1989 air battle near Tobruk
On 4 January 1989, two Grumman F-14 Tomcats of the United States Navy shot down two Libyan-operated Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23s which the Americans believed were attempting to engage them, as had happened eight years prior during the Gulf of Sidra incident, in 1981. The engagement took place over the Mediterranean Sea about 40 miles (64 km) north of Tobruk, Libya.
In 1973, Libya claimed much of the Gulf of Sidra (south of Latitude 31° 30′) as its territorial waters and subsequently declared a "line of death", the crossing of which would invite a military response. The United States did not recognize Libya's territorial claims, and continued to challenge the line, which led to military hostilities in August 1981 and March 1986. A terrorist attack which killed two American soldiers on 5 April 1986 was linked to Libya and prompted the U.S. to carry out retaliatory air strikes against targets within Libya ten days later.
Attempts by Libya to obtain weapons of mass destruction were of great concern to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Administration since it recognized Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism. Tensions between Libya and the U.S. were high after the latter accused Libya of building a chemical weapons plant near Rabta in the fall of 1988. During a December 1988 press interview, Reagan indicated there was the potential for military action to destroy the plant. The possibility of a U.S. attack caused Libya to increase its air defenses around Rabta and its state of military readiness throughout the country.
On the morning of 4 January 1989, the USS John F. Kennedy was sailing toward the eastern Mediterranean Sea for a scheduled port visit to Haifa, Israel. The aircraft carrier was more than 120 miles (190 km) north of Libya and had aircraft operating roughly 80 miles (130 km) north of the country. Aircraft from the Kennedy included several flights of A-6 Intruders on exercises south of Crete, two pairs of F-14 Tomcats from VF-14 and VF-32 conducting combat air patrols, and an E-2 Hawkeye from VAW-126 providing airborne early warning and control. The easternmost combat air patrol station was provided by two F-14s from VF-32 with aircraft call signs Gypsy 207 (crewed by Commander Joseph Bernard Connelly and Commander Leo F. Enwright in Bureau Number 159610) and Gypsy 202 (crewed by Lieutenant Herman C. Cook III and Lieutenant Commander Steven Patrick Collins in Bureau Number 159437). Although the Kennedy Battle Group was not operating within the contentious Gulf of Sidra and was 600 miles (970 km) away from Rabta, the battle group commander believed Libyan concerns about a U.S. attack increased the likelihood of a confrontation. The American air crews were given a special brief by the battle group commander which emphasized their rules of engagement due to the carrier's proximity to Libya.
At 11:55 local time, the E-2 detected two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers take off from Al Bumbah airfield, near Tobruk, and observed them heading north toward the battle group. The F-14s from VF-32 were directed to intercept the MiG-23s, while the F-14s from VF-14 covered the A-6s as they departed to the north. Using their onboard radars, the intercepting F-14s began tracking the MiG-23s when the Libyan aircraft were 72 nautical miles (133 km) away, at an altitude of 8,000 feet (2,400 m), and traveling at a speed of 420 knots (780 km/h; 480 mph). Unlike some previous aerial encounters, where Libyan pilots were instructed to turn back after detecting an F-14's radar signal sweep their aircraft, the MiG-23s continued to close in on the American fighters with a head-on approach.
As both pairs of aircraft converged, the E-2 and other U.S. eavesdropping assets in the area monitored radio communications between the Libyan aircraft and their ground controllers. The Americans listened to the MiG-23s receive guidance to intercept the F-14s from ground controllers at a radar station in Al Bumbah. This radar station was one of several that were activated along the Libyan coast to support the MiG-23s.
At 11:58, the F-14s made a left turn, away from the MiG-23s, to initiate a standard intercept. Seven seconds later, the MiG-23s turned back into the American fighters for another head-on approach and were descending in altitude. At this point, the F-14 crews began employing tactics which would reduce the effectiveness of the MiG-23s' radars and the 12-mile-range AA-7 Apex missiles they were potentially carrying. The American aircraft started descending from 20,000 to 3,000 feet (6,100 to 910 m) to fly lower than the Libyan fighters. The drop in altitude was meant to prevent the MiG-23s from detecting the F-14s by using ocean clutter to confuse their onboard radars. The American pilots executed another left turn away from the Libyan aircraft during the descent. Moments after the F-14s created a 30-degree offset, the MiG-23s turned to place themselves back into a collision course and accelerated to 500 knots (930 km/h; 580 mph).
The air warfare commander on the Kennedy gave the American air crews the authority to fire if they believed the MiG-23s were hostile. The F-14s turned away from the approaching MiG-23s two more times, and each time, the American air crews saw the Libyan aircraft turn back toward them for a head-on approach. At 12:00:53, the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) in the lead F-14, Commander Leo Enwright in Gypsy 207, ordered the arming of the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the American fighters, after what he determined was the fifth time the Libyan aircraft turned back toward him.
