Life Against Death

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Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History
Life Against Death (Wesleyan University Press edition).jpg
Cover of the first edition
AuthorNorman O. Brown
Cover artistHarry Zelenko
CountryUnited States
LanguageEnglish
SubjectSigmund Freud
PublisherWesleyan University Press
Publication date
1959
Media typePrint (Hardcover and Paperback)
Pages366
ISBN0-8195-5148-1
Followed byLove's Body

Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History (1959; second edition 1985) is a book by the American classicist Norman O. Brown, in which the author offers a radical analysis and critique of the work of Sigmund Freud, tries to provide a theoretical rationale for a nonrepressive civilization, explores parallels between psychoanalysis and Martin Luther's theology, and draws on revolutionary themes in western religious thought, especially the body mysticism of Jakob Böhme and William Blake. It was the result of an interest in psychoanalysis that began when the philosopher Herbert Marcuse suggested to Brown that he should read Freud.

The book became famous when Norman Podhoretz recommended it to the critic Lionel Trilling, and over fifty-thousand copies had been sold by 1966. It has been compared to works such as Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (1955) and the philosopher Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization (1961), and Brown's objectives have been seen as being the same as Foucault's. Though Life Against Death has been called one of the great nonfiction works of the 20th century, some critics have found it of lesser weight than Eros and Civilization, and Brown has been criticized for misinterpreting Freud's theories. It has been suggested that, despite his objectives, Brown's arguments imply that sexual repression is biologically inevitable. Brown later called parts of Life Against Death "quite immature" and wrote of his Love's Body (1966) that it was written to confuse any followers he acquired due to the book and destroy its positions.

Background[edit]

Brown, whose background was in classical studies, became interested in psychoanalysis because of Herbert Marcuse,[1] a philosopher associated with the Institute for Social Research based in Frankfurt. Marcuse had little direct concern with Freud while in Frankfurt, but devoted more attention to psychoanalysis in the 1950s,[2] and in 1953 suggested to Brown that he should read Freud.[3]

Seeking a passage to a "post-Marxist world", Brown began his turn to psychoanalysis partly because he had become disenchanted with politics after the failure of Henry Wallace's 1948 Presidential candidacy.[4] In Life Against Death, Brown wrote that he had begun a careful study of Freud in 1953, because he felt the need to reconsider both human nature and the human race's future prospects. Commenting that he had inherited from Protestantism a conscience which dictated that intellectual work should be directed toward ending or minimizing human suffering, Brown addressed the book to everyone ready to consider new ideas and possibilities.[5] Brown proposed a synthesis of psychoanalysis, anthropology, and history, calling the analyst Géza Róheim's efforts in that direction pioneer work of significance second only to Freud's.[6] Brown also commended Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (1955) as, "the first book, after Wilhelm Reich's ill-fated adventures, to reopen the possibility of the abolition of repression."[7]

Radicals such as Reich and Róheim represented a minority current of opinion within psychoanalysis, which by the 1940s was viewed as fundamentally conservative by the European and American intellectual community. Critics outside the psychoanalytic movement agreed in seeing Freud as a conservative. The left-wing writer Erich Fromm had argued that several aspects of psychoanalytic theory served the interests of political reaction in his The Fear of Freedom (1942), an assessment confirmed by sympathetic writers on the right. Philip Rieff, in Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (1959), portrayed Freud as a man who admirably urged men to make the best of an inevitably unhappy fate.[8]

In the 1950s, Marcuse and Brown, along with Trilling in Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture (1955), challenged this interpretation of Freud. They believed that Freud showed that a high price has been paid for civilization, and that Freud's critical element was to be found in his late metahistorical studies, works considered unscientific by orthodox analysts and reactionary by the neo-Freudians.[9] Marcuse and Brown shared a similar general outlook and devoted the most attention to the same Freudian concepts. They saw Freud's greatness in his metahistorical analysis of "the general neurosis of mankind", argued that modern man is sick with the burdens of sexual repression and uncontrolled aggression, attempted to make explicit the hidden critical trend in psychoanalysis that promised a nonrepressive civilization as a solution to the dilemma of modern unhappiness, and accepted the most radical and discouraging of Freud's psychological assumptions: the pervasive role of sexuality and the existence of the death instinct. Brown, unlike Marcuse, had strong mystical inclinations and drew on revolutionary themes in western religious thought, especially the body mysticism of Böhme and Blake.[10]

Summary[edit]

"Brown begins his Life Against Death with the riddle that haunts all romantics: Why does man who is born into a garden of innocent delight create a culture in which he is alienated from himself, his fellows, and nature? Why civilization and its discontents instead of paradise? In the tradition of Nietzsche and Freud, Brown considers man a diseased animal. Culture emerges when erotic energy is sublimated and turned to the production of objects, character structures and political organizations that yield little pleasure. Man alone of all the animals represses his true desires, lives in continual conflict and guilt, and constructs for himself a corporate neurosis that he calls civilization."

