "Geopolitics and climatology" below).

German geopolitics[edit]

German Geopolitik is characterized by the belief that life of States—being similar to those of human beings and animals—is shaped by scientific determinism and social Darwinism. German geopolitics develops the concept of Lebensraum (living space) that is thought to be necessary to the development of a nation like a favorable natural environment would be for animals.

Friedrich Ratzel[edit]

Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), influenced by thinkers such as Darwin and zoologist Ernst Heinrich Haeckel, contributed to 'Geopolitik' by the expansion on the biological conception of geography, without a static conception of borders. Positing that states are organic and growing, with borders representing only a temporary stop in their movement, he held that the expanse of a state's borders is a reflection of the health of the nation—meaning that static countries are in decline. Ratzel published several papers, among which was the essay "Lebensraum" (1901) concerning biogeography. Ratzel created a foundation for the German variant of geopolitics, geopolitik. Influenced by the American geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ratzel wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine, unlike land power.

The geopolitical theory of Ratzel has been criticized as being too sweeping, and his interpretation of human history and geography being too simple and mechanistic. Critically, he also underestimated the importance of social organization in the development of power.[37]

The association of German Geopolitik with Nazism[edit]

After World War I, the thoughts of Rudolf Kjellén and Ratzel were picked up and extended by a number of German authors such as Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach and Otto Maull. In 1923, Karl Haushofer founded the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (Journal for Geopolitics), which was later used in the propaganda of Nazi Germany. The key concepts of Haushofer's Geopolitik were Lebensraum, autarky, pan-regions, and organic borders. States have, Haushofer argued, an undeniable right to seek natural borders which would guarantee autarky.

Haushofer's influence within the Nazi Party has recently been challenged,[38] given that Haushofer failed to incorporate the Nazis' racial ideology into his work. Popular views of the role of geopolitics in the Nazi Third Reich suggest a fundamental significance on the part of the geo-politicians in the ideological orientation of the Nazi state. Bassin (1987) reveals that these popular views are in important ways misleading and incorrect.

Despite the numerous similarities and affinities between the two doctrines, geopolitics was always held suspect by the National Socialist ideologists. This was understandable, for the underlying philosophical orientation of geopolitics did not comply with that of National Socialism. Geopolitics shared Ratzel's scientific materialism and geographic determinism, and held that human society was determined by external influences—in the face of which qualities held innately by individuals or groups were of reduced or no significance. National Socialism rejected in principle both materialism and determinism and also elevated innate human qualities, in the form of a hypothesized 'racial character,' to the factor of greatest significance in the constitution of human society. These differences led after 1933 to friction and ultimately to open denunciation of geopolitics by Nazi ideologues.[39] Nevertheless, German Geopolitik was discredited by its (mis)use in Nazi expansionist policy of World War II and has never achieved standing comparable to the pre-war period.

Disciplinary differences in perspectives on Geopolitics[edit]

Negative associations with the term "geopolitics" and its practical application stemming from its association with World War II and pre-World War II German scholars and students of Geopolitics are largely specific to the field of academic Geography, and subdisciplines of Human Geography such as Political Geography in particular. However, this negative association does not exist, or at least not to the same extent, in disciplines such as History or Political Science that make use of geopolitical concepts. Classical Geopolitics forms an important element of analysis for Military History as well as for subdisciplines of Political Science such as International Relations and Security Studies. This difference in disciplinary perspectives is addressed by Bert Chapman in Geopolitics: A Guide To the Issues, in which Chapman makes note that academic and professional International Relations journals are more amenable to the study and analysis of Geopolitics, and in particular Classical Geopolitics, than contemporary academic journals in the field of Political Geography.[40]

In disciplines outside of Geography, Geopolitics is not negatively viewed (as it often is among academic geographers such as Carolyn Gallaher or Klaus Dodds) as a tool of Imperialism or associated with Nazism, but rather viewed as a valid and consistent manner of assessing major international geopolitical circumstances and events, not necessarily related to armed conflict or military operations.

