Jurisprudence of concepts

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Rudolf von Ihering, one of the juris philosophers of the jurisprudence of concepts

The jurisprudence of concepts was the first sub-school of legal positivism,[1][2] according to which, the written law must reflect concepts, when interpreted.[3] Its main representatives were Ihering, Savigny and Puchta.

This school was, thus, the preceding trigger of the idea that law comes from a dogmatic source, imposition from man over man and not a natural consequence of other sciences or of metaphysical faith.

Among the main characters of the jurisprudence of concepts are:

  • formalism, search of rights in written law
  • systemisation
  • search for justifying specific norm with basis from more generic ones.[4]

So, according to this school, law should have prevailing sources based upon the legislative process, although needing to be proven by more inclusive ideas of a social sense.

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Costa, Alexandre Araújo. "A Jurisprudência dos Conceitos". Arcos. Retrieved 17 December 2011. 
  2. ^ Pepino, Elsa Maria Lopes Ferreira; Graviorno, Gracimeri, Vieira Soeiro de Castro; Filgueira, Sofia Varejão. "A importância da Jurisprudência dos Conceitos para a Metodologia Jurídica" (PDF). Revista Depoimentos, da Faculdade de Direito de Vitória. Retrieved 17 December 2011. 
  3. ^ that means that the interpretation of the words stated in the law must be guided by the scientific concepts that these words represent.
  4. ^ Rocha, Sérgio André (2009). "Evolução Histórica da Teoria Hermenêutica - do Formalismo do Século XVIII ao Pós-Positivismo". Retrieved 25 January 2012.