Germany–United Kingdom relations

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Germany–United Kingdom relations
Map indicating locations of Germany and United Kingdom


United Kingdom

Germany–United Kingdom relations, or Anglo–German relations, are the bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and Germany.

Before the unification of Germany in 1871, Britain was often allied in wartime with Prussia. The royal families often intermarried. The "Hanoverian kings" were also the rulers (1714–1837) of the small German state of Hanover. They ruled both countries from London.

Historians have long focused on the diplomatic and naval rivalries between Britain and Germany in the period after 1871, searching for the root causes of the growing antagonism that led to World War I. In recent years historians have paid greater attention to the mutual cultural influences and the transfer of ideas and technologies, as well as industry, trade, and science.[1]

During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), Prussia was a British ally and suffered for it; some of the other German states at times supported France. Britain and Germany fought against each other in two wars, World War I and World War II. After British occupation of part of West Germany (1945–50), they became close allies in NATO, and now with the former East Germany as well. Trade relations have been very strong since the late Middle Ages, when the German cities of the Hanseatic League traded with England and Scotland. Both nations were active in the EU, with Germany seen as the dominant nation within the Union and Britain a more reluctant member that never adopted the Euro. Britain decided in 2016 to leave the EU.

Country comparison[edit]

Germany Germany United Kingdom United Kingdom
Population 81,757,600 62,041,708
Area 357,021 km2 (137,847 sq mi) 244,820  km2 (94,526 sq mi )
Population density 229/km2 (593/sq mi) 246/km2 (637/sq mi)
Capital Berlin London
Largest city Berlin – 3,439,100 (4,900,000 Metro), (Rhine-Ruhr 12,190,000 metro) London – 7,556,900 (13,945,000 Metro)
Government Federal parliamentary constitutional republic Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Official languages German (de facto and de jure) English (de facto); Welsh in Wales
Main religions 58% Christianity, 37% non-religious, 4% Islam, 1% other[2] 59.3% Christianity, 25.1% non-religious, 7.2% unstated, 4.8% Islam,
1.5% Hinduism, 0.8% Sikhism, 0.5% Judaism, 0.4% Buddhism
Ethnic groups 91.5% German, 2.4% Turkish, 6.1% other[3] 87% White (81.9% White British), 7.0% Asian, 3% Black, 2% Mixed, 0.9% Other (2011 Census)
GDP (nominal) €2.936 trillion (US$3.66 trillion) €35,825 per capita ($44,660) £1.985 trillion (US$3.004 trillion), £27,805 per capita ($43,875)
Expatriate populations 297,000 German-born people live in the UK (2013 ONS estimate) 250,000 British-born people live in Germany
Military expenditures €37.5 billion (US$46.8 billion) (FY 2008)[4] £41 billion (US$65 billion) (FY 2009–10)[5]


Shared heritage[edit]

English and German are both West Germanic languages. Modern English has diverged significantly after absorbing more French influence after 1066. English has its roots in the languages spoken by Germanic peoples from mainland Europe, more specifically various peoples came from what is now the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, including a people called the Angles, after whom English is named. Many everyday words in English are of Germanic origin and are similar to their German counterparts, while more intellectual and formal words are of French, Latin or Greek origin while German tends to form calques of many of these. English has become a dominant world language, and is widely studied in Germany. German in the 19th and early 20th century was an important language of science and technology, but it has now largely lost that role. In English schools, German was a niche language much less important than French. German is no longer widely studied in Great Britain except at the A-level in secondary schools.[6]

Trade and the Hanseatic League[edit]

There is a long history of trade relations between the Germans and the British. The Hanseatic League was a commercial and defensive confederation of merchant guilds and their market towns that dominated trade along the coast of Northern Europe. It stretched from the Baltic to the North Sea during the 13th–17th centuries, and included London. The main centre was Lübeck, Germany. The Hanseatic League facilitated trade between London and numerous cities, most of them controlled by German merchants. It also opened up trade with the Baltic.[7]

Royal family[edit]

Until the late 17th century marriages between the English and German royal families were uncommon. Empress Matilda, the daughter of Henry I of England, was married between 1114 and 1125 to Henry V, Holy Roman Emperor, but they had no issue. In 1256, Richard, 1st Earl of Cornwall, was elected King of Germany and his sons were surnamed Almain. Throughout this period, the Steelyard of London was a typical German business settlement. German mercenaries were hired in the Wars of the Roses.

