Mug shot after surrender to U.S. forces
|Maximum Leader of the National Liberation|
December 15, 1989 – December 20, 1989
|Preceded by||Office created|
|Succeeded by||Office abolished|
|Military Leader of Panama|
August 12, 1983 – December 20, 1989
|President||Ricardo de la Espriella|
Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino
Eric Arturo Delvalle
Manuel Solís Palma
|Preceded by||Rubén Darío Paredes|
Manuel Noriega Moreno
February 11, 1934
Panama City, Panama
|Died||May 29, 2017 (aged 83)|
Panama City, Panama
|Spouse(s)||Felicidad Sieiro de Noriega (1960–2017; his death)|
|Alma mater||Chorrillos Military School|
School of the Americas
|Branch/service||Panama Defense Forces|
|Years of service||1967–1990|
|Commands||Panama Defense Forces|
|Battles/wars||Invasion of Panama|
Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno (Spanish pronunciation: [maˈnwel noˈɾjeɣa]; February 11, 1934 – May 29, 2017) was a Panamanian politician and military officer who was the de facto ruler of Panama from 1983 to 1989. He had longstanding ties to United States intelligence agencies; however, he was removed from power by the U.S. invasion of Panama.
Born in Panama City to a poor mestizo family, Noriega studied at the Chorrillos Military School in Lima and at the School of the Americas. He became an officer in the Panamanian army, and rose through the ranks in alliance with Omar Torrijos. In 1968, Torrijos overthrew President Arnulfo Arias in a coup, establishing himself as leader; under Torrijos's government, Noriega became chief of military intelligence. After Torrijos's death in 1981, Noriega consolidated his power to become Panama's de facto ruler in 1983. From the 1950s until shortly before the U.S. invasion, Noriega worked with U.S. intelligence agencies. Noriega was one of the Central Intelligence Agency's most valued intelligence sources, as well as one of the primary conduits for illicit weapons, military equipment and cash destined for U.S.-backed forces throughout Latin America. The U.S. also regarded Noriega as an ally in its War on Drugs, despite Noriega himself having amassed a personal fortune through drug trafficking operations. Though his U.S. intelligence handlers were aware of this, it was allowed because of his usefulness to the U.S.
Noriega relied upon military nationalism to maintain his support, and did not espouse a specific social or economic ideology. In 1988, Noriega was indicted by federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa on charges of racketeering, drug smuggling, and money laundering. Following the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, he was captured and flown to the United States, where he was tried on the Miami indictment. The trial, lasting from September 1991 to April 1992, ended with Noriega's conviction on most of the charges. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison, and ultimately served 17 years after a reduction in his sentence and time off for good behavior. Scheduled to be released in 2007, Noriega remained in prison in the U.S. while he appealed a decision to extradite him to France; the appeal was unsuccessful, and Noriega was sent to France in 2010, where he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment for money laundering. In 2011 France extradited him to Panama, where he was incarcerated for crimes committed during his rule. Diagnosed with a brain tumor in March 2017, Noriega suffered complications during surgery, and died two months later.
Noriega's authoritarian rule in Panama has been described as a dictatorship, and was marked by repression of the media, an expansion of the military, and the persecution of political opponents, effectively controlling the outcomes of any elections. He was known for his complicated relationship with the U.S., being described as being its ally and nemesis at the same time. He has been called one of the best-known dictators of his time, and compared to authoritarian rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi and Augusto Pinochet.
Early life and family
Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno was born in Panama City, into a relatively poor mestizo, or mixed-race, family with Native American, African, and Spanish heritage. His year of birth is generally given as 1934, but is a matter of uncertainty. It has been variously recorded as 1934, 1936, and 1938. Noriega himself has provided varying dates of birth. Noriega's mother has been variously described as a cook or a laundress, while his father, Ricaurte Noriega, was an accountant. Neither had a lengthy presence in his life: his mother died of tuberculosis when he was still a child. Noriega was brought up by a godmother in a one-room apartment in the slum area of Terraplén. Authors and journalists have suggested that Noriega was in fact the illegitimate son of his father and his father's domestic worker, whose family name was Moreno.
Noriega was educated first at the Escuela República de México, and later at the Instituto Nacional, a well-regarded high school in Panama City that had produced a number of nationalist political leaders. He was described as an "oddly serious child," a bookish student always neatly dressed by his punctilious godmother. During his time in the Instituto Nacional he met his older brother Luis, a socialist activist and also a student at the school: Manuel had not previously met his siblings. Manuel began living with Luis, who introduced him to politics, including recruiting him into the Socialist Party's youth wing. During his time in the socialist youth group, Noriega took part in protests and authored articles criticizing the U.S. presence in Panama. He is reported to have begun his association with the U.S. intelligence services at this time, providing information about the activities of his comrades. He continued to work with the U.S. intelligence services at various points till the 1980s: a $10.70 payment in 1955 was the first of many payments he would receive from the U.S. for his activities.
Noriega harbored intentions of becoming a doctor, but was unable to secure a place in the University of Panama's medical school. After graduating from the Instituto Nacional, Noriega won a scholarship to Chorrillos Military School in the Peruvian capital of Lima, with the help of Luis, who had by then received a position in the Panamanian embassy in Peru. While in Peru he made the acquaintance of Roberto Díaz Herrera, who later became a close ally.
Noriega married Felicidad Sieiro, whom he had met in the 1960s, and the couple had three daughters: Lorena; Sandra; and Thays. Sieiro had been a school teacher, and Noriega a member of the National Guard. Her family, of Basque heritage, was reported to have been unhappy with the marriage. Noriega was repeatedly unfaithful to his wife, who at one point expressed a desire for a divorce, though she changed her mind later.
