India–United States relations

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Indo-American relations
Map indicating locations of India and USA

India

United States
Diplomatic Mission
Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C. Embassy of the United States, New Delhi
Envoy
Ambassador Ambassador Richard Verma
PM Modi of India, during Joint Press Interaction with President Obama of US, 2015.
US Embassy in New Delhi.

India–United States relations (or Indo-American relations) refers to the international relations that exist between the Republic of India and the United States of America.

Post-independence India had friendly relations with the United States of America. In subsequent years, India's socialist policies had a distinctly adverse impact on its relations with the United States. India cultivated a relatively cooperative strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union as a direct response to the US making Pakistan a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) treaty-ally in 1954.[1] In 1961, India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement to maintain relations with both the USA and USSR. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India began to review its foreign policy in a unipolar world, and developed closer ties with the United States and the European Union. Current Indian foreign policy is based on maintaining strategic autonomy to safeguard sovereign rights and promote national interests within a multi-polar world.[2][3]

Key recent developments include the rapid growth of India's economy and bilateral trade, the close links between the Indian and American computer and Internet industries, a geopolitical coalition to balance the rise of an increasingly assertive China, the weakening of U.S.-Pakistan relations over various ongoing disputes, and the 2008 reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's nuclear program. Today, India and the US share an extensive cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship.[4][5][6]

According to Gallup's annual World Affairs survey, India is perceived by Americans as their 6th favourite nation in the world, with 71% of Americans viewing India favourably in 2015.[7] President Barack Obama was the first US president to be the chief guest of the 66th Republic Day celebrations of India held on 26 January 2015.[8]

History[edit]

To 1947[edit]

Historically, the relationships between India in the days of the British Raj and the US were thin.[9] The only significant immigration from India before 1965 involved Sikh farmers going to California in the early 20th century.[10] Very few American businessmen, tourists, religious seekers or Christian missionaries spent much time in India.[11]

The religiously curious in the U.S. welcomed the visit of Swami Vivekananda, who introduced Yoga and Vedanta to America at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, in connexion with the World's Fair there in 1893. He also spoke to large audiences in Chicago and at numerous other venues in 1893-94. He raised some money but won few followers, so he moved on to England.[12]

Mark Twain visited India in 1896[13] and described it in his travelogue Following the Equator with both revulsion and attraction before concluding that India was the only foreign land he dreamed about or longed to see again.[14] Regarding India, Americans learned more from English writer Rudyard Kipling.[15] Mahatma Gandhi had an important influence on the philosophy of non-violence promoted by Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 1950s.

In the 1930s and early 1940s the United States gave very strong support to the Indian independence movement in defiance of the British Empire.[16][17]

World War II[edit]

American GIs at a market in Calcutta (now Kolkata) in 1945.

Everything changed in World War Two, when India became the main base for the American China Burma India Theater (CBI) in the war against Japan. Tens of thousands of American servicemen arrived, bringing all sorts of advanced technology, and money; they left in 1945. Serious tension erupted over American demands, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that India be given independence, a proposition Prime Minister Winston Churchill vehemently rejected. For years Roosevelt had encouraged Britain's disengagement from India. The American position was based on principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-colonial era. However, in 1942 when the Indian National Congress launched a Quit India movement, the British authorities immediately arrested tens of thousands of activists. Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base for aid to China. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt pushed too hard, so Roosevelt backed down.[18][19]

Post-independence (1947-1997)[edit]

President John F. Kennedy and President Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India in Car Before Motorcade
President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, with Nehru's sister, Madame Pandit, waving from their limousine as they leave Washington National Airport, during Nehru's visit to the United States, 1949.

After Indian independence and until the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the US and India was cold and often thorny. This was due to the closeness of the US towards India's arch-rival Pakistan during the War, with Pakistan joining the US-led Western Bloc in 1954. The relations worsened further with India pursuing a policy of being neutral i.e. not aligned with either the US or the Soviet Union, but maintaining close ties with the latter to counter Pakistan.

In the late 1948s, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected American suggestions for resolving the Kashmir crisis. His 1949 tour of the US was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides.[20] India rejected the American advice that it not recognise the Communist conquest of China, but it did back the US when it supported the 1950 United Nations resolution condemning North Korea's aggression in the Korean War. India tried to act as a broker to help end that war, and served as a conduit for diplomatic messages between the US and China. Meanwhile, poor harvests forced India to ask for free American food, which was given starting in 1950.[21] In the first dozen years of Indian independence (1947–1959), the US provided $1.7 billion in gifts, including $931 million in food. The Soviet Union provided about half as much, largely in the form of steel mills.[22] In 1961, the US pledged $1.0 billion in development loans, in addition to $1.3 billion of free food.[23]

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru receiving President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Parliament House, before the President's address to a joint session of Parliament, 1959.

In 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first US President to visit India to strengthen the staggering ties between the two nations. He was so supportive that the New York Times remarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian-American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary."[24]

John Kenneth Galbraith (far left), as US ambassador to India, with President John F. Kennedy, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, 1961

During John F. Kennedy's Presidency (1961–63), India was considered a strategic partner and counterweight to the rise of Communist China. Kennedy said,

"Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system."

The Kennedy administration openly supported India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war and considered the Chinese action as "blatant Chinese Communist aggression against India".[25][26] The United States Air Force flew in arms, ammunition and clothing supplies to the Indian troops and the United States Navy even sent the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier from the Pacific Ocean to protect India, only to recall it back before it reached the Bay of Bengal.[27][28] In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, the United States discussed contingency planning that could be implemented in the event of another Chinese attack on India. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India."[29][30] Kennedy's ambassador to India was the noted liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who was considered close to India.[31] While in India, Galbraith helped establish one of the first Indian computer science departments, at the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. As an economist, he also presided over the (at the time) largest US foreign aid program to any country.

