Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, and Christian Suter. Overcoming Global Inequalities Paradigm Publishers, 1. jun. 2014, Chapter 6
KAH, Henry Kam. "Central African Republic. Understanding the Séléka Insurrection of March 24 2013." Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 5, University of Buea, Cameroon, October 2013: pp 47-66. "The presence of South African troops and those of member countries of the Central African union did not deter the Séléka from advancing towards Bangui. In fact, in an attempt to stop the group from advancing on to the capital, South African forces were killed in the process."
^Stretching back to 2007, South African military assistance to the Central African Republic was in direct support of President François Bozizé, to a point where the SANDF provided the president with personal protection (Operation Morero). The SANDF also has a training mission in the Central African Republic (Operation Vimbezela). In January 2013, the SANDF deployed additional 200 troops. The purpose of this deployment is a matter of dispute; while some claim it was to oppose the Séléka that threatened Bozizé's rule, others claim it was solely to protect the training mission. This determines the outcome of the Battle of Bangui; if the aim of the deployment was restricted to the latter, the SANDF achieved its objective, whereas it failed if the objective was to keep Bozizé in power. Regardless of the outcome of the Battle of Bangui, the mission to the CAR as a whole resulted in failure. For further reading: