Jackson–Vanik amendment

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The Jackson–Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 is a 1974 provision in United States federal law intended to affect U.S. trade relations with countries with non-market economies (originally, countries of the Soviet Bloc) that restrict freedom of Jewish emigration and other human rights. The amendment is contained in the Trade Act of 1974 which passed both houses of the United States Congress unanimously, and signed by President Gerald Ford into law, with the adopted amendment, on January 3, 1975. Over time, a number of countries were granted conditional normal trade relations subject to annual review, and a number of countries were liberated from the amendment.

On December 14, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the Magnitsky Act (formally titled the Russia and Moldova Jackson–Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012)[1][2] that repealed the application of the Jackson–Vanik amendment to Russia and gave normal US trade relations to Russia and Moldova, instead punishing individuals violating human rights.

The amendment is named after its major co-sponsors Henry M. Jackson of Washington in the Senate and Charles A. Vanik of Ohio in the House of Representatives, both Democrats.


Antisemitism in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev[edit]

Antisemitism in the Soviet Union once again peaked during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, following Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War. "Anti-Zionist" propaganda, including the film Secret and Explicit, was often antisemitic in nature.[3] Many of Brezhnev's close advisors, most principally Mikhail Suslov, were also fervent antisemites.[4] Jewish emigration to Israel and the United States, which had been allowed in limited amounts under the rule of Khrushchev, once more became heavily restricted, primarily due to concerns that Jews were a security liability or treasonous.[5] Would-be emigrants, or refuseniks, often required a vyzov, or special invitation from a relative living abroad, for their application to be even considered by the Soviet authorities. In addition, in order to emigrate, one needed written permission from all immediate family members. The rules were often stretched in order to prevent Jews from leaving, and ability for appeal was rarely permitted. Substantial fees were also required to be paid, both to emigrate and as "reimbursement".[6]

Institutional racism against Jews was widespread in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, with many sectors of the government being off-limits.[7] Following the failure of the Dymshits–Kuznetsov hijacking affair, in which 12 refuseniks unsuccessfully attempted to hijack a plane and flee west, crackdowns on Jews and the refusenik movement followed. Informal centres for studying the Hebrew language, the Torah and Jewish culture were closed.[8]

Immediately following the Six-Day War in 1967, the antisemitic conditions started causing desire to emigrate to Israel for many Soviet Jews. A Jewish Ukrainian radio engineer, Boris Kochubievsky, sought to move to Israel. In a letter to Brezhnev, Kochubievsky stated:

I am a Jew. I want to live in the Jewish state. That is my right, just as it is the rights of a Ukrainian to live in the Ukraine, the right of a Russian to live in Russia, the right of a Georgian to live in Georgia. I want to live in Israel. That is my dream, that is the goal not only of my life but also of the lives of hundreds of generation that preceded me, of my ancestors who were expelled from their land. I want to my children to study in the Hebrew language. I want to read Jewish papers, I want to attend a Jewish theatre. What is wrong with that? What is my crime ...?[9]

Within the week he was called in to the KGB bureau and without questioning, was taken to a mental institution in his hometown of Kiev (for more information, see: Political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union).[10] While this may seem as an isolated incident, the aftermath of the Six-Day War affected almost every Jew within the Soviet Union.[10] Jews who had been subject to assimilation under previous regimes were now confronted with a new sense of vigour and revival in their Jewish faith and heritage. On February 23, 1979, a six-page article was distributed throughout the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, which criticized Brezhnev and seven other individuals for being "Zionist".[11] The article contained traces of deep-rooted antisemitism in which the anonymous author, a member of the Russian Liberation Organization, set out ways to identify Zionists; these included "hairy chest and arms", "shifty eyes", and a "hook-like nose".[12]

A major stride was made in the United States in regards to helping the Soviet Jews on 18 October 1974, when Senator Henry M. Jackson, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Senator Jacob Javits and Congressman Charles Vanik met to discuss the finalization of the "Jackson–Vanik amendment" which had been in limbo in the United States Congress for nearly a year.[13] After the meeting, Jackson told reporters that a "historic understanding in the area of human rights" had been met and while he did not "comment on what the Russians have done [...] there [had] been a complete turnaround here on the basic points".[13] The amendment set out to reward the Soviet Union for letting some Soviet Jews leave the country.