Sam Keen, 1974.[11]

Brown offers an analysis of the problems associated with sexuality and human mortality, and solutions to them. Brown expounded "the underlying ambivalence of Freud's late instinctual dualism", in which "Eros and Death were seen as antagonistic psychological principles which constantly threatened to collapse into one another." However, Brown stressed their underlying unity, since this approach suggested a way of escaping Freud's conclusion that aggression was inevitable. Brown argued that Freud did not consider aggression a basic psychological fact, but rather a secondary manifestation of a more fundamental instinctual force, the death instinct: it was "the external expression of an impulse originally directed against the self". In Brown's interpretation of Freud, aggression becomes a problem "because Eros could carry out its project of creating life only when the death instinct was frustrated in its original enterprise. In order that men might live (and love), they were inevitably forced to destroy, to direct the energies of the death instinct away from themselves onto their fellowmen."[12]

Freud's analysis of the dynamics of Life and Death was mistaken, according to Brown, since Freud's discovery of the ultimate identity of the two instincts implied that there is no necessary antagonism between Eros and Thanatos: they exist in harmony at a deeper level of psychic life and aggression was therefore not inevitable. Brown believed that the death instinct need not be externalized in the form of aggression if "men could recapture the original undifferentiated harmony of Life and Death." Brown therefore called for an end to the "repression of death" that perpetuated aggression. People had to learn "how to die" or, more concretely, to learn "how to grow old." Brown's argument is a psychological solution that involved adopting a new attitude toward death and did not involve political or economic revolution. Brown criticized Reich for "misrepresenting the problem of repression as one of genital sexuality" and advocated polymorphous perversity instead.[13]

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. Brown offers a radical analysis and critique of Freud's work.

Brown concluded that if undifferentiated sexuality is the ultimate measure of human happiness, then any form of sexual organization is already repressive. Brown maintained that the pregenital organizations were "just as tyrannical as adult sexuality" and that the earlier organization of libidinal energy into oral, anal, phallic syndromes was "as foreign to the undifferentiated eroticism of early infancy" as genital sexuality. In a truly nonrepressive civilization, "sexuality would be completely undifferentiated" and even the distinction between the sexes would become insignificant.[14]

Brown did not accept Freud's theory of an innate biological dynamic leading from undifferentiated sexuality to adult genitality, and suggested instead that the explanation of how mankind abandoned the "primeval happiness" of polymorphous perversity was to be found through an analysis of social history. Brown explained repressive differentiation in terms of Freud's revised theory of anxiety, according to which anxiety produces repression rather than the reverse. Brown, like Róheim, saw the basic form of anxiety as separation anxiety, and also identified separation with death, a breakdown of the union of mother and child that he saw as "the essence of life." Brown maintained that anxiety can be identified with separation, and that separation causes anxiety because the union between mother and child had been so long and lovingly indulged.[15]

Children respond to the anxiety caused by separation through various projects to reestablish the original unity, projects Brown identified as "flights from death". These projects involve various organizations of the libido that Brown characterizes as repressive and which required abandoning the polymorphous perversity of earliest infancy. Examples are the oral project, in which children try to overcome separation through "the hypercathexis of the act of sucking", reuniting themselves with their mothers through the mouth (and in fantasy, ingesting them entirely), the anal project, in which children engage in "symbolic manipulation of feces as a magic instrument for restoring communion with the mother", and the phallic project, which is the attempt to reunite with the mother through the penis, identified with the entire body. These projects all involve reorganization of the libidinal economy, transferring sexual energy from the entire body to particular organs, and in all of them repression is self-imposed. The differentiation of sexuality occurs not because of an external force such as social or economic exigency, but because of "self-repression."[16]

