National Resident Matching Program
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), also called The Match, is a United States-based private non-profit non-governmental organization created in 1952 to place U.S. medical school students into residency training programs located in United States teaching hospitals. Its mission has since expanded to include the placement of U.S. citizen and non-U.S. citizen international medical school students and graduates into residency and fellowship training programs. In addition to the annual Main Residency Match that encompasses more than 43,000 applicants and 31,000 positions, the NRMP conducts Fellowship Matches for more than 60 subspecialties through its Specialties Matching Service (SMS). The NRMP is sponsored by a Board of Directors that includes medical school deans, teaching hospital executives, graduate medical education program directors, medical students and residents, and one public member.
NRMP International, a subsidiary of the National Resident Matching Program, was established in 2010 to provide medical matching services outside the United States and Canada.
From shortly after the first residency programs were formally introduced in the 1920s, the hiring process was "characterized by intense competition among hospitals for (an inadequate supply) of interns." In general, hospitals benefited from filling their positions as early as possible, and applicants benefited from delaying acceptance of positions. The combination of those factors led to offers being made for positions up to two years in advance of the start of postgraduate training.
In 1945, medical schools decided not to release any transcripts or permit any letters of recommendation to be written until a particular date. In that way, they managed to move the date of residency selection back to the fourth year of medical school. However, the competition for residents simply took on another form. Programs began to issue offers with a time limit for reply. The time limit rapidly decreased from 10 days in 1945 to less than 12 hours in 1950. Students were being issued "exploding" offers that required them to make a decision about training before hanging up the telephone.
In the early 1950s, the National Interassociation Committee on Internships (NICI) examined existing matching plans and chose the Boston Pool Plan, utilized at the time by Boston-area programs, as the model for a trial run of a new centralized system. In October of 1951, student representatives from 79 medical schools formed the National Student Internship Committee (NSIC) to discuss the findings of the NICI trial Match and consider an NICI proposal to replicate the Boston Pool Plan at the national level. NSIC petitioned to have the algorithm modified to more equitably represent applicants, and the modified algorithm was adopted and used for the first Match on April 15, 1952. That Match was a success, and the NICI recommended the creation of an organization to administer and oversee the running of the Match. The organization, known as the National Intern Matching Program (NIMP), was incorporated on January 7, 1953.
Modifications to the algorithm proposed by students in 1951 were based on concerns that the matching process favored hospitals over applicants. The students believed the algorithm gave them incentives to misrepresent their true preferences. A publication in 1962 by David Gale & Lloyd Shapley noted that there always exists a stable solution when colleges are matching with students, but that it is possible to favor colleges as a group over applicants as a group (and vice versa). That is, Gale and Shapley found that there is a college-optimal stable match and an applicant-optimal stable match. Lloyd Shapley along with Alvin Roth, would go on to win the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for their work on stable allocations.
A debate arose regarding whether the matching program was susceptible to manipulation or unreasonably fair to programs. Indeed, it was shown that in simple cases (i.e. those that exclude couples, second-year programs, and special cases for handling unfilled slots) that had multiple "stable" matchings, the algorithm would return the solution that preferred the preferences of programs over applicants. A correspondence in New England Journal of Medicine in 1981 recognized that the algorithm in use was program-optimal for individual applicants,
The NRMP algorithm saw only minor and incremental changes after its institution in 1952. However, in the fall of 1995 the NRMP Board of Directors commissioned a preliminary research study to evaluate of the current algorithm and recommend changes to be considered in its operation and description,  as well as a study comparing a new algorithm with the existing one. A new applicant-proposing algorithm was adopted in May 1997 and has been in use since its first application in March 1998, although the study showed that the net effect of the change on actual matches has been minimal.
Matching applicants to programs is a generalization of the stable marriage problem; as a result, the solutions are very similar. A simplified version of the algorithm that is used to perform the matching process is described below and on the NRMP website. However, this description does not include the handling of couples (pairs of applicants who participate in a Match together, perhaps to stay in the same geographic location), second-year positions, or special handling of residency positions that remain unfilled. The full algorithm is described in Roth, Alvin; Elliott Peranson (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design" (PDF). The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 756–757. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. Retrieved 23 Feb 2016.
