Lamont v. Postmaster General
|Lamont v. Postmaster General|
|Argued April 26, 1965
Decided May 24, 1965
|Full case name||Corliss Lamont, dba Basic Pamphlets, Appellant v. Postmaster General of the United States|
|Citations||381 U.S. 301 (more)
85 S.Ct. 1493; 14 L.Ed.2d 398
|The Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act is unconstitutional since it imposes on addressees an affirmative obligation that amounts to an unconstitutional limitation of their rights under the First Amendment.|
|Concurrence||Brennan, joined by Goldberg|
|White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.|
|Wikisource has original text related to this article:|
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), was a landmark First Amendment Supreme Court case, in which the ruling of the Supreme Court struck down § 305(a) of the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, a federal statute requiring the Postmaster General to detain and deliver only upon the addressee's request unsealed foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda."
Under the stricken code, a recipient of material deemed "political propaganda" was required to indicate their intent to receive such materials before they were delivered and accept the material by indicating a desire to do so on a card provided by the Post Office. The card stated that except with the addressee's name and consent to receiving the material, it would be returned within 20 days, the Post Office assuming that the addressee does not want that publication or any similar one in the future.
The Court held:
the Act, as construed and applied, is unconstitutional, since it imposes on the addressee an affirmative obligation which amounts to an unconstitutional limitation of his rights under the First Amendment.
The Court was unanimous in the judgment (8-0, with Justice White recused). Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion (which Justice Goldberg joined) and Justice Harlan also wrote a concurring opinion.
- Sigler, Jay A. (1965). "Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right". Georgetown Law Journal 54: 30.