French approach on geopolitics[edit]

French geopolitical doctrines lie broadly in opposition to German Geopolitik and reject the idea of a fixed geography. French geography is focused on the evolution of polymorphic territories being the result of mankind's actions. It also relies on the consideration of long time periods through a refusal to take specific events into account. This method has been theorized by Professor Lacoste according to three principles: Representation; Diachronie; and Diatopie.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu outlined the view that man and societies are influenced by climate. He believed that hotter climates create hot-tempered people and colder climates aloof people, whereas the mild climate of France is ideal for political systems. Considered as one of the founders of French geopolitics, Élisée Reclus, is the author of a book considered as a reference in modern geography (Nouvelle Géographie universelle). Alike Ratzel, he considers geography through a global vision. However, in complete opposition to Ratzel's vision, Reclus considers geography not to be unchanging; it is supposed to evolve commensurately to the development of human society. His marginal political views resulted in his rejection by academia.

French geographer and geopolitician Jacques Ancel is considered to be the first theoretician of geopolitics in France, and gave a notable series of lectures at the Carnegie foundation and published "Géopolitique" in 1936. Like Reclus, Ancel rejects German determinist views on geopolitics (including Haushofer's doctrines).

Braudel's broad view used insights from other social sciences, employed the concept of the longue durée, and downplayed the importance of specific events. This method was inspired by the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache (who in turn was influenced by German thought, particularly that of Friedrich Ratzel whom he had met in Germany). Braudel's method was to analyse the interdependence between individuals and their environment.[41] Vidalian geopolitics is based on varied forms of cartography and on possibilism (founded on a societal approach of geography—i.e. on the principle of spaces polymorphic faces depending from many factors among them mankind, culture, and ideas) as opposed to determinism.

Due to the influence of German Geopolitik on French geopolitics, the latter were for a long time banished from academic works. In the mid-1970s, Yves Lacoste—a French geographer who was directly inspired by Ancel, Braudel and Vidal de la Blache—wrote La géographie, ça sert d'abord à faire la guerre (Geography first use is war)in 1976. This book—which is very famous in France—symbolizes the birth of this new school of geopolitics (if not so far the first French school of geopolitics as Ancel was very isolated in the 1930s–40s). Initially linked with communist party evolved to a less liberal approach. At the end of the 1980s he founded the Institut Français de Géopolitique (French Institute for Geopolitics) that publishes the Hérodote revue. While rejecting the generalizations and broad abstractions employed by the German and Anglo-American traditions (and the new geographers), this school does focus on spatial dimension of geopolitics affairs on different levels of analysis. This approach emphazises the importance of multi-level (or multi-scales) analysis and maps at the opposite of critical geopolitics which avoid such tools. Lacoste proposed that every conflict (both local or global) can be considered from a perspective grounded in three assumptions:

  1. Representation: Each group or individuals is the product of an education and is characterized by specific representations of the world or others groups or individuals. Thus, basic societal beliefs are grounded in their ethnicity or specific location. The study of representation is a common point with the more contemporary critical geopolitics. Both are connected with the work of Henri Lefebvre (La production de l'espace, first published in 1974)
  2. Diachronie. Conducting an historical analysis confronting "long periods" and short periods as the prominent French historian Fernand Braudel suggested.
  3. Diatopie: Conducting a cartographic survey through a multiscale mapping.

Connected with this stream, and former member of Hérodote editorial board, the French geographer Michel Foucher developed a long term analysis of international borders. He coined various neologism among them: Horogenesis: Neologism that describes the concept of studying the birth of borders, Dyade: border shared by two neighbouring states (for instance US territory has two terrestrial dyades : one with Canada and one with Mexico). The main book of this searcher "Fronts et frontières" (Fronts and borders) first published in 1991, without equivalent remains as of yet untranslated in English. Michel Foucher is an expert of the African Union for borders affairs.

More or less connected with this school, Stéphane Rosière can be quoted as the editor in Chief of the online journal L'Espace politique [1], this journal created in 2007 became the most prominent French journal of political geography and Geopolitics with Hérodote.