President Nixon at the arrival ceremony for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, on the South Lawn of the White House, 1971.

Following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, Indo-US relations deteriorated gradually. While Kennedy's successor Lyndon Johnson sought to maintain relations with India to counter Communist China,[32] he also sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with the hopes of easing tensions with China and weakening India's growing military buildup as well.[32] Relations then hit an all-time low under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon shifted away from the neutral stance which his predecessors had taken towards Indo-Pakistani hostilities. He established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, now under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was seen as leaning towards the Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close.[33] The frosty relationship between Nixon and Indira worsened the relations further.[34] During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the US openly supported Pakistan and even deployed its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the beleaguered West Pakistani forces. Later in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, which was opposed by the US, however it also concluded that the test did not violate any agreement and proceeded with a June 1974 shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor.[35][36]

Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, at far left, President of India, with President Jimmy Carter, First Lady Rosalynn Carter, Prime Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee, 1978

In the late 1970s, with the anti-Soviet Janata Party leader Morarji Desai becoming the Prime Minister, India improved its relations with the US, now led by Jimmy Carter, despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to India's non-proliferation record.[37]

After the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the relations between the two countries continued to improve gradually, despite India not supporting the United States' role in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The Reagan Administration provided limited assistance to India. India sounded out Washington on the purchase of a range of US defence technology, including F-5 aircraft, super computers, night vision goggles and radars. In 1984 Washington approved the supply of selected technology to India including gas turbines for naval frigates and engines for prototypes for India’s light combat aircraft. There were also unpublicised transfers of technology, including the engagement of a US company, Continental Electronics, to design and build a new VLF communications station at Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu, which was commissioned in the late 1980s.[38] Despite these achievements, it was not until the late 1990s that there was a significant effort by both countries to improve relations with each other.[39]

1998-2008[edit]

Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian Prime Minister, he authorised nuclear weapons testing at Pokhran. The United States strongly condemned this testing, promised sanctions, and voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning the tests. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies, prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India, and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies.[40] However, these sanctions proved ineffective - India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the US only constituted a small portion of its GDP. Only Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. Afterward, the Clinton administration and Prime Minister Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help rebuild relations. In March 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited India, undertaking bilateral and economic discussions with Prime Minister Vajpayee. During the visit, the Indo-US Science & Technology Forum was established.[41]

Over the course of improved diplomatic relations with the Bush Administration, India agreed to allow close international monitoring of its nuclear weapons development, although it has refused to give up its current nuclear arsenal.[42] In 2004, the US decided to grant Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status to Pakistan. The US extended the MNNA strategic working relationship to India but the offer was turned down.[43][44]

After the September 11 attacks against the US in 2001, President George W. Bush collaborated closely with India in controlling and policing the strategically critical Indian Ocean sea lanes from the Suez Canal to Singapore. After the December 2004 tsunami, the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas. An Open Skies Agreement was signed in April 2005, enhancing trade, tourism, and business via the increased number of flights, and Air India purchased 68 US Boeing aircraft at a cost of $8 billion.[45]

Former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made recent visits to India as well in 2005. The United States and India also signed a bilateral Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation in 2005.[46] After Hurricane Katrina, India donated $5 million to the American Red Cross and sent two planeloads of relief supplies and materials to help.[47] Then, on 1 March 2006, President Bush made another diplomatic visit to further expand relations between India and the US.[48]

21st century[edit]

Prime Minister Vajpayee with President Bush in the White House, 2001.

India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent Great Power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India have gotten under way. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes.[49] The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the United States Congress, while between 2009-2010 more than 100,000 Indian students have attended American colleges and universities.[50]

During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change.[51] In November 2010, President Barack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament,[52] where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.[53]

Between 2004 and 2014 Western think-tanks, especially in the US and UK, failed to foresee the swing in electoral voting patterns of the growing middle-class and anticipate the scale of political change in India brought about by improvements in basic education and freedom of the press. According to Michael Kugelman, South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, the US was unprepared to meet new challenges in India because of its ”inability to keep pace with the transformations.”[54]

June 2010 Strategic Dialogue[edit]

President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and the Indian delegation at the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue reception at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., 2010.

In June 2010, the United States and India formally re-engaged the US-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials, led by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, visited Washington, D.C. As leader of the US delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensable partner and a trusted friend".[55] President Obama appeared briefly at a United States Department of State reception to declare his firm belief that America "will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."[56] The Strategic Dialogue produced a joint statement in which the two countries pledged to "deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages ... for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity."[57] It outlined extensive bilateral initiatives in each of ten key areas: (1) advancing global security and countering terrorism, (2) disarmament and nonproliferation, (3) trade and economic relations, (4) high technology, (5) energy security, clean energy, and climate change, (6) agriculture, (7) education, (8) health, (9) science and technology, and (10) development.[58]

Foreign policy issues[edit]

According to some analysts, India-US relations have been strained over the Obama administration's approach to Pakistan and the handling of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.[59][60] India's National Security Adviser, M.K. Narayanan, criticised the Obama administration for linking the Kashmir dispute to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and said that by doing so, President Obama was "barking up the wrong tree."[61] Foreign Policy in February 2009 also criticised Obama's approach to South Asia, saying that "India can be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem" in South Asia. It also suggested that India take a more proactive role in rebuilding Afghanistan, irrespective of the attitude of the Obama Administration.[62] In a clear indication of growing rift between the two countries, India decided not to accept a US invitation to attend a conference on Afghanistan at the end of February 2009.[63] Bloomberg has also reported that, since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the public mood in India has been to pressure Pakistan more aggressively to take actions against the culprits behind the terrorist attack, and that this might reflect on the upcoming Indian general elections in May 2009. Consequently, the Obama Administration may find itself at odds with India's rigid stance against terrorism.[64]