The American air crews armed their weapons when the opposing aircraft were less than 20 miles (32 km) away and closing in on each other at a rate of 1,000 knots (1,900 km/h; 1,200 mph). At a distance of about 14 nautical miles (26 km), the lead F-14 pilot, Commander Joseph Connelly, made a radio call to the carrier group's air warfare commander to see if there was any additional information in regard to the MiG-23s. There was no response to his call. At 12:01:20 and a range of 12 nautical miles (22 km), Enwright fired an AIM-7; he surprised Connelly, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his aircraft. The missile failed to track toward its target. At about 10 nautical miles (19 kilometres), Enwright launched a second AIM-7, but it also failed to hit its target.
The MiG-23s continued to fly directly toward the American fighters at 550 knots (1,020 km/h; 630 mph). The F-14s executed a defensive split, where both aircraft made turns in opposite directions. Both Libyan fighters turned left to pursue the second F-14, Gypsy 202. Connelly prepared Gypsy 207 for a right turn to get behind the MiG-23s as they went after the other American fighter. With the MiG-23s pointed directly at him, Lieutenant Commander Steven Collins, the RIO in Gypsy 202, fired a third AIM-7 from roughly five miles (8.0 km) away and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. After executing a sharp right turn, Gypsy 207 gained a position in the rear quadrant of the final MiG-23. As the Libyan fighter was turning left and at distance of one and a half miles (2.4 km), Connelly fired an AIM-9 missile which downed its target. The time was 12:02:36 when the last MiG-23 was hit by the AIM-9. The F-14s descended to several hundred feet in altitude and departed at high speed back to the carrier group. The Libyan pilots were both seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but it is not known whether the Libyan Air Force was able to successfully recover them.
The following day, Libya accused the U.S. of attacking two unarmed reconnaissance planes which were on a routine mission over international waters. Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, called for a United Nations emergency session to take up the incident. The U.S. claimed the American air crews acted in self-defense due to demonstrations of hostile intent by the Libyan aircraft. Two days after the engagement, the Pentagon released photographs taken from the videotapes on the F-14s which, according to U.S. naval intelligence analysts, showed the lead MiG-23 armed with two AA-7 Apex missiles and two AA-8 Aphid missiles. The AA-7 can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile, and it can be fired at another aircraft from head-on. The imagery was used to prove the Libyan fighters were armed and helped support the U.S. position that the MiG-23s were hostile.
It is not known for sure what the actual intent was for the Libyan aircraft on 4 January. Gaddafi could have believed the U.S. was preparing for an attack on the chemical facility in Rabta and ordered his military to see if the aircraft offshore were bombers bound for targets in Libya. The possible reasons for the MiG-23s' flight profile range from a deliberate attack against the battle group to a radio breakdown with ground controllers which led to the Libyan fighters merging with the F-14s.
Details released three months after the incident revealed the MiG-23s never turned on their onboard radars which were needed to guide their AA-7 missiles at maximum range. The turns by the Libyan pilots prior to the first missile launch by the F-14s were considered too slight to be deemed hostile according to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin. Despite these findings, Aspin said the self-defense claim by the U.S. was still justified due to the continued acceleration of the MiG-23s as they closed the distance with the F-14s, and because Libya had a history of firing first.
F-14 Tomcat BuNos 159437, 159610
At the request of the National Air and Space Museum, the U.S. Navy provided BuNo 159610 to its Udvar-Hazy location near Dulles International Airport. Although Tomcat BuNo 159610 downed the Libyan MiG-23 as a VF-32 F-14A model Tomcat, it returned from that deployment and was entered into the F-14D re-manufacture program and served later in a precision strike role as a VF-31 F-14D(R).
As of June 2017[update], BuNo 159437 is still resting at the Aircraft Maintenance and Restoration Group (AMARG) facility at Davis-Monthan AFB. This aircraft is one of eight F-14s currently remaining in the AMARG complex and has not been scrapped due to impending museum placement.
- Hainan Island incident – an incident involving aircraft between the U.S. and China
- Operation Odyssey Dawn
- Pan Am Flight 103
- Ouadi Doum air raid
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- Stanik 2003, p.230.
- Pear, Robert. "U.S. Downs 2 Libyan Fighters, Citing Their 'Hostile Intent'; Chemical Plant Link Denied." New York Times, 5 January 1989. Retrieved: 5 August 2017.
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- Wilson, George C. "Secretly Acquired MiGs Aided Navy Pilots In Libya Combat." Washington Post, 13 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017.
- Halloran, Richard. "U.S. Says Tape Shows Missiles On a Libyan Jet." The New York Times, 6 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017.
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- "Tomcat Sunset Saturday: Celebrate the Retirement of the F-14 Tomcat". Archived from the original on 2007-07-09. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
- Brief description of the incident
- January 16, 1989 Time Europe story, with details of the radio broadcasts and times.
- Air aces record
- VF-32 photo gallery
- Audio recording of the engagement
- Libyan Wars, 1980–89, Part 6 – Chemical Reaction, Tom Cooper.
- video footage of the incident