A much more conservative stream is personified by François Thual was a French expert in geopolitics, and a former official of the Ministry of Civil Defence. Thual taught geopolitics of the religions at the French War College, and has written thirty books devoted mainly to geopolitical method and its application to various parts of the world. He is particularly interested in the Orthodox, Shiite, and Buddhist religions, and in troubled regions like the Caucasus. Connected with F. Thual, Aymeric Chauprade, former professor of geopolitics at the French War College and now member of the extreme-right party "Front national", subscribes to a supposed "new" French school of geopolitics which advocates above all a return to realpolitik and "clash of civilization" (Huntington). The thought of this school is expressed through the French Review of Geopolitics (headed by Chauprade) and the International Academy of Geopolitics. Chauprade is a supporter of a Europe of nations, he advocates a European Union excluding Turkey, and a policy of compromise with Russia (in the frame of a Eurasian alliance which is en vogue among European extreme-right politists) and supports the idea of a multipolar world—including a balanced relationship between China and the U.S.

Russian geopolitics[edit]

Domestic Russian geopolitical views evolved over the centuries. In 988 Prince Vladimir of Kiev officially introduced Byzantium-based Eastern Orthodoxy to pagan Kievan Rus' and arranged the baptism of many of his subjects in the waters of the Dnieper. In 1240 Catholic Swedish knights attempted to expand the influence of western-style Catholicism in Orthodox Russia, but the Grand Duke of Novgorod, Alexander Nevsky, defeated them on the Neva (Battle of the Neva, from which he got his nickname of Nevsky), and then in 1242 defeated an army of the Teutonic knights on the thin ice of Lake Peipus. Alexander Nevsky collaborated with the Golden Horde in opposing western influences. In 1380 Prince Dmitry Donskoy, with the blessing of St. Sergius of Radonezh, defeated the Golden Horde in the Kulikovo. In 1480 the forces of the Grand Duchy of Moscow put an end to the yoke of the Horde (Great stand on the Ugra river). In 1510 century Filofei, the hegumen of the Monastery of the Holy Eliazar near Pskov, crystallised the Russian geopolitical concept of Muscovy as the Third Rome. Among Russian authors, the term "geopolitics" first came into use in 1920[citation needed] among émigrés in the Eurasianism movement. In the late 1920s it appeared in the Soviet Union. In this regard, some modern historians[which?] date the appearance of a Russian geopolitical school to those years. Earlier thinkers to consider the geopolitical issues in this context are either predecessors to or researchers outside the general national geopolitical school.[citation needed]

In different periods of its existence (1922-1991) the Soviet Union had different, sometimes ambivalent geopolitical policies and practices. With a view to the spread of socialism in the world in general and in the possibility of increasing its territory in particular, the pre-war Soviet Union, on the one hand, contrary to the real possibilities, did not formally absorb the adjacent People's Revolutionary Mongolia (proclaimed in 1924), Tuvan People's Republic (Tannu Tuva) (1921-1944) or Gilan (1920-1921). Instead it concentrated on building itself up as a Soviet society. In 1939 Moscow negotiated a sphere of influence for itself in Eastern Europe according to the terms of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact signed with Nazi Germany. In consequence the USSR annexed part of Poland, western Ukraine and western Byelorussia (modern-day Belarus), as well as the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but faced tough resistance (the Winter War of 1939-1940) from Finland to its demand for Finnish territory.

During the Second World War of 1939-1945 and immediately afterwards the USSR dramatically strengthened its influence in the world, fostered the establishment of several socialist satellite states ("people's democracies"), and directly annexed to itself some further territories - much of East Prussia (1945), part of northern Finland (1944), Transcarpathia (1945), southern Sakhalin (1945), the Kuriles (1945), and Tannu Tuva (1944). However, the Soviet Union did not realize some of its other war aims, such as:

The Soviet Union failed to create in southern Europe a "little USSR" from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and possibly[original research?] Romania and Greece.