On February 22, 1981, in a speech, which lasted over 5 hours, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev denounced antisemitism in the Soviet Union.[14] While Lenin and Stalin had much of the same in various statements and speeches, this was the first time that a high-ranking Soviet official had done so in front of the entire Party.[14] Brezhnev acknowledged that antisemitism existed within the Eastern Bloc and saw that many different ethnic groups existed whose "requirements" were not being met.[14] For decades, people of different ethnic, or religious backgrounds were assimilated into Soviet society and denied the ability or resources to get the education or practice their religion as they had previously done.[14] Brezhnev made it official Soviet Policy to provide these ethnic groups with these "requirements" and cited a fear of the "emergence of inter-ethnic tensions" as the reason.[14] The announcement of the policy was followed with a generic, but significant Party message;

The CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] has fought and will always fight resolutely against such phenomena [inter-ethnic tensions] which are alien to the nature of socialism as chauvinism or nationalism, against any nationalistic aberrations such as, let us say, anti-Semitism or Zionism. We are against tendencies aimed at artificial erosion of national characteristics. But to the same extent, we consider impermissible their artificial exaggeration. It is the sacred duty of the party to educate the working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, of a proud feeling of belonging to a single great Soviet motherland.[15][16]

While to most, the issue of antisemitism seemed to be dropped very casually and almost accidentally, it was very much calculated and planned.[15] At this time the Soviet Union was feeling pressure from around the world to solve many human rights violations that were taking place within their borders, and the statement responded to the inquiries of countries such as Australia and Belgium.[15] While the Party seemed to be taking a hard stance against antisemitism, the fact remained that antisemitic propaganda had long been present in the Soviet Union, making it extremely difficult to solve the problems right away.[15] Furthermore, Jewish organizations in Washington D.C. were calling attention to the problems of Soviet Jewry to American leaders.[15]

Antisemitism, however, remained widespread both within and outside the Communist Party; antisemitic media continued to be published with the assent of the government, while antisemitic propaganda (believed variously to be the work of far-right groups or the Soviet government) spread throughout cities in the Soviet Union during the late 1970s.[17] Mikhail Savitsky's 1979 painting, Summer Theatre, depicted a Nazi extermination camp guard and Jewish prisoner grinning between a pile of Russian corpses.[18]


From 1972 to January 1975, Congress debated and added the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which had restricted the president's ability to provide most favored nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union and other non-market economies of the Soviet bloc. The timing and provisions of the amendment reflected the presidential ambitions and distrust of the Soviet Union of Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA).[19]

After the Soviet Union allowed a number of Soviet Jews to emigrate in the years after the 1967 June War in the Middle East, expectations of freer emigration to buttress Jewish settlers to Israel were raised, but they were soon shattered as the 1972 Soviet emigration head tax made emigration very difficult. This Soviet edict levied an additional exit tax on educated emigrants, which appeared to have the effect of singling out Jews, who anonymously had the highest state paid education costs and wealth, most heavily. The education tax, imposed after the 1972 Moscow summit of superpower leaders Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, emboldened those who criticized the Nixon administration's policy of detente for downplaying concerns for human rights.[19] Nixon's handling of the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration and US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's reluctance to broach the subject disappointed US Jewish activists.[19] The Soviets announced the abolishing of the tax just before the introduction of the amendment in Congress, arguably in an attempt to halt its enactment.[20]

At first, Jackson organized the political movement to link trade and emigration in US relations with the Soviet Union in concert with Jewish activists, but he soon took matters into his own hands. Jackson drafted what would become the Jackson–Vanik amendment in mid-1972 and introduced it to the 92nd Congress on October 4, 1972. Jackson's efforts, rooted in his own domestic political agenda and ideological distrust of and antipathy toward the Soviet Union, complicated the Nixon White House's pursuit of detente, which it had worked on since 1969.[21] However, three-quarters of the Senate co-sponsored the amendment, neutralizing opposition from President Nixon.[21]

