Iroquois Theatre fire
The Iroquois Theatre, shortly before the fire
|Time||about 3:15 p.m.|
|Date||30 December 1903|
|Location||Chicago, Illinois, United States|
|Cause||Ignition of muslin curtains due to broken arc light|
The Iroquois Theatre fire happened on December 30, 1903, in Chicago, Illinois. It was the deadliest theater fire and the deadliest single-building fire in United States history. At least 602 people died as a result of the fire, but not all the deaths were reported, as some of the bodies were removed from the scene.
- 1 The theatre
- 2 Why the Iroquois was dangerous
- 3 The fire
- 4 Aftermath
- 5 Memorial
- 6 Developments
- 7 In popular culture
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 Further reading
- 11 External links
The Iroquois Theatre was at 24–28 West Randolph Street, on the North Side between State Street and Dearborn Street in Chicago. The syndicate that bankrolled its construction chose the location specifically to attract women on day trips from out of town who, it was thought, would be more comfortable attending a theatre near the safe, police-patrolled Loop shopping district. The theatre opened in November 1903 after numerous delays due to labor unrest and, according to one writer, the unexplained inability of architect Benjamin Marshall to complete required drawings on time. Upon opening it was lauded by drama critics; Walter K. Hill wrote in the New York Clipper (a predecessor of Variety) that the Iroquois was "the most beautiful ... in Chicago, and competent judges state that few theaters in America can rival its architectural perfections ..."
The Iroquois had a capacity of 1,602 with three audience levels. The main floor, known as the orchestra or parquet, had approximately 700 seats on the same level as the foyer and Grand Stair Hall. The second level, the dress circle or [first] balcony, had more than 400 seats. The third level, the gallery, had about 500 seats. There were four boxes on the first level and two above.
Everyone used the same entrance, and the broad stairs leading off the foyer to the balcony level were also used to reach the stairs to the gallery level. Theater designers claimed this allowed patrons to "see and be seen" regardless of the price of their seats. But the common stairway ignored Chicago fire ordinances that required separate stairways and exits for each balcony. The design proved disastrous, as people exiting the gallery encountered a crowd leaving the balcony level, and those descending from the upper levels met the orchestra level patrons in the foyer.
The backstage areas were unusually large, with dressing rooms on five levels, an uncommonly large fly gallery (where scenery was hung), and even an elevator available to transport actors down to the stage level.
Why the Iroquois was dangerous
Fire readiness deficiencies noted before the fire
Despite being billed as "Absolutely Fireproof" in advertisements and playbills, numerous deficiencies in fire readiness were apparent:
- An editor of Fireproof Magazine toured the building during construction and noted "the absence of an intake, or stage draft shaft; the exposed reinforcement of the (proscenium) arch; the presence of wood trim on everything and the inadequate provision of exits."
- A Chicago Fire Department captain who made an unofficial tour of the theatre days before the official opening noted that there were no sprinklers, alarms, telephones, or water connections. The captain pointed out the deficiencies to the theatre's fire warden but was told that nothing could be done, as the fire warden would simply be dismissed if he brought the matter up with the syndicate of owners. When the captain reported the matter to his commanding officer, he was again told that nothing could be done, as the theatre already had a fire warden.
- The firefighting equipment consisted of six "Kilfyre" extinguishers. Kilfyre was a primitive form of dry chemical fire extinguisher also sold for dousing chimney fires in residential houses. It consisted of a 2" × 24" tube of tin filled with about three pounds of white powder, mostly sodium bicarbonate. The user was instructed to "forcibly hurl" the contents of the tube at the base of the flames. The fire began high above the stage, so the Kilfyre, when thrown, fell uselessly to the ground.
Protecting the audience from hazards on stage
The risks inherent in flammable scenery and props were recognized even in 1903. Two features, a safety curtain that confines fire to the stage area and smoke doors that allow smoke and heat to escape through the roof above the stage, combine to increase fire safety in theaters. This arrangement creates negative pressure; the stage area becomes a chimney, and fresh, breathable air is sucked through the exit doors into the audience area. At the Iroquois, the smoke doors above the stage were fastened closed. This meant that smoke flowed out of the building through many of the same exits people were trying to use to escape.