India and US governments have differed on a variety of regional issues ranging from India's cordial relations with Iran, Russia and Sri Lanka to foreign policy disagreements relating to Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, dismissed any concerns over a rift with India regarding American AfPak policy. Calling India and the United States "natural allies",[65] Blake said that the United States cannot afford to meet the strategic priorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan at "the expense of India".[66]

India criticised the Obama Administration's decision to limit H-1B (temporary) visas, and India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee (Now the President of India) said that his country would oppose US "protectionism" at various international forums.[67] India's Commerce Minister, Kamal Nath, said that India may move against Obama's outsourcing policies at the World Trade Organization.[68] However, the outsourcing advisory head of KPMG said that India had no reason to worry, since Obama's statements were directed against "outsourcing being carried out by manufacturing companies" and not outsourcing of IT-related services.[69]

In May 2009, Obama reiterated his anti-outsourcing views and criticised the current US tax policy "that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."[70] However, during the US India Business Council meeting in June 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated for stronger economic ties between India and the United States. She also rebuked protectionist policies, saying that "[United States] will not use the global financial crisis as an excuse to fall back on protectionism. We hope India will work with us to create a more open, equitable set of opportunities for trade between our nations."[71]

In November 2010, Obama became the second US President (after Richard Nixon in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On 8 November, Obama also became the second US President (after Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959) to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council.[72][73] Calling the India-US relationship "a defining partnership of the 21st century", he also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.[74]

Strategic and military relations[edit]

In March 2009, the Obama Administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India.[75] This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F414 engines announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, makes the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia).[76] Indians have raised concerns about contract clauses forbidding the offensive deployment of these systems.[77] India is trying to resolve performance-related issues on the Boeing P-8I that have already been delivered to India.[78][79]

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen has encouraged stronger military ties between India and the United States, and said that "India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner [of the US]".[80] US Undersecretary of State William Joseph Burns also said, "Never has there been a moment when India and America mattered more to each other." [81] The Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter, during his address to the Asia Society in New York on August 1, 2012, said that India–US relationship has a global scope, in terms of the reach and influence of both countries. He also said that both countries are strengthening the relations between their defence and research organisations.[82]

Harsh V. Pant, professor of International relations at King's College London, highlighted the importance of India to US strategic planning by saying: "India is key to the US’ ability to create a stable balance of power in the larger Indo-Pacific and at a time of resource constraints, it needs partners like India to shore up its sagging credibility in the region in face of Chinese onslaught.” Neelam Deo, director of foreign policy at Gateway House, underscored the importance that India attaches safeguarding its national interests by saying: “India is a big country, with its own strategic objectives and imperatives and it will act on opportunities where interests converge, as it has done in the past.”[54]

Revelations about US spying operations against India[edit]

India, in July and November 2013, demanded that the US respond to revelations that the Indian UN mission in New York City and the Indian Embassy in Washington had been targeted for spying.[83]

On 2 July 2014, U.S. diplomats were summoned by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to discuss allegations that the National Security Agency had spied upon private individuals and political entities within India.[84][85] A 2010 document leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the Washington Post revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorised to spy on the Indian Prime-Minister Narendra Modi.[86][87]

2013 Dispute over Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges[edit]

In December 2013, the arrest, strip-search and temporary detention of an Indian diplomat in New York following a domestic labour dispute caused uproar in India.[88] Deputy Consul General Devyani Khobragade was arrested by US State Department Police on allegations of visa-fraud and handed over to US Marshals for detention.[89][90] The incident occurred a week after US Ambassador Nancy Powell categorically stated that "an Indo-US strategic treaty will never be signed" and clarified that the US preferred a flexible approach to the critical issue of strategic collaboration.[91]

Indian former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the treatment of the female consular official which included repeated handcuffing, stripping and cavity searches, DNA swabbing, and placement in a hold-up alongside common criminals and drug offenders as "deplorable".[92] The Government of India took steps to ensure that diplomatic and consular privileges accorded unilaterally to US Government personnel posted to New Delhi are henceforth based on reciprocity.[93][94][95][96][97] External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said : “We’re not hostile, this is an arrangement based on reciprocity,”.[98] Shashi Tharoor, India's minister of human resource development commented : "The cardinal principle of diplomatic relations is reciprocity, and India realized that it had been naive in extending courtesies to the U.S. that it was not receiving in return,"[99]

The American Community Support Association (ACSA) club and American Embassy Club in New Delhi were ordered to cease all commercial activities benefiting non-diplomatic personnel by 16 January 2014.[100] The ACSA club operates a bar, bowling alley, swimming pool, restaurant, video-rentals club, indoor gym and a beauty parlour within the embassy premises.[101][102][103] Tax-free import clearances given to US diplomats and consular officials for importing food, alcohol and other domestic items were revoked with immediate effect. US embassy vehicles and staff are no longer immune from penalties for traffic violations. American diplomats were asked to show work contracts of all domestic help (cooks, gardeners, drivers and security staff) employed within their households. [104]

Indian income tax and immigration authorities are investigating allegations of work-permit, visa and income tax fraud at the American Embassy School.[105][106][107]