Anne of Cleves was the consort of Henry VIII. It was not until William III of England that a king of German origin came to reign, from the House of Nassau. The consort of his successor Queen Anne was Prince George of Denmark from the House of Oldenburg, who had no surviving children.

In 1714, succeeding Queen Anne, George I, a German-speaking Hanoverian prince of mixed British and German descent, ascended to the British throne, founding the House of Hanover.[8] For over a century, Britain's monarchs were also rulers of Hanover (first as Prince Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, then as a separate Kingdom). This was a personal union rather than a political one, with the two countries remaining quite separate, but the king lived in London. British leaders often complained that kings George I and George II--who barely spoke English-- were heavily involved in Hanover and distorted British foreign policy for the benefit of Hanover, a small, poor rural country of little importance in Western Europe.[9] In contrast King George III never visited Hanover in the 60 years (1760-1820) he ruled it. Hanover was occupied by France during the Napoleonic wars, but some Hanoverian troops fled to England to form the King's German Legion, a unit within the British army made up of ethnic Germans. The personal link with Hanover finally ended in 1837 with the accession of Queen Victoria to the British throne: under the Salic Law women were ineligible for the throne of Hanover.

Every British monarch from George I to George V in the 20th century took a Royal German consort. Queen Victoria (1837-1901) was raised under close supervision by her German-born mother Princess Victoria of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld. She married her first cousin Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (1819-1861) in 1840. Their daughter Princess Victoria (1840-1901) married Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia in 1858. He became Crown Prince three years later. she and her husband were liberals who admired Britain and detested Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. but Bismarck had the ear of the elderly King, who died in 1888. The crown prince now became Kaiser, and Princess Victoria became Empress of Germany. But he died after only 99 days on the throne. Her son Wilhelm (1859-1941) became Kaiser forced Bismarck to retire.[10]

Kaiser Wilhelm II[edit]

Wilhelm, grandson of Queen Victoria, had a love-hate relationship with Britain. He visited often and was well known in higher circles, but he recklessly promoted the great expansion of the German Navy, which was a potential threat that the British government could not overlook. The humiliating crisis came in the Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908. While on an extended visit to Britain, the Kaiser gave a long interview to the London Daily Telegraph which was full of bombast, exaggeration, and vehement protestations of love for Britain. He ridiculed the British populace as "mad, mad as March hares" for questioning the peaceful intentions of Germany and its sincere desire for peace with England, while admitting that the German populace was "not friendly" toward England. The interview caused a sensation around Europe, demonstrating the Kaiser was utterly incompetent in diplomatic affairs. The British leadership had already decided that Wilhelm was mentally somewhat disturbed, and saw this as further evidence of his unstable personality rather than an indication of official German hostility.[11] It was a much more serious issue inside Germany, where there was near-unanimous ridicule of the Kaiser; thereafter he played only a nominal or symbolic role in major state affairs.[12]

The British Royal family retained the German surname von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha until 1917, when, in response to anti-German feelings during World War I, it was legally changed to the more British "Windsor". In the same year, members of the British Royal family members gave up any German titles they held, whilst their German relatives were stripped of any British titles they held by an Act of Parliament.

Intellectual influences[edit]

Ideas flowed back and forth between the two nations.[1] Refugees from Germany's repressive regimes often settled in Britain, most notably Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Advances in technology were shared, as in chemistry.[13] Over a hundred thousand German immigrants also came to Britain. Germany was perhaps one of the world's main centres for innovative social ideas in the late 19th and early 20th century. The British around 1910, led by the Liberals Asquith and Lloyd George, adopted Bismarck's system of social welfare.[14] Ideas on town planning were exchanged.[15]


Rapid German economic growth[edit]

Germany, united in 1871 after defeating Austria and France, now became the economic, military and diplomatic powerhouse under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Very rapid growth took place in heavy industry, coal, steel, chemicals and railways. Its domestic economy rivalled Britain by 1890, but its international trade and finance was on a lesser scale. The German overseas empire was a late development and was far behind Britain.