- Skylights on the roof of the stage, which were intended to open automatically during a fire and allow smoke and heat to escape, were fastened closed.
- The curtain was not tested periodically, and it got stuck when the theatre personnel tried to lower it.
- The curtain was not fireproof. Although it is now known to cause cancer, asbestos can be interwoven with metal wire to create a strong and effective barrier against fire. The curtain at the Iroquois not only failed to lower but also proved to be both weak and flammable. Chemist Gustave J. Johnson of the Western Society of Engineers analyzed a piece of the material after the fire: "[It] was largely wood pulp. By mixing pulp with asbestos fiber, the life of the curtain is prolonged, the cost is cheapened, and the wire foundation may be dispensed with... It results in a curtain that may get inside city ordinances, but is of no value in a fire."
Escape in the event of fire
The owners of the theater claimed that the thirty exits would allow everyone inside to escape the building in five minutes. Audiences in 1903 were aware of the hazard of fire, particularly after more than 900 people died in the Ring Theatre fire in Vienna.
- Exit doors opened inward, into the auditorium. People trying to escape tended to hold the doors closed. When people were able to pull the doors open enough to get out, some people were then wedged in the door opening as people continued to push on the door. Today, exit doors open outward, so that people trying to escape will tend to hold the doors open.
- There were no exit signs. Many exits were concealed by flammable drapery, and many were locked.
- Theater staff had never had a fire drill. They were unfamiliar with the exits and some refused to open locked exit doors.
- There was no emergency lighting. The main auditorium lights were never switched on, so the theater remained dimly lit, as during a performance. When tons of burning scenery collapsed onto the stage, the electrical switchboard was destroyed and all electric lights went out.
- During performances, the stairways were blocked with iron gates to prevent people with inexpensive tickets from taking seats in other parts of the theater. (On the day of the fire, there were no empty seats in the house.)
- Many of the exit routes were confusing.
- There were several ornamental "doors" that looked like exits, but were not. Two hundred people died in one passageway that was not an exit.
- Iron fire escapes on the north wall led to at least 125 deaths. The upper platform had no way of getting down. People were trapped on all levels because the icy, narrow stairs and ladders were dangerous to use and because smoke and flames blocked the way down.
On December 30, 1903, a Wednesday, the Iroquois presented a matinee performance of the popular Drury Lane musical Mr. Bluebeard, which had been playing at the Iroquois since opening night. The play, a burlesque of the traditional Bluebeard folk tale, featured Dan McAvoy as Bluebeard and Eddie Foy as Sister Anne, a role that let him showcase his physical comedy skills. Attendance since opening night had been disappointing, people having been driven away by poor weather, labor unrest, and other factors. The December 30 performance drew a much larger sellout audience. Tickets were sold for every seat in the house, plus hundreds more for the "standing room" areas at the back of the theatre. Many of the estimated 2,100–2,200 patrons attending the matinee were children. The standing room areas were so crowded that some patrons instead sat in the aisles, blocking the exits.
At about 3:15 p.m., the beginning of the second act, a dance number was in progress when an arc light shorted out and sparks ignited a muslin curtain. A stagehand tried to douse the fire with the Kilfyre canisters provided, but it quickly spread to the fly gallery high above the stage where several thousand square feet of highly flammable painted canvas scenery flats were hung. The stage manager tried to lower the asbestos fire curtain, but it snagged. Early reports state that it was stopped by the trolley-wire that carried one of the acrobats over the stage, but later investigation showed that the curtain had been blocked by a light reflector which stuck out under the proscenium arch. A chemist who later tested part of the curtain stated that it was mainly wood pulp mixed with asbestos, and would have been "of no value in a fire".