Brown praised The Interpretation of Dreams (1899) as one of the great applications and extensions of the Socratic axiom "know thyself", but criticized Totem and Taboo (1913), writing that in that work Freud correlates psycho-sexual stages of development with stages of history, thereby seeing history as a "process of growing up". Brown saw that view as a "residue of eighteenth-century optimism and rationalism" and considered it inadequate as both history and psychoanalysis. He credited the philosopher Stuart Hampshire with providing an acute comparison between Freud and the philosopher Baruch Spinoza in Spinoza (1951), but wrote that Hampshire fails to recognize important differences between the two, such as Freud's dualism.[17] Brown argues that Luther's personality was based partly upon anal fantasies and that Luther achieved some of his spiritual breakthroughs while defecating.[18][19] Brown suggests numerous similarities between Lutheran Protestantism and psychoanalysis.[20] He also provides a study of Jonathan Swift,[21] in which he denounces attempts to conceal Swift's interest in scatology and "housebreak this tiger of English literature." He criticizes Aldous Huxley and John Middleton Murry for their treatment of Swift. While giving them credit for calling attention to Swift's "hatred of the bowels", he deplores their reduction of the theme to Swift's personal psychopathology and failure to see that Swift was calling attention to something significant.[22] Brown advocates "dialectical consciousness" as a step toward the creation of a "Dionysian ego".[23]

Publication history[edit]

Life Against Death was first published in the United States by Wesleyan University Press in 1959.[24] In 1959, the book was published in the United Kingdom by Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sphere Books published editions in 1968 and 1970.[25] In 1985, the book was published in a second edition with an introduction by the historian Christopher Lasch.[24]

Reception[edit]

Mainstream media[edit]

Life Against Death received a positive review from Susan Sontag in The Supplement to the Columbia Spectator,[26] and was also reviewed by the philosopher Frank Meyer in National Review,[27] and discussed by Loren Baritz in The Nation,[28] the sociologist Edgar Z. Friedenberg in The New York Times Book Review,[29] Ralph Flores in Library Journal,[30] the political scientist Alan Wolfe in The New Republic,[31] Charles Peck in Across the Board,[32] the art critic Roger Kimball in The New Criterion,[33] the critic Camille Paglia in Salon,[34] the critic George Scialabba in Bookforum,[35] and in Time magazine and Yale - Theatre.[36][37][38]

Sontag, in a 1961 review later republished in Against Interpretation (1966), wrote that Life Against Death and Eros and Civilization represented a "new seriousness about Freudian ideas" and exposed most previous writing on Freud in the United States as irrelevant or superficial. She praised Brown for his boldness in discussing fundamental problems "about the hypocrisy of our culture, about art, money, religion, work, about sex and the motives of the body", and considered his work an advance in understanding "the revolutionary implications of sexuality in contemporary society." She credited Brown with showing that Freud's "psychological categories" are "political categories" and that "psychological categories are also bodily categories", with carefully pointing out the limits of Freud's thought, and with providing "an analysis of the whole range of Freudian theory, a theory of instinct and culture, and a set of historical case studies." Though she considered Brown's "commitment to Protestantism as the herald of a culture which has transcended sublimation ... historically dubious", she wrote that by placing his ideas in the framework of Christian eschatology Brown raised issues of great importance and opened the possibility of a "psychoanalytic theory of history which does not simply reduce cultural history to the psychology of individuals", working out an original point of view that was simultaneously historical and psychological, and forcing a reconsideration of the meaning of eschatology. She concluded that, "The highest praise one can give to Brown's book is that, apart from its all-important attempt to penetrate and further the insights of Freud, it is the first major attempt to forumulate an eschatology of immanence in the seventy years since Nietzsche."[26]

Baritz described Life Against Death as a good example of "metahistory".[28] Friedenberg, reviewing Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization (1961), noted that it shared a "kinship in mood if not in tone or method" to Life Against Death and its "strident paean to the primal id."[29] Flores credited John O. King with showing that Life Against Death, "in its very recommendation of play (as an article of faith), fits into the ascetic schema it would deny."[30] Peck described Life Against Death as "arguably one of the significant books of the second half of the century."[32] Kimball described the book as a "dense, learned academic tract that blends Freud, Marx, idealist philosophy, and mysticism East and West in a preposterous but intoxicating brew." He wrote that Brown had a gift for "infusing mystic pronouncements with a radical, anti-bourgeois animus and a febrile erotic charge" and that his work was "tremendous hit on American campuses, where the homeless radicalism of irresponsible affluence made all manner of utopian schemes seem attractive." Kimball wrote that Brown's views parallel those of Marcuse, despite the difference of tone between the two thinkers. He dismissed the ideas of both Brown and Marcuse as false and harmful.[33]

