Jessica Wilson

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Jessica Wilson
Jessica-wilson-feb-17.jpg
Institutions University of Toronto, Scarborough
Main interests
Metaphysics, epistemology

Jessica M. Wilson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto, Scarborough.[1] Her research focuses on metaphysics, especially on the metaphysics of science and mind, the epistemologies of skepticism, a priori deliberation, and necessity.[2] Wilson was awarded the Lebowitz Prize for excellence in philosophical thought by Phi Beta Kappa in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association.[3][4][5]

Education and career[edit]

Wilson received her baccalaureate summa cum laude in mathematics from the University of California, San Diego in 1987, before starting a doctorate program in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder in 1994, and eventually receiving her doctorate in philosophy from Cornell University in 2001.[1] Wilson accepted an appointment as the William Wilhartz Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan in 2002, before moving to the University of Toronto, Scarborough in 2005.[1] From 2014 to 2016, Wilson held a simultaneous appointment as a Regular Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Eidyn Research Centre at the University of Edinburgh.[1] Wilson has also held visiting positions at the University of Cologne, the University of St. Andrews, the University of Barcelona, Australian National University, and the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science.[1]

Research areas and publications[edit]

Her research has focused largely on metaphysics and epistemology, with a focus on the metaphysics of modality, fundamentality, science, and mind, and the epistemologies of skepticism, a priori deliberation, and necessity, as well as physicalism, emergentism, and mental causation.[2] In the study of physicalism, Wilson first published on the 'proper subset strategy' for avoiding the worry that higher-level and their realizing lower-level properties would causally overdetermine their effects: properties are associated with sets of causal powers, and one property realizes another by the realized property being associated with a set of causal powers that is a proper subset of that associated with the realizing property;[6] Wilson also argues that a nontrivial version of physicalism must be defined to exclude fundamental mental entities.[7] Wilson's criticism of 'Grounding', understood as a generic relation of metaphysical dependence, problematizes a notion that has recently occupied center stage in metaphysics.[8]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e Wilson, Jessica. "Curriculum Vitae" (PDF). University of Toronto. Retrieved 1 April 2014. 
  2. ^ a b "Jessica Wilson - Department of Philosophy". University of Toronto. 
  3. ^ News - Rutgers University, News, Retrieved August 7, 2015, "...The Phi Beta Kappa Society ... American Philosophical Association (APA), has awarded the 2014 Lebowitz Prizes to Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers) and Jessica Wilson (The University of Toronto) for Philosophical Achievement ... Lebowitz award recognizes the work of celebrated philosophers for their excellence in thought, in addition to awarding an honorarium of $30,000 to each recipient...."
  4. ^ Hayley Baker, The Key Reporter, 2014 Lebowitz Prizes, Retrieved August 7, 2015, "..Phi Beta Kappa Society ... awarded the 2014 Lebowitz Prizes to Jonathan Schaffer and Jessica Wilson for Philosophical Achievement and Contribution for their symposium titled “Grounding in Metaphysics.” ..."
  5. ^ Hartnet, Laura. "Jonathan Schaffer and Jessica Wilson Awarded 2014 Lebowitz Prizes". Phi Beta Kappa Society. Retrieved 5 April 2014. 
  6. ^ 'How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?'
  7. ^ Pereboom, Derk (2011). Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199764037. 
  8. ^ 'No work for a theory of grounding'

External links[edit]