Foy, who was preparing to go on stage at the time, ran out and attempted to calm the crowd, first making sure that his young son was in the care of a stagehand. He later wrote, "It struck me as I looked out over the crowd during the first act that I had never before seen so many women and children in the audience. Even the gallery was full of mothers and children." Foy was widely seen as a hero after the fire for his courage in remaining on stage and pleading with patrons not to panic even as large chunks of burning scenery landed around him.
By this time, many of the patrons on all levels were quickly attempting to flee the theatre. Some had found the fire exits hidden behind draperies on the north side of the building, but found that they could not open the unfamiliar bascule locks. Bar owner Frank Houseman, who had pitched a single game for the Baltimore Orioles in 1886, defied an usher who refused to open a door. He was able to open the door because his ice box at home had a similar lock. Houseman credits his friend, outfielder Charlie Dexter, who had just quit the Boston Beaneaters, with forcing open another door. A third door was opened either by brute force or by a blast of air, but most of the other doors could not be opened. Some patrons panicked, crushing or trampling others in a desperate attempt to escape from the fire. Many were killed while trapped in dead ends or while trying to open what looked like doors with windows in but were actually only windows.
The dancers on stage were also forced to flee, along with the performers backstage and in the numerous dressing rooms. When the performers and stagehands went out of the back exit, an icy wind rushed in and made the fire substantially bigger. Many escaped from the theatre through the coal hatch and through windows in the dressing rooms, and others tried to escape via the west stage door, which opened inwards and became jammed as actors pressed toward the door frantically trying to get out. By chance a passing railroad agent saw the crowd pressing against the door and unfastened the hinges from the outside using tools that he normally carried with him, allowing the actors and stagehands to escape. Someone else opened the huge double freight doors in the north wall, normally used for scenery, allowing "a cyclonic blast" of cold air to rush into the building and create an enormous fireball. As the vents above the stage were nailed or wired shut, the fireball instead traveled outwards, ducking under the stuck asbestos curtain and streaking toward the vents behind the dress circle and gallery 50 feet (15 m) away. The hot gases and flames passed over the heads of those in the orchestra seats and incinerated everything flammable in the gallery and dress circle levels, including patrons still trapped in those areas.
Those in the orchestra section exited into the foyer and out of the front door, but those in the dress circle and gallery who escaped the fireball could not reach the foyer because the iron grates that barred the stairways were still in place. The largest death toll was at the base of these stairways, where hundreds of people were trampled, crushed, or asphyxiated.
Patrons who were able to escape via the emergency exits on the north side found themselves on the unfinished fire escapes. Many jumped or fell from the icy narrow fire escapes to their deaths; the bodies of the first jumpers broke the falls of those who followed them.
Students from the Northwestern University building north of the theatre tried bridging the gap with a ladder and then with some boards between the rooftops, saving those few able to manage the makeshift cross-over.
The Iroquois had no fire alarm box or telephone. The Chicago Fire Department's Engine 13 was alerted to the fire by a stagehand who had been ordered to run from the burning theater to the nearest firehouse. On the way to the scene, at approximately 3:33 pm, a member of Engine 13 activated an alarm box to call additional units. Initial efforts focused on the people trapped on the fire escapes. The alley to the north of the theater, known as Couch Place, was icy, narrow, and full of smoke. Aerial ladders could not be used in the alley and black nets, concealed by the smoke, proved useless.
The Chicago Police Department became involved when an officer patrolling the theater district saw people emerge from the building in a panic, some with clothing on fire. He called in from a police box on Randolph Street, and police, summoned by whistles, soon converged on the scene to control traffic and aid with the evacuation. Some of the city's thirty uniformed police matrons were called in, because of the number of female casualties.
Corpses were piled ten high around the doors and windows. Many patrons had clambered over piles of bodies only to succumb themselves to the flames, smoke, and gases. It is estimated that 575 people were killed on the day of the fire; at least 30 more died of injuries over the following weeks. Many of the Chicago victims were buried in Montrose, Forest Home, Oak Woods, Rosehill and Graceland cemeteries.