Jackson's staffer Richard Perle said in an interview that the idea belonged to Jackson, who believed that the right to emigrate was the most powerful among the human rights in certain respects: "if people could vote with their feet, governments would have to acknowledge that and governments would have to make for their citizens a life that would keep them there."[22] While there was some opposition, the American Jewish establishment on the whole and Soviet Jewry activists (particularly the Washington Committee for Soviet Jewry[23] and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry) supported the amendment over Nixon's and Kissinger's objections.[24]

In 1973 Rep. Charles Vanik, chair of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, introduced in the House of Representatives the legislation drafted with Jackson. The amendment would deny normal trade relations to certain countries with non-market economies that restricted freedom of emigration. The amendment was intended to allow primarily Jewish refugees and other religious minorities to escape from the Soviet bloc. Vanik's aide, Mark E. Talisman, is regarded as having played an instrumental role in securing passage.[25][26]

Jackson attached his amendment to legislation the Nixon administration badly wanted. In the House of Representatives, Vanik lined up House leaders as primary sponsors of the amendment. During this period, Jackson also expanded his base of support, adding other ethnic, economic, and ideological groups as supporters. Labor, ethnic groups originally from Eastern European and Baltic States, human rights organizations and liberal intellectuals were the most significant additions to organized labor and Jewish activists. While building support, Jackson resisted compromise with the administration and the Soviet Union.[27]

Once the Nixon administration began to appreciate the threat Jackson presented its policy of detente, and in particular the linkage of detente to expanded trade, it made a number of attempts to thwart Jackson. The administration tried to keep the amendment out of the committee version of the bill during the House Ways and Means Committee's markup sessions. When it became clear that this was impossible, delay was the administration's next option, along with the threat of a veto.[27]

The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 further complicated Congressional views of the Soviet Union. Soviet involvement in the conflict may have stoked distrust of the USSR by some members of Congress, but there were other members who feared that pressure on the Nixon Administration to advance the goals of the Jackson–Vanik amendment complicated the emergency supply of US military weapons to Israel. Israel prevailed in the Yom Kippur War, and on December 11 the House of Representatives voted by an overwhelming 319-80 vote to include the entire Jackson–Vanik amendment in the trade bill, which passed 272–140. With that, Congress recessed until January 1974.[27]

On January 21, 1974, the second session of the 93rd United States Congress began, and the Jackson amendment was introduced in the Senate. Having lost the legislative battle in the House of Representatives, the administration and Soviet authorities turned to negotiations with Jackson. Trilateral talks began in spring 1974 involving Congress, the Executive Branch and the Soviet Union. The prominent individuals involved were Jackson, Kissinger, and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin, a skilled senior diplomat who had served in Washington for decades. Kissinger enjoyed a special status in these negotiations since he alone controlled the communications between Jackson and the Soviet Union. In effect, Kissinger was the only one of the three parties involved who knew what all sides were saying in secret, informal sessions, while he also conducted a long-standing "back channel" dialogue with Soviet authorities via Dobrynin. Kissinger's influence only grew as Nixon was increasingly consumed by the Watergate political scandal.[28]

In March 1974, Kissinger returned from Moscow with news that the Soviets were willing to cooperate with the members of Congress. Jackson, however, would complicate matters by making public the demands that had been accommodated in quiet diplomatic dialogue.[28]

Jackson pursued negotiations with the administration and the Soviet Union on the terms of the amendment. The outline of an agreement was perceivable, but by summer the talks seemed to bog down as Watergate sapped the Executive Branch's political energy. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974.