Paglia, discussing her intellectual development, observed that Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media (1964) was published the year she entered college, while Brown's Life Against Death and the critic Leslie Fiedler's Love and Death in the American Novel had been published five years earlier. Paglia wrote of Brown, McLuhan and Fiedler, that, "They understood the creative imagination, and they extended their insights into speculation about history and society. Their influence was positive and fruitful: They did not impose their system on acolytes but liberated a whole generation of students to think freely and to discover their own voices." Paglia proposed their work as an alternative to that of the philosophers Jacques Derrida and Foucault, and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, which she dismissed as irrelevant to American culture.[34] She called Life Against Death "one of the great nonfiction works of the 20th century" and "what Michel Foucault longed to achieve but never did."[34] Scialabba called the book "rewardingly adventurous".[35]

Time wrote that Life Against Death was "largely ignored by both critics and the public". However, it added that following the publication of Love's Body (1966), some important critics belatedly reviewed Life Against Death and The Observer placed it "on two outstanding-books lists." According to Time, there were more than fifty-thousand copies of Life Against Death in print as of 1966, and the book, like the sociologist David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (1950) and the fantasy writer J. R. R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings (1954–1955), had become "one of the underground books that undergraduates feel they must read to be with it".[36] Time also described the book as "an undergraduate's delight".[37]

Scientific and academic journals[edit]

In 1959, Life Against Death received notices in The Journal of Analytical Psychology and the American Journal of Sociology.[39][40] In The Journal of Social Psychology, the book received a notice in 1959 and another notice in 1960.[41][42] The book was also discussed by the sociologist Robert Neelly Bellah in Sociological Inquiry,[43] the psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow in Theory & Society,[44] Alan W. Dyer in the Journal of Economic Issues,[45] Michael Beard in Edebiyat: Journal of Middle Eastern Literatures,[46] Christopher Shultis in Perspectives of New Music,[47] Matthew Day in Method & Theory in the Study of Religion,[48] Basit Kareem Iqbal in Islam & Science,[49] Nigel Dodd in the Journal of Classical Sociology,[50] and R. R. Reno in First Things.[51]

Chodorow credited Brown and Marcuse with providing the most important expression of a view that accepts drive theory and maintains that theories such as Neo-Freudianism and ego psychology undermine "psychoanalytic insight into the drives, repression, and the unconscious." Though she found their views "powerful and at times attractive", she questioned their interpretations of Freud. She argued that their social theories are a "radical individualist" view that sees social relations an unnecessary form of constraint, that they failed to explain how social bonds and political activity are possible, that their theories involve a "problematic view of women, gender relations, and generation", that their use of primary narcissism as a model for union with others "maintains a focus on individual gratification and denies gratification and selfhood to the other", and that they both "conflate the clinical as a source of evidence for theory with the therapeutic as a goal of psychoanalysis", with Brown being less guilty of this than Marcuse. However, she maintained that the work of Marcuse and Brown nevertheless helped suggest "a more consistent and persuasive psychoanalytic social theory and vision of social possibility." Addressing the specific problems of Brown's work, she argued that there are internal contradictions within Life Against Death, as well as contradictions between that work and Love's Body, that Brown's assertion that the infant's desire to avoid separation is a refusal to face death is a metaphorical claim that "brings irrelevant instinctual considerations into a clearly object-related and ego experience", and that despite giving theoretical primacy to drives Brown "can often be read as starting from a theory of relationship, with instincts tacked on." Though she credited Brown with providing a dual account of drives and object relations, she wrote that he "consistently underplays this component of his work" in Life Against Death.[44]

Beard wrote that Life Against Death, with its "apocalyptic companion" Eros and Civilization, "provided one of the most influential blueprints for radical thinking in the decade which followed." Though considering Brown's discussion of "the psychoanalytic dimensions of the Reformation" important, he wrote that "it was never clear how to follow up on them". He suggested that while Brown had influenced many students, he had no true successor, and described the methods Brown used in Life Against Death as unpromising for the study of the Middle East.[46] Shultis and Iqbal both described the book as "famous".[47][49] Dodd credited Brown with making a distinctive and original contribution to "the sociological and philosophical understanding of money, credit and debt".[50]

Reno described Life Against Death as an "ambitious" and "speculative" work that, along with Love's Body (1966), "gave theoretical expression to the counterculture of the 1960s". He called Brown's "decision to make desire his redemptive principle was a stroke of genius." Though he considered Brown "easy to make fun of", and wrote that Brown's appeals to the "dialectical metaphysics of hope" can sound "hopelessly jejune" and that his "Dionysian ecstasies" were overwrought, he credited Brown with a "mobile metaphysical imagination" that "allowed him to recognize the larger implications of modern, naturalistic conceptions of culture" and drawing the "obvious conclusions in bold, prophetic strokes". Though Reno doubted that Foucault read Brown, he wrote that Foucault's "intellectual life was devoted to detailed studies of cultural norms oriented toward the very same goal".[51]