The application process for residency training begins prior to the opening of the Main Residency Match in September. Applications usually are sent to programs through the Electronic Residency Application Service (ERAS), a service of the Association of American Medical Colleges. After applicants apply to programs, programs review applications and invite selected candidates for interviews held between October and February. After the interview period is over, programs and applicants each compile "rank order lists" that they submit to the NRMP. Programs list applicants, ranked in order from most to least preferred, who they wish to train. Similarly, applicants rank programs where they wish to train. For applicants matching as a couple, the rank order lists include pairs of program choices that are considered simultaneously by the matching algorithm. Applicants' rank order lists can include a combination of categorical programs (training that is 3-5 years in length and begins in the first post-graduate year); preliminary programs (training that is one year in length and begins in the first post-graduate year); or advanced programs (training that is 3-4 years in length and begins after one or more years of preliminary training). For advanced programs on the rank order list, applicants can append a supplemental list of preliminary programs to attempt to match to a full course of training.
The matching process begins with an attempt to match an applicant to the program most preferred on that applicant’s rank order list. If the applicant cannot be matched to that first choice program, an attempt is made to place the applicant into the second choice program, and so on, until the applicant is tentatively matched to a program that has an open position and who prefers that applicant or all the applicant’s choices on the ROL have been exhausted. This process is carried out for all applicants until each applicant has either been tentatively matched to the most preferred choice possible or all choices submitted by all applicants have been exhausted. Tentative matches then become final.
To understand how the current NRMP algorithm works, it is helpful to begin by considering the simpler case where there are no couples or secondary programs.
As in the stable marriage problem, the basic goal it to match applicants to programs so that the results are "stable". "Stability" in this case means that there is no applicant A and program P such that both of the following are true:
- A is unmatched or would prefer to go to P over the program to which A matched
- P has a free slot or would prefer A over one of the other applicants matched to the program.
It can be shown that for any instance of the problem, there is at least one valid solution. Under the old (pre-1995) NRMP algorithm that favored programs' preferences over applicants', programs could benefit in certain cases from lying about their preferences. That no longer is true under the current algorithm. Neither applicants nor programs can benefit by lying about their preferences, even if they have perfect knowledge of everyone's preferences.
Under the current system, it also is impossible for an applicant to be harmed by including more residency programs at the bottom of a list if those programs are indeed preferable to not being matched.
Couples' rank order lists are processed simultaneously by the matching algorithm, which complicates the problem. In some cases there exists no stable solution (with stable defined the way it is in the simple case). In fact, the problem of determining whether there is a stable solution and finding it if it exists has been proven NP-complete. Also, while there is no randomization in the NRMP algorithm—so it will always return the same output when given exactly the same input—different outcomes can be produced by changing trivial features of the data such as the order in which applicants and programs are processed. However, in initial testing of the algorithm over 5 years of residency match data and a variety of different initial conditions, the current NRMP algorithm always terminated quickly on a stable solution. Testing also showed that "none of [the trivial] sequencing decisions had a large or systematic effect on the matching produced"—the maximum number of applicants ever observed to be affected in a single run was 12 out of 22,938.
In general once the programs' rank order lists have been set, there is no way for an applicant to match into a better position by deciding to match as part of a couple. For example, if a very strong applicant and a very weak applicant match as a couple, there is no mechanism in the algorithm that allows the stronger applicant to somehow improve the desirability of the weaker applicant. (Of course, if the programs know prior to processing the matching algorithm that the stronger and weaker applicant are participating in the Match as a couple, they are free to change their lists accordingly, which could affect the final outcome.)