National Guard career
Noriega graduated from Chorrillos in 1962 with a specialization in engineering. He returned to Panama and joined the Panama National Guard. Posted to Colón, he was given a commission as a second lieutenant in September 1962. His commanding officer in Colón was Omar Torrijos, then a major in the National Guard. Torrijos became a patron and mentor to Noriega, protecting him when he ran into trouble. In a 1962 incident, according to journalist John Dinges, Torrijos helped Noriega avoid legal problems after a prostitute accused Noriega of beating and raping her. Soon after, Noriega's drinking and violence obliged Torrijos to confine him to his quarters for a month. Despite Noriega's problems, Torrijos maintained their relationship, ensuring they were always in the same command; he also brought Díaz Herrera into the same unit. Díaz Herrera and Noriega became both friends and rivals for Torrijos's favor. In 1966, Noriega was again involved in a violent incident, allegedly raping a 13-year-old girl and beating her brother. After this Torrijos transferred Noriega to a remote posting.
In 1964, prior to some of these incidents, Noriega had been posted to the province of Chiriquí, where Torrijos and Díaz Herrera were stationed. At the time, Arnulfo Arias, a native of that province, was preparing to contest the 1968 Panamanian Presidential election. Arias was a member of the National Revolutionary Party that represented the National Revolutionary Party. The sitting President, Roberto Chiari, belonged to the Liberal Party, which ordered Torrijos to harass Arias's party members and weaken his election bid. Torrijos passed this task on to Noriega, whose men arrested a number of people. Several prisoners said that they had been tortured; others stated they had been raped in prison. The brutality of Noriega's activities led to him being suspended for ten days, an item of information that was picked up by the U.S. intelligence services.
As a second lieutenant in 1966, Noriega spent many months taking courses at the School of the Americas. The school was located at the United States Army's Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. Dinges has suggested that Torrijos sent Noriega to the school to help him "shape up" and live up to Torrijos's expectations. Despite performing poorly in his classes, he received a promotion to first lieutenant in 1966, and Torrijos found him a job as an intelligence officer in the "North Zone" of the National Guard. Shortly afterward he returned to the School of the Americas for more training. During the various times he spent there, Noriega participated in courses on infantry operations, counterintelligence, intelligence, and jungle warfare. He also took a course in psychological operations at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.
Noriega's job required him to penetrate and disrupt the trade unions that had formed in the United Fruit Company's workforce, and he proved adept at this work. His new superior officer Boris Martínez was a fervent anti-communist, and enforced strict discipline on Noriega. Reports have suggested that he continued to pass intelligence to the U.S. during this period, about the plantation workers' activities. In 1967 the administration of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson concluded that Noriega would be a valuable asset, as he was a "rising star" in the Panamanian military. Noriega maintained a close relationship with the School of the Americas as the de facto leader of Panama, partly due to the latter's Panamanian outpost. Officials from the Panamanian military were frequently given courses at the school free of charge. Noriega was proud of his relationship with the school, and wore its crest on his military uniform for the rest of his career.
Rise to power
Arias was elected president in 1968 following a populist campaign. Soon after taking office he launched a purge of the National Guard, sending much of its general staff into "diplomatic exile" or retirement. In response, Torrijos and a few other officers led a coup against him, ousting him after an eleven-day presidency. A power struggle followed between the various forces involved in the coup, and chiefly between Torrijos and Martínez. Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict.
At the end of 1969 Torrijos went to Mexico on holiday. A coup was launched in his absence, in which Noriega's loyalty allowed Torrijos to hang on to power, greatly enhancing Torrijos's image. Torrijos promoted Noriega to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him chief of military intelligence in August 1970: Noriega had gone from being a captain to a lieutenant colonel in just a year and a half, and according to Dinges, had left his undisciplined past behind him. When Arias's supporters launched a guerrilla uprising in his home province, Noriega as the head of intelligence played an important role in putting it down within a year.
Torrijos retained power as a military ruler until 1981: during this time he negotiated the Torrijos–Carter Treaties with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which ensured that control over the Panama Canal would pass to Panama in 1999. These treaties, as well as a new labor code that included maternity leave, collective bargaining rights, and bonus pay, made Torrijos popular in Panama despite the absence of democratic elections. Historian Javier Galván writes that Torrijos's relationship with Noriega was symbiotic; Torrijos provided the political acumen, while Noriega enforced his unpopular decisions with force, when necessary. Noriega would provide intelligence, and carry out covert operations, that were critical to Torrijos successfully negotiating the release of the Panama Canal from the U.S.
Head of intelligence
Noriega proved to be a very capable head of intelligence. In that position, he had 1,300 Panamanians exiled whom he viewed as threats to the government. He also kept files on several officials within the military, the government, and the judiciary, allowing him to blackmail them later. He also held the positions of head of the political police, and head of immigration. His tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders. He was described as doing much of Torrijos "dirty work". For instance, Noriega ordered the death of Hector Gallegos, a priest whose work at an agricultural cooperative was seen as a threat by the government: Gallegos's body is reported to have been thrown from a helicopter into the sea. He also made an effort during this period to portray Panama as a hub of enforcement against drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos.