In August 1974, when the national deadlock was broken by Nixon's resignation and Ford's appointment, Jackson had to decide whether or not to concur with an agreement that was not perfect or hold out longer and possibly sink the entire trade bill. Given the choice of having the bill with the Jackson amendment or doing away with both the bill and the Jackson amendment together, Kissinger was apparently willing to let the two die. So to compromise, Jackson had agreed to grant, at least temporarily, trade concessions, including extensions of credit, to the Soviet Union.[29]

Eventually, Jackson accepted less than perfect terms. Jackson was anxious to achieve a legislative victory after years of battle and apparently decided it best not to ask too many more questions nor press too hard for less ambiguous pledges lest he be left with nothing to show for his efforts.[29]

President Ford signed the 1972 Trade Agreement on January 3, 1975, with the Jackson amendment. On January 10, the Soviet government sent a letter that apparently indicated the Soviets' refusal to comply with the need to provide assurances on emigration or to make technical changes in the 1972 Trade Agreement. On January 13, Kissinger met with Soviet officials and subsequently issued a statement "that the 1972 Trade Agreement cannot be brought into force at this time and the President will therefore not take the steps required for this purpose by the Trade Agreement. The President does not plan at this time to exercise the waiver authority."[29]

Business involvement[edit]

Harry Stone, vice president and his brother, Irving Stone, president of American Greetings based in Vanick's home town, Cleveland, Ohio, played a major role in gaining sponsorship for the amendment. Harry Stone served as campaign chairman to the late U.S. Representative Charles Vanik, a connection that gained significance when Vanik asked Stone and his brother Irving, then American Greetings president, to encourage congressman Wilbur Mills to schedule a floor vote on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment requiring the Soviet Union to allow Jewish emigration to the U.S. in order to qualify for "most favored nation status" for its exports. Senator J. William Fulbright, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee characterized the amendment as "idealistic meddling" in the amendment's attempts to use free Jews using trade and credit as levers against the Soviet Union. American Greetings was the largest employer in Mills's Arkansas district. Fulbright, apparently saw the same light as Mills, as American Greetings opened one of its largest printing plants in Fulbright's and Mills's state of Arkansas.

"The role that Harry Stone played in making the Jackson-Vanik bill a reality will go down as one of the most meaningful contributions that a Clevelander has ever made," says Vic Gelb, an honorary for life director of the Cleveland Jewish News. "It made a world of difference in the history of events and enabled the exodus of Jews from the former Soviet Union."


The difficulty faced by Senator Jackson in the three-way negotiation process that took place from August 1974 through January 1975, demonstrated some of the institutional constraints on congressional involvement in foreign policy making. The Jackson–Vanik amendment is a case study of how domestic politics shapes American Foreign policy making. It exemplifies the fact that one cannot understand U.S. foreign policy if one does not understand the domestic politics in Congress and the White House that shape policy decisions.


The amendment denied most favored nation status to certain countries with non-market economies that restricted emigration, which is considered a human right. Permanent normal trade relations can have been extended to such country only if the president determined that it complies with the freedom of emigration requirements. However, the president had authority to grant an annual waiver, which was granted to the People's Republic of China in the late 1970s and to Vietnam and Laos in later decades.

The core provision of the amendment was codified as 19 U.S.C. 2432(a), Sec. 402 "Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade" of the Trade Act of 1974 (Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law (United States) 93–618, 88 Stat. 1978):

(a) Actions of nonmarket economy countries making them ineligible for normal trade relations, programs of credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees, or commercial agreements To assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after January 3, 1975, products from any nonmarket economy country shall not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations), such country shall not participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country -

(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice, and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country is no longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3).


