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Lewis's generalization is an analysis of the non-monotonic semantics of definite descriptions. It was proposed, as an aside, by David Lewis in Counterfactuals (1973): a sort of corollary to possible world semantics. Philippe Schlenker revived the analysis, dubbing it "Lewis's generalization" in 2003.
Notes and references
- Schlenker (2003): 417
- Primary sources
- Stalnaker, Robert Culp (1968). "A Theory of Conditionals". Pages 41–55 in William Leonard Harper, Robert Culp Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce (eds). Ifs. Basil Blackwell.
- Lewis, David Kellogg (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Lewis, David Kellogg (1973). "Counterfactuals and Comparative Similarity". Journal of Philosophical Logic 2/4: 418–446.
- Other works
- Girard, Patrick. (2007). "From Onions to Broccoli: Generalizing Lewis’s Counterfactual Logic". Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17/2: 213–229.
- Schlenker, Philippe (2003). "Conditionals as Definite Descriptions: A Referential Analysis". Research on Language and Computation 2: 417–462.
- Paul Égré and Mikäel Cozic. Introduction to the Logic of Conditionals. 20th European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information (ESSLLI), 4–15 August 2008.
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