Dinges wrote that in the early 1970s the U.S. Justice Department had enough evidence to bring an indictment of Noriega on drug charges in a U.S. court, but chose not to do so because of the diplomatic consequences involved. This evidence included the testimony of an arrested boat courier, and of a drug smuggler arrested in New York. Though Torrijos frequently promised the U.S. cooperation in dealing with drug smuggling, Noriega would have headed any effort at enforcement, and the U.S. began to see him as the real problem. Dinges writes that the U.S. government considered several options to move Noriega out of the drug trafficking business, including assassinating him, and linking him to a fictional plot against Torrijos. Though no assassination attempt was made, the other ploys may have been tried in the early 1970s, according to Dinges. Beginning in 1972, however, Dinges writes that the U.S. relaxed its efforts at trapping individuals involved with smuggling within the Panama government, possibly as a result of an agreement between Torrijos and U.S. president Richard Nixon.
During the same period of the early 1970s, Noriega's relationship with the U.S. intelligence services was regularized. He was placed on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while he held his position as head of Panamanian intelligence. The CIA made its first regular payment to him in 1971; he had previously been paid by U.S. intelligence services on a case-by-case basis. The CIA valued him as an asset because he was willing to provide information about the Cuban government, and later about the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. On some occasions, the Panamanian embassy in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, would be used by U.S. intelligence agents. Noriega also served as the U.S. emissary to Cuba during negotiations following the Johnny Express incident. Noriega was given access to CIA contingency funds, which he was supposed to use to improve his intelligence programs, but which he could spend with little accountability. The payments were as high as U.S. $100,000 in some years.
The CIA was aware that Noriega was selling intelligence on the U.S. to Cuba at the same time. Noriega also undertook a number of activities while nominally working for the CIA that served his own ends at the expense of the U.S. government. Journalist Frederick Kempe wrote in 1990 that Noriega had been linked to a series of bombings targeting the U.S. territory in the Panama Canal Zone during the prelude to the U.S. Presidential election in 1976 after the administration of U.S. President Gerald Ford stepped back from negotiations about the Panama Canal. The bombings highlighted to the U.S. government the difficulty of holding on to the Panama Canal Zone in the face of hostility within Panama. Kempe stated that the U.S. knew of Noriega's involvement in the bombings but decided to turn a blind eye toward them. In a December 1976 meeting with George H. W. Bush, then the director of Central Intelligence, Noriega flatly denied involvement, instead suggesting that the CIA was responsible.
During negotiations for the Panama Canal treaties, the U.S. government ordered its military intelligence to wiretap Panamanian officials. Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed the U.S. agents and bought the tapes himself; the incident came to be known as the "Singing Sergeants affair". Although some intelligence officials wanted Bush to prosecute the soldiers involved, he declined to do so, because that would have exposed Noriega's role in the matter. The CIA did not report this incident to either the National Security Agency or the U.S. Justice Department. Noriega and Torrijos later used their knowledge of the U.S. wiretapping operations to tilt the Panama Canal negotiations in their favor. Noriega's drug-related activities came to the U.S. government's attention once again during the ratification process for the Panama Canal treaties, but were once again downplayed by the U.S. intelligence services in order to get the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate.
Death of Torrijos
After the Nicaraguan Revolution was launched against U.S.-backed authoritarian ruler Anastasio Somoza Debayle in August 1978, Torrijos and Noriega initially supported the rebels, providing them with surplus National Guard equipment and allowing Panama to be used as a cover for arms shipments from Cuba to Nicaragua. Torrijos sought for himself the same aura of "democratic respectability" that the Sandinista rebels had in Nicaragua, and so abandoned the title of "Maximum Leader" he had taken in 1972, promising that elections would be held in 1984. Noriega also arranged for weapons purchased in the U.S. to be shipped to the Sandinista forces, a deal on which he made a profit. The U.S. discovered Noriega's role in supplying weapons, and though the episode proved embarrassing to the Carter administration in the U.S., no charges were brought against Noriega because the U.S. did not wish to anger a friendly government, and the issue was rendered moot by the Sandinista victory in 1979. After Somoza's overthrow, Noriega continued to smuggle weapons, selling them to leftist guerrillas fighting the U.S.-backed authoritarian government in El Salvador. After one of these shipments was captured, Torrijos, who had friends in the Salvadoran military government, reprimanded Noriega, though the shipments did not stop altogether.
Torrijos died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. A later investigation by the aircraft manufacturer stated it was an accident; Noriega's authority over the government investigation led to speculation about his involvement. Florencio Flores Aguilar had inherited Torrijos position, but true power lay with the trio of Noriega, Díaz Herrera, and Rubén Darío Paredes, who ranked just below him. Flores was removed in a quiet coup on March 3, 1982, after which Paredes was made leader until 1983 by general agreement, after which the military would work together to ensure his election as the president in the election scheduled for 1984. During this period Noriega became a full colonel and the National Guard's chief of staff, effectively the second-highest rank in the country. He reformed the National Guard as the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and with the financial assistance of the U.S., expanded and modernized it. The quick promotions they received earned him the officer corps' loyalty. Among the steps he took to consolidate his control was to bring the various factions of the army together into the PDF. On August 12, 1983, in keeping with Noriega's earlier deal with Paredes, Paredes handed over his position to Noriega, newly appointed a general, with the understanding that Noriega would allow him to stand for President. However, Paredes never received the political support he expected, and after assuming his new position Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not contest the election. Noriega, now head of the PDF, thus became the de facto ruler of Panama.
De facto rule of Panama
Rather than become president, Noriega preferred to remain behind the scenes, and avoid the public scrutiny that came with the post. He did not have a particular social or economic ideology, and used military nationalism to unify his supporters. The Partido Revolucionario Democrático (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), which had been established by Torrijos and had strong support among military families, was used by Noriega as a political front for the PDF. Noriega compelled the Panamanian National Assembly to pass Law 20, which was supposedly aimed at protecting the Panama Canal from communists, and allowed a huge influx of U.S. weapons to the Panamanian military. The law also tripled the size of the military forces, and gave the National Guard control over immigration, customs, commercial transportation, railroads, and airports. Noriega's period in power saw significant capital flight from Panama; according to Kempe, this was at least in part because wealthy individuals worried their wealth would be seized by Noriega's administration.