The British Foreign Office had been poorly served by a series of ambassadors who provided only superficial reports on the dramatic developments of the 1860s. That changed with the appointment of Odo Russell (1871-1884), who developed a close rapport with Bismarck and who provided in depth coverage of German developments.[16]

Britain gave passive support to the unification of Germany under Prussian auspices for strategic and ideological reasons as well as business advantages. In terms of strategy, the rise of the German Empire meant there was a counterbalance on the continent to both France and Russia, the two powers that troubled Britain the most. The threat from France and the Mediterranean, and from Russia and Central Asia, could be neutralised by judicious relationships with Germany. The new nation would be a stabilising force, and Bismarck especially emphasised his role in stabilising Europe and preventing any major war on the continent. Gladstone, however, was always suspicious of Germany, and disliked its authoritarianism; he feared that sooner or later Germany would make war on a weaker neighbour.[17] The ideological gulf was stressed by Lord Arthur Russell in 1872:

Prussia now represents all that is most antagonistic to the liberal and democratic ideas of the age; military despotism, the rule of the sword, contempt for sentimental talk, indifference to human suffering, imprisonment of independent opinion, transfer by force of unwilling populations to a hateful yoke, disregard of European opinion, total want of greatness and generosity, etc., etc."[18]

Britain was looking inward and avoided picking any disputes with Germany, although it did make clear in the "war in sight" crisis of 1875 that it would not tolerate a pre-emptive German war on France.[19]


German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck built a complex network of European alliances that kept the peace in the 1870s and 1880s. The British were building up their empire, but Bismarck strongly opposed colonies as too expensive. When public demand forced him in the 1880s to grab colonies in Africa and the Pacific, conflicts with Britain were minimal.[20]

Improved relations to 1890s, then downhill[edit]

Relations between Britain and Germany improved as the key policy-makers, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were both realistic conservatives and largely in agreement on policies.[21] There were several proposals for a formal treaty relationship between Germany and Britain, but they went nowhere; Britain preferred to stand in what it called "splendid isolation."[22] Nevertheless, a series of developments steadily improved their relations down to 1890, when Bismarck was fired by the aggressive new Kaiser Wilhelm II. In January 1896 he escalated tensions with his Kruger telegram congratulating Boer President Kruger of the Transvaal for beating off the Jameson raid. German officials in Berlin had managed to stop the Kaiser from proposing a German protectorate over the Transvaal. In the Second Boer War, Germany sympathised with the Boers. In 1897 Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz became German Naval Secretary of State and began the transformation of German Navy from small, coastal defence force to a fleet meant to challenge British naval power. Tirpitz calls for Riskflotte (Risk Fleet) that would make it too risky for Britain to take on Germany as part of wider bid to alter the international balance of power decisively in Germany's favour.[23] At the same time German foreign minister Bernhard von Bülow called for Weltpolitik (World politics). It was the new policy of Germany to assert its claim to be a global power. Bismarck's conservativism was abandoned as Germany was intent on challenging and upsetting international order.[24] Thereafter relations deteriorated steadily. London began to see Berlin as a hostile force and moved to friendlier relationships with France.[25]

Wilhelm's "Weltpolitik"[edit]

Coming to power in 1888, the young Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed Chancellor Bismarck in 1890 and sought aggressively to increasing Germany's influence in the world through his Weltpolitik. Foreign policy was controlled by the erratic Kaiser, who played an increasingly reckless hand,[26] and by the powerful foreign office under the leadership of Friedrich von Holstein.[27] The foreign office in Berlin argued that: first, a long-term coalition between France and Russia had to fall apart; secondly, Russia and Britain would never get together; and, finally, Britain would eventually seek an alliance with Germany. Germany refused to renew its treaties with Russia. But Russia did form a closer relationship with France in the Dual Alliance of 1894, since both were worried about the possibilities of German aggression. London refused to agree to the formal alliance that Germany sought. Berlin's analysis proved mistaken on every point, leading to Germany's increasing isolation and its dependence on the Triple Alliance, which brought together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The Triple Alliance was undermined by differences between Austria and Italy, and in 1915 Italy switched sides.[28]

Naval race[edit]

The British Royal Navy dominated the globe in the 19th century, but after 1890 Germany worked to achieve parity. It never did catch up, but the resulting naval race heightened tensions between the two nations.[29][30]