Analysts predict that the incident has caused long-term damage to the relationship. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington said, “The Indians have taken an extremely tough line on this. They are bracing for a full-fledged fight” if the case against the diplomat goes forward. Former diplomat and foreign-policy commentator K.C.Singh opined : “If they are going to throw their rule book at us, then we are saying we, too, have a rule book in India, (...) “Of late, there has been a growing feeling here that the U.S. has lost interest in India,[108] that it is no longer the special friendship [...] The relationship is still fragile and is resting on a crag. Till we put it on flat ground, episodes like this can cause major damage to the ties.”[109] Reacting to the rapidly deteriorating relations between the two countries, which had been seen as cordial and improving in the recent past, John Bellinger, a former State Department legal adviser said : "Whether it was wise policy to actually arrest and detain someone for a non-violent crime like this, even if technically permissible under the Vienna Convention, is questionable to me. It's really quite surprising,". Robert D. Blackwill, the former US ambassador to India from 2001 to 2003 and currently a Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) opined that the treatment meted out to Devyani Khobragade and the subsequent impact of the incident on US-India relations as giving a "new meaning to the word stupid".[110][111]

Speaking at Harvard Law School during its 2014 Class Day ceremony, US attorney in Manhattan Preet Bharara, the Indian-born prosecutor in the Devyani Khobragade case revealed that it was the US Department of State who initiated and investigated proceedings against the Indian official : “(It was) not the crime of the century but a serious crime nonetheless, that is why the State Department opened the case, that is why the State Department investigated it. That is why career agents in the State Department asked career prosecutors in my office to approve criminal charges,”.[112][113][114]

Paradigm of Emerging Markets and Global Geopolitical Reconfiguration[edit]

India views the ongoing global power shift [115] from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean as an opportunity to lift billions of persons out of extreme poverty and a March to Modernity.[116] Indians, observing the Chinese geopolitical ascension, have concluded the their country can only be taken seriously in 21st.century world affairs if it can speak from a position of economic strength. Investors and companies have been encouraged to tap the aspirations of the 1.2 billion strong[117] Indian market for goods & services and profit from Indian Ocean trade through the Make in India initiative launched by the Government of India.[118][119] The challenge facing India is to successfully leverage the country's youth dividend[120] towards achieving the Indian Century [121][122] and to avoid hubris that India's economic growth is inevitable.[123][124][125]

Several Indo-Pacific regional powers, no longer content with peripheral influence in global discussions, are seeking a radical reordering of the post-WWII global hierarchy of power.[126][127] Minor powers have grown enough in self-confidence to form new partnerships in order to further national interests and political goals.[128] The consensual view in Asia is that America will continue to remain relevant in world affairs for the foreseeable future, but already no longer enjoys uncontested supremacy.[129][130][131] Reflecting upon the extent to which the stakes have risen in the contest for a place at the global high table, US President Barack Obama implored Americans to "win the future by out-innovating, out-educating and out-building the rest of the world".[132] Relentless efforts by American think-tanks and government officials to reassure alliance partners about American primacy in global affairs flies in the face of a steady stream of setbacks and challenges from Central Europe right through to the Indo-Pacific region (EU nations joining the AIIB, Russian annexation of Crimea, dismemberment of Ukraine, redrawing of colonial borders by loosely affiliated non-State entities,[133] Iran nuclear negotiations, forceful assertion on maritime claims by China).[134][135][136]

The European Union, still reeling from the combined effects of the global economic slowdown, European sovereign debt crisis and a re-assertive Russia is trying to find a solution to reverse the surge of Euroscepticism.[137][138] Apart from trade, maritime escort duties against pirates and symbolic military exercises, European countries have little else to show in the Indo-Pacific region due to budgetary constraints.

Perpetuation of State borders in the Eurasian continent, which contain several hotly contested demarcation lines which date back from the European Colonial period in Asia (Nine-dotted line, Sykes–Picot Agreement,[139][140] Durand Line, McMahon Line, Radcliffe Line); appear increasingly elastic[141][142] in the face of geopolitical, socio-economic and technological transformations.[140][143][144][145][146]

The primacy of Western-led post-World War II supranational institutions and Bretton Woods system in shaping the outcomes of Asian affairs is no longer a given. Asian countries have not forgotten their colonial past and bitter lessons learnt from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The BRICS are committed to building a multipolar world order and have agreed to coordination on core interests of individual members.[147][148][149][150][151] Western sanctions against Russia prompted China to conclude a $400 billion energy accord, effectively neutralizing efforts to drain Russian finances.[152][153][154][155] BRICS are wooing investors with the allure of best potential for economic growth.[156] Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), North–South Transport Corridor, Asian Highway Network, New Eurasian Land Bridge and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has received increased attention at Track-2 initiatives of the RIC (Russia, India & China) countries.[157][158]

INS Vikrant currently being fitted-out at Cochin Shipyard is the lead-ship of Vikrant-class aircraft carriers for the Indian Navy

Muscle flexing by China on the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) against the backdrop of prominent displays of military might (live test of an ASAT weapon in 2007 by China in response to a 1985 satellite-kill by the USA) and challenges (the Hainan Island incident where the President of the USA was forced to apologise to China to ensure the safe return of the crew of a US Navy intelligence gathering aircraft which was intercepted by PLAN fighter planes) has rekindled an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region.