Noriega took control of most major newspapers by either buying a controlling stake in them, or by forcing them to shut down. The government also harassed, intimidated, or exiled individual journalists and editors. The newspaper La Prensa, which remained independent and was frequently critical of Noriega, had its staff intimidated and its offices damaged; eventually, it too was forced to close. In May 1984, Noriega allowed the first presidential elections in 16 years. Noriega and Díaz Herrera picked Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino to be the PRD's candidate, with the intention of keeping him under close control. When the initial results showed Arias, who had the support of much of the opposition, on his way to a landslide victory, Noriega halted the count. After brazenly manipulating the results, the government announced that Barletta had won by a slim margin of 1,713 votes. Independent estimates suggested that Arias would have won by as many as 50,000 votes had the election been conducted fairly. More than 60,000 votes were not included in the final count. Noriega's rule became increasingly repressive, even as the U.S. government of Ronald Reagan began relying on him in its covert efforts to undermine Nicaragua's Sandinista government. The U.S. accepted Barletta's election, and signalled a willingness to cooperate with him, despite recognizing the flaws in the election process.
Drug and weapons operations
By the early 1970s, American law enforcement officials had reports of Noriega's possible involvement with narcotics trafficking. No formal criminal investigations were begun, however, with news reports attributing the lack of action to factors including U.S. interest in concluding the Panama Canal treaty, the value of intelligence from Panama, and Panama's support for U.S. foreign policy.
During the early 1980s, civil wars broke out in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. U.S. arms shipments to the area increased dramatically as a result, as did drug smuggling to the U.S., particularly of cocaine. Noriega's involvement with drug smuggling grew as well. Dinges wrote that Noriega frequently received large payments, sometimes as high as $100,000 per shipment, in return for the smugglers receiving immunity from prosecution. A report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency stated that Noriega held firm control over drug-related activities and money laundering through a group of close associates within the military. On June 12, 1986, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published an article in The New York Times describing Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling and money laundering. Hersh recorded a U.S. White House official as saying that reducing Noriega's activities could greatly reduce international drug trafficking.
Many of the operations Noriega benefited from were run by associates such as Floyd Carlton and Cesar Rodríguez. Large sums from drug revenues were brought in from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Noriega received protection payments in these instances as well. American Steven Kalish also began a large scale business selling drugs, laundering money and selling hardware to the Panamanian military for large profits with Noriega's assistance. Dinges writes that in at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to ship a load of marijuana worth U.S. $1.4 million through Panama, for which Noriega had agreed to provide false Panamanian customs stamps to help it avoid scrutiny in the U.S.; Noriega was to be paid $1 million for this exercise. However, beginning in 1984 Noriega appeared to reduce the scale of his operations, and even ordered a raid against a cocaine factory in the interior of Panama, a raid which he then emphasized as evidence of his cooperation with the U.S. in their fight against drugs. He also ordered a crackdown on money laundering by Colombian cartel figures Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela. Noriega's new image was symbolized by his being invited as a speaker in 1985 to Harvard University, for a conference on the role of the military in Central America's wars, a speech which received a lot of attention in Panama's pro-government press.
Noriega began supplying weapons to the M-19 rebel group in Colombia in 1981. On one occasion, the PDF supplied weapons to a small band of M-19 fighters who flew to Panama from Cuba, before an attack on Colombia's west coast. According to some reports, the M-19 also asked Noriega to mediate their negotiations with Colombian drug cartels in February 1982. A 1990 book discussing Noriega's administration stated that he had sold 5,000 Panamanian passports to the Cuban government for use by its intelligence services. Noriega's direct involvement in moving weapons and drugs declined in the early 1980s; instead, he invested in legal businesses, and used these as a cover for money laundering operations, much of which were related to the drug trade. Hersh reported unnamed U.S. officials as saying that Noriega had amassed a personal fortune in European banks as a result of his illegal activities, as well as owning two homes in Panama and one in France.
CIA involvement and U.S. support
Noriega acted as a conduit for U.S. support to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua for many years, including funds and weapons. He allowed the CIA to establish listening posts in Panama, and also helped the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government against the leftist Salvadoran insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. U.S. spy ships used bases in Panama in their operations against the Nicaraguan government, and much of the intelligence gathered by these ships was processed in the U.S. bases in Panama. Noriega permitted these activities despite the Panama Canal treaties restricting the use of the U.S. bases to protecting the canal.
Bush, now US vice president, met again with Noriega in December 1983 to discuss support for the Contras. Noriega had a working relationship with U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North by 1985. Noriega offered to help North assassinate or sabotage Sandinista leaders in return for North helping Noriega improve his image with the U.S. government. In June 1985 North met with Noriega in Panama and Noriega agreed to train Contra soldiers in Panama for an invasion of Nicaragua in 1986. Noriega has been reported to have played a role in the Iran–Contra affair in the mid-1980s, in which the proceeds of arms sales to Iran were smuggled to support the Contras. At Noriega's trial in 1991–1992, the U.S. government stipulated that it had paid $322,000 to Noriega. Journalists and historians have suggested the figure was much higher: Kempe suggested $110,000 annually, while others have posited $200,000 per year. Kempe suggested that the budget provided to Noriega for his intelligence activities totaled $200,000 every year. These payments included $76,039 as "gifts and incentives" from the CIA. CIA director William Webster would nonetheless describe Noriega as an ally in the U.S. government's war on drugs. Officials in the Reagan administration stated that Noriega's drug-related activities had been overlooked because he was an ally of the U.S. in the conflicts in Central America. The U.S. was also concerned that any successor to Noriega would not tolerate the U.S. military's presence within Panama.