Of the 300 or so actors, dancers, and stagehands, only five people died: the aerialist (Nellie Reed), an actor in a bit part, an usher, and two female attendants. The aerialist's role was to fly out as a fairy over the audience on a trolley wire, showering them with pink carnations. She was trapped above the stage while waiting for her entrance; during the fire she fell, was gravely injured, and died of burns and internal injuries three days later.
In New York City on New Year's Eve some theaters eliminated standing room. Building and fire codes were subsequently reformed; theaters were closed for retrofitting all around the country and in some cities in Europe. All theater exits had to be clearly marked and the doors configured so that, even if they could not be pulled open from the outside, they could be pushed open from the inside.
After the fire, it was alleged that fire inspectors had been bribed with free tickets to overlook code violations. The mayor ordered all theaters in Chicago closed for six weeks after the fire.
As a result of public outrage, many were charged with crimes, including Mayor Carter Harrison, Jr. Most charges were dismissed three years later, however, because of the delaying tactics of the owners' lawyers and their use of loopholes and inadequacies in the city's building and safety ordinances. Levy Mayer was the defender of the theater and its manager, Will Davis. The only person convicted was a tavern keeper charged with grave robbing.
A bronze bas-relief memorial by sculptor Lorado Taft with no identifying markings was placed inside the LaSalle Street entrance to City Hall. The Chicago Tribune described the marker December 31, 1911, as depicting "the Motherhood of the World protecting the children of the universe, the body of a child borne on a litter by herculean male figures, with a bereaved mother bending over it". The memorial was in the Iroquois Hospital on Wacker until the building was demolished in 1951. It was placed in storage in City Hall until it was installed in its current location, near the building's LaSalle Street entrance, in 1960. The memorial was rededicated on November 5, 2010, and a descriptive plaque was donated by the Union League Club of Chicago. The dedication was attended by members of the Chicago City Council, the Union League Club and Taft's granddaughter.
Chicago held an annual memorial service at City Hall, until the last survivors died.
The Iroquois fire prompted widespread implementation of the panic bar, first invented in the United Kingdom following the Victoria Hall disaster. Panic exit devices are now required by building codes for high-occupancy spaces, and were mass manufactured in the US following the fire by the Von Duprin company (now part of Allegion).
A second result of the fire was the requirement that a fireproof asbestos curtain (or sheet metal screen) be raised before each performance and lowered afterward to separate the audience from the stage. (Not common practice and not code in many jurisdictions—not for every performance.)[clarification needed]
In popular culture
In 2011, the Neo-Futurists theater company in Chicago produced a show called "Burning Bluebeard" by Jay Torrence, which recounted the story of the Iroquois fire from the perspective of the performers, including Eddie Foy. The play received critical praise and was named one of the “2011 Best of Fringe” by the Chicago Tribune, one of the “Top Five Funniest Shows of 2011” by WBEZ Radio and one of the “Twelve Outstanding Ensembles of 2011” by Time Out Chicago’s Kris Vire. The Ruffians theater company remounted the production in 2013 with the original cast. The Ruffians once again are remounting "Burning Bluebeard" at Theatre Wit In Chicago.
- "This Day In History: Fire Breaks Out In Chicago Theater". The History Channel.
- Brandt, Nat (2003). Chicago Death Trap: The Iroquois Theatre Fire of 1903. Southern Illinois University Press. pp. 11–13. ISBN 0-8093-2490-3.
- Hatch, Anthony P. (2003). Tinder Box: The Iroquois Theatre Disaster, 1903. Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers. pp. 7–12. ISBN 0-89733-514-7.
- Brandt, pp. 11–13.
- Hatch 2003, p. 18.
- Hatch 2003, p. 66.
- Hatch 2003, p. 235.
- Brandt 2003, p. 5.
- The concrete arch above the stage.
- Hatch 2003, p. 12.
- Hatch 2003, p. 14.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 13–14.
- Brandt, p. 31.
