Leibniz's gap

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Leibniz's gap is a philosophy of mind term that is used to refer to the problem that thoughts cannot be observed or perceived solely by examining brain properties, events, and processes. Here the word 'gap' is a metaphor of a subquestion regarding the mind–body problem that allegedly must be answered in order to reach more profound understanding of consciousness and emergence. A theory that could correlate brain phenomena with psychological phenomena would "bridge the gap." The term is named after Gottfried Leibniz who first presented the problem in his work The Monadology in 1714. Leibniz's passage describing the gap goes as follows:

Leibniz himself sought to bridge the gap by introducing monads to explain the existence of immaterial, eternal souls. Leibniz's gap, however, applies to materialism and dualism alike. This brought late 19th century scientists to conclude that psychology must build on introspection; thus introspectionism was born. Computationalism seeks to answer the problem proposed by Leibniz's gap through functional analysis of the brain and its processes. Today the term Leibniz's gap is still in wide use in scientific debate as the mind body problem remains unsolved.

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