A 1988 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations concluded: "The saga of Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega represents one of the most serious foreign policy failures for the United States. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Noriega was able to manipulate U.S. policy toward his country, while skillfully accumulating near-absolute power in Panama. It is clear that each U.S. government agency which had a relationship with Noriega turned a blind eye to his corruption and drug dealing, even as he was emerging as a key player on behalf of the Medellín Cartel (a member of which was notorious Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar)." Noriega was allowed to establish "the hemisphere's first 'narcokleptocracy'". Kempe argued in 1990 that the U.S. provided much of the training that allowed him to seize control of Panama, and called Noriega's relationship with the U.S. a "sordid marriage of convenience".
Murder of Spadafora and aftermath
Hugo Spadafora was a physician and political activist who had first clashed with Noriega when they were both members of Torrijos's government. Though an ally of Torrijos's, he and Noriega had been personal enemies for a long time. Despite not being a member of the opposition, he became a vocal critic of Noriega after returning to Panama from Guatemala in 1981. Spadafora amassed evidence of corruption within the government by using his position as an ally of Torrijos to question Noriega's allies, including Rodriquez and Carlton. This included a lengthy conversation with Carlton in mid-1985 after his drug operations had collapsed due to conflicts over a missing shipment, and he had received negative publicity in the Panamanian press. In September 1985 he accused Noriega of having connections to drug trafficking and announced his intent to expose him. The drug trafficking charges threatened Noriega's support among his own constituency of middle class individuals who had benefited under his and Torrijos's government.
According to writers R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez, on an occasion when Spadafora was traveling by bus from Costa Rica to Panama, witnesses saw him being detained by the PDF after crossing the border. His decapitated body was later found wrapped in a United States Postal Service mail bag showing signs of brutal torture. Noriega was widely believed to be responsible for the murder, and according to Koster and Sánchez, the U.S. had intelligence implicating Noriega. On the day of Spadafora's arrest, the U.S. National Security Agency monitored a telephone conversation between Noriega and Luis Córdoba, the military commander in Chiriquí province where Spadafora was arrested. During the conversation Córdoba told Noriega, "We have the rabid dog." Noriega responded "And what does one do with a dog that has rabies?" Spadafora's murder badly damaged Noriega's image, both within and outside Panama, and was among the reasons for the U.S. beginning to view Noriega as a liability rather than an asset, despite his ongoing support for U.S. interventions elsewhere.
Barletta, who was in New York City when Spadafora was murdered in September 1985, announced his intention to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. Upon his return to Panama, however, he was forced to resign after a confrontation with Noriega. He was replaced by Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle. Barletta was highly regarded in the Reagan administration, and his removal brought a downturn in the relations between the U.S. and Noriega. The U.S. response included reducing economic assistance and pressuring Panama to reform its banking secrecy laws, crack down on narcotics trafficking, investigate the murder of Spadafora, and reduce the PDF's role in the government.
Díaz Herrera considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power during a brief period that Noriega was traveling outside the country, but despite mobilizing some troops, eventually decided against following through with the coup, realizing he could not count on sufficient support. Furthermore, Noriega had made a deal with his deputy, to the effect that he would step down as military leader in 1987 and allow Díaz Herrera to succeed him. In 1987, however, Noriega went back on this agreement, announced he would be heading the military for the next five years, and assigned Díaz Herrera to a diplomatic post. Díaz Herrera retaliated by making public statements accusing Noriega of rigging the 1984 election, murdering Spadafora, and of trafficking in drugs, as well as of assassinating Torrijo with a bomb on his plane. These statements provoked huge protests against Noriega, with 100,000 people, approximately 25% of the population of Panama City, marching in protest on June 26, 1987. Noriega charged Díaz Herrera with treason, and cracked down hard on the protesters. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking Noriega to step down until Díaz Herrera could be tried; in response Noriega sent government workers to protest outside the U.S. embassy, a protest which quickly turned into a riot. As a result, the U.S. suspended all military assistance to Panama, and the CIA stopped paying Noriega a salary. The Senate resolution had the effect of identifying the U.S. with the effort to remove Noriega; Noriega exploited the rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position. Without the support of the U.S., Panama defaulted on its international debt, and that year the country's economy shrunk by 20%. However, though the U.S. considered not recognizing Delvalle as president, the state department decided against it, as it would have amounted to breaking relations with Noriega.
Noriega's relationship with the U.S. deteriorated further during the late 1980s, particularly after the U.S. began to suspect that Noriega was lending his support to other intelligence services and drug-trafficking groups. Hersh wrote in 1986 that U.S. intelligence officials suspected that Noriega was selling intelligence to the Cuban government of Fidel Castro; his report received widespread attention. Bob Woodward published a story about Noriega in The Washington Post soon afterward, going into even greater detail about Noriega's intelligence connections. Woodward and Hersh's reputations made certain that the stories were taken seriously. Spadafora had also informed the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration of some of his findings about Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling. Multiple U.S. agencies continued to investigate Noriega despite opposition from the Reagan administration. In 1988 Noriega was indicted in a U.S. court on charges of drug-trafficking. The indictment accused him of "turning Panama into a shipping platform for South American cocaine that was destined for the U.S., and allowing drug proceeds to be hidden in Panamanian banks." Soon afterward an army colonel and a few soldiers made an attempt to overthrow Noriega; their poorly planned effort was crushed within a day.