Failure to match
It is possible for an applicant not to match to a program. Until the 2010 Main Residency Match, applicants who did not obtain a position went through a process called the Scramble. At 12:00 p.m. on Monday of Match Week, the NRMP notified applicants whether they had matched to a program (but did not release the name of the program) and released a list of unfilled programs. Applicants then applied en masse to programs that had unfilled positions, frequently having to change their preferred specialty in the process. The Scramble was widely recognized to be chaotic, disorganized, and lacking in transparency. The Scramble ended on Match Day, which was Thursday of Match Week. Most positions filled within the first few hours, and nearly all in the first 48 hours. Scrambling was extremely competitive: in 2008, roughly 10,600 applicants, many of whom were foreign-trained, scrambled for only 1,392 residency positions.
After the 2010 Main Residency Match, the Scramble was replaced by the Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program, or SOAP. In SOAP, unmatched applicants are offered positions in unfilled programs through a series of rounds, creating a systematic way for applicants to find training positions without the chaos of the Scramble. In SOAP, all appointments are made through the NRMP (no direct matching allowed, unlike the Scramble), and unmatched applicant data and unfilled program data are released at the same time on Monday of Match Week. Match Day is now Friday of Match Week.
International medical graduates
To participate in the NRMP, an international medical graduate must meet the requirements for ECFMG certification (not required of M.D. graduates of Canadian medical schools, who are not considered IMGs in the U.S.) by the "Rank Order List Certification Deadline" in February of the year of the Match.
To acquire ECFMG certification, IMGs must:
- Obtain passing scores on USMLE Step 1, USMLE Step 2 Clinical Knowledge and USMLE Step 2 Clinical Skills
- Obtain a medical diploma of medical education taken at an institution registered in the International Medical Education Directory (IMED)
In comparison, students and graduates from medical schools in the United States are bound to the graduation requirements of their individual schools. Both U.S. and foreign-trained applicants can participate in the NRMP while completing their final year of medical school before acquiring their medical diplomas.
In 2002, 16 law firms filed a lawsuit on behalf of 3 residents seeking to represent all residents matching through the NRMP. The plaintiffs put forward a case which sought to show that the NRMP colluded with other national medical and medical education organization and with residency-sponsoring institutions to depress resident wages, operating in violation of United States antitrust legislation. The chief complaint read:
|“||"Plaintiffs bring this action under the federal antitrust laws for: (a) money damages and other appropriate relief to compensate resident physicians for the harm they suffered as a result of a longstanding, nationwide contract, combination and conspiracy among Defendants and others to illegally restrain competition in the market for resident physician services; and (b) injunctive relief to end the illegal restraints.
Defendants and others have illegally contracted, combined and conspired among themselves to displace competition in the recruitment, hiring, employment and compensation of resident physicians, and to impose a scheme of restraints which have the purpose and effect of fixing, artificially depressing, standardizing and stabilizing resident physician compensation and other terms of employment.
Defendants' illegal combination and conspiracy has restrained competition in the employment of resident physicians by: (a) stabilizing wages below competitive levels by exchanging competitively sensitive information regarding resident physician compensation and other terms of employment; (b) eliminating competition in the recruitment and employment of resident physicians by assigning prospective resident physician employees to positions through the National Resident Matching Program ("NRMP"); and (c) establishing and complying with anticompetitive accreditation standards and requirements through the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME").
Each of the named Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class is currently, or was recently, employed as a resident physician or is seeking such employment and has been injured by Defendants' illegal contract, combination and conspiracy.
Each of the named Defendants and members of the Defendant Class directly participate in the illegal contract, combination and conspiracy alleged herein, and are either employers of resident physicians, entities related to and/or affiliated with such employers, or professional organizations through which the illegal restraints set forth in this Complaint are accomplished.."
In 2004, after a lobbying effort by the Association of American Medical Colleges and the American Hospital Association, a rider that granted specific immunity to the NRMP was added to a pension act signed into law by President George W. Bush. The provision was sponsored by Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Judd Gregg, Republican of New Hampshire. Subsequently, a federal district court dismissed the case http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/14/politics/14match.htm</ref>
Implementations in software packages
- R: The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem and the simple case of the programs/residents problem is available as part of the
- NRMP homepage Retrieved on June 16, 2017
- Gusfield, Dan; Robert W. Irving (1989). "1.1.1". The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. The MIT Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN 0-262-07118-5.