Evaluations in books, 1959–1981[edit]

The Situationist writer Raoul Vaneigem, writing in The Revolution of Everyday Life (1967), credited Brown with showing how Eros, understood as essentially narcissistic, can lead to union with beings in the world.[52] The journalist Raymond de Becker, noting that Brown was carrying Freud's ideas to the extreme, dismissed his theories as speculation.[53]

Paul Robinson credited Brown and Marcuse with systematically analyzing psychoanalytic theory in order to reveal its critical implications and of going beyond Reich and Róheim in probing the dialectical subtleties of Freud's thought, thereby reaching conclusions more extreme and utopian than theirs. He found Trilling's work on Freud of lesser value. Robinson saw Brown's exploration of the radical implications of psychoanalysis as in some ways more rigorous and systematic than that of Marcuse. He noted that Life Against Death and Eros and Civilization have often been compared, but found Brown's book more elegantly written, attributing this to Brown having a background in literature and the classics rather than philosophy and political theory. Yet while admiring the rigor and imagination of Brown's arguments, he believed that his analysis of the genesis of sexual differentiation unwittingly subverts its purpose of showing that a nonrepressive organization of sexual life is possible. Robinson argued that if tyrannical sexual organizations result from inability to accept separation or death, and if this flight from separation is in turn based on the fact of prolonged infantile dependence, then sexual repression is a biological inevitability. Brown thus, despite his objectives, offers "a counsel of despair", since his analysis of sexual repression fails to offer a theoretical rationale for a nonrepressive civilization. Brown was unable to either explain the historical rise of repressive civilization or to provide a solution to the problems of modern living. Robinson believed that while Brown's work is psychologically more radical than that of Marcuse, it is politically more timid, and failed to transform psychoanalytic theory into historical and political categories. He deemed Marcuse a finer theorist who provided a more substantial treatment of Freud. He also found the subtitle of Life Against Death, "the Psychoanalytical Meaning of History", to be "pompous and misleading".[54]

The gay rights activist Dennis Altman, although influenced by Life Against Death, criticized aspects of the book, writing that, "There is a danger in Brown of the realities of the body dissolving into metaphysical flights, so that his concept of polymorphous perversity becomes ultimately an asexual one and he seems to envisage this not as a move to expand sexuality from its obsessive genitality but rather as the total supplanting of that genitality."[55] The social psychologist Liam Hudson described Life Against Death as a "strange, fertile work" that presaged a collapse of the popular "infatuation with hard science". Writing in 1972, Hudson commented that while Brown's book was neglected when first published, it was "now being read by psychologists with close attention". He suggested that the book was neglected by radicals because its publication coincided with that of Eros and Civilization. Comparing the two works, he found Eros and Civilization more reductively political and therefore less stimulating than Life Against Death.[56] The critic Frederick Crews wrote that Brown's work was "a disservice to the important cause of applied psychoanalysis" and that Brown had become the center of a "cult" among literary humanists that needed to be challenged. He maintained that, despite Trilling's praise of Life Against Death, Brown was an unreliable interpreter of psychoanalysis.[57] The journalist Jerry Hopkins and the music manager Danny Sugerman, writing in No One Here Gets Out Alive (1980), identified Life Against Death as an influence on singer Jim Morrison.[58]

The psychoanalyst Joel Kovel found Life Against Death similar to Eros and Civilization, but considered it less successful.[59]

Evaluations in books, 1982–1991[edit]

The historian Russell Jacoby called Life Against Death one of the boldest efforts to revitalize psychoanalysis, but believed that the work failed to "disturb its theoretical sleep."[60] The psychotherapist Myron Sharaf criticized Brown for misinterpreting Reich, writing that while Brown presents Reich's view as being that the pregenital stages would disappear if full genitality were established, Reich actually believed that society represses both pregenital and genital sexuality, leading to the failure of some persons to reach the genital level and the vulnerability of others to regress to pregenital levels. Reich's view, according to Sharaf, was that given full genital expression, pregenital impulses and conflicts do not disappear but simply lose their significance and their power to disrupt healthy genitality.[61] The critic Edward W. Said wrote that Life Against Death was a vanguard book at the time of its publication.[21] Lasch, in his introduction to the second edition of Life Against Death, described the book as "important and valuable". He considered Brown's chapter on Swift the strongest part of the book, calling it "tough, learned, witty, and inventive". He endorsed Brown's criticism of psychoanalytic critics of Swift such as Huxley and Murry, and suggested that Brown's work was in some ways superior to that of Marcuse. He credited Brown with having grasped the importance of Freud's concept of the death instinct. However, he found Brown's proposed solutions to human problems unconvincing, writing that, "We would do better to see our subjection to time as a source of moral insight as well as a limitation." He argued that Brown sometimes confused Eros with Thanatos, or "simply inverts them", and should have identified Freud's "Nirvana principle" with Thanatos rather than Eros.[62]