The presidential election of May 1989 was marred by fraud and violence. COLINA, a pro-military coalition led by the PRD, named Carlos Duque, a former business partner of Noriega as its candidate. ADOC, an opposition coalition, nominated Guillermo Endara, a member of Arias' Panameñista Party, and two other prominent oppositionists, Ricardo Arias Calderón and Guillermo Ford, as vice-presidential candidates. Anticipating fraud, the opposition tracked ballot counts at local precincts on the day of the election (local ballot counts were done in public). As an exit poll made it clear that the opposition slate was winning by a wide margin, reports of missing tally sheets and seizures of ballot boxes by the PDF soon emerged. In the afternoon of the day after the election, the Catholic bishops conference announced that a quick count of public tallies at polling centers showed the opposition slate winning 3–1. Official tallies the day after that, however, had Duque winning by a 2–1 margin.
Rather than publish the results, Noriega voided the election, claiming that "foreign interference" had tainted the results. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, present in Panama as an observer, denounced Noriega, saying the election had been "stolen", as did Archbishop of Panama Marcos G. McGrath. Noriega had initially planned to declare Duque the winner regardless of the actual result. However, Duque knew he had been badly defeated and refused to go along. The next day, Endara, Arias Calderón, and Ford rolled through the old part of the capital in a triumphant motorcade, only to be intercepted by a detachment of Noriega's paramilitary Dignity Battalions. Arias Calderón was protected by a couple of troops, but Endara and Ford were badly beaten. Images of Ford running to safety with his guayabera shirt covered in blood were broadcast around the world. When the 1984–1989 presidential term expired, Noriega named a longtime associate, Francisco Rodríguez, acting president. The U.S. recognized Endara as the new president. Noriega's decision to void the election results led to another coup attempt against him in October 1989. A number of Noriega's junior officers rose up against him, but the rebellion was easily crushed by the members of the PDF loyal to Noriega. After this attempt, he declared himself the "maximum leader" of the country. The rebels were captured and taken to a military base outside Panama City, where they were tortured and then executed.
U.S. invasion of Panama
In March 1988, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with Noriega seeking his resignation. Panama was represented at these negotiations by Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt. After lengthy and inconclusive talks, the negotiations collapsed a few months later; according to Dinges, Noriega had no intentions of ever resigning. On December 15, 1989, the PRD-dominated legislature spoke of "a state of war" between the United States and Panama. It also declared Noriega "chief executive officer" of the government, formalizing a state of affairs that had existed for six years. The U.S. government stated that Noriega's forces were engaging in routine harassment of U.S. troops and civilians. Three incidents in particular occurred very near the time of the invasion, and were mentioned by Bush as a reason for the invasion. In a December 16 incident, four U.S. personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside PDF headquarters in the El Chorrillo neighborhood of Panama City. The United States Department of Defense said that the servicemen were traveling unarmed in a private vehicle, and that they attempted to flee the scene only after their vehicle was surrounded by a crowd of civilians and PDF troops. Robert Paz of the United States Marine Corps was shot and killed in the incident. An American couple who witnessed the incident were also arrested and harassed by the PDF.
The U.S. launched its invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. Although the killing of the marine was the ostensible reason for the invasion, the operation had been planned for months before his death. The move was the largest military action by the U.S. since the Vietnam War, and included more than 27,000 soldiers, as well as 300 aircraft. The Bush administration considered quicker strategies involving fewer troops, but decided eventually to mount a large invasion to ensure Noriega and all his allies were removed from power.
The invasion began with a bombing campaign that targeted Noriega's private vehicles, and the PDF headquarters located in Panama City. Several slums in the middle of the city were destroyed as a result. The day after the invasion, Noriega's deputy Colonel Luis del Cid retreated with some soldiers to the mountains outside David City, after laying mines in the airport. Though this was part of a contingency plan for the invasion, del Cid quickly decided that the Panamanian military was not in a position to fight a guerrilla war against the U.S., and negotiated a surrender. 23 U.S. soldiers were killed in the operation, including two that were killed by friendly fire; 324 soldiers were injured. Casualties among the Panamanian forces were much higher; between 300 and 845. A large number of civilians were killed in the invasion: the precise figure is a matter of debate. The U.S. government reported between 202 and 250 civilian deaths; Americas Watch estimated 300 civilian deaths; the United Nations estimated 500 civilian deaths and former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark estimated that 3,000 civilians were killed.
On December 29, the United Nations General Assembly voted, 75–20 with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as a "flagrant violation of international law". The invasion was followed by widespread looting, as the Panamanian police stood by; Kempe reported that the looters caused half a billion U.S. dollars in damages, which the U.S. government later helped repair. Overall, the invasion caused U.S. $1.5 billion in property damage. According to a CBS poll, 92% of Panamanian adults supported the U.S. incursion, and 76% wished that U.S. forces had invaded in October during the coup. Activist Barbara Trent disputed this finding, saying in a 1992 Academy Award-winning documentary The Panama Deception that the Panamanian surveys were completed in wealthy, English-speaking neighborhoods in Panama City, among Panamanians most likely to support U.S. actions. Human Rights Watch described the reaction of the civilian population to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".
