The material conditional (also known as material implication, material consequence, or simply implication, implies, or conditional) is a logical connective (or a binary operator) that is often symbolized by a forward arrow "→". The material conditional is used to form statements of the form p → q (termed a conditional statement) which is read as "if p then q". Unlike the English construction "if … then …", the material conditional statement p → q does not conventionally specify a causal relationship between p and q; "p is the cause and q is the consequence from it" is not a generally valid interpretation of p → q. It merely means "if p is true then q is also true", such that the statement p → q is false only when p is true and q is false. In a bivalent truth table of p → q, if p is false then p → q is true, regardless of whether q is true or false (Latin phrase: ex falso quodlibet) since (1) p → q is always true as long as q is true, and (2) p → q is true when both p and q are false. This truth table is useful in proving some mathematical theorems (e.g., defining a subset).
The material conditional is also symbolized using:
- p ⊃ q (although this symbol may be used for the superset symbol in set theory);
- p ⇒ q (although this symbol is often used for logical consequence, i.e. logical implication, rather than for material conditional);
- Cpq (using Łukasiewicz notation or Bocheński notation).
With respect to the material conditionals above:
Conditional statements may be nested such that either or both of the antecedent or the consequent may themselves be conditional statements. In the example (p → q) → (r → s), meaning "if the truth of p implies the truth of q, then the truth of r implies the truth of s", both the antecedent and the consequent are conditional statements.
In classical logic, p → q is logically equivalent to ¬(p ∧ ¬q) and, by De Morgan's Law, logically equivalent to ¬p ∨ q. Whereas in minimal logic (and therefore also intuitionistic logic), p → q only logically entails ¬(p ∧ ¬q); and in intuitionistic logic (but not minimal logic), ¬p ∨ q entails p → q.
Logicians have many different views on the nature of material implication and approaches to explain its sense.
As a truth function
The compound p → q is false if and only if p is true and q is false. By the same stroke, p → q is true if and only if either p is false or q is true (or both). The → symbol is a function that uses pairs of truth values of the components p, q (e.g., p is True, q is True ... p is False, q is False) and maps it to the truth values of the compound p → q. The truth value of p → q is a function of the truth values of its components (p, q). Hence, this interpretation is called truth-functional.
The compound p → q is also logically equivalent to ¬p ∨ q (either not p, or q (or both)), and to ¬q → ¬p (if not q then not p). It is, however, not equivalent to ¬p → ¬q, which is instead equivalent to q → p.
As a formal connective
The material conditional can be considered as a symbol of a formal theory, taken as a set of sentences, satisfying all the classical inferences involving →, in particular the following characteristic rules:
Unlike the truth-functional one, this approach to logical connectives permits the examination of structurally identical propositional forms in various logical systems, where somewhat different properties may be demonstrated. For example, in intuitionistic logic, which rejects proofs by contraposition as valid rules of inference, (p → q) ⇒ ¬p ∨ q is not a propositional theorem, but the material conditional is used to define negation.
"It is not the case that given true, won't be true."
"Impossible without ." The word "without" doesn't mean "because of the lack of", but "in absence of the consequent".
When studying logic formally, the material conditional is distinguished from the semantic consequence relation (also known as entailment). By definition, if every interpretation that makes A true also makes B true. However, there is a close relationship between the two in most logics, including classical logic. For example, the following principles hold:
- If then for some . (This is a particular form of the deduction theorem. In words, it says that if Γ models ψ this means that ψ can be deduced just from some subset of the theorems in Γ.)
- The converse of the above
- Both and are monotonic; i.e., if then , and if then for any α, Δ. (In terms of structural rules, this is often referred to as weakening or thinning.)
Other properties of implication (the following expressions are always true, for any logical values of variables):
- Truth preserving: The interpretation under which all variables are assigned a truth value of 'true' produces a truth value of 'true' as a result of material implication.
- Commutativity of antecedents:
Comparison of Boolean truth tables shows that is equivalent to , and one is an equivalent replacement for the other in classical logic. See material implication (rule of inference).
Philosophical problems with material conditional
Outside of mathematics, it is a matter of some controversy as to whether the truth function for material implication provides an adequate treatment of conditional statements in a natural language such as English, i.e., indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals. A counterfactual conditional is a conditional with special morphological marking which conveys that the speaker regards the antecedent as impossible or unlikely. An indicative conditional is a conditional sentence which doesn't bear any such special marking and thus conveys that the speaker regards its antecedent as a live possibility. That is to say, critics argue that in some non-mathematical cases, the truth value of a compound statement, "if p then q", is not adequately determined by the truth values of p and q. Examples of non-truth-functional statements include: "q because p", "p before q" and "it is possible that p".
