Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889

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The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889, the first between Kingdom of Italy and the Ethiopian Empire, was caused by Italy's attempt to occupy the interior of what became the colony of Eritrea.

As the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan spilled over the frontier, Ethiopia was faced with a two-front war. The Emperor Yohannes IV also had to face internal resistance from his powerful vassals. King Menelik of Shewa even signed a treaty of neutrality with Italy in October 1887.

While there is universal agreement that the war began in January 1887, historians differ about when it ended.[2] Some limit the war to 1887,[3][4] others extend it down to the Treaty of Wuchale in 1889,[5][6][7] and others combine it with the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–96 and treat a single conflict as occurring from 1887 until 1896.[8] The naming of the conflict also varies. It may be called the First Italo-Ethiopian War[5][9] and the war of 1895–96 as the Second Italo-Ethiopian War.[2] Otherwise it may be identified solely by date.[4][6]

Italian historiography tends to group together all the fighting from 1885 until 1896. The original name for the fighting was Guerra d'Africa (African War),[10][11][12] at term which indicates the broad perceived scope of early Italian colonial ambitions. As the Italian historian Giuseppe Finaldi puts it, "The war is called the Guerra d'Africa, not the Guerra d'Eritrea or such like."[13]

Background[edit]

The first Italian colony in what was to become the colony of Eritrea was Assab Bay, purchased by Giuseppe Sapeto on behalf of the Società di Navigazione Rubattino (Rubattino Shipping Company) on 15 November 1869 from the brothers Ibrahim and Hassan Ben Ahmed for 6,000 Maria Theresa thalers.[14] The Suez Canal opened two days later. The deal was later finalised for 8,350 thalers and with the Sultan Abd Allah Sahim as a party. On 11 March 1870, Sapeto purchased the Bay of Buya from the same brothers and sultan.[15] Between 15 April 1870 and December 1879, however, Assab went unused by the company. The company offered it to the Italian government, which on 5 July 1882 passed a law making it Italy's first colony.[14]

The outbreak of the Mahdist uprising changed the political situation in the Horn of Africa. Egypt was unable to maintain its garrison in Massawa and, with British approval, an Italian Corpo Speciale per l'Africa (Special Corps for Africa), commanded by Colonel Tancredi Saletta, occupied it on 5 February 1885.[14]

Campaign[edit]

Dogali campaign[edit]

Italian moves into the hinterland of Massawa, territory claimed by Ethiopia, brought her forces into conflict with those of Ethiopia, specifically those of Ras Alula, governor of Mareb Mellash.

On 24[2] or 25 January 1887, Alula attacked the Italian fort at Sahati. In the ensuing skirmish, his troops were beaten back.[16] On 26 January, an Ethiopian force of about 15,000 men[2] ambushed an Italian battalion sent to reinforce Sahati and almost annihilated it at Dogali, 10 miles (16 km) west of Massawa. The battle of Dogali turned out to be one of the most important in the history of modern Ethiopia.[16] The response in Italy was immediate. The Italian parliament voted 5,000,000 lire for troops to reinforce Massawa.[17] An Italian force was sent to garrison the interior, while Yohannes IV withdrew his forces to avoid confrontation. Disease ravaged the Italian troops and they were pulled out in March 1887, ending the first phase of the war.[2]

Following his victory, Alula remained in contact with the Italians regarding prisoners. He also subjected Massawa to a landward blockade in an effort to completely cut off its trade with the hinterland. This angered the local Muslim traders, whose sympathies shift towards the Italians.[16]

In his attack on Sahati, Alula had acted entirely on his own initiative. The Emperor Yohannes was at Makelle during the battle of Dogali. When Alula requested permission to expel the Italians from Massawa, the emperor is said to have castigated him for making war without permission: "Who gave you permission to go and make war there? Those soldiers are not yours but mine; I shall cut off your hand."[16] In late March, Yohannes summoned Alula to Makelle, where he was more conciliatory He promised the ras reinforcements against any Italian counterattack but forbade offensive operations.[16]

Italian reinforcements[edit]

On 2 June 1887, the Italian parliament voted a further 200,000,000 lire for troops, ammunition and supplies to be sent to Massawa.[17] During the summer, an expeditionary force of 20,000 men was assembled in Italy. It landed in Massawa during November.[16]

With Yohannes weakened, Menelik of Shewa and King Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam entered into an alliance against him. In retaliation, the emperor crossed into Gojjam in early August 1887 and devastated it.[16] The following month, he ordered Menelik to bar communications with Assab through Aussa.[5] In response, Menelik sent letters to both the emperor and the Italians offering to mediate, as he had done after Dogali.[18]