Noriega received several warnings about the invasion from individuals within his government; though he initially disbelieved them, they grew more frequent as the invasion drew near, eventually convincing Noriega to go on the run. Noriega used a number of subterfuges, including lookalikes and playbacks of his recorded voice, to confuse U.S. surveillance as to his whereabouts. During his flight Noriega reportedly took shelter with several supportive politicians, including Balbina Herrera, the mayor of San Miguelito. The last two days of his flight were spent partly with his ally Jorge Krupnick. Kempe reported that Noriega considered seeking sanctuary in the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies, but both buildings were surrounded by U.S. troops. On the fifth day of the invasion, Noriega and four others took sanctuary in the Apostolic Nunciature, the Holy See's embassy in Panama. Having threatened to flee to the countryside and lead guerrilla warfare if not given refuge, he instead turned over the majority of his weapons, and requested sanctuary from Archbishop José Sebastián Laboa, the papal nuncio.
Prevented by treaty from invading the Holy See's embassy, U.S. soldiers from Delta Force erected a perimeter around the Nunciature. Psychological warfare specialists were brought in to attempt to dislodge Noriega, including blaring rock music, and turning a nearby field into a helicopter landing zone. After ten days, Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. He was detained as a prisoner of war, and later taken to the United States.
Prosecution and imprisonment
Prosecution in the United States
Following his capture Noriega was transferred to a cell in the Miami federal courthouse, where he was arraigned on the ten charges which the Miami grand jury had returned two years earlier. The start of the trial was delayed until September 1991 due to complex legal maneuvering over whether Noriega could be tried after his detention as a prisoner of war, the admissibility of evidence and witnesses, and how to pay for Noriega's legal defense. The trial ended in April 1992, when Noriega was convicted on eight of the ten charges of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering.
In pre-trial proceedings, the government stipulated that Noriega had received $322,000 from the U.S. Army and the CIA. Noriega insisted that he had in fact been paid close to $10,000,000, and that he should be allowed to testify about the work he had done for the U.S. government. The district court held that information about the operations in which Noriega had played a part supposedly in return for payment from the U.S. was not relevant to his defense. It ruled that "the tendency of such evidence to confuse the issues before the jury substantially outweighed any probative value it might have had." One of the witnesses in the trial was Carlton, who had previously flown shipments of drugs for Noriega.
Information about Noriega's connections to the CIA, including his relationship with Oliver North and his alleged contact with Bush, were kept out of the trial. After the trial, Noriega appealed this exclusionary ruling by the judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals ruled in the government's favor, despite disagreeing with the lower court. It said: "Our review leads us to conclude that information regarding the purposes for which the United States previously paid Noriega potentially had some probative value;... Thus, the district court may have overstated the case when it declared evidence of the purposes for which the United States allegedly paid Noriega wholly irrelevant to his defense". The Court of Appeals refused to set aside the verdict because it felt that "the potential probative value of this material, however, was relatively marginal". On July 10, 1992, Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in prison.
Before receiving his permanent prison assignment, Noriega was placed in the Federal Detention Center, Miami. Noriega was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, in an unincorporated area of Dade County, Florida, and had the Federal Bureau of Prisons ID number 38699-079. Under Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, Noriega was considered a prisoner of war, despite his conviction for acts committed prior to his capture by the "detaining power" (the US). This status meant that he had his own prison cell, furnished with electronics and exercise equipment. His cell was nicknamed "the presidential suite".
While Noriega was in prison, he was visited by two evangelical Christian ministers, Clift Brannon and Rudy Hernandez. Noriega saw the two ministers regularly for more than two years, and received weekly religious instruction sessions from them for some time. Noriega was reported to have undergone a full conversion to evangelical Christianity in May 1990, and was baptized in October 1992, while still in prison. Noriega's prison sentence was reduced from 30 years to 17 years for good behavior. After serving 17 years in detention and imprisonment, his sentence ended on September 9, 2007.
Prosecution in France
The French government had requested Noriega's extradition after he was convicted of money laundering in 1999. It stated that Noriega had laundered $3 million in drug proceeds by purchasing luxury apartments in Paris. Noriega was convicted in absentia, but French law required a new trial after the subject of an in absentia sentence was apprehended. He faced up to 10 years in French prison if convicted. France had previously made Noriega a Commandeur of the Légion d'honneur in 1987.
In August 2007, a U.S. federal judge approved the French government's request to extradite Noriega to France after his release. Noriega appealed his extradition because he claimed France would not honor his legal status as a prisoner of war. Though Noriega had been scheduled to be released in 2007, he remained incarcerated while his appeal was pending in court.
On February 20, 2010, Noriega's lawyers filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the United States to block his extradition to France, after the court refused to hear his appeal the previous month. Noriega's attorneys had hoped the dissenting opinion in that ruling, written by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, would convince the full court to take up his case, but on March 22, 2010, the Supreme Court refused to hear the petition. Two days after the refusal, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami lifted the stay that was blocking Noriega's extradition. Later that month Noriega's attorney stated that he would travel to France and try to arrange a deal with the French government.
Noriega was extradited to France on April 26, 2010. Noriega's lawyers claimed the La Santé Prison, at which he was held, was unfit for a man of his age and rank; the French government refused to grant him prisoner of war status, which he had in the United States. On July 7, 2010, Noriega was convicted by the 11th chamber of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris and sentenced to seven years in jail. The prosecutor in the case had sought a ten-year prison term. In addition, the court ordered the seizure of €2.3 million (approximately U.S. $3.6 million) that had long been frozen in Noriega's French bank accounts.
Return, illness, and death
In 1999, the Panamanian government had sought the extradition of Noriega to face murder charges in Panama because he had been found guilty in absentia in 1995 and sentenced to 20 years in prison. After Noriega was imprisoned in France, Panama asked the French government to extradite Noriega so he could face trial for human rights violations in Panama. The French government had previously stated that extradition would not happen before the case in France had run its course. On September 23, 2011, a French court ordered a conditional release for Noriega to be extradited to Panama on October 1, 2011. Noriega was extradited to Panama on December 11, 2011, and incarcerated at El Renacer prison to serve time for crimes committed during his rule.