India has staked a claim to playing a central role in the Asian Century [159][160][161][162] by embarking upon a programme to modernise and diversify assets of the Strategic Forces Command, raise the profile of the Andamans and Nicobar Command (ANC), and renew civilizational ties with regional countries. India has prioritized the strengthening of strategic partnerships - with Russia, Vietnam, Japan, Singapore & Iran - in order to offset and forestall an irrecoverable shift in strategic balance of power in Asia emanating from a resurgent China seeking to advance its One Belt, One Road initiative.[163][164] Agreements to install ocean surveillance capabilities in Madagascar, Fiji, Seychelles (Assumption Island),[165] Mauritius (Agaléga) & Maldives seeks to shelter India's strategic interests and diaspora.[166][167][168][169][170] India's national security planners have sought to consolidate India's presence in countries which are key to China's One Road, One Belt with special focus on Oman, Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Historic terrestrial and maritime trade routes of Asia

The tendency of Indians to get carried away by lofty rhetoric when it comes to China prompted Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, to advise unwavering attention to the improvement of societal aspirations and caution against over-reach : "it is in India's interest to bide its time, remain calm, not get distracted by geopolitics and instead focus on core strengths. India has the advantage, even on China, because of a young population. Put aside the border for now, engage China, take advantage of their competencies".[171]

The scale and speed of economic development in the Asia-Pacific region,[172][173] in both absolute and relative terms,[174] has profoundly shaken public self-confidence in Western countries[175] and stunned observers.[176][177] In 2014, Asia-Pacific (+29%) accumulated wealth faster than Europe (+6.6%) and North America (+5.6%). However, America leads in absolute numbers with $370,000 (including life and pension assets) per household and Europe follows with $220,000.[178]

Recent developments indicate that while India and China are increasingly competing on geopolitical matters, the two countries are simultaneously willing to bridge differences and cooperate on trade.

China-India driven economic growth, fresh opportunities to develop new geographical zones due to improved Sino-Indian relations,[179] observed collateral consequences on local populations & economies caused by recent US-led military interventions in Iraq & Afghanistan, conspicuous absence of the US President at the APEC Indonesia 2013 summit due to the United States federal government shutdown of 2013,[180][181][182] budgetary constraints of the US military,[183] improvements in anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by littoral States to counter maritime power projection assets,[184] limitations in the US air-sea battle doctrine, risks of conflict escalation, historic intra-regional rivalries,[185][186] the fact that post-WWII American interventions in major conflicts in Asia have not been victorious (stalemate in the Korean peninsula, Vietnam debacle, ineffectual US-led COIN operations in Afghanistan) and the unconvincing US pivot to Asia, dissolved the appetite amongst Asian countries to support a US-led China containment policy.[187][188][189][190][191][192][193][194] US economic, political and military dominance is in relative decline compared to emerging powers.[195][196] American capacity to shape global outcomes (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine) has been ineffectual. Re-balancing by regional powers has allowed several Asian microstates and LDCs to extract significant economic advantages and concessions while staying on the sidelines of regional power-play.[197][198][199][200][201][202] Asian countries increasingly view the US primarily as a market for manufactured goods and as a highly capable provider of security infrastructure.[203][204][205]

The 2015-2016 Indian budget foresees co-development of manufacturing hubs in Southeast Asian countries.[206] In March 2015, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj announced that India's 2015 target for trade with ASEAN is $100 billion and both sides are aiming to double it to $200 billion by 2022.[207] India has accelerated initiatives to resolve insurgency in Northeast India[208] to promote economic development within the Seven Sister States.[209]

The improvement and optimization of inter-Asian trade through future mega infrastructure projects, like the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor and Thai Kra Isthmus Canal,[210] are increasing seen as viable and vital to the continuation of economic integration of regional markets.[211][212][213][214][215][216] In May 2014,[217] India announced prioritization of Asian Highway Network regional cross-border connectivity programmes like the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project with Myanmar and the Trilateral India-Myanmar-Thailand Friendship Highway to Thailand.[218][219][220]

Geopolitical map of the Eurasian region

Inadequate representation in global security and governance architectures has led India to complement traditional international forums such as the United Nations Security Council, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) with special interest groupings such as BRIC/BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), East Asia Summit (EAS), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).[221]

India aspires to an incontournable role in the Asian pivot to Asia.[222][223] Between 2004 and 2014 Western think-tanks, especially in the US and UK, failed to pick-up on tell-tale signs of impending transformations to the Indian political scene : swings in electoral voting patterns in rural areas (60% of India's 1.2billion population live outside urban population centers), large-scale nationwide citizen-led protests around specific societal agendas (anti-corruption, right to information), and rapid changes in priorities of the growing middle-class electorate. The association of improvements in basic education, vibrant & unrestricted mass media journalism, penchant for political debate in Indian society,[224] and the huge increase in Indians working and studying abroad has changed how Indians perceive themselves in the global arena in general and Asia in particular.

Geopolitical map of the Heartland theory from Halford Mackinder's 1904 The Geographical Pivot of History

Academics have raised concerns about the relaxed institutional attitude in the West to rapid metamorphosis in Asia. In 2010, John Doggett of McCombs School of Business, University of Texas issued a wake-up call: "China and India are beating us at our own game".[225] Highlighting the ”inability to keep pace with the transformations” in Asia by Western countries, Michael Kugelman - South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center - advocated a change in mind-set and the necessity for Western countries to make their presence felt in India.[54][226][227] Explaining the need for a review of available expertise on India centric matters, Jakob De Roover of University of Ghent in Belgium opined: "India and the West could together look for solutions to the problems that we share. Instead, Western commentators reproduce old colonial stories about India as an immoral culture. This gives them a twisted relationship to the Indian people. On the one hand, they keep turning towards the same class of Indian journalists, activists, and intellectuals for ‘local knowledge’. But these native informants merely talk the talk of the West to the West."[228]