The German Navy under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had ambitions to rival the great British Navy, and dramatically expanded its fleet in the early 20th century to protect the colonies and exert power worldwide.[31] Tirpitz started a programme of warship construction in 1898. In 1890, Germany traded the strategic island of Heligoland in the North Sea with Britain in exchange for the eastern African island of Zanzibar, and proceeded to construct a great naval base there. The British, however, kept well ahead in the naval race by the introduction of the highly advanced new Dreadnought battleship in 1907.[32]

Two Moroccan crises[edit]

In the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, Germany nearly came to blows with Britain and France when the latter attempted to establish a protectorate over Morocco. The Germans were upset at having not been informed about French intentions, and declared their support for Moroccan independence. William II made a highly provocative speech regarding this. The following year, a conference was held in which all of the European powers except Austria-Hungary (by now little more than a German satellite) sided with France. A compromise was brokered by the United States where the French relinquished some, but not all, control over Morocco.[33] In 1911 France strong-armed itself into seizing more control over Morocco. The German Foreign Minister Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter was not opposed to these moves, but he felt Germany was entitled to some compensation elsewhere in Africa, specifically control over the French Congo. He sent a small warship, made saber-rattling threats, and whipped up a hornets' nest of anger among German nationalists. France and Germany soon agreed on a compromise, with France gaining control of Morocco and Germany gaining a slice of the French Congo. The British cabinet, however, was angry and alarmed at Germany's aggressiveness. David Lloyd George made a dramatic "Mansion House" speech that denounced the German move was an intolerable humiliation. There was talk of war, and Germany backed down. Relations remained sour.[34]

Coming of the World War[edit]

In British politics, the Liberal party was antiwar and believed it was always possible and preferable to negotiate peaceful solutions. The Conservatives looked for ways to aggressively protect the British Empire, especially from German interests. Socialists, as in the emerging Labour party, denounced war as a capitalist device to maximize profits. In 1907, the leading German expert in the Foreign Ministry Eyre Crowe wrote a memorandum for senior officials that warned vigorously against German intentions.[35] Crowe argued that Berlin desired "hegemony" first "in Europe, and eventually in the world". Crowe argued that Germany presented a threat to the balance of power similar to the threat posed by Napoleon. Appeasement would only encourage the Germans To demand more and more. The solution Crowe recommended was to strengthen the Entente Cordiale upgrading it to a full military alliance.[36]

In Germany left-wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made large gains in the 1912 German election. German historian Fritz Fischer famously argued that the Junkers who dominated Germany deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government.[37] Other scholars argue that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or difficult.[38]

In explaining why neutral Britain went to war with Germany, Paul Kennedy, in The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (1980) argued that it was critical for war that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain. Kennedy downplayed the disputes over economic trade and imperialism. There had long been disputes over the Baghdad Railway which Germany proposed to build through the Ottoman Empire. An amicable compromise on the railway was reached in early 1914, so it played no role in starting in the summer crisis. Germany relied time and again on sheer military power, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities. Germany saw its invasion of Belgium as a necessary military tactic and Britain saw it as a profound moral crime--that was a major cause of British entry into the war that had started a few days before. Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of 1870—when Prussia and the German states smashed France—would mean Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the English Channel, and north-west France. British policy makers insisted that would be a catastrophe for British security.[39]

In 1839 Britain, Germany and other powers agreed on the Treaty of London to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. Germany violated that treaty in 1914—calling it a "scrap of paper", so Britain declared war.[40]

Allied victory[edit]

The great German spring offensive on the Western front of 1918 almost succeeded, but the British and French pulled back, opening up the battlefield, and frustrating the last-ditch German plan. By summer 1918, American soldiers were arriving on the Western front at 10,000 a day, while Germany was unable to replace its casualties and saw its army shrink every day. A series of very large battles in September and October produced sweeping Allied victories, and the German high command under Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg realized it was hopeless and told the Kaiser to go into exile. In November the new government negotiated an armistice that was based on the Fourteen Points of American president Woodrow Wilson. In effect, however, it was a surrender. Allied forces occupied and disarmed Germany, stripped it of its war gains and colonies, and seized its navy. By keeping the food blockade in place, the Allies were determined to starve Germany until it agreed to peace terms.[41][42]