The countries subject to the amendment included the Soviet Union (and later the post-Soviet states), the People's Republic of China, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Albania, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.[30]

Of Soviet Bloc countries, Poland was exempt from the amendment, but from 1982 to 1987 its unconditional MFN status was suspended due to its actions against Solidarność. Yugoslavia was also exempt; however, in 1991–1992, due to violent events in the former Yugoslavia, the MFN status of Serbia and Montenegro was suspended.[30]

Soviet Union[edit]

Exit USSR visa of the type 2. For those who received permission to leave the USSR permanently and lost Soviet citizenship. Not all were able to receive this kind of exit visa

At first the Jackson–Vanik amendment did little to help free Soviet Jewry. The number of exit visas declined after the passing of the amendment.[24] However, in the late 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to comply with the protocols of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Lazin (2005) states that scholars differ on how effective the amendment was in helping Soviet Jews. Some argue that it helped bring the plight of Soviet Jews to the world's attention, while others believe it hindered emigration and decreased America's diplomatic bargaining power.[24]

Since 1975 more than 500,000 refugees, large numbers of whom were Jews, evangelical Christians, and Catholics from the former Soviet Union, have been resettled in the United States. An estimated one million Soviet Jews have immigrated to Israel in that time.

Jackson–Vanik also led to great changes within the Soviet Union. Other ethnic groups subsequently demanded the right to emigrate, and the ruling Communist Party had to face the fact that there was widespread dissatisfaction with its governance.

Former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky wrote in his 2004 book The Case for Democracy (p. 3):

... Kissinger saw Jackson's amendment as an attempt to undermine plans to smoothly carve up the geopolitical pie between the superpowers. It was. Jackson believed that the Soviets had to be confronted, not appeased. Andrei Sakharov was another vociferous opponent of détente. He thought it swept the Soviet's human rights record under the rug in the name of improved superpower relations. ... One message he would consistently convey to these foreigners (the press) was that human rights must never be considered a humanitarian issue alone. For him, it was also a matter of international security. As he succinctly put it: "A country that does not respect the rights of its own people will not respect the rights of its neighbors."

Lautenberg Amendment (1990)[edit]

After Boris Perchatkin’s speeches in the US Congress in 1989[31][32][33] Frank Lautenberg suggested the Lautenberg Amendment, Public Law 101–167, enacted on November 21, 1989, took effect in 1990 which provided refugee status in the United States for nationals from the Soviet Union and later the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania who are Jews, Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian Catholics or Ukrainian Orthodox; as well as nationals of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia; and Jews, Christians, Baha’is and other religious minorities from Iran.[34] The Lautenberg measure allowed refugee status to people from historically persecuted groups without requiring them to show that they had been singled out.[34][35] Under the Lautenberg Amendment, 350,000 to 400,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union which had not presented any form of evidence of persecution gained entry to the United States by October 2002 according to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.[citation needed] Beginning in 2002, a special "Refugee Corps" in the Department of Homeland Security handled issues involving the Lautenberg Amendment.[36]

Post-soviet states[edit]

Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania[edit]

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were subject to the amendment because they had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. They were liberated from the amendment upon the US recognition of their independence on September 6, 1991.[30]


Kazakhstan's Jewish community reportedly requested the US to cancel Jackson Vanik amendment for Kazakhstan.[37] In an article titled "A Relic of the Cold War", journalist Robert Guttman refers to the Amendment as an "outdated and rather meaningless piece of legislation".[38] The U.S. Chamber of Commerce argues that the application of Jackson-Vanik on Kazakhstan puts U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage.[39] The Chamber urges the U.S. Congress to graduate Kazakhstan from Jackson-Vanik.[39]


Kyrgyzstan first received conditional normal trade relations in 1992. In 1997 it was found fully compliant with the Jackson-Vanik provisions, but its status remained subject to annual review. On May 18, 2000, Public Law 106-200 authorized the President to extend unconditional normal trade relations to Kyrgyzstan.[30]


Moldova first received conditional normal trade relations in 1992. In 1997 it was found to be fully compliant with the Jackson-Vanik provisions, but its status remained subject to annual review.[30]

On November 16, 2012 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would repeal the Jackson–Vanik amendment for Russia and Moldova. After approval by the Senate, the law repealing the effects of the Jackson–Vanik amendment on Russia and Moldova was signed by President Barack Obama on December 14, 2012.[40]