Asian regional powers are unwilling to forfeit any notion of an independent foreign policy and thereby become a tool in the global exercise of power.[229] Speaking at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, the Indian Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh postulated that Asian countries will increasingly attend to their national security and internal markets through structured dialogue within Asian multilateral structures like ASEAN and SCO rather than be over-reliant on formal alliances with external powers.[230] Recent rebalancing and alliance-building activities in the Indo-Pacific region have demonstrated that Asian states are unwilling to settle for a Western-dominated global order and blindly asquise an American-led construct of geopolitical frameworks, rules-based trade and mobility mechanisms which do not adequately address the interests of Asian countries.[231] The majority of Asian states have had autocratic leaders who curtailed civil liberties and imposed restrictions on democratic institutions within their countries. Asian populations have accommodated authoritarian leaders (Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore being a classic example), showing preference for stable economic development and progressive reduction of wealth-gap, over principled stands on human-rights and the promotion of democracy. The non-Western rational of Asian diplomacy in the post-Colonial era appears to balance nationalist aspirations, developmental opportunities, shared cultural roots and historical legacies.[232][233]

The appointment in January 2015 of former Indian Ambassador to the US, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, as Foreign Secretary [234][235][236] seeks to reassure Western countries about Indian strategic intentions in Asia.[237][238][239] Subrahmanyam Jaishankar is the father of Dhruva Jaishankar - a German Marshall Fund (GMF) Transtlantic Fellow in Washington.[240]

US Government and Narendra Modi[edit]

As Chief Minister of Gujarat[edit]

Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat between 2001 and 2014, became the Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014 after the Bharatiya Janata Party decisively won the 2014 Indian General Elections. The US Government completely failed to anticipate the political rise of Narendra Modi to the office of Prime Minister of India.

Sectarian violence during the 2002 Gujarat riots damaged relations between the US Government and Narendra Modi, the then incumbent Chief Minister of Gujarat. Human rights activists accused Modi of fostering anti-Muslim violence. New-York based NGO Human Rights Watch, in their 2002 report directly implicated Gujarat state officials in the violence against Muslims.

In 2012, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Indian Supreme Court found no “prosecutable evidence” against Modi.[241][242] The Supreme Court of India absolved Narendra Modi of any criminal wrongdoing during the 2002 Gujarat riots.

Prior to Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister of India, the US Government had made it known that Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat would not be permitted to travel to the US. Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center opined that although technically speaking there was no US 'visa ban' from 2005 to 2014, the US government policy of considering Modi as persona non grata had resulted in a defacto travel-ban.[243] After the US revoked his existing B1/B2 visa in 2005 and refused to accept his application for an A2 visa, the US State Department affirmed that the visa policy remained unchanged : "(Mr Modi) is welcome to apply for a visa and await a review like any other applicant".[244][245]

Exploring opportunities on how to move the relationship out of a state of morose, Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, says that "the U.S. must first signal its willingness and commitment to collaborating with the new government—and that it will not dwell on the controversy of the 2002 Gujarat riots, which led the U.S. to revoke Modi’s visa in 2005."[246]

On 11 June 2014, Robert Blackwill, the former Coordinator for Strategic Planning and Deputy US National Security Advisor during the presidency of George W. Bush, spoke at length about India-US relations and said : "Mr Modi is a determined leader. He is candid and frank. I also worked with him during the Gujarat earthquake when I was posted as (the US) ambassador to India. (...) It was mistake by the current Obama administration to delay engagement with Mr Modi. I do not know why they did so but definitely, this did not help in building relationship. (...) The old formula and stereotypes will not work if the US administration wants to engage with Mr Modi. The Indian prime minister is candid, direct and smart. He speaks his mind. The US administration also has to engage in candid conversation when Mr Modi meets President Obama later this year. They have to do something innovative to engage with him." [247]

2005 Denial of Visa Application and Revocation of Visa[edit]

In 2005, the US Department of State used a 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) provision to revoke Modi’s tourist/business visa citing section 212 (a) (2) (g) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act.[248] The IRFA provision “makes any foreign government official who ‘was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe violations of religious freedom’ ineligible for a visa to the United States.”

David C. Mulford, the US Ambassador to India from 2003 to 2009, justified the rejection of a diplomatic visa to Modi in a statement released on 21 March 2005 stating that the US State Department re-affirmed the original decision to revoke Modi's tourist/business visa to which India's highest judiciary abstained all the charges from Modi later on the particular issue:[249]

This decision applies to Mr. Narendra Modi only. It is based on the fact that, as head of the State government in Gujarat between February 2002 and May 2002, he was responsible for the performance of state institutions at that time. The State Department's detailed views on this matter are included in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the International Religious Freedom Report. Both reports document the violence in Gujarat from February 2002 to May 2002 and cite the Indian National Human Rights Commission report, which states there was "a comprehensive failure on the part of the state government to control the persistent violation of rights of life, liberty, equality, and dignity of the people of the state." [250]

Modi remains the only person ever to be banned to travel to the United States of America under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) provision of US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) due to political interest.[251][252]

Robert Blackwill, former US ambassador to India opined : "I think it was a serious mistake on the part of the last (Bush) administration to do that (deny Modi a visa) and the current (Obama) administration to keep it in place... all the way till the 2014 Indian elections,".[253] Blackwill highlighted the decision to deny Modi a visa as “absolutely unique” involving private political interest saying that the people who made the decision “thought, it’s pretty safe, because, he’s never going to be Prime Minister”.[254] Modi was found not guilty of the charges by India's judiciary.[255]

Nicholas Burns, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 2005 to 2008, has spoken about the visa denial by saying : "Bush administration officials, including me, believed this to be the right decision at the time."[256][257] and has opined that "Now that it looks like Modi will become prime minister, it’s reasonable for the Obama administration to say it’s been 12 years [since the 2002 riots], and we’ll be happy to deal with him"[258]