In the Khaki Election of 1918, coming days later, Prime Minister David Lloyd George promised to impose a harsh treaty on Germany. At the great Paris Peace Conference in early 1919, however, Lloyd George took a much more moderate approach. France and Italy however demanded and achieved harsh terms, including forcing Germany to admit starting the war, and a demand that Germany pay the entire Allied cost of the war, including veterans' benefits and interest.[43]

Interwar period[edit]

In 1920–1933, Britain and Germany were on generally good terms, as shown by the Locarno Treaties[44] and Kellogg–Briand Pact which helped reintegrate Germany into Europe.

At the Genoa conference in 1922, Britain clashed openly with France over the amount of reparations to be collected from Germany. In 1923 France occupied the Ruhr industrial area of Germany following German default in reparations. Britain condemned the French move, and largely supported Germany in the ensuring Ruhrkampf (Ruhr struggle) between the Germans and the French. In 1924 Britain forced France to make major concessions in regards to the amount of reparations Germany had to pay.[45] It was the United States that resolved the reparations issue. The Dawes Plan (1924-29) and the Young Plan (1929-31), sponsored by the United States, provided financing for the sums Germany owed the Allies in reparations. Much of the money returned to Britain, which in turn paid off its American loans. Starting in 1931, German payments to Britain were suspended. Eventually in 1951 West Germany paid off the World War I reparations it owed Britain.[46]

With the coming to power of Hitler and the Nazis in 1933, relations turned tense. In 1934 a secret report by the British Defence Requirements Committee identified Germany as the "ultimate potential enemy" and called for Continental expeditionary force of five mechanised divisions and fourteen infantry divisions. However, budget restraints prevented the formation of this large force.[47] In 1935 the two nations agreed to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, designed to avoid a repeat of the pre-1914 naval race.[48]

By 1936 a policy of appeasement began under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in an effort to prevent war, or at least postpone it until the British military was ready. Appeasement has been the subject of intense debate for seventy years among academics, politicians and diplomats. The historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong, to the judgement that he had no alternative and acted in Britain's best interests. At the time, these concessions were very popular and the Munich Agreement in 1938 among Germany, Britain, France and Italy prompted Chamberlain to announce that he had secured "peace for our time".[49]

World War II[edit]

Nazi Germany and Britain fought each other From September 1939 to the German surrender of May 1945.[50][51] This great confrontation continues to loom large in the British public memory.[52] Germany quickly overran Poland, and in spring 1940 astonish the world by the conquest of the low countries and France, driving the British army off the continent and seizing most of its weapons, vehicles and supplies. War was brought to British skies in the Battle of Britain in late summer 1940, but their aerial assault was repulsed. The planned German invasion Operation Sealion became impossible, the Britain and its empire was standing alone against Germany, albeit with large scale funding and munitions supplied by the United States. In December 1941 United States entered the war against Germany and Japan, and Japan attacked and overwhelmed the British outposts in the Pacific, from Hong Kong to Singapore. Following the Allied invasion of France on D-Day in June 1944, British Strategic bombing forces, and land forces contributed substantially to the defeat of Germany.[53]

Since 1945[edit]

Road sign delimiting the British zone of occupation in Berlin, 1984.


As part of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, Britain took control of its own sector in occupied Germany. It soon merged its sector with the American and French sectors, and that territory became the independent nation of West Germany in 1949. The British played a central role in the Nuremberg trials of major war criminals in 1946. In Berlin, the British, American, and French zones were joined into West Berlin, and the four occupying powers kept official control of the city until 1991.[54][55]

Much of Germany's industrial plant fell within the British zone and there was trepidation that rebuilding the old enemy's industrial powerhouse would eventually prove a danger to British security and compete with the battered British economy. One solution was to build up a strong, free trade union movement in Germany. Another was to rely primarily on American money, through the Marshall Plan, that modernised both the British and German economies, and reduced traditional barriers to trade and efficiency. It was Washington, not London, that pushed Germany and France to reconcile and join together in the Schumann Plan of 1950 by which they agreed to pool their coal and steel industries.[56]

Cold War[edit]