In 2003, Vladimir Putin pursued an economic agenda for Russia to begin normalized trade relations with the West which included Russia joining the European Union and the repeal of the Jackson–Vanik amendment.[41] Putin tried to use his relationships with both the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who was the head of the European Union's Council in 2003, to gain Russia's membership in the European Union, and also Hank Greenberg, who was the chairman and CEO of the American International Group (AIG), to repeal the Jackson-Vanik provisions in the United States.[41] Putin wished for Greenberg to support through Greenberg's AIG greater development of the nascent Russian home-mortgage market.[41]

On November 16, 2012 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would repeal the Jackson–Vanik amendment for Russia and Moldova. After approval by the Senate, the law repealing the effects of the Jackson–Vanik amendment on Russia and Moldova was signed together with Magnitsky bill by President Barack Obama on December 14, 2012.[1][40]


On March 8, 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill permanently exempting Ukraine from trade restrictions imposed under the 1974 Jackson–Vanik amendment.[42]

People's Republic of China[edit]

Until the accession of the PRC to the World Trade Organization in December 2001 the PRC was covered by the provisions of Jackson-Vanik. Before China's crackdown on the Tiananmen protests of 1989, a waiver was granted to China as a routine matter.[43]: 211  After the crackdown, the waiver became a more contentious issue.[43]: 211  As part of the 2001 WTO entry agreement for China, China received permanent normal trade relations and the Jackson-Vanik amendment no longer applied.[43]: 214 

U.S. legal challenge[edit]

In April 2011, American University in Moscow professor Eduard Lozansky and former Reagan administration official Antony Salvia filed a federal lawsuit in Washington, D.C. against the Obama administration arguing the law is illegal.[44][45]

See also[edit]