"[Of] the sixteen possible truth-functions of A and B, material implication is the only serious candidate. First, it is uncontroversial that when A is true and B is false, "If A, B" is false. A basic rule of inference is modus ponens: from "If A, B" and A, we can infer B. If it were possible to have A true, B false and "If A, B" true, this inference would be invalid. Second, it is uncontroversial that "If A, B" is sometimes true when A and B are respectively (true, true), or (false, true), or (false, false)... Non-truth-functional accounts agree that "If A, B" is false when A is true and B is false; and they agree that the conditional is sometimes true for the other three combinations of truth-values for the components; but they deny that the conditional is always true in each of these three cases. Some agree with the truth-functionalist that when A and B are both true, "If A, B" must be true. Some do not, demanding a further relation between the facts that A and that B."
The truth-functional theory of the conditional was integral to Frege's new logic (1879). It was taken up enthusiastically by Russell (who called it "material implication"), Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, and the logical positivists, and it is now found in every logic text. It is the first theory of conditionals which students encounter. Typically, it does not strike students as obviously correct. It is logic's first surprise. Yet, as the textbooks testify, it does a creditable job in many circumstances. And it has many defenders. It is a strikingly simple theory: "If A, B" is false when A is true and B is false. In all other cases, "If A, B" is true. It is thus equivalent to "~(A&~B)" and to "~A or B". "A ⊃ B" has, by stipulation, these truth conditions.
The meaning of the material conditional can sometimes be used in the English "if condition then consequence" construction (a kind of conditional sentence), where condition and consequence are to be filled with English sentences. However, this construction also implies a "reasonable" connection between the condition (protasis) and consequence (apodosis) (see Connexive logic).
The material conditional can yield some unexpected truths when expressed in natural language. For example, any material conditional statement with a false antecedent is true (see vacuous truth). So the statement "if 2 is odd then 2 is even" is true. Similarly, any material conditional with a true consequent is true. So the statement "if I have a penny in my pocket then Paris is in France" is always true, regardless of whether or not there is a penny in my pocket. These problems are known as the paradoxes of material implication, though they are not really paradoxes in the strict sense; that is, they do not elicit logical contradictions. These unexpected truths arise because speakers of English (and other natural languages) are tempted to equivocate between the material conditional and the indicative conditional, or other conditional statements, like the counterfactual conditional and the material biconditional.
It is not surprising that a rigorously defined truth-functional operator does not correspond exactly to all notions of implication or otherwise expressed by "if … then …" sentences in natural languages. For an overview of some of the various analyses (formal and informal) of conditionals, see § References below. Relevance logic attempts to capture these alternate concepts of implication that material implication glosses over.
- "Comprehensive List of Logic Symbols". Math Vault. 2020-04-06. Retrieved 2020-09-03.
- Magnus, P.D (January 6, 2012). "forallx: An Introduction to Formal Logic" (PDF). Creative Commons. p. 25. Retrieved 28 May 2013.
- Weisstein, Eric W. "Implies". mathworld.wolfram.com. Retrieved 2020-09-03.
- Teller, Paul (January 10, 1989). "A Modern Formal Logic Primer: Sentence Logic Volume 1" (PDF). Prentice Hall. p. 54. Retrieved 28 May 2013.
- Clarke, Matthew C. (March 1996). "A Comparison of Techniques for Introducing Material Implication". Cornell University. Retrieved March 4, 2012.
- Counterfactuals are also often called subjunctives though the term is acknowledged as a misnomer when applied to English. English conditionals of this sort do not use subjunctive mood. See Palmer (1986), Dancygier & Sweetswer (1996), Iatridou (2000), Karawani (2014), Romero (2014), Mackay (2015), among others.
- Edgington, Dorothy (2008). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Conditionals". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 ed.).
- Brown, Frank Markham (2003), Boolean Reasoning: The Logic of Boolean Equations, 1st edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA. 2nd edition, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2003.
- Edgington, Dorothy (2001), "Conditionals", in Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell.
- Quine, W.V. (1982), Methods of Logic, (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Stalnaker, Robert, "Indicative Conditionals", Philosophia, 5 (1975): 269–286.