In the second half of the 20th century, the USSR operated as one of the two superpowers, along with the United States. It also headed the second-most powerful military-political bloc and achieved a balance of forces with NATO (military-strategic parity). Without declaring detailed geopolitical concepts openly (apart from parity and "containment of American hegemony and neo-colonialism"[citation needed]), in fact the USSR shared geopolitical control of the planet, acting in the political, military (including naval), economic, scientific and sports fields. The USSR had the largest individual military-industrial complex and the largest armed forces, which indirectly become involved in conflict with the West in local wars. Like the American school of geopolitics, Soviet geopolitics widely employed the concept of "world capitalism" opposing "worldwide socialism". Although the military-political Soviet bloc ("world socialist system") fissured (notably in socialist Yugoslavia, Albania and the People's Republic of China), the Soviet Union as a whole continued to strengthen its influence in the world, actively and, in most cases successfully supporting not only allies in the ATS, but several groups of socialist orientation, as well as national liberation movements.

Professor Alexei L. Narochnitsky, a Soviet specialist on Russian geopolitics, studied Russian geopolitics of the 19th century, producing scientific and documentary historical works. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USSR's political successor, the Russian Federation, while having less influence (relative to the USSR) in the international arena, a smaller GDP (in the second half of the world's top ten), and suffering from backwardness in science,[citation needed] from a significant reduction of strategic nuclear forces, from increased poverty and corruption, from outdated infrastructure, from internal economic crises and from a difficult demographic situation, still retained recognition as a potential superpower. Russia has achieved (1998) full membership in the Group of Eight (G8), and has achieved recognition with other emerging powers as part of the BRIC community. Russian leaders and politicians actively advocate the rejection of a unipolar world and of the United States as the sole superpower, and express the need to establish a multipolar world with ever-increasing roles for potential superpowers and for regional powers and organizations. In this respect Russia agrees with China (which is actually closer to superpower status[citation needed]).

In the 1990s a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences  ( ru ) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vadim Tsymbursky  ( ru ) (1957-2009), coined the term "island-Russia" and developed the "Great Limitrophe" concept.

Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov (retired), a prominent Russian geopolitics specialist of the early 21st century, headed the Academy of Geopolitical Problems (Russian: Академии геополитических проблем), which analyses the international and domestic situations and develops geopolitical doctrine. Earlier, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov headed the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation; in this capacity, he firmly and fundamentally defended the national interests of Russia, opposing NATO's eastward expansion, the aggressive foreign policy of the United States and of the West in general, speaking out against the construction of a unipolar world, to time for his shoulders were already studying in the Military Academy and impeccable service in a motorized infantry troops in various command positions.[clarification needed] Construction of a unipolar world dominated by the West (contrary to the national interests of the Russian Federation) and the further expansion of NATO allegedly threaten Russia's national security.

In recent years,[when?] Russia has actively developed new schools and directions in geopolitics. Vladimir Karjakin, a Fellow at the Center for Defense Studies RISS, has proposed the term "geopolitics of the third wave"[42] - based on innovative approaches and new challenges. This interdisciplinary approach is based on the principles of synergy and of post-non-classical science in the context of socio-political dynamics and strategies of indirect actions.

Geopolitics and climatology[edit]

A recent research undertaken by historian specializing on geopolitics, Max Ostrovsky, analyzed the interdependence between military power, industry, manpower, agriculture, and climate.[43] The result of the research suggested a solution to the century-old debate of the world-pivotal region, expressed by Mackinder's formula, "Who rules X land, rules the world."

As Mackinder had already stated, it is not any permanent in space region. But the final formula appears if geopolitics is combined with climatology: Who rules the largest temperate zone with the most optimum rainfall, rules the world.[44] This formula, Ostrovsky claims, is relevant for all ages since the Neolithic Revolution. It has worked on regional scales in pre-modern time and on the global scale afterwards.[45] Today, the largest national temperate area with the most optimum rainfall is the Mid-East of the United States. It is reflected in the current world order.

World pivotal regions were not permanent in space because climate is not permanent. "Mountain ranges stand unperturbed," as Spykman put it, but climate changes, and changes in historic rather than geologic rhythm. Storm belts shift, and the mainstream of civilization shifts accordingly. The temperate optimum rainfall in history shifted northward and resulted in the northward shift of civilization stressed by many geopoliticians and other scholars.