- "Fire Inquiry Discloses: Skylights Reported Opened After the Disaster—Cannot Find the 'Asbestos' Curtain—Usher Arrested". The New York Times. 5 January 1904. Retrieved 2011-12-05.
- "What is a 'Fireproof' Screen". Chicago Tribune. 2 January 1904. Retrieved 2012-12-12.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 224.
- "Iroquois Theatre Fire". Eastland Memorial Society. Retrieved 2012-12-05.
- "A Tragedy Remembered" (PDF). NPFA Journal (National Fire Protection Association) (July/August). 1995.
Actor Eddie Foy's personal account
- Bob Secter (19 December 2007). "The Iroquois Theater fire". Chicago Tribune (Chicagotribune.com). Retrieved 2011-12-05.
- Hatch 2003, p. 88.
- Hatch 2003, p. 150.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 81–87.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 129.
- Brandt 2003, pp. 41–51.
- Brandt 2003, pp. 28–40.
- Brandt 2003, pp. 39–40.
- Engine 13 was then located at 209 North Dearborn Street. It has since moved to North Columbus Drive.
- This is called a "still and box alarm" in Chicago; a "still alarm" is one where the fire alarm boxes remain "still." Alarms received by telephone are considered still alarms, so the term remains in use today.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 118-119.
- From 1885, Chicago police had matrons to work with female prisoners; the first "policewomen" in the city were appointed in 1913.
- Hatch 2003, pp. 119.
- Brandt 2003, p. 90.
- "Jane Doe of the Iroquois Theatre Fire gravesite". Findagrave.com. Retrieved 2013-12-30.
- Brandt 2003, pp. 36–40.
- Brandt 2003, pp. 126–130.
- Brandt 2003, p. xviii.
- Brandt 2003, p. 139.
- Zasky, Jason. "Burning Down the House: The 1903 Iroquois Theater Fire". Failure Magazine. Retrieved 2009-10-01.
The Iroquois Theater advertised itself as 'absolutely fireproof,' it went up in flames six weeks after opening
- "Historic City Hall Plaque to be Rededicated". WBBM-TV News (CBS Chicago.com). 4 November 2010. Retrieved 2011-01-24.
- "Iroquois Theatre Fire Victims Remembered". Theatre Historical Society of America. 7 November 2010. Retrieved 2013-12-30.
- "Our History". Montrose Cemetery & Crematorium. Retrieved 2014-03-29.
- Schweyer, Jenny (5 November 2008). "Exit Devices: Von Duprin Changes the Face of Commercial Security". Article Alley. Retrieved 2009-01-13.
- "Collinwood School Fire". Encyclopedia of Cleveland History. Case Western Reserve University. 27 March 2008. Retrieved 2011-12-05.
- Metz, Nina (21 December 2011). "Best of Chicago's fringe theater scene in 2011". Chicago Tribune. Retrieved 2013-12-21.
- Molzahn, Laura (21 December 2011). "2011's funniest and best-dressed Chicago shows". WBEZ. Retrieved 2013-12-21.
- Vire, Kris (25 December 2011). "Twelve outstanding ensembles in Chicago theater". Time Out Chicago. Retrieved 2013-12-21.
- McCurdy, D.B. (1904). Lest We Forget: Chicago's Awful Theatre Horror. Chicago: Memorial Publishing.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Iroquois Theatre fire.|
- "The Iroquois Theater Fire". Eastland Memorial Society. Retrieved July 27, 2007.
The screams of the children for their mothers and mothers for their children I shall carry in my memory to my dying day. — Frank Slosson, Secretary-Treasurer of the Bain Wagon Works, survivor
- Chicago's Awful Theater Horror by Marshall Everett, 1904, includes photographs, at Internet Archive
- Hucke, Matt. "Iroquois Theater Fire Memorial". Graveyards (of Chicago). Retrieved July 27, 2007.
... photograph of memorial at Montrose Cemetery, Chicago ...
- Verdict of Coroner's Jury
- "Contradictions in reports about Iroquois disaster. Discuss what really happened on December 30, 1903".