With the United States taking the lead, Britain with its Royal Air Force played a major supporting role in providing food and coal to Berlin in the Berlin airlift of 1948–1949. The airlift broke the Soviet blockade which was designed to force the Western Allies out of the city.[57]

In 1955 West Germany joined NATO, while East Germany joined the Warsaw Pact. Britain at this point did not officially recognise East Germany. However the left wing of the Labour Party, breaking with the anti-communism of the postwar years, called for its recognition. This call heightened tensions between the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).[58]

After 1955, Britain decided to rely on relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, and a way to reduce its very expensive troop commitments in West Germany. London gained support from Washington and went ahead with the reductions while insisting it was maintaining its commitment to the defence of Western Europe.[59]

Britain made two applications for membership in the Common Market (European Community). It failed in the face of the French veto in 1961, but its reapplication in 1967 was eventually successful, with negotiations being concluded in 1972. The diplomatic support of West Germany proved decisive.

In 1962 Britain secretly assured Poland of its acceptance of the latter's western boundary. West Germany had been ambiguous about the matter. Britain had long been uneasy with West Germany's insistence on the provisional nature of the boundary. On the other hand, it was kept secret so as not to antagonise Britain's key ally in its quest to enter the European Community.[60]

In 1970 the German government under Willy Brandt, the former mayor of West Berlin, signed a treaty with Poland recognizing and guaranteeing the borders of Poland.


UK Foreign Secretary William Hague and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister for Foreign Affairs in London, 3 February 2014.

In 1990, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at first opposed German reunification, but eventually accepted the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.[61]

Since 1945 Germany hosts several British military installations in Western part of the country as part of British Forces Germany. Both countries are members of the European Union and NATO, and share strong economic ties. David McAllister, the former minister-president of the German state of Lower Saxony, son of a Scottish father and a German mother, holds British and German citizenship. Similarly, the leader of the Scottish National Party in the British House of Commons, Angus Robertson is half German, as his mother was from Germany. Robertson speaks fluent German and English.

In 1996, Britain and Germany established a shared embassy building in Reykjavik. Celebrations to open the building were held on 2 June 1996 and attended by the British Foreign Minister at the time, Malcolm Rifkind, and the then Minister of State at the German Foreign Ministry, Werner Hoyer, and the Icelandic Foreign Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson. The commemorative plaque in the building records that it is "the first purpose built co-located British-German chancery building in Europe".[62]


See also[edit]