The pioneer of the research on historical climatology, climatologist Ellsworth Huntington, published his epochal The Pulse of Asia[46] in 1907. There he emphasized the dependence of historical cycles—"the beating pulse of Asia"—on rainfall cycles. He was the contemporary of classical geopoliticians, but none of them collaborated with him.


The framework of Meta-geopolitics, proposed by Nayef Al-Rodhan combines traditional and new dimensions of geopolitics to offer a multidimensional view of power and power relationships.[47] In this framework, the importance of geography is superseded by the combination of hard- and soft- power tools that states can employ to preserve and obtain power. Meta-geopolitics defines seven key dimensions of state power that include social and health issues, domestic politics, economics, environment, science and human potential, military and security issues, and international diplomacy.[48] The Meta-geopolitics framework allows for the assessment of relative strengths and weaknesses as well as predictions about future trends. Furthermore, while this analytical grid is relevant for states, it also applies to private and transnational entities, which are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary geopolitics.[49]


Non-interventionism, the geopolitical policy whereby a nation seeks to avoid alliances with other nations in order to avoid being drawn into wars not related to direct territorial self-defense. An original more formal definition is that Non-intervention is a policy characterized by the absence of interference by a state or states in the external affairs of another state without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without its consent. This is based on the grounds that a state should not interfere in the internal politics of another state, based upon the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination. A similar phrase is "strategic independence".[50] Historical examples of supporters of non-interventionism are US Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, who both favored nonintervention in European Wars while maintaining free trade. Other proponents include United States Senator Robert A. Taft and United States Congressman Ron Paul.

Democracy and geopolitics[edit]

State geopolitical interests can be also seen as anti-democratic in nature, as, like other elements of grand strategy, they get little attention from the general public.[51] Polls of United States public opinion concerting Vietnam War give illustrate the lack of interest in such theories: in 1970 only a third of Americans believed that the U.S. had not made a mistake by sending troops to fight in Vietnam,[52] however USA continued to defend its geopolitical interests[53][54] by military intervention in Vietnam for another 5 years, till 1975. Another example is the presence of US troops in Afghanistan, which in 2013 was supported by only 20% of US population, but US military presence continues in 2015.