- Roth, Alvin E. (December 8, 2012). "The Theory and Practice of Market Design" (PDF). Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB.
- Medical seniors hit interne plan. New York Times 1951; 22 Oct:25 (col. 1).
- Shiller JG. An alum recalls the first matching plan. P&S: The Journal of the College of Physicians & Surgeons of Columbia University 1985; 5:29.
- Williams KJ. A reexamination of the NRMP matching algorithm. Acad Med 1995; 70:470-476.
- Peranson E, Randlett R. Comments on Williams' "A reexamination of the NRMP matching algorithm". Acad Med. 1995;70:490-494. (footnote at the bottom of page 492)
- Gale D, Shapley LS. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematics Monthly. 1962;69:9-15.
- Roth "Redesign" 748
- Robinson, Sara (April 2003). "Are Medical Students Meeting Their (Best Possible) Match?" (PDF). SIAM News (3): 36. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
- Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 64 references Roth, A.E. (1984). "The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory". Journal of Political Economy. 92: 991–1016. doi:10.1086/261272. as proving that the pre-1995 algorithm is essentially the hospital-optimal algorithm described in Gusfield 39. Gusfield 41 demonstrates that the hospital-optimal algorithm is also applicant-pessimal.
- Williams KJ, Werth VP, Wolff JA. An analysis of the resident match. N Engl J Med. 1981;304:1165-1166; correspondence in N Engl J Med. 1981;305:526
- Roth AE. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 1984; 92:991-1016.
- Klaus B, Klijn F, Massó J. Some things couples always wanted to knowabout stable matchings (but were afraid to ask). Review of Economic Design 2007; 11:175-184.
- Roth "Redesign" 749
- Evaluation of changes to be considered in the NRMP algorithm, by Alvin E. Roth. October 24, 1995
- Roth "Redesign" 752, 760
- Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 38
- Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 41
- Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 59
- "Analysis of the National Residency Matching Program". Tedlab.mit.edu. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
- Gusfield "Stable Marriage" 54 gives an example of a situation with no stable solution and states that proof of NP completeness comes from Ronn, Eytan (June 1990). "NP-complete stable matching problems". Journal of Algorithms. 11 (2): 285–304. ISSN 0196-6774. doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2.
- Roth "Redesign" 759
- Roth "Redesign" 757
- Roth "Redesign" 758
- Roth, Alvin; Elliott Peranson (September 1999). "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design". The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 756–757. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
-  Archived December 26, 2011, at the Wayback Machine.
- "Using "SOAP" to Clean Up the Scramble". Studentdoctor.net. 2010-10-24. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
- "The Residency Scramble: How It Works and How It Can Be Improved". Studentdoctor.net. 2009-03-12. Retrieved 2013-09-09.
- https://web.archive.org/web/20111202180322/http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/faq/us_seniors_faq.html. Archived from the original on December 2, 2011. Retrieved December 6, 2011. Missing or empty
- nrmp.org > Independent Applicants Updated 09/08/2010.
- nrmp.org > 2012 Main Match Schedule Updated 05/19/2011
- nrmp.org > U.S. Seniors > Registering with the NRMP Updated August 2010
- Antitrust Against the Resident Match. http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic926634.files/7.1%20Antitrust%20Lawsuit%20Against%20the%20Resident%20Match.pdf
- Full text of class action complaint . IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/07/residents-brief.htm
- Robinson S .Antitrust Lawsuit Over Medical Residency System Is Dismissed. Aug. 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/14/politics/14match.html
- Klein, T. (2015). "Analysis of Stable Matchings in R: Package matchingMarkets" (PDF). Vignette to R Package matchingMarkets.
- "matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings". R Project.
- "matchingR on github". R Project.