Leaky homes crisis
The leaky homes crisis is an ongoing construction and legal crisis in New Zealand concerning a number of timber framed buildings constructed from 1994 to 2004 that suffered from weather-tightness problems. The problem was primarily related to the decay of timber framing which, in extreme cases, made buildings structurally unsound. Some buildings became unhealthy to live in due to moulds and spores developing within the damp timber framing. The repairs and replacement costs that may have been avoided were estimated in 2009 to be approximately $11.3 billion.
The Building Act 1991, which came into effect about 1994, changed buildings controls from a prescriptive system to a more self-regulated regime. In addition, the Government dropped the apprentice training system for builders and the related building trades. Some developers and builders knowingly or carelessly constructed buildings with numerous faults and short-cuts. An architectural design trend towards Mediterranean-style houses with complex roofs, plastered exterior walls, internal decks and small or no eaves also factored in.
Some local authorities were later found to have issued Building Consents based on insufficient documentation, failed to carry out inspection of the work during construction and issuing code completion certificates for buildings which were later found to have leaking problems. Consequently some councils now share significant financial responsibilities with the builders (which in many cases have closed or otherwise removed themselves from liability) and the owners. Court cases have generally assigned around one third of the financial responsibility to local authorities. A 2013 Supreme Court case involving the Auckland City Council extended the liability of local bodies.
There are many reasons that some buildings from the 1990s were leaky. A major one was the increase in the use of cladding systems such as fibre cement sheet and EIPS (Externally Insulated Plaster System) that relied on a paint finish as the primary defence against water ingress. This system is very similar to Exterior insulation finishing system (or EIFS). Such cladding systems typically allowed for little construction or thermal movement so that fine cracks that appeared insignificant, and would have been relatively insignificant in traditional claddings such as weatherboard, allowed continuous ingress of moisture into the framing. These causes, combined with the reduced air movement through the prevalence of sheet cladding or sheet insulating materials for the monolithic look cladding, resulted in very damp conditions which are ideal for rot. A further exacerbating factor that resulted in more significant damage from the leaks, was the change to the New Zealand Standard for Timber Treatment in 1995, allowing the use of untreated Pinus radiata timber for wall framing. As this timber has little natural resistance to rot when wet, damage occurs more quickly.
In many cases claddings were not used within their specifications or not installed correctly. Many buildings built in the "Mediterranean" style used these types of cladding and had features such as recessed windows, flat roofs, minimal eaves, multiple stories, complex roofs, solid balustrades, balconies and penetrations of the exterior cladding that increased the likelihood of water infiltrating the structure.
Lack of detailed drawings for buildings was also a contributing factor. Some builders were unable to make a weathertight structure without proper guidance. This has partially been blamed on the breakdown of the apprenticeship system and unqualified builders in the marketplace. Council staff carrying out building inspections had neither the required building knowledge to ensure weathertightness nor the intuition to look for it.
The Building Act 1991 was replaced by the Building Act 2004, which introduced a licensing scheme for building designers, builders and related trades. Councils were required to be registered with a central authority and were to be subject to regular quality control procedure checks. Council building inspectors remain unlicensed.
The Government dissolved the BIA (Building Industry Authority, the Government department which was responsible for the oversight and administration of the building sector) on 30 November 2004 and replaced it with DBH (Department of Building and Housing).
Some of the Acceptable Solutions to the Building Code were re-written, most notably E2/AS1 External Moisture which covers the detailing of roofs and walls was greatly expanded.
The Standard covering durability of timber framing was amended in late 2003 with the publication of NZS 3602: 2003 Timber and Wood-based Products for Use in Building. This revision required a return to the use of treated radiata framing in external walls.
Several thousands of homes throughout the country are still awaiting renovation, with a total cost that has been estimated by a PricewaterhouseCoopers report to the Government in 2008 as being around NZ$11.3 billion for a consensus estimate of 42,000 buildings. Other building experts estimate the true cost at $23 billion for 89,000 buildings, and accused government of reducing the figure of affected buildings to 42,000 buildings because they were allegedly "unhappy" with the expert prediction.