Already in late August 1887, Menelik had received the Italian diplomat Pietro Antonelli in Shewa to negotiate an alliance against Yohannes. Italy requested a small piece of territory in the interior in which to garrison their troops during the summer. Antonelli also gave Menelik Italy's justifications for a punitive expedition to avenge Dogali. On 19 September, Antonelli proposed a treaty of neutrality with Shewa in exchange for munitions. A draft of this treaty survives.[5][18] In October, Menelik signed a secret treaty with Antonelli guaranteeing his neutrality in return for arms.[18]

In September 1887, Alula invaded Damot with a Tigrayan army. With their ras away, the Tigrayan chiefs made contact with the Italians. On 11 November 1887, Gerald Portal, the British consul at Cairo, met Alula at Asmara. He then met Yohannes encamped by Lake Ashangi on 7 December. He conveyed to the emperor his government's opinion that the attack on Sahati had been "unjust" and urged that Alula be removed as governor of Mareb Mellash.[16] Yohannes refused to concede anything to the Italians: "If they cannot live there [at Massawa] without Sahati, let them go."[16] He also defended Ras Alula, saying that "[he] did no wrong; the Italians came into the province under his governorship and he fought them, just as you [the British] would fight the Abyssinians [Ethiopians] if they came to England."[16]

By January 1888, the Italians had moved two brigades up to Dogali. Yohannes mobilised for war. He ordered Menelik to guard Wollo and Begemder, while Ras Mikael brought up 25,000 Oromo cavalry to Tigray. Facing a Mahdist invasion in the west, Yohannes abandoned his campaign in March.[16] Paul Henze suggests that "personal antipathy to Islam and desire to see the Mahdist rebellion contained must ... have carried weight in his decision to give priority to the war against the Mahdists over defense against Italian encroachment."[19]

With Yohannes out of the fighitng, Alula withdrew to Asmara in early April 1888 and retreated to Adwa on 23 April. Although Asmara was left undefended, the Italians did not move on it. On 6 February 1889, they occupied Keren.[16] Dejazmach Dabbab Araya, governor of Akele Guzay, occupied Asmara on 9 February 1889 on his own initiative.[16]

In the vacuum that followed the 1889 death of Yohannes IV, General Oreste Baratieri occupied the highlands along the Eritrean coast and Italy proclaimed the establishment of the new colony of Italian Eritrea, a colony of the Kingdom of Italy. The Italian possession of maritime areas previously claimed by Ethiopia was formalized in 1889 with the signing of the Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia. In the Treaty, Menelik of Shewa, a southern Ethiopian kingdom, recognized the Italian occupation of his rivals' lands of Bogos, Hamasien, Akkele Guzay, and Serae in exchange for guarantees of financial assistance and continuing access to European arms and ammunition.[20]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Sarkees & Wayman (2010), p. 262: "The conclusion of the war is coded as a compromise because Italy failed to defeat Ethiopia but was able to withdraw effectively while maintaining its colony in Eritrea".
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Sarkees & Wayman (2010), pp. 261–62.
  3. ^ Gleditsch (2004), p. 238.
  4. ^ a b Clodfelter (2017), p. 202, calls it the Italian–Abyssinian War.
  5. ^ a b c d Caulk (2002), pp. 77–79.
  6. ^ a b Phillips & Axelrod (2005), p. 619.
  7. ^ Kohn (2007), p. 263.
  8. ^ Jaques (2007), p. l.
  9. ^ Singer & Small (1994) call it the "first" Italo-Ethiopian war and classify it as an "imperial" and "extra-systemic" war because although Ethiopia was an independent power at the time, it was not part of the international system of states.
  10. ^ Piccinini (1887–88).
  11. ^ Gorra (1895).
  12. ^ Battaglia (1958).
  13. ^ Finaldi (2009), pp. 297–98.
  14. ^ a b c Tripodi (1999), pp. 15–.
  15. ^ Shinn & Ofcansky (2013), p. 361.
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Henze (2000), pp. 157–59.
  17. ^ a b Gabre-Selassie (2005), p. 96.
  18. ^ a b c Caulk (2002), p. 33.
  19. ^ Henze (2000), p. 159.
  20. ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Abyssinia" . Encyclopædia Britannica. 1 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–94.

Sources[edit]

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  • Erlich, Haggai (1973). A Political Biography of Ras Alula 1875–1897 (PhD thesis). University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies.
  • Finaldi, Giuseppe Maria (2009). Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa: Italy's African Wars in the Era of Nation-Building, 1870–1900. Bern: Peter Lang.
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