  1. ^ a b Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth, eds. Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity (2009).
  2. ^ Religionszugehörigkeit, Deutschland Archived 25 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine., (in German)
  3. ^ CIA. "CIA Factbook". Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
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  5. ^ The Top 15 Military Spenders, 2008
  6. ^ Sylvia Jaworska (2009). The German Language in British Higher Education: Problems, Challenges, Teaching and Learning Perspectives. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 66ff. 
  7. ^ James Westfall Thompson, Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages (1300–1530) (1931) pp. 146–179.
  8. ^ Philip Konigs, The Hanoverian kings and their homeland: a study of the Personal Union, 1714-1837 (1993).
  9. ^ Jeremy Black, The Continental Commitment: Britain, Hanover and Interventionism 1714-1793 (2005).
  10. ^ Catrine Clay (2009). King, Kaiser, Tsar: Three Royal Cousins Who Led the World to War. Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 7–8. 
  11. ^ Thomas G. Otte, "'The Winston of Germany': The British Foreign Policy Élite and the Last German Emperor." Canadian Journal of History 36.3 (2001): 471-504.
  12. ^ Christopher M. Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II (2000) pp. 172-80, 130-38.
  13. ^ Johann Peter Murmann, "Knowledge and competitive advantage in the synthetic dye industry, 1850-1914: the coevolution of firms, technology, and national institutions in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States," Enterprise and Society (2000) 1#4, pp. 699–704.
  14. ^ Ernest Peter Hennock, British social reform and German precedents: the case of social insurance, 1880-1914 (1987).
  15. ^ Helen Meller, "Philanthropy and public enterprise: International exhibitions and the modern town planning movement, 1889–1913." Planning perspectives (1995) 10#3, pp. 295–310.
  16. ^ Karina Urbach, Bismarck's Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell's Mission to Berlin (1999) excerpt and text search
  17. ^ Karina Urbach, Bismarck's Favorite Englishman (1999) ch 5
  18. ^ Klaus Hilderbrand (1989). German Foreign Policy. Routledge. p. 21. 
  19. ^ Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (1980) pp 27-31
  20. ^ Edward Ross Dickinson, "The German Empire: an Empire?" History Workshop Journal Issue 66, Autumn 2008 online in Project MUSE, with guide to recent scholarship
  21. ^ J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (1964).
  22. ^ John Charmley, "Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900–1950." Contemporary British History 18.3 (2004): 130-146.
  23. ^ William L. Langer, The diplomacy of imperialism: 1890-1902 (1951) pp 433-42.
  24. ^ Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp 368-69.
  25. ^ Schmitt, England and Germany, 1740-1914 (1916) pp 133-43.
  26. ^ On the Kaiser's "histrionic personality disorder", see Frank B. Tipton, A History of Modern Germany since 1815 (2003) pp 243–245.
  27. ^ Röhl, J.C.G. (Sep 1966). "Friedrich von Holstein". Historical Journal. 9 (3): 379–388. doi:10.1017/s0018246x00026716. 
  28. ^ Raff, Diethher (1988), History of Germany from the Medieval Empire to the Present, pp. 34–55, 202–206 
  29. ^ Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (1980).
  30. ^ Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900-1914 (2005)
  31. ^ Woodward, David (July 1963). "Admiral Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Navy, 1897–1916". History Today. 13 (8): 548–555. 
  32. ^ Herwig, Holger (1980). Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888–1918. 
  33. ^ Esthus, Raymond A. (1970). Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries. pp. 66–111. 
  34. ^ Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2012) pp 204-13.
  35. ^ see Full Text: Crowe Memorandum, January 1, 1907.
  36. ^ Jeffrey Stephen Dunn (2013). The Crowe Memorandum: Sir Eyre Crowe and Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1918-1925. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. p. 247. 
  37. ^ Fritz Fischer Germany's Aims in the First World War (1967).
  38. ^ Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War (1999)
  39. ^ Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, pp 464–470.
  40. ^ Martin Gilbert (2004). The First World War: A Complete History. Macmillan. p. 32. 
  41. ^ Nicholas Best, Greatest Day in History: How, on the Eleventh Hour of the Eleventh Day of the Eleventh Month, the First World War Finally Came to an End (2008).
  42. ^ Heather Jones, "As the centenary approaches: the regeneration of First World War historiography." Historical Journal (2013) 56#3 pp: 857–878.
  43. ^ Manfred F. Boemeke et al., eds. (1998). The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge U.P. p. 12. 
  44. ^ Frank Magee, "Limited Liability"? Britain and the Treaty of Locarno," Twentieth Century British History, (Jan 1995) 6#1, pp. 1–22.
  45. ^ Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," Central European History, (1978) 11#3, pp. 231–255.
  46. ^ Thomas Adam (2005). Germany and the Americas: O-Z. ABC-CLIO. pp. 2:269–72. 
  47. ^ Keith Neilson; Greg Kennedy; David French (2010). The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956 : Essays in Honour of David French. Ashgate. p. 120. 
  48. ^ D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement" Journal of Modern History, (1956) 28#2, pp. 155–175 in JSTOR
  49. ^ Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War (Manchester University Press, 1998).
  50. ^ E.L. Woodward, British foreign policy in the Second World War (HM Stationery Office, 1962)
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Further reading[edit]