The majority of affected buildings are homes or apartments, but in 2011 the twenty-year-old Ronald McDonald House for children with cancer and their families at Wellington Hospital was demolished as leaky and replaced.
The Minister of Education said in 2009 that at least 73 schools were affected, and in 2011 that 157 schools still needed repairs, at an estimated cost of at least $1.5 billion As of 2013 the Ministry of Education was taking action against architects and builders involved with 87 of the 309 schools which have "leakiness" problems.  One school in Wellington, Seatoun School, built at a cost of $5.3 million and opened in 2002 is costing $4.5 million to repair. 
As of mid-2009, plans for an up to NZ$6 billion bailout package shared between government and local authorities are in doubt because the amount could affect New Zealand's international credit rating. In November 2009, national government decided not to offer a more substantial sharing of costs, and it is now estimated that in most cases, around 64% would have to be borne by the owners, 26% by Councils, and only 10% by national government funds, while also forcing homeowners to sign away their rights to sue for more.
Prime Minister John Key noted that while claimants did not have to accept the settlement, legal costs for bringing suit could eat up any further money awarded to them. Some claimants have taken negligence claims against company directors of construction companies, relying on the decision in Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd  2 NZLR 548. There have also been accusations that parts of the legal and inspection professions are profiting substantially from disputes around the cases, and that significant money was diverted into these channels rather than into fixing the buildings. The governments position was assailed by mayors of affected Councils and by pundits, who noted that paying only 10%, and then receiving 12.5% back in goods and services tax, the government was actually making money from the crisis. Another report commissioned by North Shore City Council estimated a potential gain by government of up to $2 billion. Further, National was also criticised that as an opposition party, they had constantly asked for the then Labour-led government to assist homeowners financially.
The government has also imposed a 10 year limit (after construction) on claims, even though some building experts believe many cases will only be found out about during coming years, as building rot becomes advanced enough. They also warned that houses in drier parts of New Zealand were now starting to show problems, which had simply developed at a slower pace – and that despite Building Act reforms in 2004, there were still houses being built that leaked badly due to shoddy workmanship.
In February 2010, New Zealand's Building and Construction Minister Maurice Williamson, National, warned that the size of the issue at at least $11 billion was so gianormous [sic] that even a government with budget surpluses would struggle. He noted that: "...a Government who's [sic] running deficits - and has a forecast track of deficits for many years out - has to just sit there with its head in its hands, saying, 'Well, I just don't how to do this'." He also warned that it was necessary to come up with a solution so money could be spent on fixing houses, rather than paying lawyers, and that there was a risk of significant rates rises in the major centres like Auckland, Tauranga, Wellington and Christchurch, of a scale that would "make eyes water".
Expected to cost around $1 billion, by November 2012 only 12 victims had received final payouts under the government scheme.
In 2009 it was estimated between 22,000 and 89,000 properties were affected, but the government's scheme would cover around 3,500 at the most.
Various Councils and politicians have warned that the leaky homes crisis could impact on the rates bill. Further, in mid-2011, the Valuer-General of the country instructed Council that in the re-evaluation of property values (which are used to set local body rates), auditors had to take into account the loss of value incurred by practices likely to cause leaky home syndrome – even if the home had not, or not yet, experienced any damage from it. This was to take into account that such homes faced widespread stigma, and thus, were harder to sell. While this was expected to reduce not only the valued worth but also the rates bill of the relevant owners (by between 5 and 20%, or even more if the house is already confirmed as leaking), it was noted that other ratepayers would have to make up the difference via higher rates.
Effect on liable firms
The placing into liquidation of Mainzeal Construction and Property, New Zealand’s third largest construction company, in February 2013 was blamed on both a slowdown in commercial construction work and liability for several leaky apartment buildings in Auckland and Wellington where other parties had gone out of existence.  
Similarities to British Columbia
A very similar issue arose in the Canadian province of British Columbia. It is commonly known as the Leaky condo crisis and has been an ongoing issue that is estimated to have caused $4 billion in damage since the 1980s.
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- Weathertight Homes Resolution Service
- Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 – the Act covering assessment and claims resolution