The philosopher José Guilherme Merquior, writing in Foucault (1985), compared Life Against Death to Foucault's Madness and Civilization, describing them as similar calls "for the liberation of the Dionysian id." However, he suggested that Foucault probably would not have acknowledged a resemblance between his views and Brown's.[63] The political scientist Jeffrey B. Abramson credited Brown with providing the only account of preambivalence that highlights "the Freudian concept of identification and its significance as a desire to be at one with another person." However, he criticizes Brown for "seeking to achieve a final state of satisfaction that would end the self to be satisfied", a conclusion that he considers "nihilistic" and close to the views of Spinoza. Abramson attempted to follow Brown's reading of Freud, while avoiding Brown's eschatological approach. He grouped Brown's work with Marcuse's Eros and Civilization, Rieff's Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, Paul Ricœur's Freud and Philosophy (1965), and Jürgen Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), arguing that they jointly placed Freud at the center of moral and philosophical inquiry.[64]

The philosopher Roger Scruton, writing in Sexual Desire (1986), criticized Brown, describing his proposals for sexual liberation, like those of Marcuse in Eros and Civilization, as "another expression of the alienation" he condemned and an attempt to "dress up the outlook of the alienated individual in the attributes of virtue."[65] Stephen Frosh found Life Against Death and Eros and Civilization to be among the most important advances towards a psychoanalytic theory of art and culture, although he finds the way these works turn the internal psychological process of repression into a model for social existence as a whole to be disputable.[66] The poet and cultural critic Wayne Koestenbaum criticized Brown for affirming the anus as "a bodily and symbolic zone" while ignoring its connection to sodomy and homosexual desire. Koestenbaum, unlike Brown, believes that to privilege the anus is to "admit the desirability of male homosexual relations."[67] Kovel identified Life Against Death, along with Eros and Civilization, as models for his History and Spirit (1991), noting that he encountered them at a time when his ambitions as a psychoanalyst and his political hopes were in conflict. Kovel believed that Marcuse and Brown's place in history is uncertain, but nevertheless writes that they gave him the hope that psychoanalysis could be turned away from a narrow clinical orthodoxy and toward emancipatory purposes. He saw the main difference between Marcuse and Brown as being that the former remained a historical materialist with a political emphasis, while Brown became an apolitical idealist.[68]

Evaluations in books, 1992–present[edit]

Paglia identified Life Against Death as an influence on her work of literary criticism Sexual Personae (1990), writing that Brown's work, along with that of Allen Ginsberg, Leslie Fiedler, and Harold Bloom, provided her with an alternative to the New Criticism, which she sees as insupportable because of its exclusion of history and psychoanalysis.[69] Paglia believed that in Life Against Death and Love's Body, "the deeply learned and classically trained Brown made an unsurpassed fusion of literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, history, and politics." Paglia credited Brown's books with making a major impact on American culture in the 1960s, writing that along with Arnold Hauser's The Social History of Art (1951) they helped her to see Foucault as foolish. Paglia lamented, however, that, "my generation was condemned to live out what was only imagined by the older Norman O. Brown", noting that the excesses of the 1960s lead many people to disaster.[70]

The critic Diana Trilling, writing in 1993, commented that while Life Against Death was a "central document of the unruly sixties", it was "now little remembered". According to her, Lionel Trilling, though considering Brown's work important, never agreed with Brown's criticisms of traditional moral ideas or advocacy of polymorphous perversity, and their psychoanalyst friends ignored Brown's critique of civilization.[71] Richard Webster, writing in Why Freud Was Wrong (1995), found Life Against Death to resemble the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther (1958) in the similarities it suggests between Lutheran Protestantism and classical psychoanalysis. Though agreeing that there are similarities between the two, he wrote that while Protestants may be comforted by the discovery that the revealed truths perceived by Luther are in harmony with Freud's hypotheses, others may regard such a "congruence of ancient faith and modern reason" with scepticism and "ask to what extent we should regard psychoanalysis not as a scientific approach to human nature but as a disguised continuation of the Judaeo-Christian tradition." Webster described Brown's work, like that of Marcuse, Lacan, and several other modern thinkers, as "a doomed and tragic attempt to reconstruct at the level of the intellect a sensual identity which has been crucified at the level of the spontaneous and vital body."[72]