  • Adams, R. J. Q. British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–1939 (1993)
  • Anderson, Pauline Relyea. The background of anti-English feeling in Germany, 1890-1902 (1939).
  • Bartlett, C. J. British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (1989)
  • Brandenburg, Erich. From Bismarck To The World War: A History Of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914 (1928) online
  • Dugdale, E.T.S. ed German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 (4 vol 1928-31), English translation of major German diplomatic documentsvol 1, primary sources, Germany and Britain 1870-1890. vol 2 1890s online
  • Dunn, J.S. The Crowe Memorandum: Sir Eyre Crowe and Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1918-1925 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012). excerpt, on British policy toward Germany
  • Faber, David. Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (2009) excerpt and text search
  • Frederick, Suzanne Y. "The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890-1914," pp 306-336 in William R. Thompson, ed. Great power rivalries (1999) online
  • Geppert, Dominik, and Robert Gerwarth, eds. Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity (2009)
  • Görtemaker, Manfred. Britain and Germany in the Twentieth Century (2005)
  • Hilderbrand, Klaus. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer (1989; reprint 2013), 272pp
  • Hoerber, Thomas. "Prevail or perish: Anglo-German naval competition at the beginning of the twentieth century," European Security (2011) 20#1, pp. 65–79.
  • Horn, David Bayne. Great Britain and Europe in the eighteenth century (1967) covers 1603-1702; pp 144-77 for Prussia; pp 178-200 for other Germany; 111-43 for Austria
  • Kennedy, Paul M. "Idealists and realists: British views of Germany, 1864–1939," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 25 (1975) pp: 137-56; compares the views of idealists (pro-German) and realists (anti-German)
  • Kennedy, Paul. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (London, 1980) excerpt and text search; influential synthesis
  • Lambi, I. The navy and German power politics, 1862-1914 (1984).
  • Major, Patrick. "Britain and Germany: A Love-Hate Relationship?" German History, October 2008, Vol. 26 Issue 4, pp. 457–468.
  • Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (1991)
  • Milton, Richard. Best of Enemies: Britain and Germany: 100 Years of Truth and Lies (2004), popular history covers 1845–1945 focusing on public opinion and propaganda; 368pp excerpt and text search
  • Neville P. Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War (2005).
  • Oltermann, Philip. Keeping Up With the Germans: A History of Anglo-German Encounters (2012) excerpt; explores historical encounters between prominent Britons and Germans to show the contrasting approaches to topics from language and politics to sex and sport.
  • Padfield, Peter The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900-1914 (2005)
  • Palmer, Alan. Crowned Cousins: The Anglo-German Royal Connection (London, 1985).
  • Ramsden, John. Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London, 2006).
  • Reynolds, David. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (2nd ed. 2000) excerpt and text search, major survey of British foreign policy
  • Rüger, Jan. The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007).
  • Rüger, Jan. "Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism," Journal of Modern History (2011) 83#3, pp. 579–617 in JSTOR
  • Schmitt, Bernadotte E. England and Germany, 1740-1914 (1918) online.
  • Scully, Richard. British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860–1914 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 375pp
  • Sontag, Raymond James. Germany and England: background of conflict, 1848-1898 (1938)
  • Taylor, A. J. P. Struggle for Mastery of Europe: 1848–1918 (1954), comprehensive survey of diplomacy
  • Urbach, Karina. Bismarck's Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell's Mission to Berlin (1999) excerpt and text search
  • Weinberg, Gerhard L. The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany (2 vols. (1980)

Post 1941[edit]

  • Bark, Dennis L., and David R. Gress. A History of West Germany. Vol. 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963. Vol. 2: Democracy and Its Discontents, 1963–1991 (1993), the standard scholarly history
  • Berger, Stefan, and Norman LaPorte, eds. The Other Germany: Perceptions and Influences in British-East German Relations, 1945–1990 (Augsburg, 2005).
  • Berger, Stefan, and Norman LaPorte, eds. Friendly Enemies: Britain and the GDR, 1949–1990 (2010) online review
  • Deighton, Anne. The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1993)
  • Dockrill, Saki. Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955 (1991) 209pp
  • Glees, Anthony. The Stasi files: East Germany's secret operations against Britain (2004)
  • Hanrieder, Wolfram F. Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (1991)
  • Heuser, Beatrice. NATO, Britain, France & the FRG: Nuclear Strategies & Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (1997) 256pp
  • Noakes, Jeremy et al. Britain and Germany in Europe, 1949–1990 * Macintyre, Terry. Anglo-German Relations during the Labour Governments, 1964-70: NATO Strategy, Détente and European Integration (2008)
  • Mawby, Spencer. Containing Germany: Britain & the Arming of the Federal Republic (1999), p. 1. 244p.
  • Smith, Gordon et al. Developments in German Politics (1992), pp. 137–86, on foreign policy
  • Turner, Ian D., ed. Reconstruction in Postwar Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–1955 (Oxford, 1992), 421pp.
  • Zimmermann, Hubert. Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy & West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (2002) 275pp

External links[edit]