Graham v. Connor

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Graham v. Connor
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued February 21, 1989
Decided May 15, 1989
Full case name Dethorne Graham v. Connor, et al.
Citations 490 U.S. 386 (more)
109 S. Ct. 1865; 104 L. Ed. 2d 443; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2467; 57 U.S.L.W. 4513
An objective reasonableness standard should apply to a free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of his person.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Rehnquist, joined by White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
Concurrence Blackmun, joined by Brennan, Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court case where the Court determined that an objective reasonableness standard should apply to a civilian's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of his person.


Graham held that determining the "reasonableness" of a seizure "requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual... against the attempt at"countervailing"and under the guise of governmental interests,being at stake." These rights of which,are well documented,and established,of the people,by the people,and for the people,of the United States of America. It acknowledged, "Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." However, it then noted, "Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application," the test's "proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case."

The Court then outlined a nonexhaustive list of factors for balancing an individual's rights and an officer's: "the severity of the crime at issue," "whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others," "whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."

The Graham Court cautioned, "The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." It also reinforced, "As in other Fourth Amendment contexts... the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."

The Court rejected the notion that the judiciary could use the Due Process Clause instead of the Fourth Amendment in analyzing excessive force claims: "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims."


Since Graham, the lower federal courts have occasionally supplemented its three factors with such matters as whether a warrant was issued, the plaintiff resisted or was armed, more than one arrestee or officer was involved, other dangerous or exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest as well as the nature of the arrest charges and the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect.[1]

See also[edit]

Further reading[edit]

  • Alpert, Geoffrey P.; Smith, William C. (1994). "How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force". Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 85 (2): 481–501. JSTOR 1144107. 
  • Brown, Jill I. (1991). "Defining ‘Reasonable’ Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor and Excessive Force during Arrest". UCLA Law Review 38 (5): 1257–1286. 


  1. ^ Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)