Brown "issued a powerful challenge to Freud's doctrine that human possibilities were inherently and insurmountably limited. But he did so not by arguing, as earlier critics like Karen Horney and Erich Fromm had done, that the master's theories had been valid only, or mainly, for the particular kind of society in which he himself had lived. Disdaining the cheap relativism of such tactics, Brown set out to show that Freud's pessimistic sense of human possibility did not necessarily follow from his analysis of human nature, an analysis Brown accepted as sound in all essential respects. The brilliance of Life Against Death lay in the amazingly convincing case Brown was able to build for the consistency of that analysis with his own vision of a life of 'polymorphous perversity', a life of play and of complete instinctual and sexual freedom."

Norman Podhoretz, 1999.[73]

The historian Arthur Marwick dismissed Life Against Death as, "a curious ragbag of quotations".[74] Norman Podhoretz wrote that the book became famous partly because Podhoretz recommended it to Trilling, who produced "a favorable review of this central text of the nascent cultural radicalism toward which he was in general antagonistic and which - with Mailer, Brown, and me in mind - he would dryly characterize as 'the Norman invasion.'"[75] The philosopher Todd Dufresne compared Life Against Death to Marcuse's Eros and Civilization and Paul Goodman's Growing Up Absurd (1960) and noted that its sales figures reflected its influence: over fifty-thousand copies had been sold by 1966. Dufresne described the book as idiosyncratic and questionable. He questioned to what extent its readers actually understood the work, suggesting that many student activists might have shared the view of Morris Dickstein, to whom it meant, "not some ontological breakthrough for human nature, but probably just plain fucking, lots of it".[1] The essayist Jay Cantor described Life Against Death and Eros and Civilization as "equally profound".[76]

Brown's view[edit]

"I did feel when writing Love's Body some kind of obligation to undo what I had done in Life Against Death. I wanted to release any followers I had acquired or at least to confuse them. Insofar as Life Against Death happened to end up by making me a leader, I did want to get lost...Thus I felt under some existential stress to write Love's Body in order to torpedo Life Against Death, to destroy it as a position."

Norman O. Brown, 1974.[77]

Brown later expressed dissatisfaction with Life Against Death, referring to its chapter on "Language and Eros" as "quite immature."[78] He observed that the book, "records the first revision of my historical identity, from Marx to Marx and Freud", a process which occurred because his first "historical identity", Marxism, had been "wrecked in the frozen landscapes of the Cold War, the defeat of the simplistic hopes for a better world that inspired the Henry Wallace campaign for the Presidency in 1948." Brown, who saw Louis Zukofsky's poetry as anticipating the ideas of both Life Against Death and Love's Body (1966), has called Life Against Death "my first exuberant surge of premature post-Marxist energy", writing that in it he had wagered his "intellectual life on the idea of finding in Freud what was missing in Marx." Brown "found in Freud's analysis of the pathological dimension of human desires the basis for a post-Marxist critique of capitalism." Commenting on his intellectual development, Brown noted that, "My Marxist background had given me a healthy prejudice against moneymaking. Imagine my excitement when I discovered Sandor Ferenczi's article 'The Ontogenesis of the Interest in Money'; with its immortal conclusion, 'After what has been said money is seen to be nothing other than deodorized, dehydrated shit that has been made to shine.'"[79]

That this shift of Brown's interests toward psychoanalysis led to the writing of Love's Body, which concluded that "there is only poetry", showed, according to Brown, that pursuing the implications of Freud's ideas consistently led to the breakdown of "categories of traditional 'rationality' still accepted as authoritative by both Marx and Freud; that massive breakdown...which Nietzsche baptized with the name of Dionysus." Brown wrote that he now realized that he did not really know what he was saying when he called for "Dionysian consciousness" in the last chapter of Life Against Death. Brown added that it was clear to him in that work "that at that deep level which can only be expressed in myth or metaphor, Freud's 'instinct theory' needed to be remythologized in terms of Dionysus, that is to say in terms of instinctual dialectics rather than instinctual dualism. Or, to use another metaphor, in terms of Heraclitus rather than Empedocles." Brown concluded that the last chapter of Life Against Death was disfigured by the misleading idea that the world could be 'a pastoral scene of peace and pleasure, luxe calme et volupté, Baudelaire's utopian image invoked by Marcuse in Eros and Civilization'."[80]