2009 USCIRF visa black-list[edit]

In 2009, the US Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) report [259] after ignoring the views and decision of independent body (SIT) set up by India's highest judiciary[260] vehemently alleged that there was "significant evidence" linking Narendra Modi to communal riots in the state in 2002 and asked the Obama administration to continue the policy of preventing him from travelling to the United States of America .[261][262]

The Obama administration maintained the 2005 decision taken by the George W. Bush administration to deny Narendra Modi entry into the United States of America.[263] The US Government says that Modi can circumvent the USCIRF sanctions regime by visiting Washington on a Heads of government A1-visa as long as he is the Prime Minister of India.[264] According to US State Department Spokesperson, Jen Psaki : "US law exempts foreign government officials, including heads of state and heads of government from certain potential inadmissibility grounds,". The visa refusal came after some Indian-American groups and human rights organizations with political view campaigned against Modi, including the Coalition Against Genocide.[265]

As Prime Minister of India[edit]

Modi's visit to America, 2014[edit]

During the run-off to the general election there was wide ranging scepticism regarding future of the strategic bilateral relation under Modi’s premiership as in 2005 he was, while Chief Minister of Gujarat, denied a US visa[266] during the Bush administration for his alleged poor human rights records.[267] However sensing Modi’s inevitable victory well before the election, the US Ambassabor Nancy Powell had reached out to him as part of greater re-approachment from the west. Moreover, following his 2014 election as the Prime Minister of India President Obama congratulated him over telephone and invited him to visit the US.[268][269] US Secretary of State John Kerry visited New Delhi on 1 August to prepare the grounds for Modi's first ever US visit as Prime Minister. In September 2014, days before visiting the US in an interview to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Modi said that "India and the United States are bound together, by history and culture" but acknowledged that there have been “ups and downs” in relations.[270] Modi travelled to US from 27–30 September 2014,[271] beginning with his maiden address in the United Nations general assembly followed by attending a gala public reception by the Indian American community in New York’s Madison Square Garden before heading Washington, D.C. for the bilateral talk with Obama. While there, Modi also met several American business leaders and invited them to join his ambitious Make in India program in a bid to make India a manufacturing hub.[272][273][274]

Barack Obama's visit to India, 2015[edit]

President Barack Obama, was the chief guest for the annual Indian Republic Day parade on 26 January 2015.[275] India and the US held their first ever bilateral dialogue on the UN and multilateral issues in the spirit of the "Delhi Declaration of Friendship" that strengthens and expands the two countries' relationship as part of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.[276]

The conspicuous absence of major announcements, a key indicator of the state of US relations with the host country, led political commentators in both countries to highlight the confidence-building aspects of the visit[277][278][279][280][281]

Military relations[edit]

Indian Naval officer Lt. Cmdr. Amarjeet Saluja, discusses underway replenishment procedures with chief boatswain's mate Ricky Cambridge, aboard the INS Betwa off the coast of India, 2004.
A Marine assigned to Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/4, gives small arms training to Indian soldiers assigned to the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Infantry aboard USS Boxer off the coast of Mumbai, 2006.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead meets with Vice Adm. Sanjeev Bhasin, flag officer commanding-in-chief of Western Naval Command in Mumbai, 2010.

US-India military relations derive from a common belief in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seek to advance shared security interests. These interests include maintaining security and stability, defeating violent religious extremism and terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies, and protecting the free flow of commerce.

In recent years, India has conducted large joint military exercises with the US in the Indian Ocean.[282]

Recognising India as a key to its strategic interests, the United States has sought to strengthen its relationship with India. The two countries are the world's largest democracies, and both are committed to political freedom protected by representative government. The US and India have a common interest in the free flow of commerce and resources, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. They also share an interest in creating a strategically stable[clarification needed] Asia.

There have been some differences, however, including US concerns over the nuclear weapons programmes and the pace of economic reforms in India. In the past, these concerns may have dominated US thinking, but today the US views India as a growing world power with which it shares common strategic interests.[citation needed] A strong partnership between the two countries will continue to address differences and shape a dynamic and collaborative future.

In late September 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions imposed under the terms of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act following India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The non-proliferation dialogue has bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries. In a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in November 2001, the two leaders expressed a strong interest in transforming the US-India bilateral relationship. High-level meetings and concrete cooperation between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the US and India launched the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP), which was both a milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress.

In July 2005, Bush hosted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington, D.C. The two leaders announced the successful completion of the NSSP, as well as other agreements which further enhanced cooperation in the areas of civil nuclear, civil space, and high-technology commerce. Other initiatives announced included a US-India economic dialogue, the fight Against HIV/AIDS, disaster relief, technology cooperation, an agriculture knowledge initiative, a trade policy forum, energy dialogue, CEO Forum, and an initiative to assist each other in furthering democracy and freedom.[283] President Bush made a reciprocal visit to India in March 2006, during which the progress of these initiatives were reviewed, and new initiatives were launched.

In December 2006, the US Congress passed the historic Henry J. Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. US policy had been opposed to nuclear cooperation with India in prior years because India had developed nuclear weapons against international conventions, and had never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). The legislation clears the way for India to buy US nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use.

Nuclear cooperation[edit]

The India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement also referred to as the "123 Agreement", signed on 10 October 2008 is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector.[284][285] For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India’s 2010 Nuclear Liability Act which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident.

Economic relations[edit]

The United States is one of India's largest direct investors. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow has increased from USD $11.3 million to $344.4 million, and totaling $4.13 billion. This is a compound rate increase of 57.5 percent annually. Indian direct investments abroad began in 1992, and Indian corporations and registered partnership firms are now allowed to invest in businesses up to 100 percent of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 54.8 percent of the country's foreign investments. The second largest are in non-financial services (software development), accounting for 35.4 percent of investments.