On February 5, 2012, Noriega was moved to the Hospital Santo Tomás in Panama City because of high blood pressure and a brain hemorrhage. He remained in the hospital for four days before being returned to prison. It was announced on March 21, 2012, that Noriega had been diagnosed with a brain tumor, which was later revealed to have been benign. On January 23, 2017, he was released from prison and placed under house arrest to prepare for surgery that would remove the tumor. On March 7, 2017, he suffered a brain hemorrhage during surgery which left him in a critical condition in the intensive care unit of Santo Tomas hospital.
Noriega died on May 29, 2017, at the age of 83. Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela announced Noriega's death on Twitter shortly before midnight, writing, "The death of Manuel A. Noriega closes a chapter in our history; his daughters and his relatives deserve to bury him in peace." His wife and three daughters were all alive at the time of his death.
Image and legacy
Noriega's authoritarian rule of Panama has been described as a dictatorship, while Noriega himself has been referred to as a "strongman". A 2017 obituary stated that Noriega "was an opportunist who used his close relationship with the United States to boost his own power in Panama and to cover up the illegal activities for which he was eventually convicted." A 2010 article in The Guardian referred to him as the best known dictator of his time, and as "Panama's answer" to Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi". Dinges writes that though Noriega's regime saw a number of murders and crimes, they were similar in scale to those that occurred at the same time under the authoritarian governments of Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador; these governments never saw the level of condemnation from the U.S. that Noriega's did.
After Noriega's death, an article in The Atlantic compared him to Castro and Augusto Pinochet, stating that while Castro had been the nemesis of the U.S., and Pinochet had been its ally, Noriega had managed to be both. It called Noriega the archetype of U.S. intervention in Latin America: "The lawless, vicious leader whom the U.S. cultivated and propped up despite clear and serious flaws." The author stated that although Panama was a freer democracy after Noriega's removal, it was still plagued by corruption and drug trafficking, while Daniel Ortega, whom the U.S. tried to fight with Noriega's help, remained firmly in power in Nicaragua, and argued that this demonstrated the failure of the U.S.'s approach to Latin American interventions. Similarly, authors Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St-Clair stated that despite Noriega's overthrow, Panama's importance in the illegal drug trade continued to grow.
Noriega took great care to shape perceptions of him. He permitted and encouraged rumors that as Panama's chief of intelligence, he was in possession of negative information about everybody in the country. Dinges suggests that the impression among some officials that Noriega made money off of every transaction in the country may have been cultivated by Noriega himself. Among opposition leaders in Panama he was seen variously as a sexual pervert, a sadist, and a rapist. Within U.S. government circles contradictory images abounded; Noriega was seen as a CIA spy, a drug trafficker, a nationalist supporting Torrijos, an ally of Cuba, and an ally of Oliver North and the Contras. He was perceived as a trusted collaborator in the war against drugs, even as the DEA was investigating him for involvement in smuggling. By the time of his removal he had come to be hated in the U.S., and the invasion was portrayed as an attempt to remove an evil man. Dinges writes that these contradictory images played a large role in shaping the U.S. government's self-contradictory policy towards Noriega.
Noriega used the moniker "El Man" to refer to himself, but he was also known by the nickname "Pineapple Face", as a result of pockmarked features left by an illness in his youth. He detested the name, and it would later be the subject of a lawsuit. He lived a lavish lifestyle during his time as the de facto ruler of Panama, and it was described in an obituary as a "libertine life off drug-trade riches, complete with luxurious mansions, cocaine-fueled parties and voluminous collections of antique guns." His bravado during public speeches was remarked upon by commentators; for instance, after his indictment in the U.S., he made a public speech while brandishing a machete, and declaimed "Not one step back!" The attitude of machismo that Noriega adopted has been described as a reaction to the persecution which his brother Luis faced as an openly homosexual man in Panama and Peru. This image contrasted sharply with the impact of a mug shot which was taken of him after his capture, and became a symbol of his fall from power. He was reported to have been a deeply superstitious man, who placed trust in a number of talismans which he carried with him.
In popular culture
British actor Bob Hoskins portrayed Manuel Noriega in the biographical 2000 American television movie Noriega: God's Favorite. The film was described as a "political drama with profound stakes", that was nonetheless depicted with "wild humor". A reviewer wrote that "the hair-raising career of deposed Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega surpassed even the surreal creations of many Latin American novelists, thus making him a natural movie subject". Hoskins was nominated for a Satellite Award for his role in the film. Noriega is mentioned in season 1 episode 5 of the National Geographic documentary Dictators Rulebook.
Noriega was depicted in the video game Call of Duty: Black Ops II. In July 2014, he filed a lawsuit against the game company Activision for depicting him and using his name without his permission. Noriega, who filed the suit while in prison for murder, claimed he was portrayed as "a kidnapper, murderer and enemy of the state". In the game, the fictional character Frank Woods refers to Noriega as "Old Pineapple Face", a nickname originally applied to the President by Panamanians. On October 28, 2014, the case against Activision was dismissed by a judge in California.
Notes and references
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|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Manuel Noriega.|
- The Official Archives of General Manuel Antonio Noriega
- 1989 Report on the situation of human rights in Panama by Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
- My Pen Pal, the story of Sarah York, a girl from a small Michigan town who was a pen pal with Noriega, beginning c. 1988.
Rubén Darío Paredes
| Military Leader of Panama
Guillermo Endara (as President of Panama)