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Devetak et al (eds), An Introduction to International Relations, 2012, p. 492.
  2. ^ Evans, G & Newnham, J., (1998), "The Penguin Dictionary of International relations", Penguin Books, London, Uk. ISBN 0-14-051397-3
  3. ^ Fidelity. "2015 Stock Market Outlook", a sample outlook report by a brokerage house.
  4. ^ McKinsey Insights & Publications. "Insights & Publications".
  5. ^ Vladimir Toncea, 2006, "Geopolitical evolution of borders in Danube Basin"
  6. ^ Mehmet Akif Okur, “Classical Texts Of the Geopolitics and the “Heart Of Eurasia”, Journal of Turkish World Studies, XIV/2, pp.76-90
  7. ^ Gogwilt, Christopher. The Fiction of Geopolitics. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804737319. 
  8. ^ Jason Dittmer, Jo Shar (2014). Geopolitics: An Introductory Reader. Routledge. p. 64. 
  9. ^ Sea Power
  10. ^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and the Effects upon International Politics, (Washington and London: Kennikat Press, 1920, p 26-27).
  11. ^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and the Effects upon International Politics, (Washington and London: Kennikat Press, 1920, p 25-27, 167-8, 172).
  12. ^ Christopher Lloyd GoGwilt, "The Geopolitical Image: Imperialism, Anarchism, and the Hypothesis of Culture in the Formation of Geopolitics", Modernism/modernity, Volume 5, Number 3, September 1998, pp. 49–70 et The Fiction of Geopolitics: Afterimages of Culture, from Wilkie Collins to Alfred Hitchcock. Stanford. Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 35–36.
  13. ^ Foundations of Modern Europe, London, George Bell, 1904, 284 pages
  14. ^ The Day of the Saxon, (New York & London: Harper and Brothers, 1912, p 122).
  15. ^ Sloan, G.R. "Sir Halford Mackinder: the heartland theory then and now", in Gray C S and Sloan G.R., Geopolitics, geography and strategy. London: Frank Cass, pp. 15–38.
  16. ^ Mehmet Akif Okur, “Classical Texts Of the Geopolitics and the “Heart Of Eurasia”, Journal of Turkish World Studies, XIV/2, pp.75-80
  17. ^ See map in Polelle, Raising Cartographic Consciousness, p. 57.
  18. ^ Mehmet Akif Okur, “Classical Texts Of the Geopolitics and the “Heart Of Eurasia”, Journal of Turkish World Studies, XIV/2, pp.81-83
  19. ^ See map in Polelle, Raising Cartographic Consciousness, p. 118.
  20. ^ Karl Haushofer, Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics, 1931, (tr. Usachev I. G., Mysl’, Moscow, 2004, p 312).
  21. ^ Michael Heffernan, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics, (London & New York: Arnold, 1998, p 134).
  22. ^ Karl Haushofer, "Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics", 1931, (tr. Usachev I. G., Mysl’, Moscow, 2004, p 312).
  23. ^ Karl Haushofer, "The Continental Bloc: Mittel Europa – Eurasia – Japan," 1941, (tr. Usachev I. G., Mysl’, Moscow, 2004).
  24. ^ Mehmet Akif Okur, “Classical Texts Of the Geopolitics and the “Heart Of Eurasia”, Journal of Turkish World Studies, XIV/2, pp.83-85
  25. ^ (Perseus Books, New York, 1997)
  26. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 814
  27. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 821-2
  28. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 813
  29. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 810
  30. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 804
  31. ^ Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 703-732
  32. ^ a b Zbignew Brzezinski, (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Perseus Books, New York, p. 31
  33. ^ Zbignew Brzezinski, (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Perseus Books, New York, p. XIV
  34. ^ Zbignew Brzezinski, (2000). The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia, The CSIS Books, Washington, p. 55
  35. ^ Zbignew Brzezinski, (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Perseus Books, New York, pp. XIII-XIV, 30-31
  36. ^ Max Ostrovsky, "The Idea of Eurasia," European Forum, Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 2009,
  37. ^ O Tuathail (2006) page 20
  38. ^ O'Tuathail, 1996
  39. ^ Mark Bassin, "Race Contra Space: The Conflict Between German 'Geopolitik' and National Socialism," Political Geography Quarterly 1987 6(2): 115-134,
  40. ^
  41. ^ Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II La part du milieu (vol. 1) ISBN 2-253-06168-9
  42. ^ See: Kariakin, V. V. (2013). Geopolitika Tretei Volny: Transformatsiia Mira v Epokhu Postmoderna [Geopolitics of the third wave : The transformation of the world in the postmodern epoch] (in Russian). Moscow: Granitsa. ISBN 9785946915632. 
  43. ^ Max Ostrovsky, Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order, (Lanham; University Press of America, 2007).
  44. ^ Max Ostrovsky, Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order, (Lanham; University Press of America, 2007, p 355-356).
  45. ^ Max Ostrovsky, Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order, (Lanham; University Press of America, 2007, p 93-126).
  46. ^ The Pulse of Asia: A Journey in Central Asia Illustrating the Geographic Basis of History, (London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910).
  47. ^ LIT
  48. ^ GCSP
  49. ^ The Northern Times
  50. ^ Galen, Ted (1997). Carpenter,The libertarian reader : classic and contemporary readings from Lao-tzu to Milton Friedman. New York: Free Press. pp. 336–344. ISBN 0684832003. 
  51. ^ Finn, Adreen. "The Problematic Nature of Geopolitics". Commentary and Outlook. 
  52. ^ Lunch, William L., Sperlich, Peter W. (1979). [0=American+National+Election+Study%2C+1966&collection=DATA&journal[0]=Western+Political+Quarterly&paging.startRow=1 "American public opinion and the war in Vietnam"]. Western Political Quarterly 32 (1): 21–44. doi:10.2307/447561. Retrieved 6 June 2014. 
  53. ^ Lind, Michael (2002). Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict (1st Touchstone ed.). New York: Touchstone. ISBN 0684870274. 
  54. ^ Lind, Michael. "The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict". New York Times. Retrieved 6 June 2014. 


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