  1. ^ a b "Obama Signs Magnitsky Bill". The Moscow Times. Reuters. 17 December 2012. Archived from the original on December 4, 2015. Retrieved 26 December 2012.
  2. ^ Solash, Richard (December 14, 2012). "Obama Signs Russia, Moldova Trade Bill And Magnitsky Sanctions Into Law". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved September 19, 2020.
  3. ^ Fomin, Valery (1996). Cinema and power: Soviet Cinema, 1965-1985: Documents, evidence, and reflections (in Russian). Mainland. pp. 120–121.
  4. ^ Mlechin, Leonid (7 July 2019). ""You Give us Little Hawks, Give us Little Hawks!": Why Identifying Jews Became the Most Important Problem in the Post-War USSR". Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  5. ^ Joseph Dunner. Anti-Jewish discrimination since the end of World War II. Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey. Vol. 1. Willem A. Veenhoven and Winifred Crum Ewing (Editors). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1975. Hague. ISBN 90-247-1779-5, ISBN 90-247-1780-9; pages 69-82
  6. ^ Garbuzov, Leonid. "A struggle to preserve ethnic identity: the suppression of Jewish culture by the Soviet Union's emigration policy between 1945-1985" (PDF). Boston University International Law Journal: 168–169.
  7. ^ Dunner, Joseph (1975). Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 69–82. ISBN 9024717809.
  8. ^ The Refusenik Project staff. "Historical Overview". The Refusenik Project. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  9. ^ Beckerman, Gal (2010). When They Come For Us, We'll All Be Gone. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 103.
  10. ^ a b Beckerman, Gal (2010). When They Come For Us We'll All Be Gone. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 103.
  11. ^ Korey, William (1984). Robert O. Freedman (ed.). Brezhnev and Soviet Anti-Semitism. Durham: Duke University Press. p. 31.
  12. ^ Korey, William. Brezhnev and Soviet Anti-Semitism. p. 31.
  13. ^ a b Beckerman, Gal. When They Come For Us, We'll All Be Gone. p. 305.
  14. ^ a b c d e Korey, William. Brezhnev and Soviet Anti-Semitism. p. 29.
  15. ^ a b c d e Korey, William. Brezhnev and Soviet Anti-Semitism. p. 30.
  16. ^ "none". Povada. February 23, 1981. p. 38.
  17. ^ Klose, Kevin (15 July 1979). "Soviet Jews See Growth in Anti-Semitism". Washington Post. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  18. ^ "Mikhail Savitsky Summer Theatre From the cycle Death Camp Number Tattooed on My Heart". Alamy. 31 March 1979. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  19. ^ a b c Stern 1979, Chapter 1.
  20. ^ "Declassified KGB Study Illuminates Early Years of Soviet Jewish Emigration", Sana Krasikov, December 12, 2007 (retrieved May 31, 2015)
  21. ^ a b Stern 1979, Chapter 2.
  22. ^ "Richard Perle: The Making of a Neoconservative", a PBS transcript
  23. ^ "Collection: Washington Committee for Soviet Jewry Records | the Center for Jewish History ArchivesSpace".
  24. ^ a b c Lazin, Fred A. (2005). The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel versus the American Jewish Establishment. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. Rowman and Littlefield. p. 51.
  25. ^ Barnes, Bart (16 July 2019). "Mark Talisman, advocate for Jewish causes, dies at 77 (obit)". Washington Post. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
  26. ^ "Mark Talisman, Champion Of Key Law In Fight For Soviet Jewry, Is Dead At 78". Jewish Week. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 15 July 2019. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
  27. ^ a b c Stern 1979, Chapter 3.
  28. ^ a b Stern 1979, Chapter 4.
  29. ^ a b c Stern 1979, Chapter 5.
  30. ^ a b c d e Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes. Government Printing Office, 2001. pp. 250–259.
  31. ^ Gura 2018, p. 173.
  32. ^ Ostrovskaya 2017, p. 69.
  33. ^ Semyonova 2020.
  34. ^ a b Kampeas, Ron (2013-03-22). "Congress extends Lautenberg amendment". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved 2018-12-03.
  35. ^ Epshteyn, Boris (2013-06-06). "Thank You Senator Lautenberg: The Lautenberg Amendment opened the door for more religious minorities to find a new life in America". US News. Retrieved 2018-12-03.
  36. ^ "New Agents to Handle Refugees Could Help Jews from FSU, Iran". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 2012-12-12. Retrieved 2018-12-03.
  37. ^ "Jewish Community Asks USA to Cancel Jackson-vanik Amendment for Kazakhstan". www.cjp.org. Archived from the original on 3 July 2013. Retrieved 2 February 2022.
  38. ^ "A Relic of the Cold War", Robert Guttman
  39. ^ a b "US Chamber of Commerce Primer on PNTR for Kazakhstan" (PDF). U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
  40. ^ a b "Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 6156". whitehouse.gov. 2012-12-14. Retrieved 2012-12-18 – via National Archives.
  41. ^ a b c Walker, Martin (2003-07-31). "Walker's World: Putin, votes and money". UPI. Retrieved 2018-12-03.
  42. ^ THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR - Number 671
  43. ^ a b c Lampton, David M. (2024). Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-8725-8.
  44. ^ "Two US citizens sue President over Jackson-Vanik amendment", Mamonov Roman. Voice of Russia. April 20, 2011. Accessed June 7, 2011
  45. ^ "Jackson-Vanik law challenged in court", UPI. April 21, 2011. Accessed June 7, 2011


Further reading[edit]

  • Brumley, Robert H. (1990). "Jackson–Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?". Boston University International Law Journal. 8 (2): 363–372.
  • Jochnick, Christopher B.; Zinner, Josh (1991). "Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson–Vanik Amendment". Harvard Human Rights Journal. 4 (1): 128–151.
  • Korey, William (1988). "The Jackson–Vanik Amendment in Perspective". Soviet Jewish Affairs. 18 (1): 29–47. doi:10.1080/13501678808577593.
  • Lazin, Fred A. (2011). "Jewish Influence in American Foreign Policy: American Jewry, Israel and the Issue of Soviet Jewry, 1968–1989". The Lawyer Quarterly. 3 (1): 157–169.
  • McMahon, Michael S. (1980). "The Jackson–Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974: An Assessment after Five Years". Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. 18 (3): 525–556.

External links[edit]