Trade relations[edit]

U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during a meeting with Indian and American business leaders in New Delhi.

The US is one of India's largest trading partners. In 2011, the US exported $21.50 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $36.15 billion worth of Indian goods.[286] Major items imported from India include information technology services, textiles, machinery, gems and diamonds, chemicals, iron and steel products, coffee, tea, and other edible food products. Major American items imported by India include aircraft, fertilisers, computer hardware, scrap metal, and medical equipment.[287][288]

The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $9 billion (accounting for 9 percent of total foreign investment). Americans have made notable foreign investments in the Asian country's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries.[288]

In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh created a new programme called the Trade Policy Forum. It is run by a representative from each nation. The United States Trade Representative was Rob Portman, and the Indian Commerce Secretary then-Minister of Commerce Kamal Nath. The goal of the programme is to increase bilateral trade and investment flow. There are five main sub-divisions of the Trade Policy Forum, including:

  • The goals of the Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers group include agreeing that insecticides manufactured by US companies can be sold throughout India. India had also agreed to cut special regulations on trading carbonated drinks, many medicinal drugs, and lowering regulations on many imports that are not of an agricultural nature. Both nations have agreed to discuss improved facets of Indian regulation in the trade of jewellery, computer parts, motorcycles, fertiliser, and those tariffs that affect American exporting of boric acid. The group has also discussed matters such as those wishing to break into the accounting market, Indian companies gaining licenses for the telecommunications industry, and setting policies regarding Indian media and broadcasting markets. Other foci include the exchange of valuable information on recognising different professional services, discussing the movement and positioning of people in developing industries, continuation of talks on financial services markets, limitation of equities, insurance, retail, joint investment in agricultural processing and transportation industries, and small business initiatives.

The majority of exports from the US to India include: aviation equipment, engineering materials and machinery, instruments used in optical and medical sectors, fertilisers, and stones and metals. Below are the percentages of traded items (India to US), which have increased by 21.12 percent to $6.94 billion:

  1. Diamonds & precious stones (25 percent)
  2. Textiles (29.01 percent)
  3. Iron & Steel (5.81 percent)
  4. Machinery (4.6 percent)
  5. Organic chemicals (4.3 percent)
  6. Electrical Machinery (4.28 percent)

Major items of export (US to India) for the year 2006 (up to the month of April) were $2.95 billion USD:

  1. Engineering goods & machinery (including electrical) (31.2 percent)
  2. Aviation & aircraft (16.8 percent)
  3. Precious stones & metals (8.01 percent)
  4. Optical instruments & equipment (7.33 percent)
  5. Organic chemicals (4.98 percent)

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

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Further reading[edit]

  • Aspen Institute India. The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011) online
  • Ayres, Alyssa and C. Raja Mohan, eds. Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (2009) excerpt and text search
  • Barnds, William J. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (1972)
  • Chary, M. Srinivas (1995). The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward India Since Independence. Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-313-27602-6. 
  • Brands, H. W. India and the United States: The Cold Peace (1990)
  • Brands, H. W. Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918-1961 (1991) pp 196–230; Loy Henderson was US Ambassador, 1948–51
  • Chary, M. Srinivas. The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence (1995) online edition
  • Chaudhuri, Rudra. Forged in crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (Oxford University Press, 2014)
  • Clymer, Kenton J. Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's Independence (1995) online
  • Govil, Nitin. Orienting Hollywood: A Century of Film Culture Between Los Angeles and Bombay (NYU Press, 2015)
  • Hart, David M., and Zoltan J. Acs. "High-tech immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States." Economic Development Quarterly (2011) 25#2 pp: 116-129. online
  • Isaacs, Harold R. Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India (1980) online
  • Karl, David J. "U.S.-India Relations: The Way Forward," Orbis (2012) 56#2 pp 308–327 online
  • Kux, Dennis. India and The United States: Estranged Democracies 1941 - 1991 (1993)
  • McMahon, Robert J. Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (1994) excerpt and text search
  • Merrill, Dennis (1990). Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963. UNC Press. 
  • Pant, Harsh V. "The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics," Asian Security (2009) 5#3 pp 273–95 doi:10.1080/14799850903179012
  • Rani, Sudesh. "Indo-US Maritime Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects," Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol. 8, No. 2, (December 2012) Pages: 123-43 doi:10.1080/09733159.2012.742664
  • Rotter, Andrew J. Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964 (2000)
  • Roy, Dr. P. C. Indo-U.S. Economic Relations. Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1986. 73–125.
  • Schaffer, Teresita C. India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (2010)
  • Sharma, G. D. Indo Us Defence Cooperation (Vij Books, 2012), excerpt and text search
  • Sokolski, Henry. United States and India Strategic Cooperation (2010)

Primary sources[edit]

  • Bowles, Chester (1969). A View from New Delhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1963-1969. Yale U.P. ISBN 978-0-300-10546-9. , US ambassador 1951-53 and 1963–69
  • Bowles, Chester. A View From New Delhi (1969) excerpt and text search
  • Bowles, Chester. Promises to Keep (1972), autobiography; pp 531–79 by US ambassador 1951-53 and 1963–69
  • Galbraith, John K. Ambassador's journal: a personal account of the Kennedy years (1969) online, he was US ambassador to India 1961-63
  • U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), many volumes of primary sources; the complete texts of these large books are all online. See Guide to FRUS. For example, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 was published in 2005 and is online here. The most recent volumes are Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 (2005) online here and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976 (2007) online here.

External links[edit]