References[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ a b Dufresne 2000, pp. 111–112.
  2. ^ Dufresne 2000, p. 103.
  3. ^ Dufresne 2000, p. 112.
  4. ^ Brown 2005, p. 34.
  5. ^ Brown 1985, p. xvii.
  6. ^ Brown 1985, p. xix.
  7. ^ Brown 1985, p. xx.
  8. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 147–148.
  9. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 148–149.
  10. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 223–224.
  11. ^ Keen 1974, p. 28.
  12. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 225–226.
  13. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 226–228.
  14. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 228–229.
  15. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 229–230.
  16. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 230–231.
  17. ^ Brown 1985, pp. 6, 14, 47.
  18. ^ Kovel 1970, p. 131.
  19. ^ Kovel 1991, p. 198.
  20. ^ Webster 2005, p. 5.
  21. ^ a b Said 1984, p. 72.
  22. ^ Lasch 1985, p. vii.
  23. ^ Brown 1985, p. 322.
  24. ^ a b Brown 1985, p. iv.
  25. ^ Brown 1970, p. 6.
  26. ^ a b Sontag 1990, pp. ix, 256–262.
  27. ^ Meyer 1960, p. 136.
  28. ^ a b Baritz 1962, pp. 340–343.
  29. ^ a b Merquior 1991, p. 25.
  30. ^ a b Flores 1983, p. 1258.
  31. ^ Wolfe 1991, pp. 29–35.
  32. ^ a b Peck 1996, p. 59.
  33. ^ a b Kimball 1997, pp. 4–9.
  34. ^ a b c Paglia 2000.
  35. ^ a b Scialabba 2009, p. 21.
  36. ^ a b Time 1966, p. 110.
  37. ^ a b Time 1966, pp. 11–12.
  38. ^ Yale - Theatre 1968, pp. 4–5.
  39. ^ The Journal of Analytical Psychology 1959, p. 190.
  40. ^ American Journal of Sociology 1959, pp. 228–232.
  41. ^ The Journal of Social Psychology 1959, pp. 159–162.
  42. ^ The Journal of Social Psychology 1960, pp. 211–214.
  43. ^ Bellah 1971, pp. 119–121.
  44. ^ a b Chodorow 1985, pp. 271–319.
  45. ^ Dyer 1989, pp. 503–510.
  46. ^ a b Beard 1998, p. 161.
  47. ^ a b Shultis 2006, pp. 66–87.
  48. ^ Day 2009, pp. 230–234.
  49. ^ a b Iqbal 2012, pp. 146–150.
  50. ^ a b Dodd 2013, pp. 47–68.
  51. ^ a b Reno 2014, pp. 25–30.
  52. ^ Vaneigem 1994, p. 254.
  53. ^ Becker 1968, p. 282.
  54. ^ Robinson 1990, pp. 148–149, 223, 224, 231–233.
  55. ^ Altman 2012, pp. 108–109.
  56. ^ Hudson 1976, p. 75.
  57. ^ Crews 1975, pp. 22–23.
  58. ^ Hopkins & Sugarman 1995, p. 44.
  59. ^ Kovel 1981, p. 272.
  60. ^ Jacoby 1983, p. 135.
  61. ^ Sharaf 1983, pp. 103, 493.
  62. ^ Lasch 1985, pp. vii–xi.
  63. ^ Merquior 1991, p. 33.
  64. ^ Abramson 1986, pp. ix, 142.
  65. ^ Scruton 1994, pp. 350, 413.
  66. ^ Frosh 1987, pp. 21–22, 150.
  67. ^ Koestenbaum 1989, p. 19.
  68. ^ Kovel 1991, pp. 1, 239.
  69. ^ Paglia 1993, pp. ix, 114.
  70. ^ Paglia 1993, pp. 211–212.
  71. ^ Trilling 1993, pp. 375–376.
  72. ^ Webster 2005, pp. 5, 476.
  73. ^ Podhoretz 1999, p. 199.
  74. ^ Marwick 1998, p. 312.
  75. ^ Podhoretz 1999, p. 75.
  76. ^ Cantor 2009, p. xii.
  77. ^ Brown 1974, p. 33.
  78. ^ Brown 2005, p. 30.
  79. ^ Brown 1991, pp. 158, 170, 171, 179.
  80. ^ Brown 1991, pp. 180, 190.

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